Judgment 1. This Second Appeal is by the defendants against the judgment of reversal. 2. The plaintiff brought a suit for declaration of his right, title and interest in the suit lands. He also prayed for confirmation of possession over the same and, in the alternative, for recovery of possession. The plaintiff also prayed that the defendants be restrained by permanent injunction from interfering with the possession, of the plaintiff over the suit lands. The suit lands were described in Schedule A of the plaint and they are plot No. 6616, appertaining to khata No. 1884 and area 20 decimals; plot number 6686, appertaining to khata No. 1885 and area 11 decimals and plot No. 6619, appertaining to khata No. 1886 area 21 decimals-all appertaining to tauzi number 4268 and Khewat No. 69. 3. According to the plaintiff, one Chhathu Missir was the proprietor of tauzi No. 4268 under Khewat No. 69 of village Shamsuddinpur Maner Mahal Mohammadpur Painal. Plots Nos. 6616 and 6686 were recorded as raiyati kaiyami land of one Ramnath Mahton. Plot No. 6619 was recorded in the name of one Ramdas Mahto. According to the plaintiff, these lands were under the aforesaid tauzi No. 4268. The plaintiffs case was that Chhathu Missir died and it was Kamla Missir (son of Chhathu Missir) who came in possession of the proprietary interest in the aforesaid tauzi but the same was sold on 18-1-1933 in Execution Case No. 1433 of 1932 in execution of decree passed in S.C. C. Suit No. 2/2 of 1931 brought by one Paudhari Kuer against the said Kamla Missir. According to the plaintiff, the entire tauzi was purchased by the decree-holder (Paudhari Kuer) herself and the same having been comformed, the decree-holder obtained delivery of possession on 2-5-1935 and accordingly, the decree-holder Paudhari Kuer got her name entered is the Register-D also. The sons of aforesaid Kamla Missir subsequently filed one Title Suit being Title, Suit No. 126 of 1946 against Paudhari Kuer for getting the auction sale aside but the said Title Suit was dismissed on 11-9-1948. 4. In the meantime, according to the plaintiff in 1936, Paudhari Kuer had obtained one rent decree against the aforesaid Ram Nath Mahto and Ramdas Mahto and got the suit plots auction sold in Execution Case No. 481 of 1938 and Execution Case No. 1457 of 1937. 4. In the meantime, according to the plaintiff in 1936, Paudhari Kuer had obtained one rent decree against the aforesaid Ram Nath Mahto and Ramdas Mahto and got the suit plots auction sold in Execution Case No. 481 of 1938 and Execution Case No. 1457 of 1937. Thus, according to the plaintiffs, the lands of khata No. 1884 were purchased by the decree-holder Paudhari Kuer and the lands of khata No. 1886 were purchased in auction sale by the plaintiff. They also obtained delivery of possession in respect of the aforesaid purchased lands on 11-1-1939 and 8-2-1939, respectively and the auction-purchasers accordingly, came in possession of the suit lands. The plaintiffs further case is that subsequently in Jeth 1348 Fasli, the plaintiff took oral settlement of the suit lands of khata No. 1884 from Paudhari Kuer on the basis of a receipt and came in possession of the total suit lands. The plaintiff also claimed to have acquired the proprietary interest of Paudhari Kuer in Tauzi No 4268 to the extent of 2 anna 2 p. by two registered sale deeds dated 17-6-1940 and got his name entered in the Register-D. There after, the plaintiff filed Rent Suit No. 1600 of 1956 against the aforesaid Rampath Mahton for realisation of rent of the remaining portion of plot No. 6616 and obtained a decree for the same. Thus, the plaintiff claimed to have been in possession of the suit lands all along. According to the plaintiff, there was interference by the defendants which necessitated the filing of the suit. 5. The suit was contested by the defendants and their case was that before the survey operation of 1910-11, there was a takhata of 25-11 acres of land (including the suit land) falling under tauzi No. 4268. Out of this tauzi No. 4268, subsequently, a separate tauzi was carved out as tauzi No. 2277 and an area of 1-71 acres of land was put in the new carved out tauzi in the new carved out tauzi in the name of one Deobasi Kuer and her mother who were recorded as Darmeyani-bakader. Defendantsfuther case is that after the death of Deobasi Kuer and her mother, new carved out tauzi No. 2277 devolved on Kamla Missir (son of Chhathu Missir) from whom the father of defendant 1 purchased the proprietary interest under registered sale deed dated 15-9-1942 and came in possession of the same. Defendantsfuther case is that after the death of Deobasi Kuer and her mother, new carved out tauzi No. 2277 devolved on Kamla Missir (son of Chhathu Missir) from whom the father of