JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---Respondent No. 1 in this petition, hereinafter referred to as "the defendant", is a tenant of a shop forming part of a house bearing Municipal House No. 999 and situated at Sangamner town in Ahmednagar District. The said shop will hereinafter be referred to as the suit premises." The petitioners, hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiffs", filed a suit, being Regular Civil No. 258 of 1971, for possession of the suit premises on the ground that the plaintiffs required the same reasonably and bona fide for their own use and occupation and also on the ground that the defendant was guilty of arrears of rent. In the trial Court the claim on the ground of arrears of rent had been negatived and in the appeal Court the plaintiffs did not press for the decree for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. Therefore, the said ground is being kept out of consideration in this judgment. 2. The learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), of Sangamner, by his judgment and order dated 12th December, 1975. Decreed the suit on the ground available to the landlord under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, hereinafter referred to as "the Bombay Rent Act". The question that arises under section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act, namely the question of comparative hardship, was also decided by the learned trial Judge in favour of the plaintiffs. This decree passed by the learned trial Judge was challenged by the defendant in Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1976 which was heard and allowed by the learned Assistant Judge of Ahmednagar by his judgment and order dated 18th October, 1978. While so allowing the appeal the learned Assistant Judge noticed that in law the first plaintiff, for whom the possession of the suit premises was sought, was not the owner of the suit premises. Nevertheless, he proceeded to consider his case on the assumption that the third plaintiff who was the owner of the suit premises had herself asked for possession of the suit premises. Nevertheless, he proceeded to consider his case on the assumption that the third plaintiff who was the owner of the suit premises had herself asked for possession of the suit premises. Thereafter the learned Assistant Judge came to the conclusion that the suit premises were not reasonably and bona fide required by the plaintiffs for the use and occupation of the first plaintiff and secondly that if a decree for possession were passed it would cause greater hardship to the defendant than the hardship that would be caused to the plaintiff by the refusal to pass a decree. Consistent with these findings the learned Appellate Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit throughout. It is against this decree of the dismissal of the suit passed by the learned Appellate Judge that the plaintiffs have approached this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 3. Before considering the contentions which have been raised on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Abhale, the learned Advocate appearing in support of the petition, it would be appropriate to briefly refer to the material and the findings given on that material by the learned Assistant Judge. The learned Assistant Judge noted that the house of which the suit premises form part was given as gift to the third plaintiff by her maternal uncle and therefore she was the full owner of the same. The partition, under which the suit premises are said to have come to the share of the first plaintiff, could not transfer any right, title or interest in the suit premises to the first plaintiff because what was not joint property could not be partitioned under the law. It has not been shown that at any time the third plaintiff made a gift of the suit premises to the first plaintiff. Moreover, it was also found by the learned Assistant Judge that in the relevant records the suit premises stand in the name of the second plaintiff alone. Considering all this material which was on record it was not difficult for the learned Assistant Judge to say that the first plaintiff was not the owner of the suit premises and, therefore, he could not be the landlord vis-a-vis the defendant. Considering all this material which was on record it was not difficult for the learned Assistant Judge to say that the first plaintiff was not the owner of the suit premises and, therefore, he could not be the landlord vis-a-vis the defendant. However, in paragraph 13 of his judgment the learned Assistant Judge proceeded to mention that assuming for the time being that the third plaintiff were the sole owner of the property, she could demand possession of the suit premises on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement for the first plaintiff. So assuming he considered the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the suit premises for the first plaintiff himself. 4. It was found by the learned Assistant Judge, as it had been found by the Court below that the first plaintiff has secured an agency of an organisation known as Kisan Co-operative Sugar Factory of Niphad. That agency is for the distribution of bread. That the first plaintiff is engaged in the distribution of bread in the town of Sangamner is established on acceptable evidence. It has been so accepted by the two courts below. However, it was noticed by the learned Assistant Judge that the first plaintiff was not distributing bread directly to the consumers but was distributing the same through shopkeepers. In other words, he was acting as a sort of wholesale dealer in bread. It was indeed the case of the first plaintiff himself that in the course of such business, which he was carrying on, the storage of bread for considerable time was necessary and for the purpose he wanted the suit premises. It was not his case, for example, that without the suit premises he could not carry on the business at all. 5. The learned trial Judge accepted the plaintiffs' case made out under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act. The learned Assistant Judge, as a final Court of facts, held that the evidence did not establish that the first plaintiff was in need of the suit premises for the purpose of opening his business. 