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1983 DIGILAW 332 (MP)

NANNUSINGH NAHARSINGH RAJPUT v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

1983-09-13

M.D.BHATT

body1983
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is the appeal of the eight accused persons viz. Mannusingh, Abhaysingh, Jagdish Singh, Naharua//as Naharsingh, Khushal singh, Karan Singh, Indersingh and Nawal, who on their convictions under sections 147, 429 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code have each been sentenced to respective terms of imprisonment of one year, two years and eight years, with the direction for the concurrent running of these sentences. ( 2. ) VILLAGE Bihar of the district East Nimar comprises of a little over 100 houses, inhabited by Thakurs and also Bhils, belonging to aboriginal tribe. From mid-noon till later afternoon on 15-5-1982; about 41 houses and some thrashing grounds, all mostly of Bhils, were gutted with fire and were destroyed. In this village, not only the household effects and other sundry articles were destroyed but 34 cattle including 23 goats (grown-up as well as younger ones), one bullock and some calves were also roasted to death, and this apart, two bullocks and seven goats were sufficiently burnt and injured (P. W. 17 Dr. Chenana ). All such damage, consequent to the burning of the houses, household effects, grain and cattle was to the tune of about Rs. 1,13,458 00 (Rs. one lac, thirteen thousand, four hundred fifty eight), as assessed by the Police Investigation Agency, vide the detailed list ex. P-4. ( 3. ) THE case of the prosecution, in short, was that all the appellants-accused and one Salim alias Salirauddin, now absconding, just before the alleged incident, started hurling abuses at P. W. 1 Kachru Bhil and others, and then collected at the house of the accused Indersingh and after the firing of some pistol-shots by Salim and the throwing of hand-grenades from the house-top of Indersingh, all emerged from the said house armed with lethal weapons viz. fire-arms, ballam, pharsi etc. and also buckets filled with kerosene oil, and then started on their rampage, burning the houses of the bhils and others,-the first place burnt down was the mandap of P. W. 1 kachru and then the adjoined house of Dagdu; and then further, the houses of the rest of the respective persons, as detailed in the list Ex. P. 4. ( 4. P. 4. ( 4. ) THE appellants-accused Jagdish and Abhaysing were stated to be carrying in turn the buckets full of kerosene oil; and the absconding accused Salim, all along continued, setting fire to the houses, cattle sheds and thrashing grounds, with the help of rag covered wooden sticks (torches) doused with kerosene oil. Rest of the appellants accused, all the while, were brandishing their weapons and threatening the victims with usual filthy abuses, making the victims flee from the village to safer places. The police of P. S. Pipalod, in the meanwhile, was apprised of the incident. Consequently, the police arrived at the scene; and the fire-brigade extinguished the fire with the help of victims and their sympathisers. Some seizures of burnt and damaged articles were made on the spot Fired empty cartridges were also seized from certain places. One fire-arm with cartridges was later recovered and seized from the accused Abhaysingh. Damage was got assessed and the injured cattle were got treated; and after due investigation, all the appellants accused were put up for trial for commission of the very many offences including the ones, of which, they now stand convicted. All the appellants-accused abjured the guilt in the trial Court. ( 5. ) THE appellants-accused Jagdish and Indersingh pleaded alibi and claimed to be at Khandwa proper on the relevant date of the incident. The rest claimed to be falsely implicated. It was specifically contended by them that they were not responsible for the fire in the village. According to them, one Rajendra Singh Thakur, with his band of followers, comprised of Bhils had mobbed the house of Indersingh and hurled stones and brick-bats on the house, had opened fire-shots, had thrown hand-grenades and had finally set fire to the Payga (cattle-shed) of Indersingh, and then to the house of one Nawalsingh and his father Babu. It was urged that this fire and accidentally spread in all neighbourhood, with the result that the particular houses of others also (as detailed in Ex. P-4) had got burnt down, resulting in loss of property and cattle. It was equally contended that Rajendrasingb thakur and his Cohorts had started this mob violence and blazing spree, just in order to pressurize Indersingh for not giving evidence in the Court against Rajendrasingb Thakur and others, who were being tried for murder of Salims father Alimuddin. P-4) had got burnt down, resulting in loss of property and cattle. It was equally contended that Rajendrasingb thakur and his Cohorts had started this mob violence and blazing spree, just in order to pressurize Indersingh for not giving evidence in the Court against Rajendrasingb Thakur and others, who were being tried for murder of Salims father Alimuddin. Only one witness was examined in defence, and that too, for proving the alibi of