JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) RESPONDENT No. 3 Kunjilal was employed as a bus driver in the M. P. Road Transport Corporation. On 10-1-1970 he was driving a bus of the Corporation on the route Khamaria-Bilaspur. The bus was checked enorute by the Flying Squad of the Corporation and it was evident that respondent No. 3 Kunjilal was driving after he had consumed liquor. Kunjilal is alleged to have then misbehaved with the checking staff. The Mobile Magistrate, Bilaspur convicted Kunjilal on his admission and sentenced him to a fine. ( 2. ) ON 2-6-1970 a charge-sheet, "annexure-A", was issued by the corporation to Kunjilal, respondent No. 3. One of the charges was that he had consumed liquor, while on duty- as driver of the bus and was driving the bus in a state of intoxication which was a major misconduct under clause I2 (l) (f) of the Standard Standing Orders. This fact of having consumed liquor and driving the bus in that state was admitted by Kunjilal. The controversy was only whether it amounted to the alleged misconduct. The Corporation came to the conclusion that the misconduct was evident. The Corporation then terminated Kunjilals service by order "annexure-B" dated 22-1-1971. ( 3. ) KUNJILAL, respondent No. 3, made an application under section 31 (3)of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act challenging the termination of his service. The Labour Court held that the domestic enquiry was invalid The labour Court then proceeded to examine the allegation of misconduct on merits. On merits, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that Kunjilal, while driving the bus, was under influence of liquor, as he himself admitted even in the Labour Court. However, the Labour Court further held that mere consumption of liquor by the bus driver, while on duty, does not amount to misconduct under clause 12 (l) (f) of the Standard Standing Orders. Consequently, the Labour Court directed reinstatement of Kunjilal, respondent No. 3, with half the back-wages by order "annexure-E" dated 31-1-1979. The Corporations revision under section 66 of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act to the Industrial Court has been dismissed by order "annexure-G" dated 21-4-1979. Consequently, the Labour Court directed reinstatement of Kunjilal, respondent No. 3, with half the back-wages by order "annexure-E" dated 31-1-1979. The Corporations revision under section 66 of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act to the Industrial Court has been dismissed by order "annexure-G" dated 21-4-1979. The Industrial Court also has taken the view that driving the bus after consumption of alcoholic drink by itself is not a misconduct falling under clause 12 (l) (f) of the Standard Standing Orders and there being no further evidence that Kunjilal, respondent No. 3, was so drunk as to be incapable of driving, the misconduct alleged, could not be held proved. This has led to this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the Corporation for quashing these orders. ( 4. ) THE only question is whether on the facts admitted and found proved, the misconduct-provided in Clause 12 (l) (f) of the Standard Standing orders is made out or not. In other words, the meaning of Clause 12 (1) (f)is the only question for decision. ( 5. ) CLAUSE 12 (1) (f) of the Standard Standing Orders reads as under :-"12. Disciplinary action for misconduct. (1) The following acts or omissions on the part of an employee shall amount to a major misconduct: *** *** *** (f) drunkenness, riotous or disorderly behaviour, during working hours at the undertaking or conduct endangering the life or safety of any person, intimidation, physical duress, or any act subversive of discipline. " (Emphasis supplied.)The real question, therefore, is whether on the admitted fact that respondent no. 3, Kunjilal, was driving a passenger bus after he had consumed liquor, his state of intoxication being evident, the misconduct provided in the aforesaid Clause 12 (1) (f) was made out. The view taken by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court, which is also reiterated by learned counsel for the respondent No. 3, is that driving the bus after consuming liquor by itself does not amount to misconduct of the driver under Clause 12 (1) (f), unless it is further shown that the driver was so drunk that he was incapable of controlling the motor vehicle while driving it. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the mere fact of driving the bus after having consumed liquor is sufficient to constitute this misconduct and it is not necessary to further show the extent of drunkenness of the driver. ( 6. ) IN my opinion, not only the word "drunkenness", but also the words or conduct endangering the life or safety of any person are significant in the aforesaid Clause 12 (1) (f ). No doubt, drunkenness by itself is sufficient to constitute the misconduct. However, apart from drunkenness, any conduct endangering the life or safety of any person also amounts to the misconduct under Clause 12 (1) (f ). An act of drunkenness may also amount to a conduct endangering the life or safety of any person but even if the act is not sufficient to constitute "drunkenness", it may, in a certain situation, amount to conduct endangering the life or safety of any person. This is true of driving a motor vehicle in a state of intoxication even when the intoxication falls short of drunkenness. "drunkenness", according to the chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, means intoxication : habitual intoxication. "intoxication", according to the same dictionary, means inter alia, state of being drunk : high excitement or elation. According to the Random house Dictionary of the Enlish Language, College Edition, "drunkenness" means inebriated, tipsy, besotted. Thus, according to the dictionary meaning, being merely inebriated or tipsy is sufficient to constitute drunkenness and it is not necessary that the inebriated person should be so drunk as to be incapable of knowing or regulating his actions. That apart, the words conduct endangering the life or safety of any person are sufficient to include within their ambit the conduct of driving a