6. On the question of comparative hardship, the learned Assistant Judge again as a final Court of facts, held as follows :--- "The plaintiff. No. 1 is thus in a position to run the business without the suit premises. No case has been made out and proved that without the suit premises the plaintiff. 6. On the question of comparative hardship, the learned Assistant Judge again as a final Court of facts, held as follows :--- "The plaintiff. No. 1 is thus in a position to run the business without the suit premises. No case has been made out and proved that without the suit premises the plaintiff. No. 1 cannot open a shop and, earn the livelihood to maintain the family of six. Thus it is clear that the plaintiff. No. 1 is in a position to maintain his family without the suit premises. On the other hand if the deft, is made to vacate the suit premises he will lose his only source of income and four families will be made to starve." 7. Mr. Abhale has assailed the finding of the learned Assistant Judge and has contended that there was no warrant for interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the Court of first instance. In support of his contention he relied upon a judgment of Mysore High Court, as it then was, in (Fitter Perra Saheb v. K. Balchandra Rao)1, A.I.R. 1972 Mysore 14. It has been mentioned in this judgment that in ordinary circumstances when the owner says that he requires his premises for his own use and occupation the Court must start with a presumption that the landlord's claim is true. It has been further mentioned that a mere statement of the tenant that the case of the landlord is false is not sufficient to rebut that presumption. I am unable to accept the proposition contained in this judgment. This is contrary to what has been said by the Supreme Court in (M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma)2, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1113, about the approach to be adopted by the courts under the Rent Act. The Supreme Court has observed : "The time honoured notion that the right or re-entry is unfettered and that the owner landlord is the sole Judge of his requirement has been made to yield to the needs of the society which had to enact the Rent Acts specifically devised to curb and fetter the unrestricted right of re-entry and to provide that only on providing some enabling grounds set out in the Rent Act the landlord can re-enter. One such ground is of personal requirement of landlord." 8. One such ground is of personal requirement of landlord." 8. In the present case, as I have already mentioned above, the learned Assistant Judge has held that the house of which the suit premises form a part is not of the ownership of the first plaintiff for whose use and occupation the suit premises are being sought. The third plaintiff who is the owner of the house and, therefore, the landlord of the defendant, could have, as the learned Assistant Judge has said, claimed possession of the suit premises on the ground that the same are required for the use and occupation of her son. But unfortunately in the present case the third plaintiff has not stepped into the witness box nor has she offered to get examined on commission with a view to prove the bona fide requirement of the suit premises. As has been held in (Nanalal Govardhanalal and Co. v. Samrutbai Lilachand Shah)3, 1980 Mh.L.J. 867, the bona fide requirement is in the first place is a state of mind though it may be something more. It must, therefore, be deposed to by the person who is requiring the premises under section 13(1)(g) namely the landlord. If the landlord does not step into the witness-box to bring before the Court legal evidence for proving his requirement, then it cannot be said that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises as mentioned in section 13(1)(g). The landlords can delegate the authority to conduct a case but he cannot delegate the duty to depose. On this ground also the finding given that the landlord's bona fide and reasonable requirement of the suit premises has not been proved, could be sustained. 9. However, I proceed to examine the further criticism which Mr. Abhale has levelled against the judgment of the appellate Judge in so far as that judgment relates to the finding under section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act. According to Mr. Abhale, the Court of appeal should not lightly interfere with the finding given by the Court of first instance on the question of comparative hardship. Abhale has levelled against the judgment of the appellate Judge in so far as that judgment relates to the finding under section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act. According to Mr. Abhale, the Court of appeal should not lightly interfere with the finding given by the Court of first instance on the question of comparative hardship. In support of this proposition he has relied upon the judgment in (Kishinchand Murjimal v. Bai Kalavati Hansraj Dwardadas)4, 74 Bom.L.R. 623, wherein it is mentioned as follows : "It is well settled that an Appeal Court will be ordinarily slow to interfere with the decision of the trial Judge on questions like the balance of hardship, for this is primarily a question of fact. To succeed the appellant must show that the trial Judge misdirected himself on a question of law or that he has based his judgment on some finding of fact on which there was no evidence. If in drawing up the statutory balance-sheet of hardship, there is some evidence of hardship on each side the decision of the trial Judge must be normally final. See Sims. v. Wilson, referred to above." 