defendant 1 purchased the proprietary interest under registered sale deed dated 15-9-1942 and came in possession of the same. The main plea of the defendants was that the suit land appertained to the new carved out tauzi No. 2277 under Khewat No. 48 and hence no valid title could have passed to the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff who auction purchased tauzi No 4268. The other main plea taken by the defendants was that the original tenants Ram Das Mahton and Ram Nath Mahton sold the suit lands to the father of defendant 1 by two registered sale deeds dt. 14-5-43 and 20-8-43 and he came in possession of the same and after the death of-the father of defendant 1, all the defendants came in possession of the suit lands. The defendants denied the story of settlement as alleged by the plaintiff and pleaded that the plaintiff acquired no interest in the suit land by purchasing a portion of tauzi No. 4268 nor could the plaintiff take advantage of any decree of the rent suit. On these pleas, the defendants pleaded that the suit was fit to be dismissed. 6. The trial Court dismissed the suit and held that the plaintiff had not proved his right, title and interest or even possession over the suit land. It further held that the defendants had proved their continuous possession over the suit lands for more than 12 years. The trial court further held that in any view of the matter, the title over the suit lands must be deemed to have been perfected in favour of the defendants. With these findings, the trial Court dismissed the suit. 7. The plaintiff preferred an appeal before the lower Appellate Court. The Court of Appeal below allowed the appeal and held that the plaintiff had proved his right, title and interest in the suit lands and has been coming in possession of the same since much more than 12 years. It further held that the defendants had completely failed to adduce any reliable evidence of the fact that they ever came in possession of the suit lands. 8. It further held that the defendants had completely failed to adduce any reliable evidence of the fact that they ever came in possession of the suit lands. 8. As I have already stated above that the main plea of the defendants was that the suit lands appertained to the newly carved out tauzi No. 2277 which was a rent free tauzi under khewat No. 48 and the learned lawyer appearing for the defendants-appellants very fairly conceded that, if the suit lands, in fact, fell to the original tauzi No. 4268 under Khewat No. 69 then he cannot succeed, hence the main question was whether the suit lands fell to the tauzi No. 2277 under Khewat No. 48 or they fell under tauzi No. 4268 under Khewat No. 69. The Court of Appeal below categorically, on a detailed consideration of the evidences, both oral and documentary, came to the finding as detailed below: "Considering all the above discussed evidence, it is thus clear that the suit lands fell in tauzi No. 4268 and that no separate tauzi 2277 was ever allotted for the suit land" The Court of Appeal below further held, on the basis of very many documentary evidences, that Paudhari Kuer had become rightful proprietor of the whale tauzi No. 4268 measuring 25.11 acres of land. It further held that the suit plots under Khatas, Nos. 1884 and 1886 fell in tauzi No. 4268 under Khewat No. 69. In order to come to this finding, the Court of Appeal below also considered the defendants exhibit (Exhibit-B) (certified copy of khatiyan) and held that Deobasi Kuer had only limited interest in the suit land. 9. The Court of Appeal below while considering the defendants documents itself, that is Exhibits C and C-1 (the certified copies of Khewat and the oral Khewat, respectively), came to the finding that though the intermediary interest was created in favour of Deobasi Kuer yet the name of Chhathu Missir was mentioned in it as the proprietor of the Darmiyani Hakdar and that this document mentioned that 1.71 acres of land was given to Deobasi Kuer only by way of maintenance and that, it was within the original khewat No. 69. On consideration of various other documentary evidence, it also came to the conclusion that no independent right of ownership was created in favour of Deobasi Kuer outside the original tauzi No. 4268. On consideration of various other documentary evidence, it also came to the conclusion that no independent right of ownership was created in favour of Deobasi Kuer outside the original tauzi No. 4268. It further held that the proprietary interest of tauzi No. 4268 all along remained vested with the original proprietor, namely, Chhathu Missir and his heirs and only a life interest had been created in favour of Parbati Kuer and Deobasi Kuer for maintenance for their lives and, therefore, it was only in that