passenger bus, after consuming liquor, even if the driver is not so drunk, as to be totally incapable of controlling himself or his actions. The consumption of even lesser quantity of liquor causes a state of inebriation or exhilaration and to some extent at least impairs the faculties and reflexes. If a person drives a motor vehicle after consuming liquor, he thereby endangers the life or safety of not only the passengers travelling in the vehicle, but also of those who happen to be simultaneously on the road. An intoxicated driver is undoubtedly a serious traffic hazard. If a person drives a motor vehicle after consuming liquor, he thereby endangers the life or safety of not only the passengers travelling in the vehicle, but also of those who happen to be simultaneously on the road. An intoxicated driver is undoubtedly a serious traffic hazard. It is precisely this reason why the driving of a motor vehicle in a state of intoxication has been expressly forbidden by statutory provisions. ( 7. ) THE relevant statutory provision applicable to a bus driver is clause (xix) of sub-Rule (1) of Rule 25 of the M. P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1974, which reads as under :- "25. Conduct and Duties of Drivers of Stage Carriage and Contract carriages other than Motor Cabs.- (1) The driver of a stage carriage or contract carriage, other than a motor cab.-*** *** *** (xix) shall not, while on duty, be in a state of intoxication or in a state in which, by reason of his having taken or used any sedative, narcotic or stimulant drug or preparation, his capacity to drive the vehicle is impaired. " Thus, there is an express prohibition forbidding the driver of a stage carriage, while on duty to be in a state of intoxication or in a state in which by reason of having taken or used any sedative, narotic or stimulant drug or preparation, his capacity to drive the vehicle is impaired. The prohibition is not confined only to that state of intoxication when the capacity to drive the vehicle is totally impaired. It applies to any state of impairment without reference to the degree of impairment. It cannot be doubted that consumption of liquor which makes the state of intoxication evident, as in the present case, is bound to impair the capacity to drive even if the capacity is not totally impaired. This condition, to which also the prohibition applies, is reached much before the state of drunkenness, when the capacity is totally impaired. All that is necessary is a state of intoxication, which impairs, even to the slightest extent, the capacity to drive the motor vehicle. Drunkenness is a subsequent stage of far greater intoxication and that need not be reached for satisfying the prohibition contained in Rule 25 (1) (xix) quoted above. The reason is obvious. All that is necessary is a state of intoxication, which impairs, even to the slightest extent, the capacity to drive the motor vehicle. Drunkenness is a subsequent stage of far greater intoxication and that need not be reached for satisfying the prohibition contained in Rule 25 (1) (xix) quoted above. The reason is obvious. An intoxicated driver of a motor vehicle, and that too a stage carriage, is a serious traffic hazard and too unsafe to be permitted, on a highway. ( 8. ) THE requirement of clause 12 (1) (f) of the Standard Standing Orders is satisfied, even if the conduct of the delinquent is likely to endanger the life or safety of any person, i. e. , even if the danger is reasonably apprehended and not only when the danger is imminent or unavoidable. An act which amounts to a traffic hazard and is forbidden by a statutory provision as a preventive measure, must amount to conduct endangering the life or safety of any person, which is a major misconduct under clause 12 (1) (f) of the Standard Standing Orders. ( 9. ) THE mere fact that drunkenness by itself constitutes misconduct while conduct endangering the life or safety of any person without amounting to drunkenness is also misconduct under clause 12 (l) (f), is sufficient to indicate that the view taken by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court is not based on a correct reading of clause 12 (1) (f) of the Standard Standing orders. In fact, the conclusion reached by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court completely overlooks the remaining part of clause 12 (1) (f), particularly, the words or conduct endangering the life or safety of any person also used therein. ( 10. ) IN my opinion, the admitted fact that respondent No. 3, while on duty, had consumed liquor and in a state of evident intoxication, was driving the stage carriage in which a large number of passengers were travelling, is sufficient to show that his conduct had endangered the life or safety of the passengers as well as others simultaneously on the highway and, therefore, the major misconduct defined in clause 12 (1) (f) of the Standard standing Orders was clearly made out. The contrary conclusion reached by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court, results from a misreading and misconstruction of clause 12 (1) (f) of the Standard Standing Orders and, therefore, there is an error apparent on the face of the record. ( 11. ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent No. 3 contended that as a result of the order passed by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court, the respondent No. 3 has been reinstated and allowing this writ petition would result in he being thrown out of employment. This was urged as a ground for refusing to interfere in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. I am unable to agree with this contention. The traffic hazard involved in permitting such a person to drive a stage carriage is too great and public interest far outweighs his individual interest. It would be in larger public interest to ensure that such a person does not drive a stage carriage. This alone is sufficient to reject this submission. ( 12. ) CONSEQUENTLY, the petition is allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court are quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. The outstanding amount of security be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.