Judgement SAHAI, J.:- Faced with piquant situation of having lost title to property, in consequence of decree passed by this Court in first appeal arising out of suit for declaration yet inclusion of the same in determination of assets, under Estate Duty Act petitioner came to this court under Art.226 of the Constitution in 1972 seeking quashing of order passed by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty as far back as 11-12-1962. 2. Before examining this Court should refrain from exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction as petitioner came to this Court after lapse of ten years if is appropriate to narrate the background in which events moved as it shall help not only in resolving controversy on merits but shall assist in deciding the preliminary objection raised by learned Standing Counsel for Commissioner of Income-tax. One Kamal Kishore Mall was the Raja of what was known as Maihauli estate. After his death his widow for brevity Rani, continued in possession over estate till 1937. On her death Balbhadra Mall, grandfather of petitioner, a collateral of Raja entered into possession. In 1940 mother-in-law of Rani filed suit. 41 of 1940, seeking declaration and possession over the property. Another suit was filed by one Pratap Kishore Mall claiming to be adopted son of the Rani. Latter suit however, was dismissed and judgment became final. Suit No. 41 of 1940 was contested by Balbhadra Mall. It was claimed that Majhauli estate was ancient impartiable estate governed by the rule of male lineal primogeniture. The suit was dismissed in 1945. First anneal against this was allowed on 29-1-1971. And we are informed that anneal against this decree has been dismissed by Supreme Court. 3. In between grandfather of petitioner died on 31-7-1955. For determination of estate duty notices u/s.55 of the Estate Duty Act were issued to seven persons. No notice was issued to petitioner. Yet he filed a statement of account in Form No. D-1 on 15-11-1961. It is not clear but it appears after death of petitioners grandfather litigation started between his sons and heirs. And Suit No. 72 of 1958 was filed. The Assistant Controller, Estate Duty, alter perusing plaint of that suit issued a show cause notice to petitioner to which he filed his reply on 30-1-1961. The Assistant Controller. It is not clear but it appears after death of petitioners grandfather litigation started between his sons and heirs. And Suit No. 72 of 1958 was filed. The Assistant Controller, Estate Duty, alter perusing plaint of that suit issued a show cause notice to petitioner to which he filed his reply on 30-1-1961. The Assistant Controller. Estate Duty after examining the claim made by petitioner in the suit of 1958 held him liable to pay estate duty and the principal value of the estate which passed on the death of deceased was determined at Rs. 9.43.348. Appeal against this order was dismissed as barred by time in 1963. In 1964 proceedings for reassessment were initiated u/s.59. It was completed on 26-11-1969. On 27-12-1971 another notice u/s.58 (4)/ 59 was issued by Assistant. Controller of Estate Duty as there was calculation error in order D/-26-11-1969. On 13-1-1972 order u/s.61 was passed. While these proceedings were going on first appeal, as already stated, was decided by this Court in 1971. Aggrieved by orders D/-11-11-1962. 26-11-1969 and 13-1-1972 passed by Assistant Controller. Estate Duty petitioner came to this Court. 4. From what has been stated above it is apparent that assets of Balbhadra Narain Mall. grandfather of petitioner were determined for purposes of Estate Duty on claim made by petitioner in Civil Litigation. Suit No. 72 of 1958 was an off-shoot of Suit No. 41 of 1940. Petitioner was claiming property of his grandfather on strength of decree of Civil Court, in the counter-affidavit it is alleged that Suit No. 41 of 1940 was not dismissed. That is not very relevant as in anneal the decree in favour of Balbhadra Narain Mall was modified. Effect of this under law was that he was not owner of the property or shall not be deemed to have been owner at least from the date the suit for declaration was filed. It is settled that a decree for declaration dates back to the date of suit. Therefore, grandfather of Petitioner was not the owner nor he could be deemed to be owner of those properties at the time of his death in 1955. It was, therefore, not his estate. Under S.4. Estate Duty Act, levy could be made upon principal value of property which passes on death of a person. Therefore, grandfather of Petitioner was not the owner nor he could be deemed to be owner of those properties at the time of his death in 1955. It was, therefore, not his estate. Under S.4. Estate Duty Act, levy could be made upon principal value of property which passes on death of a person. But if the property did not belong to the deceased at time of death it could not form part of his estate. When assessment was made civil suit was pending on the date when order was passed, on basis of claim in Civil Court and decree passed in suit for declaration, probably no exception could be taken. But once the decree was set aside the entire foundation for the order disappeared. The argument of learned standing Counsel based on counter-affidavit that order was passed as desired by petitioner does not, in our opinion, make any difference. Even if petitioner agreed for finalisation of proceedings it would not operate as estoppel or debar, him from challenging the Order if it was wholly without jurisdiction due to change of circumstances or law. 5. Learned Standing Counsel for Commissioner of Income-tax however vehemently argued that petitioner having filed this petition after ten years of the date when assessment Order was passed was guilty of laches and this Court should not issue writ in favour of a person who was not vigilant. He also urged that appeal against assessment order having been dismissed as barred by time and there being no error in that order the petitioner was not entitled to any relief. According to learned Counsel, department being not a party in Civil Suit or in the first appeal allowed by this Court it was not bound by it and the order passed by Assistant Controller Estate Duty cannot be set aside on this ground. 