the accused Indersingh and Jagdish. The trial Court disbelieved the defence version and the defence evidence; and relying on the prosecution evidence, convicted and sentenced the appellant-accused to the extent as stated at the outset. Hence, now, the present appeal. ( 6. ) THE learned counsel for the appellants-accused has vehemently urged that the prosecution evidence in the matter of the commission of the offences in question by the appellants-accused, should actually have been disbelieved by the trial Court, inasmuch as, it has already disbelieved the prosecution story regarding certain material facets of the incident viz. the origin of trouble, firing of the pistol-shots, throwing of band-grenades etc. Material prosecution witnesses are stated to be infirm witnesses and it is urged on the strength of Muluwa and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1976 S C 989. that the evidence of such infirm witnesses does not become reliable merely because the same has been corroborated by a number of witnesses of the same brand. Oral evidence of the material prosecution witnesses is stated to be highly interested and partisan; and as such, unreliable; and more so, for the reason, that there are very many mutual contradictions on certain material aspects of the incident, eg. , as to which of the appellants-accused were carrying buckets full of kerosene oil, and as to which particular accused person was holding which particular weapon. It is equally argued that the mere presence of all the accused persons together, cannot, by itself, inculpate all of them in the particular offences, inasmuch as, there is nothing on record to show that all were actuated with the common object on wreaking vengeance on the members of the rival party by burning their houses and, thus, destroying the property. Finally, it is stated that the appellants-accused are already in jail for some months past, and the sentences of imprisonment as have been awarded against them, are actually quite harsh and severe; and as such, deserve to be suitably reduced. ( 7. ) ON scrutiny of the evidence on record, the arguments advanced are apparently found to be without any merit. Although there is no dispute on the point that large number of houses were burnt down, with household effects completely destroyed, and that, sufficient number of cattle had equally died on being charred and roasted in the ghastly fire, yet this fact is equally found to be clearly proved from the prosecution evidence on record not only of the material prosecution witnesses who are the victims, and eye-witnesses, but also of certain police officers, who had seen the devastation in the village, wrought by the fire in qnestion. Suffice it to say, that the evidence of PWs Kachru, Mangu, Misariya, Sirpat, Jhagya, baiju, Radheshyam, Munshi, Rajendrasingh, Gangusingh, Dr. Chanana and police head constable Shashikant Dube irrefutably proves this fact. It stands established that in the fire, about 41 village-houses and a few thrashing grounds with all household effects were destroyed; and about 34 heads of cattle including 23 goats, 1 bullock and 4 calves were burnt to death and 2 bullocks and 7 goats were badly injured. ( 8. ) NOW comes the material question whether the appellants-accused were responsible for fire in question and for loss of all cattle-lives and property and whether all such destruction had been done by them by forming an unlawful assembly in furtherance of their common object to cause such destruction. From the prosecution evidence, it is, no doubt, clear that PW 12 Rajendrasing on the one hand, and the appellant-accused indersingh and the absconding accused Saleem on the other, were on inimical terms since some time past, inasmuch as, in the prosecution of rajendrasingh and others for murder of Saleems father Alimuddin, the appellant-accused Indersingh was one of the prosecution witnesses. It is also evident from the prosecution evidence itself that since the time of this murder and consequent to the prosecution, both Rajendrasingh and Indersingh had come to have their own rival factions in village. It is also evident from the prosecution evidence itself that since the time of this murder and consequent to the prosecution, both Rajendrasingh and Indersingh had come to have their own rival factions in village. There is, however, no satisfactory and reliable evidence that all those Bhils whose houses are found to be burnt down, belong to Rajendrasinghs party as against the rival one of Indersingh; but even presuming that they did belong, their evidence in the present case cannot, just, be discarded on this sole ground. The law is well settled that even in the matter of partisan or inimical witnesses, one has simply to scrutinize their evidence with abundant caution, to ensure that innocent persons are not unnecessarily roped in (see Mutthu. Nickar v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1978 S C 1647 ). In a faction-ridden society where an occurrence takes place, to reject the entire evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan, is to shut ones eyes to the realities of the rural life in our country. Large number of accused would go unpunished if such an easy course is