10. The learned Judge delivering the judgment in Kishanchand Murjimal's case has not referred to any binding judgments on the basis of which it would be said that it is well settled in law that an appeal Court will be ordinarily slow to interfere with the decision of the trial Judge on the question of balance of hardship for this is primarily a question of fact. I have examined (Sims v. Wilson)5, (1946)2 All England Law Reports 261. There the Court of appeal was considering the appeal under the County Courts Act in a proceeding instituted for the possession of the tenanted premises. In the concluding part of the judgment of Morton, L.J., it has been stated as follows :--- "In my view, the decision of the Judge on this question of fact is unassailable. There was evidence upon which he could properly come to the conclusion at which he arrived and I cannot find that any misdirection is established." (emphasis provided.) Reading the said judgment in the light of the provisions of the Country Courts Act, one notices that there was no appeal to the High Court against the order passed by the Country Judge under the Rent Act on a question of fact. In the appeal preferred in these circumstances the Court of appeal could only interfere with a finding if it was the result of a misdirection or the result of erroneous application of law. 11. Under section 29 of the Bombay Rent Act there is no restriction whatsoever on the powers of an appeal Court while deciding the correctness or otherwise of decision given by the Court of first instance. The powers of the appeal Court under section 29 must be deemed to be as wide as the powers of the appeal Court under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such an appeal it is not only permissible but it is the duty of an appeal Court as a final Court of facts to examine every finding given by the Court of first instance, whether that finding is on a question of fact or on a question of law. One cannot see how the Court of appeal could be slow in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the Court of first instance. Where, however, a finding of fact is recorded by the Court of first instance after seeing the witnesses and watching their demeanour, that finding in so far as it depends on the credibility of oral evidence should not be lightly interfered with. The law, however, gives a right of appeal from the judgment of a trial Court on questions of fact as well as on questions of law and the Court of appeal has to make up its own mind after carefully weighing and considering the judgment of that Court, and if, on a full consideration of all the material it is satisfied that the judgment is clearly wrong, it should not shrink from overruling it. See (Ahsanullah v. Ziaudin)6, 39 Bom.L.R. 761 (P.C.) 12. To accept the limited nature of the powers suggested by Kishanchand Murjimal's case is to obliterate the distinction between an appeal and a revision. The Supreme Court has pointed out in (State of Kerala v. K.M.C. Abdulla and Co.)7, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1535 "There is an essential distinction between an appeal and a revision. The distinction is based on differences implicit in the said expressions. An appeal is a continuation of proceedings; in effect the entire proceedings are before the appellate authority and it has power to review the evidence subject to the statutory limitations prescribed. The distinction is based on differences implicit in the said expressions. An appeal is a continuation of proceedings; in effect the entire proceedings are before the appellate authority and it has power to review the evidence subject to the statutory limitations prescribed. But in the case of a revision, whatever powers the revisional authority may or may not have, it has not the power to review the evidence unless the statute expressly confers on it that power. That limitation is implicit in the concept of revision." 13. In (Laxminarayan v. Returning Officer)8, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 66, it was pointed as follows :--- "While the trial Court has not only read the evidence of witnesses on record but has also read their evidence in their faces, looks and demeanour, the appellate Court is confined to their evidence on record. However, the appellate Court may interfere with a finding of fact if the trial Court is shown to have overlooked any material feature in the evidence of a witness or if the balance of probabilities as to the credibility of the witness is inclined against the opinion of the trial Court." An appeal is a creature of statute and the powers and jurisdiction of appellate Court must be circumscribed by words of the statute itself. At the same time a Court of appeal is a 'Court of error" and its normal function is to correct the decision appealed form and its jurisdiction must be co-extensive with that of the trial Court. This has been pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court in (Pandit Bhullan alias Ramshankar Tiwari v. Sarvodaya Vita Kavelu Kumbhar Ram Sahakari Audhogik Utpadak Sanstha, Bina)9, 1978 Mh.L.J. 276. Proceeding further it has been pointed out :--- "It cannot and ought not to do something which the trial Court could not do. An appeal is a proceeding in which the question is whether the order appealed from was right on the material placed before the lower Court. The appellate Court therefore can go into question of fact as well as of law and assess the evidence itself independently." 