Judgment S. Rajagopal, Occupier-cum-Manager, Thandapan Medical Hall, Palani, was convicted by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dindigul, in S. T. C. No 707 of 1976 for offences punishable under section 6(1) read with rule 3 and section 6(1) read with rule 4 of the Factories Act and the sentence to pay a fine of Rs. 200 in default to undergo one month simple imprisonment for each of the offences. Rajagopal preferred an appeal in C. A. No. 145 of 1977 before the learned Sessions Judge, Madurai. The appeal was allowed setting aside the conviction and sentence. Aggrieved by the order of acquittal passed by the lower appellate Court, the State has preferred this appeal against acquittal. 2. The case of the prosecution can be briefly stated as follows: Dhandapani Medical Hall situate at No. 18 Railway Feeder Road, Palani, was inspected by P.W. No. 1 the Inspector of Factories, on 10th August, 1976 at 4-30 p.m. At that time, there were sixteen male and seven female adult workers working. P. W. No. 1 verified from the muster roll that there were 23 workers working daily from 23rd April, J976 to 30th April, 1976 and on 22nd May, 1976 there were 21 workers and on 13th October, 1976 there were 23 workers. He prepared Exhibit P-1 regarding the particulars of the workers and got the attestation of the Manager No. 2 He then prepared Exhibit P-2 the inspection report. No previous permission had been obtained from the Chief Inspector of Factories for the construction of the factory building viz., Thandapani Medical Hall by submitting a detailed plan for the same along with the necessary Court fee stamp. There was also no valid licence obtained for running the factory by submitting the licence application with the necessary Court fee stamp. Hence, as the respondent has committed offences under section 6(1) read with rules 3 and 4 of the Factories Act, 1948 and Tamil Nadu Factories Rules, 1950, a show cause notice was served on the respondent. After getting the necessary sanction, proceedings were started against the respondent. 3. The respondent in his statement under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code, stated that it was true P. W. No. 1 had inspected his premises but his premises was not a ‘factory’ and it does not come within the purview of the Factories Act. Only less than ten persons worked in the premises. 3. The respondent in his statement under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code, stated that it was true P. W. No. 1 had inspected his premises but his premises was not a ‘factory’ and it does not come within the purview of the Factories Act. Only less than ten persons worked in the premises. He examined D.W. No. 1, his Manager, as a defence witness. According to D.W. No. 1, the names 1 to 10 found in Exhibit P-1 are employed in the office. There was no connection between the office and the place where the medicines are prepared. At the place where m2dicines are prepared only fifteen persons worked. The names found from Nos. 13 to 23 in Exhibit P-1 are the workers engaged in preparing medicines. He stated that when there is more work, they were in the habit of recruiting persons on daily wages but permanent workers are only then in number. 4. Accepting the evidence, of P.W. No. 1 and the undisputed facts that there was no prior permission obtained from the Chief Inspector of Factories for constructing the factory building Dhandapani Medical Hall and that there was no valid licence obtained for running the said Medical Hall, the trial Court convicted the respondent. 5. In appeal, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent mainly on two grounds. Firstly, Dhandapani Medical Hill consists of two separate premises, one where the medicines are prepared and the other where the office is situate. The total number of persons working in both the places is 23. Only 15 workers, according to the respondent, worked in the place where the medicines are prepared. Persons working in the Office of the respondent cannot be taken into account along with the workers preparing the medicines to make the entire campus a ‘factory’. As only 15 workers and said to be in one premises preparing the medicines, it cannot attract the provisions of the Factories Act. Secondly, as the concerned premises was built in 1960 and there was no objection so far for the past 16 years, the prosecution under section 6(1) read with rule 3 of the Factories Act is barred by limitation and no prosecution would lie against the respondent. 6. Assailing the order of the learned Sessions Judge, the learned Public Prosecutor contended that both the reasons given for acquittal are erroneous. 6. Assailing the order of the learned Sessions Judge, the learned Public Prosecutor contended that both the reasons given for acquittal are erroneous. Merely because there are two separate sheds in the premises of the factory, each shed should not be viewed independently for determining whether the provisions of the Factories Act would be applicable or not. At the time of inspection by P.W. No. 1, there were 23 persons working inside the factory, 16 directly employed in the manufacturing process and seven others incidental to or in connection with the manufacturing process. As regards the limitation point, he urged that the learned Judge was wrong in holding as the factory building was constructed and was running from 1960, it was barred by limitation. He failed to see the contraventions had come to light only when P.W. No. 1 inspected the factory and even if there is failure by the Inspecting Staff to detect the offence before that could not be a ground for acquittal. P.W. No. 1 detected the offence of contravention of the provisions of the Act and the Rules on 10th September, 1976 and the complaint was filed on 4th December 1976, and there is no bar of limitation under the Act. 7. Mr. G. Gopalaswamy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, contended, before section 6(1) read with rules 3 and 4 could be invoked, it should be proved the premises is a factory within the meaning of Factories Act The evidence of P.W. No. 1 and Exhibit P-1, the details of workers, prove that the premises is not a factory. The names and nature of work found in Exhibit P-1 regarding some, like the Manager, Typist and Accountant, clearly prove that they are not workers. There is nothing to show that the persons mentioned in Exhibit P-1 were doing at that time in the premises. Their duties are not known to us. Merely being employed is different from being a worker. 