charted. The law is equally well settled that the principle of falsus in una falsus in omnibus does not apply to criminal trials; and it is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from the chaff instead of rejecting the prosecution case on general grounds. Bhe Ram v. State of Haryana,air 1980 S C 957. ( 9. ) PW I Kachru, PW 2 Ramesh, PW 3 Mangu, PW 6 Misariya, pw7 Sirpat, PW8 Jhagya, PW9 Baiju, P W 10 Radheshyam, PW 11 munshi, P W 12 Rajendrasingh, PW 13 Gangusingh and P W 14 Dama are the victims as well as the eye-witnesses of the fiendish conflagration. It is the quality and not the volume of such evidence which matters for evaluation. These witnesses claim to have seen the incident from different places and at varying stages of the occurrence. It is the quality and not the volume of such evidence which matters for evaluation. These witnesses claim to have seen the incident from different places and at varying stages of the occurrence. Hence, it is but natural to expect that their perceptions would have been seemingly dissimilar and different, at least to some degree, because, what one might see, others may not, besides, in flurry, the victims get too scared; and are actually more worried about their own safety and of their kith and kin, and the security of their hearth and home; and this, circumstance too naturally tends to lead to minor variations and inconsistencies in their averments. What is of essence for balanced and judicious appreciation of evidence is the salient fact that the contradictions and discrepancies are not on such material facets of the incident as may render their evidence wholly unreliable. The evidence of such witnesses could well be partly unreliable and partly true. It is for this reason that the grain has to be scanned from the chaff; and one has to re-assure himself regarding the credibility or otherwise of the material prosecution witnesses No doubt, in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, there are some mutual contradictions, as well as, inconsistencies, when confronted with their earlier police statements (Paras 30 and 32 of PW 1. Para 12 of PW 2, Para 11 of PW 7, Paras 8 and 9 of PW 8, para 22 of PW 12, Para 6 of PW 13 and Paras 18 and 19 of PW 14 and ex. D-l to D-7); but they are all found to be on extremely minor and negligible points. The salient aspects of the incident, as disclosed by these witnesses in their evidence, are, as a matter of fact fully, in keeping with their police statements. The particular portions of these police statements, with which, these witnesses have been confronted, do not go to destroy the credibility of these witnesses nor do they expose those witnesses to be liars. ( 10. ) ARGUMENT of the appellants learned counsel that the trial Court had disbelieved those prosecution witnesses in the matter of the material aspects of the incident, is factually incorrect. Trial Courts Judgment does not disclose in the least that the prosecution witnesses had been disbelieved at all on any salient aspects of the incident. ( 10. ) ARGUMENT of the appellants learned counsel that the trial Court had disbelieved those prosecution witnesses in the matter of the material aspects of the incident, is factually incorrect. Trial Courts Judgment does not disclose in the least that the prosecution witnesses had been disbelieved at all on any salient aspects of the incident. It would be seen that the trial Court has started with the rinding, that the prelude to the horrendous fire, was the hurling of filthy abuses to PW 1 Kachru Bhil by the accused nannusingh,-the brother-in-law of the other accused Indersingh. It was, next, found that the appellants-accused had gone inside Indersingls house, climbed the tin-roof, fired gun-shots, and hurled hand-grenades : the appellants-accused, thereafter, are found to have come out from that house with their respective lethal weapons and then to have set fire to the various houses, -the first one, being that of Kachru and the next, that of Dagdu; and then of the rest, inclose succession. The presence and involvement of all the appellants-accused is also held to be fully proved by the trial Court (see mid-part of Para 15, Para 31, Para 34, mid-part and the last part of Para 35, mid-part of Para 42 and Para 44 of the trial Courts Judgment ). The story regarding the hurling of abuses to Kachru has not actually been held, to be false, but it has, just, been held, for want of support by 6 eye-witnesses to the other three, that the said fact does not stand proved beyond any shadow of doubt (para 10 of the trial Courts Judgment ). Likewise, it has, no doubt, been held that the appellants-accused had climbed the tin-roof of indersinghs house where from shots were fired and hand-grenades were thrown (Para 15 of the trial Courts Judgment), but it was held that from all this intention to kill PW 1 Kachru could not be deduced. Then again, the trial Court is not found to have held, as the appellants learned counsel has tried to suggest, that the appellant-accused did not have any lethal weapons. What the trial Court has held is that the particular fact as to, what particular accused was holding which particular weapon, was not proved beyond any shadow of doubt. Then