JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a Plaintiff's revision from an order dated the 25th July, 1977 of the Court of the Munsif, Ghazipur, refusing to allow them to amend the plaint. This revision was filed in this Court and entertained after the amendment of Section 115 by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1976 and before the substitution of that provision by U.P. Ordinance No. 15 of 1978 followed by U.P. Act No. XXXI of 1978. 2. Thus, apart from the question whether the learned Munsif could be said to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law, or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or to have acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity the question is whether his order refusing to allow amendment of the plaint, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the Plaintiffs. 3. These are the facts. The suit was filed in October, 1960. Relief claimed was for rendition of account, by the Defendants of the income, expenditure and profits of the business at Sarafa and brick kiln and to pass a decree for the recovery of the amount found due in favour of the Plaintiffs against the Defendants. The trial Court passed a preliminary decree for accounting by judgment dated the 31st Jan. 1965. On appeal the Addl. District Judge set aside the decree and remanded the suit for a fresh trial with the direction that the trial court should frame an issue on the question whether the parties were partners or not in the aforesaid business of Sarafa and brick kiln, which was also materially and substantially in issue in Suit No. 15 of 1954, and whether that question stands finally decided and is resjudicata between them. An additional issue was framed in November, 1976 raising the question whether the judgment in Suit No. 15 of 1954 operated as res-judicata with regard to the question of partnership between the parties in the present suit. I may here observe that Suit No. 15 of 1954 appears to have been finally disposed of by the judgment dated the 2nd March, 1971, by a Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 187 of 1960. 4. It is regretable, as it is, that the suit instituted in the year 1960 is still pending in the trial Court. 4. It is regretable, as it is, that the suit instituted in the year 1960 is still pending in the trial Court. While the suit was so pending after remand in the trial Court, the Plaintiffs applied for amendment of the plaint by adding the words "after dissolving the Plaintiffs' partnership" in the relief clause, the effect of which would have been to add the relief of dissolution of partnership between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants as a stepping stone of the Plaintiffs' claim for rendition of accounts by Defendants. 5. The trial Court dismissed the aforesaid application for amendment of the plaint on the following grounds: Firstly, that words 'Khilaf Muddalham' occurred twice in Clause 13 (Ka) of the plaint and the prayer in the amendment application being for addition of the words "Shirakat muddaiyan phishkar ke" after the words 'khilaaf muddalham' the relief claimed would become meaningless and indefinite if the amendment sought was given effect to. Secondly, if the amendment application were allowed, it would change the nature of the suit and necessitate leading of fresh evidence. Thirdly, the proposed amendment would render the Defendants written statement and defence completely ineffective. Fourthly, the amendment would give an undue advantage to the Plaintiffs in as much as the suit for accounting was indirectly based on an admission of dissolution of the partnership, but by the amendment the Plaintiffs wanted indirectly to take advantage of the bar of limitation. 6. The reasons given by the learned Munsif for rejecting the Plaintiffs' amendment application are not very clearly expressed, but the main basis of his order seems to be that the allowing of the amendment of the plaint by adding the relief of dissolution of partnership at this stage would give an unfair advantage to the Plaintiffs agninst Defendants. 7. Having heard learned Counsel and reading the prayer for amendment sensibly as a prayer for insertion of the words "Shirakat muddaiyaan phiskh karke", after the words "khilaaf muddalhum" at the place where the words "Khilaaf muddalhum" occur for the first time in Clause 13 (Ka) of the plaint, it appears to me that the effect of allowing the amendment would be to convert the suit for rendition of accounts of the partnership into a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts. One of the issues raised at the trial was Issue No. 3: Whether the suit is barred by Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act ? The trial court had referred to Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act in its discussion under Issue No. 3, in the judgment dated 31st January, 1975 which was set aside on appeal by the lower appellate Court on 30th November, 1975. That clause provides that a suit "for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, is not barred by the provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69. Either the partnership was already dissolved when the suit was filed or it was not so dissolved. The plaint does not contain any allegation that the alleged partnership was dissolved at anytime before the institution of the suit. If it was not dissolved before the institution of the suit, it required to be dissolved by suit before the Plaintiffs could ask for rendition of accounts by the Defendants. Now, a Court can dissolve a partnership on a suit by a partner on the grounds mentioned in Section 44 of the Indian Partnership Act. Having looked at the plaint I do not find any specification of the grounds, or ground on which the relief of dissolution of partnership, sought to be added by the amendment, could or was proposed to be based. Further, the prayer for addition of the relief for dissolution of partnership pre-supposes the continued existence of a partnership not only on the date of suit, but also on the date on which the application for amendment of the plaint was made. In the absence of any allegation in the plaint of any of the grounds on which dissolution of a partnership could be had u/s 44 of the Partnership Act, it is not possible to say whether there is or there was any cause of action for the claim for dissolution of the partnership, and if so, what was the date of the accrual of that cause of action. Article 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would also show that a suit for an account and share of the profits of a dissolved partnership could be filed only after dissolution. Article 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would also show that a suit for an account and share of the profits of a dissolved partnership could be filed only after dissolution. This is not to say that the relief of dissolution of partnership and accounting may not be combined in the same suit but it does pointedly show that in a suit for rendition of accounts of partnership, the Plaintiffs must make sure before filing the suit whether the partnership already stands dissolved or that he wants a dissolution of the partnership also, and if so, the necessary grounds for the same exist. 8. It is, thus, not a simple case of an innocent addition of a relief accidentally or inadvertantly left out by mistake in the plaint. It is also not a case where the relief of dissolution of the partnership could be granted without any fresh evidence or issues; for, the first question would be whether there is any ground which entitles the Plaintiff to a dissolution of the partnership; and, unless the Plaintiff is satisfied with the answer that there are no such grounds for none are alleged in the plaint, it is wholly wrong to say that fresh issues will not be required to be framed, and fresh evidence will not be required to be led, if the amendment sought were allowed. Thus, the grounds or the reasons given in the amendment application, both of them, are incorrect. Indeed, while allowing the relief of dissolution of a partnership, the Court is required to fix a date of dissolution, and accounts of the partnership business have to be rendered with reference to the date of dissolution of the partnership. If the Plaintiffs were allowed to amend the plaint at the stage at which they applied for it, 17 years after the institution of the suit, and even if they had alleged the necessary grounds, if any, which entitle them to dissolution of the partnership, the Defendants would have been seriously prejudiced by being compelled to share the profits of the business with the Plaintiffs if it has continued and was allowed to be carried on during the pendency of the suit. I say nothing about that because I do not know whether the business has been carried on or has come to a close and as to what are the facts. 9. I say nothing about that because I do not know whether the business has been carried on or has come to a close and as to what are the facts. 9. In the circumstances, I find that it is one of those cases in which the amendment of the plaint was rightly refused. The order refusing the amendment does not occasion any failure of justice or cause any irreparable injury to the Plaintiffs. If there is any defect in the plaint, the Plaintiffs have only themselves to blame for it, and if they feel that the suit is bound to fail on account of some technical defects which they wanted to overcome by the amendment the better course for them to adopt would have been to apply for withdrawal of the suit with permission to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action or partly on the cause of action on which the present suit was based, and partly on a new cause of action provided the law of limitation did not bar it and the Plaintiffs could show that they were acting bonafide and not malafide. 10. The revision is dismissed with costs. 11. The record of the suit was by consent of the parties not sent for in this case. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the trial Court as early as practicable with the direction that it should proceed to dispose of this suit without any further delay and as speedily as possible.