6. Taking up the last objection first the decree in Civil Suit was not collusive or fraudulent. It was fought out tooth and nail up to Supreme Court. It may not be binding on department as it was not party but a judgment on contest is certainly relevant and can be looked into to find out what was decided therein. Not only this determination of Estate Duty proceeded on claim made by petitioner in Civil Suit. No other basis has been mentioned in the order. It may not be binding on department as it was not party but a judgment on contest is certainly relevant and can be looked into to find out what was decided therein. Not only this determination of Estate Duty proceeded on claim made by petitioner in Civil Suit. No other basis has been mentioned in the order. If the basis of claim itself disappeared due to grant of decree in first appeal which arose out of basic suit, which of course gave rise to other suits, then the factual basis on which order proceeded was rendered non-existent. 7. As regards dismissal of appeal as time barred against assessment order it did not result in merger of the order. Apart from it if the primary order against which appeal was dismissed as barred by time is itself found to be erroneous then the order passed in anneal shall not be an obstruction in issuing of writ by this Court. For exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction by this Court there is no time limit. And rightly as it can be determined by Court only if circumstances were such as called for interference. Even where time to initiate any action is provided by statute discretion is, normally, left in the Court or authority deciding the matter to extend time, if it was satisfied that action could not be taken due to bona fide error or mistake. Where no limitation is provided Courts usually refuse to grant indulgence if remedy is not sought within reasonable time. What would be reasonable time is again left to the wisdom of Court or authority. Same principle applies in writ petitions. Refusal to grant relief to a person invoking extraordinary jurisdiction is in Courts discretion. It is not a right of the opposite party. Unlike Limitation Act lapse of time does not vest any right. More so when it is State. Although courts have always insisted that a person aggrieved by an order must not be guilty of laches. But what would amount to laches cannot be described with certainty. In dictionary laches is defined to mean negligence in performance. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary it is described thus : Laches or lasches, is an old French word for slackness or negligence or not doing. As time to file anneal or revision either under Civil P. C. or Cr. But what would amount to laches cannot be described with certainty. In dictionary laches is defined to mean negligence in performance. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary it is described thus : Laches or lasches, is an old French word for slackness or negligence or not doing. As time to file anneal or revision either under Civil P. C. or Cr. P. C. is normally ninety days the same period is adhered to in writ petitions directed against judicial, quasi-judicial or even administrative orders. Not on any rule or law but for uniformity and certainty. Delay of a day, a week or a month may disentitle a person from seeking any relief, on the other hand delay for ten years as in this case, may not amount to negligence or slackness. How to judge it or decide it. There can be no strait-jacket formula except test of reasonable person. If in the given circumstances a prudent and reasonable person should approach this Court and he does not then the Court may refuse to exercise discretion in his favour. In fact it is akin to estoppel by pais. If inaction or slackness results in altering of position or change in circumstances to prejudice then the Court may refuse to interfere. It is on this principle that Courts have refused to interfere in matters of seniority, promotion etc. after inordinate delay. 8. Can it be said that in challenging order D/- 11-12-1962 petitioner did not act reasonably. From facts mentioned above it is clear that after dismissal of Suit No. 41 of 1945 till its setting aside in 1971 there was no occasion for petitioner to assume that property which has devolved on him was not his or its title shall vest in some one else. No cause of action arose nor petitioner could feel aggrieved by order of 11-12-1962 till the first appeal was decided. No reasonable person could have challenged it prior to 1971. Petitioner was willing to pay Estate Duty on the assets which devolved on him. He became aggrieved only when he lost title to it. Then in 1964 re-assessment and thereafter rectification proceedings had been started. From copy of order passed by tribunal filed along with supplementary affidavit it appears re-assessment proceedings have been annulled as no notice was served on petitioner. This order was passed in 1979. He became aggrieved only when he lost title to it. Then in 1964 re-assessment and thereafter rectification proceedings had been started. From copy of order passed by tribunal filed along with supplementary affidavit it appears re-assessment proceedings have been annulled as no notice was served on petitioner. This order was passed in 1979. Can it be said that petitioner was negligent in the circumstances of the case? In our opinion, no remedy under statute may become barred. But constitutional redress does not suffer from this disability. If petitioner is denied relief, it shall result in grave injustice, as he shall have to pay estate duty for property which never devolved on him, thus negativing primary purpose for which Court exists. Nor can the petition be dismissed, as due to lapse of time State did not alter its position to its prejudice. It may arise where due to State action right of third parties may intervene. 9. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. Order D/-11-12-1962 passed by Assistant Controller Estate Duty is quashed. He shall determine principal value of the estate afresh after examining changed circumstances. As Order D/- 26-11-1969 has been set aside by Tribunal it is not necessary to quash it. Nor it is necessary to quash order D/- 13-1-1972 as due to setting aside of order D/- 26-11-1969 it automatically fell through. Petitioner shall be entitled to its costs. Petition allowed.