14. I have cited above only some of the judgments which show unmistakably that where a finding is not depending upon observation of the demeanour of the witnesses it can be subject matter of examination by the final Court of facts independent of what the trial Court has said. I have cited above only some of the judgments which show unmistakably that where a finding is not depending upon observation of the demeanour of the witnesses it can be subject matter of examination by the final Court of facts independent of what the trial Court has said. I do not think that the appeal Court is in law bound by the finding given by the trial Court or is otherwise precluded from examining the correctness of the said finding. Since the observations in Kishinchand Murjimal's case were made on the basis of the judgment in Sims v. Wilson and since I have shown that the said judgment must be confined to the fact of that case, I am of the opinion that there is no warrant for the proposition that in an appeal under section 29 of the Bombay Rent Act the appeal Court should be show to interfere with the decision of the trial Court on the question of balance of hardship. I, therefore, reject the contention of Mr. Abhale that the learned Appellate Judge has committed an error in upsetting the finding given by the Court of first instance on the question of hardship. 15. It was then canvassed by Mr. Abhale that the learned Assistant Judge has without warrant for the same interfered with the finding on the question of comparative hardship. According to him, the learned trial Judge had taken into account all facts and circumstances and had come to the conclusion which was not to be lightly interfered with. I have already extracted that part of the judgment of the learned Assistant Judge wherein he has recorded the finding that greater hardship would be caused to the defendant if a decree for possession were passed than the hardship that would be caused to the plaintiffs if a decree for possession were refused. I do not see how that finding given on the material which was before him, by the learned Assistant Judge can be said to be erroneous in fact or in law. It may be, as Mr. Abhale complains, that the learned Assistant Judge has not explicitly referred to all the material which was there on this question. For example, the learned Assistant Judge has not referred to the fact that the defendant was already in possession of a house in what has been described as Navghar Galli. I have, with Mr. It may be, as Mr. Abhale complains, that the learned Assistant Judge has not explicitly referred to all the material which was there on this question. For example, the learned Assistant Judge has not referred to the fact that the defendant was already in possession of a house in what has been described as Navghar Galli. I have, with Mr. Abhale's assistance gone through the judgment of the trial Court as well as through the judgment of the appeal Court. The learned Assistant Judge was fully justified in not referring to the house which is already in possession of the defendant because that house is essentially residential that is being used by the defendant for residential purpose. The learned trial Judge thought that permission from the landlord could be obtained for constructing a shop in a part of the said residential house. Therefore, the defendant could easily shift from the suit premises to the shop that would be constructed with the possible permission of the landlord. This evidence is so hopelessly unconnected with the availability of alternative accommodation which has to be considered under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act that the learned Assistant Judge rightly turned a Nelson's eye to the same. The finding given by the learned Assistant Judge is a finding based upon the material which was wholly relevant. If this is so, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot disturb the said finding. In (Muni Lal v. Prescribed Authority)10, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 29, it has been pointed out that it is not for the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion which may be different from that reached by the District Judge. 16. Mr. Abhale referred to another judgment of the Supreme Court in (Mehta Parikh and Co. v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax)11, 58 Bom.L.R. 1015 and contended that the finding given by the learned Assistant Judge in the instant case is an erroneous finding. It is impossible for me to subscribe to the view of Mr. 16. Mr. Abhale referred to another judgment of the Supreme Court in (Mehta Parikh and Co. v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax)11, 58 Bom.L.R. 1015 and contended that the finding given by the learned Assistant Judge in the instant case is an erroneous finding. It is impossible for me to subscribe to the view of Mr. Abhale that the view of the facts taken by the learned Assistant Judge in the instant case as such could not be reasonably entertained or it is such that no person acting judicially or properly instructed as to the relevant law would have arrived at No. case, therefore, is made out for interfering with the finding given by the learned Assistant Judge on the question of comparative hardship. In the result, this petition must fail. Rule is accordingly discharged with no order as to costs. -----