again, the trial Court is not found to have held, as the appellants learned counsel has tried to suggest, that the appellant-accused did not have any lethal weapons. What the trial Court has held is that the particular fact as to, what particular accused was holding which particular weapon, was not proved beyond any shadow of doubt. And, it was for this reason that due to the discrepancies in the matter of actual weapon, held by each particular-accused, conviction under section 148 Indian Penal Code was not made (Para 45 of the trial Courts Judgment ). Thus, from the trial Courts judgment, it is evident that the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses referred to above, had been implicitly relied on, on the main facets of the incident, inculpating all the appellants accused in the particular offences of which they have been convicted; and the negligible and insignificant details on minor points, were naturally overlooked; and rightly so. ( 11. ) CREDIBILITY of the prosecution witnesses has been tried to be assailed on the premise that some witnesses have stated regarding the accused Jagdish Singh as holding the bucketful of kerosene oil, whereas, others have spoken of Abhayasingh, holding the bucket, and further on the premise, that the evidence of these witnesses is not uniform regarding the exact weapon, held by each of these appellants-accused. The trial Court has already given cogent reasoning for existence of such minor discrepancies and I find myself in full agreement with the same. Since the whole incident of setting fire to various houses had taken quite some time, and since the appellants-accused had moved together in the whole village, from one particular house to the other, it is rational and reasonable to presume that the buckets of kerosene oil might have changed hands and so also the weapons, during the course of the whole episode, according to the convenience and the exigencies. But, this much is certain that the appellants-accused who were moving together, hurling abuses and threats, were all armed : Saleem with a pistol and others with ballams, phersas and lathis. It is absolutely immaterial as to what particular accused was holding what particular weapon. It is also clear that in the group of the appellants-accused, they had with them, the bucketful of kerosene oil. It is absolutely immaterial as to what particular accused was holding what particular weapon. It is also clear that in the group of the appellants-accused, they had with them, the bucketful of kerosene oil. The rag-covered wooden sticks were doused with kerosene oil; and then, Saleem, with the active assistance and collaboration of the present appellants-accused, had been setting fire to the various houses, thrashing grounds etc. Of these witnesses and other village-folk, who are detailed in Ex. P-4. ( 12. ) THERE is, thus, no scope for doubt, on the strength of the fully reliable evidence on the prosecution side that all the appellants-accused and saleem had formed an unlawful as> embly and that they were duly armed with lethal weapons and had made full preparation for setting fire with the help of kerosene oil and the rag-wrapped fire-sticks which they, all along have been carrying with them. All the appellants-accused, thus, are found to be animated with the common object of burning down the houses of these particular Bhils and thus destroying their hearth and home and all their property. It may, here be stated that the defence stand and the defence evidence has been rightly discarded by the trial Court for the elaborate reasons, as given. The plea of alibi of the accused Jagdishsingh and indersingh is rightly held to be concocted. Likewise, the appellants principal defence, as consistently put forth by them during the course of cross-examination of all the material prosecution witnesses and equally so in their examination under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is a manoeuvred concoction, as has already been held by the trial Court. ( 13. ) THERE is also no substance in the basic contention that P. W. 12 rajendrasingh with his band of loyals i. e. some of the prosecution witnesses had initiated aggression by setting fire, at first to the accused Indersinghs payage and later to the houses of Noval and his father Babu,-leading finally to other houses also being just engulfed by this fire, spreading with the gust of summer-wind. Falsity of this defence stand stands exposed from the very circumstance that none of the appellants-accused are found to have lodged any complaint with the police in this regard : nor any positive defence has been led, to establish this plea. Falsity of this defence stand stands exposed from the very circumstance that none of the appellants-accused are found to have lodged any complaint with the police in this regard : nor any positive defence has been led, to establish this plea. Such (a) contention does not emerge, as a reasonable probability even from the trenchant cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. Incidentally, close scrutiny of the site map Ex. P-3 showing the situation of the various houses in the village, reasonably indicates that the houses of Bhils situated in the farthest-corner