ORDER K.N. Misra, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the judgment and order dated 29-10- 1976 (Annexure-3) passed by Joint Director of Consolidation Faizabad in revision and order dated 25-2-1972 (Annexure-2) passed by Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in appeal in proceedings arising out of case under Section 9-A (2) of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter to be referred as the Act). 2. Briefly stated facts of the case are as follows : The dispute in the present case pertains to land of Khata No. 279 situate in village Jalalpur Sehra, Pargana Minjhaura, District Faizabad, which was entered in the names of petitioners Nos. 1 to 4, namely, Thakur Din, Ram Pher, Mangroo and Ganga Din. Opposite Party No. 3 Bhagelu filed objection under Section 9-A(2) of the Act claiming co-tenancy rights in the said disputed holding to the extent of ?rd share with the allegations that the land in dispute is ancestral joint family property and he is in possession over it to the extent of his share. A compromise was filed by the parties before the Assistant Consolidation Officer on 15-11-1970 wherein claim of opposite party No. 3, with regard to ?rd share in 14 plots of the disputed holding, which were of the time of common ancestor Parautan, was admitted by the petitioners and pursuant to the said compromise the Assistant Consolidation Officer passed orders on 15-11-1970 ordering that the name of opposite party No. 3 be recorded as co-tenure-holder to the extent of ?rd share in the said plots of the disputed holding. Against the said order Ganga Din, petitioner No. 4, filed an appeal asserting that he was not party to the said compromise, nor had he put in his thumb-impression on it. Petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 did not join in the said appeal. The appeal was contested by opposite party no. 3 Bhagelu who asserted that the parties had entered into compromise which was filed and duly verified by them before two members of the Consolidation Committee. The appellant was also party to the said Compromise and he had put in his thumb- impression on it. The appeal was contested by opposite party no. 3 Bhagelu who asserted that the parties had entered into compromise which was filed and duly verified by them before two members of the Consolidation Committee. The appellant was also party to the said Compromise and he had put in his thumb- impression on it. The said appeal was, however, allowed by the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) vide order dated 30-4-1971 on the ground that the Assistant Consolidation Officer had not recorded the said compromise in his own hand, as was required to be done under rules, while deciding the case in conciliation proceedings. The said order was, therefore, set aside on this ground and the case was remanded to the Consolidation Officer for disposal on merits. After remand, the petitioners contested the case asserting that Bhagelu is not the son of Shiv Charan, but he was son of Datai. They also asserted that the land in dispute was neither ancestral nor joint family property and the opposite party No. 3 has no concern with it nor he is in possession over it. They asserted that the land in dispute was acquired by Kali, son of Shiv Charan, and it was not recorded in his name in representative capacity. The consolidation officer, after taking evidence of the parties, dismissed the objection of opposite party No. 3 vide order dated 5-9- 1971 and held the petitioners alone to be tenure-holders of the land in dispute. Aggrieved by the said order, Bhagelu filed appeal which was heard and allowed by the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) vide order dated 25-2-1972 and he held the appellant to be co-tenure-holder along with the petitioners to the extent of ?rd share in the disputed 14 plots, enumerated in the order, which belonged to the common ancestor Parautam. Aggrieved by the said order the petitioners filed revision which was dismissed by Joint Director of Consolidation dated 29-10-1976. 3. Petitioners have challenged these orders in the present writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners. Sri Umeshwar Prasad, urged that opposite parties Nos.1 & 2 legally erred in holding the plots in dispute to be ancestral property from the time of common ancestor Parautam. 3. Petitioners have challenged these orders in the present writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners. Sri Umeshwar Prasad, urged that opposite parties Nos.1 & 2 legally erred in holding the plots in dispute to be ancestral property from the time of common ancestor Parautam. Referring to the relevant revenue record entries he pointed out that although in the year 1314 F the name of Parautan was recorded, but in the years 1329 F and 1345F Kali, son of Shiv Charan, was alone recorded as tenure-holder of the plots in dispute in Class-5. He further pointed out that during Oudh Rent Act when Parautan is said to have died, the statutory tenancy holding was not heritable and as such, it cannot be held that upon the death of Parautan, it devolved on all his grandsons including Bhagelu and so he could not be held to be co-tenure-holder. He further urged that the land in dispute has not come down in the identical form and on this ground also the claim of opposite party No.3 Bhagelu, to be co-tenure-holder, could not be upheld by opposite parties Nos. 1. & 2 and they committed manifest error in giving ?rd share to opposite party No. 3. I am unable to agree with this contention in view of concurrent finding recorded by opposite parties Nos. 1 & 2 to the effect that the plots in dispute belonged to the common ancestor Parautan and they are coming down intact and in the identical form ever since 1314F. The petitioners had denied opposite party No. 3 Bhagelu to be son of Shiv Charan. Opposite parties Nos. 1 & 2 have taken into consideration entire evidence on record and come to the conclusion that opposite party No. 3 Bhagelu is son of Shiv Charan who was son of Parautan. They have also recorded a finding that all the plots in dispute belonged to Parautan. Since Shiv Charan had died during lifetime of his father and, as such, after death of Parautan