capacity that their names were mentioned in the documents. It further held, on the detailed discussion of various other documentary evidence on the record, that the defendants case that the suit lands fell in tauzi No. 2277 under Khewat No. 48 was not correct. This finding is very clearly based upon the detailed consideration of the evidence, both oral and documentary on the record and, in my opinion, on a proper appraisal of the same. At this stage, it is pertinent to state that the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants, as stated earlier, fairly conceded that if this finding could not be upset by this Court; in that case, the defendants had no case. The Court of Appeal below, on a detailed discussion of oral and documentary evidence on the record, also came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs story of possession over the suit lands could not be disbelieved and held that the plaintiff has been coming in possession of the same since much more than 12 years. With these findings, the Court of Appeal below allowed the appeal preferred by the plaintiff and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The defendants have thus preferred this Second Appeal before this Court. 10. The learned counsel for the defendants-appellants advanced the following submission:- The finding of the Court of Appeal below to the effect that the defendants had failed to prove that the suit lands fell in tauzi No. 2277 under Khewat No. 48 is fit to be interfered with as the Court of Appeal below has misappreciated the three material documentary evidences; viz. Exhibits B, C and C-1. According to the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants, if the suit lands, in fact, fell in the newly carved out tauzi. Exhibits B, C and C-1. According to the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants, if the suit lands, in fact, fell in the newly carved out tauzi. No. 2277 under Khewat No. 48, then the defendants, by the sale deed in their favour (Exhibits F and F-2) executed by the occupancy raiyats Ram Dam Mahton and Ram Nath Mahton, acquired valid title over the suit lands. The other submission advanced by the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants was that the plaintiff did not deny that a new tauzi No. 2277 under Khewat No. 48 was carved out, out of the parent tauzi No. 4268 under Khewat No. 69 and Deobasis name being entered as against 1.71 acres of land in the newly carved out tauzi, it had its own legal effect which the Court of Appeal below has failed to appreciate. Learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that Exhibits B, C and C-1 have not been properly considered specially the legal impact of these documents (though, it may be mentioned that the learned counsel for defendants-appellants has, in fact, referred to these documents for the purpose of consideration of his first submission). 11 The legislature has entrusted a very important duty to the first Appellate Court and it is for that Court to decide finally on a question of fact on which the disposal of the suit may depend but it must appear from the judgment of the lower Appellate Court that it has made honest endeavour to make a proper appraisement of the merits of the case put forward by the parties. It must appear from the judgment itself that the Court of Appeal below has considered the reasonings given by the trial Court as well for coming to the contrary conclusions. In a case of reversal, it is all the more important for the Court of Appeal below to consider the evidence and also reasons of the trial Court and thereafter to come to its own reasons for not agreeing with the finding of the trial Court and there must be sufficient discussion to show that it has applied its own mind on the evidence on the record. It is not always necessary that the Court of Appeal below should deal with each and every reason given by the trial Court or discuss in detail or cover in detail the same ground as has been done by the trial Court. It is enough, if from a perusal of the lower Appellate Courts judgment one comes to the conclusion that the lower Appellate Court has fully and adequately applied its mind to all the relevant materials and evidence in connection with a particular issue and has given its own reasons which set at naught the reasons of the trial Court and if it then reverses the finding of the trial Court, it is a proper discharge of duty. 12. So far as the first submission, as referred to above, advanced by the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants is concerned, in my opinion, there is no force in it. The learned lawyers for the respective parties have taken me through the entire judgment of not only of the Court of Appeal below but also that of the trial