of the village, could not have come under the sweep of accidental fire, but must have been deliberately put to flames under the foray of the appellants-accused. Thus, the whole incriminating evidence on record leaves no room for doubt, that all these appellants-accused were guilty of the offences in question; and as such, the order of convictions as passed against them, obviously calls for no interference. ( 14. ) NOW comes the question of sentence. Sentences of imprisonment, as awarded by the trial Court, at first glance, no doubt, appear to be quite harsh; but when one considers the ruthless oppression and ravage, committed conceitedly under a well-hatched plan, there is no scope for much remorse and compassion for the appellants-accused. No doubt, human-lives were not lost, but the appellants-accused cannot take credit for this, since the victims themselves had run helter-skelter, and in the nearby jungles, to save themselves and their family. Houses of Bhils were all substantially destroyed, house-hold effects and scanty beddings were reduced to ashes and the cattle, mostly goats and the few bullocks and calves were roasted to death. The whole holocaust was horrendous and ghastly. Victims, Bhils, are found to be reduced to state of acute penury. What satisfaction and consolation can they have, if the appellants-accused are sentenced merely to long imprisonment and to no fine or separate compensation, so as to, recompense them and to relieve them of their misery? It is unfortunate that the trial Court has not considered this aspect of the matter and has totally ignored sub-section (3) of section 357 of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973 as stands amended in this State by M. P. Act no. It is unfortunate that the trial Court has not considered this aspect of the matter and has totally ignored sub-section (3) of section 357 of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973 as stands amended in this State by M. P. Act no. 29 of 1978, whereby, payment of separate compensation to the victims belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes as defined in clauses (24)and (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution has been mandatory. As per the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 (SHO 510 dt. 6-9-1950)as it stands finally amended, Bhils of this particular village are found to be covered under Scheduled Tribes. Anyway, since separate compensation has not been awarded by the trial Court, I consider it, now, just and proper to pass appropriate sentences of imprisonment and also fine, so that out of fine, if realised, reasonable compensation could be paid to the victims in accordance with section 357 (1) (b) of the Code. Accordingly, considering all the facts of the present case, for purposes of sentence, the appeal is partly allowed, only in the matter of sentence. ( 15. ) IN the result, thus, the appeal is partly allowed, only in the matter of respective sentences. Maintaining the convictions of the appellants-accused under sections 147, 429 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code; and setting aside the order of sentences as passed against the appellants-accused, it is ordered instead, that each of the appellants-accused, on their conviction under section 147, Indian Penal Code, be and is sentenced to four months RI and to pay the fine of Rs. 400 (four hundred) each, and in default of fine, to undergo four months RI. The appellants-accused, further on their conviction under section 429 Indian Penal Code, be and are, each, sentenced to one years RI and to pay the fine of Rs. 800 (eight hundred) each, and in default of fine, to further undergo eight months RI. The appellants-accused, on their conviction under section 436 Indian Penal code, be and are now sentenced to three years RI each and also to pay the fine of Rs. 8,000 (eight thousand) each, and in default of fine, to undergo two years RI. 800 (eight hundred) each, and in default of fine, to further undergo eight months RI. The appellants-accused, on their conviction under section 436 Indian Penal code, be and are now sentenced to three years RI each and also to pay the fine of Rs. 8,000 (eight thousand) each, and in default of fine, to undergo two years RI. Out of fine, if realised, following amounts to the respective victims who have suffered loss in respect to their houses, house-hold-effects and cattle, be paid by way of compensation in accordance with section 357 (1) (b) of the Code. (As per assessment Ex. P-4 and the averments of PWs):-###C:\Program Files\Regentdatatech\HTML \judgement_268_mplj_1985_SAURAS0_268_MPLJ_1985.HTM###C:\Program Files\Regentdatatech\HTML\judgement_268_mplj_1985_SAURAS1_268_MPLJ_ 1985.HTM### In case, recovered amount of fine is less, proportionate reduction be made, in compensation to be paid. Substantive sentences of imprisonment, as now awarded against the appellants-accused, shall run concurrently. All the appellants-accused are presently in jail. The learned Sessions Judge, in case of the deposit of the fine amounts, shall ensure by due diligence and vigilance, that the respective amounts of compensation are duly directly paid to the victims concerned. Appeal partly allowed.