the plots in dispute came to be recorded in the name of his eldest son Kali. They have also recorded a finding that all the plots in dispute belonged to Parautan. Since Shiv Charan had died during lifetime of his father and, as such, after death of Parautan the plots in dispute came to be recorded in the name of his eldest son Kali. No doubt, it is correct to say that Kali also acquired certain other plots and in respect of those plots opposite party No. 3 Bhagelu had asserted that the same were acquired from joint family funds by Kali and his name was recorded in representative capacity on those plots as well. The question whether those plots were acquired by Kali from joint family funds and in a representative capacity is not involved for consideration in the present case in view of the fact that opposite parties Nos. 1 & 2 have given share to opposite party No. 3 Bhagelu only in that land which has come down from the time of common ancestor Parautan. In this view of the matter, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the land in dispute, in which opposite party No. 3 Bhagelu has been given co-tenancy rights, is not ancestral property coming down from the time of common ancestor Parautan and that it had lost its identity. No evidence was led to establish that the land was settled afresh by the landlord with Kali and so, in the absence of evidence to that effect, I find it difficult to accept that Kali had acquired the land afresh from the Zamindar. 5. If the land in dispute is coming down from common ancestor, in normal course, the descendants of the common ancestor will be co-tenants unless it is proved that after the death of common ancestor the descendants were ejected or the land was settled afresh with one of them by the landlord. The heirs of statutory tenant, under Section 48 of Oudh Rent Act, were entitled to remain in occupation for a period of five years and if not evicted within further period of three years, they themselves acquired statutory tenancy rights as provided under Section 3(18) of the said Act. In the present case neither such case was pleaded nor any evidence was led to establish that after death of Parautan, the landlord ejected his heirs or that he settled it with Kali alone. In the present case neither such case was pleaded nor any evidence was led to establish that after death of Parautan, the landlord ejected his heirs or that he settled it with Kali alone. In this view of the matter. I do not find that any error has been committed by opposite parties Nos. 1 & 2 in giving co-tenancy rights to opposite party No. 3 Bhagelu in the land which belonged to the common ancestor. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, urged that opposite party No. 2 has legally erred in placing reliance upon the Compromise dated 15-11-1970 filed before the Assistant Consolidation Officer. His contention was that since the order passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer resting on the said compromise was set aside can appeal and, as such, the alleged admission, contained in the said compromise, regarding claim of opposite party No. 3 Bhagelu as co-tenure-holder in the land in dispute, could not be read and relied upon in evidence. He further urged that since the said compromise was inadmissible in evidence and, as such, the opposite parties Nos. 1 & 2 could not base their findings on the said inadmissible piece of evidence. In short, his contention was that since the order passed by Assistant Consolidation Officer was set aside in appeal and, as such the said compromise also ceased to exist and any admission contained therein, regarding claim of opposite party No. 3 Bhagelu to be co- tenure-holder, could not be read and relied upon in evidence. He further urged that the order passed by Assistant Consolidation Officer was per se without jurisdiction as he had not recorded the compromise in his own hand in reconciliation proceedings as was required under Rule 25-A and so it was rightly set aside. His contention was that since the Assistant Consolidation Officer had acted illegally and without jurisdiction in passing the order, on the basis of the alleged compromise and, as such, when the proceedings were not conducted in the manner, provided in law, the compromise filed in such proceedings would not be admissible in evidence. His contention was that since the Assistant Consolidation Officer had acted illegally and without jurisdiction in passing the order, on the basis of the alleged compromise and, as such, when the proceedings were not conducted in the manner, provided in law, the compromise filed in such proceedings would not be admissible in evidence. In support of this contention learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on Jaggan v. (Dular) Basantu (1966 Rev Dec 58) : (1966 All LJ 318) wherein it was held that : "Once it is found that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit it would follow that all proceedings before it were not proceedings before a competent court and could not be said to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Section 33 of the Evidence Act. If a court has no jurisdiction to try a suit then obviously it has no jurisdiction to record statements of witnesses and if any such statement had been recorded it could not be said to be a part of judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 33 of the Evidence Act. If the court has no jurisdiction to decide a suit, all proceedings before it would be without jurisdiction and will have no legal force. Once it was found that the court had no jurisdiction to try the suit the statement of witness made before it lost its value as a statement made before a competent court and thus it could not be said to have been made in a proper judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 33 of the Evidence Act". There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid case. In the present case, however, I find that the compromise was filed and duly verified before two members of Consolidation Committee and thereupon Assistant Consolidation Officer passed the order on the basis of the said compromise. It cannot be disputed that Assistant Consolidation Officer had jurisdiction to