Court. The learned counsel for the defendants-appellants has neither drawn my attention to any of the reasons given by the trial Court having not been considered by the lower Appellate Court nor has he argued as such. The Court of Appeal below, when it has categorically held that the documents clearly falsify the case of the defendants that the suit lands fell under tauzi No. 2277, has considered a large number of documentary evidence including the relevant documents of the defendants themselves and on a most proper appraisal of the same, came to this categorical finding. If the suit lands did not fall in tauzi No. 2277 then, as fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the appellants, the defendants had no case. This finding that the suit lands did not fall in tauzi No. 2277 is a finding on a pure question of fact and it can be interfered with only if it were based upon misreading or even mis-appreciation of the documentary evidence on record (as contended by the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants). In my opinion, the learned Court of Appeal below has neither misread any documentary evidence (nor has it been argued as such by the learned lawyer for the defendants-appellants) nor is based upon mis-appreciation of any of the documentary evidence. In my opinion, the learned Court of Appeal below has neither misread any documentary evidence (nor has it been argued as such by the learned lawyer for the defendants-appellants) nor is based upon mis-appreciation of any of the documentary evidence. In my opinion, the reasons given by the Court of Appeal below are very cogent and convincing and, in my opinion, the findings arrived at cannot be said to be unreasonable or perverse. Thus, this finding of the Court of Appeal below, which is a finding on a pure question of fact, cannot be interfered with in the Second Appeal. 13. The learned counsel for the defendants-appellants also submitted that the Exhibits B, C and C-1 were not properly considered by the Court of Appeal below which resulted in wrong finding arrived at by the Court of Appeal below. Learned counsel for the parties took me to those relevant paragraphs of the trial Court judgment and of the lower Appellate Court judgment which deal with Exhibits B C and C-1. The learned counsel for the defendants-appellants has not argued that these documents have not been considered and could not be argued as such. The learned counsel for the defendants-appellants tried to persuade me to accept that the documents Exhibits B, C and C-1 should be understood as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants. I do not feel persuaded to accept his submission. I have considered the discussions made by the Court of Appeal below on these documents that is Exhibits B, C and C-1. In my opinion, the Court of Appeal below has very correctly read these documents and the discussions made on these documents are very convincing and it cannot be said to be either unreasonable or perverse. In my opinion, therefore, there is no misappreciation by the Court of Appeal below of the documents Exhibits B, C and C-1. Thus, this submission advanced by the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants also fails. 14. In my opinion, therefore, there is no misappreciation by the Court of Appeal below of the documents Exhibits B, C and C-1. Thus, this submission advanced by the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants also fails. 14. Learned counsel for the defendants-appellants very strenuously urged that the legal impact i.e., the right of the tenure-holder, in other words, right of the darmiani hakdar, as entered in tauzi No. 2277, has not been considered by the Court of Appeal below and in that view of the matter, the case is fit to be reconsidered as to in fact, what was the legal impact of the entry of the name of darmiani hakdar in the newly carved out tauzi No. 2277 under khewat No. 48. I have already stated above that the two Courts below have concurrently held that the name of Deohasi Kuer entered as darmiani haqdar to the extent of 1.71 acres of land was only for a limited interest and she was only a maintenance-holder. The two Courts below have found as such on the basis of the entry as already made in the document. In this view of the matter, it is not that the Court of Appeal below has not considered the legal implication of entry of the name of darmiani haqdar but it has considered and taken one view which view, in my opinion, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Thus, in my opinion, this submission of the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants also fails. No other contention was raised. 15. In the result, this appeal fails but in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.