8. M. Gopalaswamy relied on the decision in Ramamoorthy, In re1, to show that the pro- section has not proved the persons found in the premises are workers within the meaning of the Factories Act and the prosecution evidence is obviously defective. The prosecution is not fail to the respondent as they had not filed the muster roll. 8. M. Gopalaswamy relied on the decision in Ramamoorthy, In re1, to show that the pro- section has not proved the persons found in the premises are workers within the meaning of the Factories Act and the prosecution evidence is obviously defective. The prosecution is not fail to the respondent as they had not filed the muster roll. He also drew my attention to the decision in Government Soap Factory, Bangalore v. Labour Court2 to support his contention that the persons found in the office cannot be said to be workers as they had no connection with any manufacturing process being carried on, to make the concerned premises, a ‘factory’. 9. Section 2(1) of the Factories Act, 1948, defines a ‘worker’ as: “Worker” means a person employed, directly or by or through any agency (including a contractor) with or without the knowledge of a principal employer, whether for remuneration or not in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of them machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process, but does not include any member of the armed forces of the Union.” Section 2(m) (ii) defines ‘factory’ as follows: ““factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on………..” The evidence of P.W. No 1 goes to show that some persons were working in one part of the premises dealing in the preparation of medicines and in the other part some persons were working in the office. If the persons working in both places come within the meaning of ‘worker’ then the premises undoubtedly becomes a ‘factory’. 10. In Abdul Latif v. Karamat Ali3 the Allahabad High Court held a person employed as an Accountant for keeping the factory accounts is a person in work incidental to the manufacturing process. The services of such a person continue after the stoppage of the manufacturing process. Such a person does not cease to be a workman for the purpose of the Factories Act. 11. The services of such a person continue after the stoppage of the manufacturing process. Such a person does not cease to be a workman for the purpose of the Factories Act. 11. In Kadar Mohideer v State4 our High Court held a watchman will be a ‘worker’ within section 2 (1) of the Factories Act, only if he could be brought within the words ‘employed’ in any other kinds of work whatsoever incidental to or connected with the subject of the manufacturing process’, which may take in many categories like packers, movers of the goods, etc, 1 have held, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, even a person employed through the agency of a contractor, with or without the knowledge of the principal employer, is a ‘worker’ in Abu Backer, In re5. 12. On the strength of the above decisions, I am inclined to agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that a ‘worker’ means a person employed directly or through any agency whether for wages or not in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process, and will include persons like Manager, Typist, Physicist, Store-Keeper, Accountant, Assistant Manager within the ambit of the definition of the Act if their work is incidental or connected with the manufacturing process. Whether a person is a ‘worker’ depends on the facts of each case. If the duties discharged actually by a person has got some connection with the concept of manufacturing process, he becomes a ‘worker’, 13. No doubt, Mr. Gopalswamy argued, before a person is branded as a ‘worker’, he should be involved in any work incidental to of connected with the manufacturing process as contemplated by the Act. On the evidence of P.W. No. 1 that when he inspected there were 23 persons working and on the inspection report Exhibit P-2 where it is stated more than 20 persons were working on previous occasions like on 23rd April, 1976, 30th April, 1976 and 22nd May, 1976, I have no hesitation in holding the premises in the instant case is a ‘factory’. 14. 14. The presumption under section 103 of the Factories Act is relied on by the learned Public Prosecutor to show that the persons found by P.W. No. 1 on the relevant date were workers In support of his contention, my attention was drawn to the decision in State of Kerala v. Chacko1 Govinda Menon, J, held that prima facie any person found working in the factory can be taken as a person employed in the factory. The word ‘premises’ in clause (m) of section 2 of the Act according to the learned Judge would include lands as well. This decision is also relied on by the State to prove that even if there are two buildings in the same premises it would still be a ‘factory’. For the same proposition, reliance is placed on the decisions in V.R. Press v. Authority appointed under Payment of Wages Act2 and Ardeshir v. Bombay State3 On the ratio of the above decisions, I am inclined to hold that even if persons are working in two places, it could come under the definition of ‘factory’. It is relevant to note here P. W. No. 1 has categorically stated some product made into powder in one shed was found being sent to the other where they were made into medicines and bottled and packed for being sent for sale. 15. As regards the launching of prosecution after the limitation period, it should be seen that P.W. 1's inspection and the laying of complaint was within time. There is no evidence to show there was a prior inspection of the said premises, much less, the offence of contravention brought to the notice of the concerned authorities. Inspection by P. W. No. 1 was on 10th October, 1976, and the complaint was filed within three months, on 4th December, 1976. There is force in the contention that the prosecution was time barred. 16. Thus, on a consideration of the evidence and the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the order of acquittal cannot be sustained. Even so, 1 am not inclined to interfere with the said order as it is stated by the learned Public Prosecutor that he does not press for anything more than the correction of the erroneous decision of the lower appellate Court. Even so, 1 am not inclined to interfere with the said order as it is stated by the learned Public Prosecutor that he does not press for anything more than the correction of the erroneous decision of the lower appellate Court. Hence, while holding the order of acquittal is wrong for the reasons mentioned above, the appeal against acquittal by the State shall stand dismissed. R.S.R. ----- Order of acquittal wrong but appeal dismissed.