decide the case on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties in reconciliation proceedings before him. The compromise was filed and verified by the parties before two members of the Consolidation Committee and thereupon the Assistant Consolidation Officer passed the order in terms of the compromise. It cannot be disputed that Assistant Consolidation Officer had jurisdiction to decide the case on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties in reconciliation proceedings before him. The compromise was filed and verified by the parties before two members of the Consolidation Committee and thereupon the Assistant Consolidation Officer passed the order in terms of the compromise. Since the Assistant Consolidation Officer could pass the order in reconciliation proceedings, on the basis of compromise between the parties, hence it cannot be said that there was any inherent lack of jurisdiction. He could entertain compromise and decide on its basis. 7. In Hori Lal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad (1982 All LJ 223) I had occasion to consider the said question and in paragraph 43 of the Report it was observed that : "The Assistant Consolidation Officer, as already observed above, can exercise jurisdiction under section 9-A (1) for settling disputes and deciding cases only in the manner prescribed by Rule 25-A, according to which he can proceed to deal with matter only in the presence of two members of Consolidation Committee. There can thus be no escape from the conclusion that the written compromise. if filed by the parties appearing before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, has got to be filed and verified in presence of two members of the Consolidation Committee whose presence is prerequisite condition for exercising jurisdiction by him under Section 9-A (1) while proceeding to settle dispute by conciliation between the parties appearing before him. Even in those cases where written compromise is filed, the Assistant Consolidation Officer has to indicate in the order the precise entry to be made in the revenue records in accordance with the terms settled in the conciliation between the parties and for that he has to incorporate in the order the settled terms contained in the written compromise. Even in those cases where written compromise is filed, the Assistant Consolidation Officer has to indicate in the order the precise entry to be made in the revenue records in accordance with the terms settled in the conciliation between the parties and for that he has to incorporate in the order the settled terms contained in the written compromise. It would thus be sufficient compliance of R. 25-A if the written compromise is filed and verified by the parties in presence of two members of the Consolidation Committee and they also put their signatures thereon, which contains the terms of conciliation." (Emphasis mine) In this view of the matter, 'I find that the Assistant Consolidation Officer neither acted illegally nor without jurisdiction in entertaining the compromise and passing order on the basis of the said compromise which was filed and duly verified before the two members of the Consolidation Committee. I, therefore, find no substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the conciliation proceedings before the Assistant Consolidation Officer were without jurisdiction and on that ground the compromise could not be read and relied upon having not been filed in proper judicial proceedings. 8-9. So far as the second limb of the argument of the learned counsel for petitioners is concerned to the effect that since the order passed by Assistant Consolidation Officer, which was based on the said compromise, was set aside in appeal and, as such, the compromise also legally became non est, appears to be very attractive but on careful consideration I find it to be devoid of any merit. This question cropped up for consideration in Jokhan v. Ram Deo (1966 Rev Dec 348) : ( AIR 1967 All 212 ) wherein Gangeshwar Prasad, J. observed that (at P. 213) : "It is apparent from the judgments of the courts below that they thought that the compromise would stand or fall with the decree in which it was embodied, and it cannot remain intact even as a compromise if the decree based on it is found to be altogether lacking in validity. Here the courts below have been in error. It is well established that a compromise decree has no greater validity than the compromise on which.it is founded and the decree remains subject to all the incidents of the agreement which it adopts. Here the courts below have been in error. It is well established that a compromise decree has no greater validity than the compromise on which.it is founded and the decree remains subject to all the incidents of the agreement which it adopts. A compromise decree has accordingly been described as only a contract with the command of a judge superadded to it. It follows as a corollary from this proposition that while the invalidity of a compromise would destroy the validity of the decree based on it, the invalidity of the decree would not necessarily destroy the validity of the compromise. If the court which attached its command to the decree was not competent to do so, the compromise would still retain its character as such on account of not having acquired or having been deprived of that strength which the command of the court had purported to add to it. In Shadi Ram v. Amin Chand (AIR 1930 Lal 937) it was held by a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court that a compromise which has merged in a decree does not become extinct upon the decree being set aside. Likewise, a compromise does not become extinct on account of having merged in a decree which is found to be without jurisdiction, but survives the extinction of the decree and continues to have the legal force and effect which it would have had if it had not been incorporated in a decree." In Shadi Ram v. Amin Chand (AIR 1930 Lah 937), a reference to which was made in the aforesaid decision, it was held that a compromise having merged in a decree does not become extinct upon that decree being set aside. 10. In view of the above, I am unable to hold that when a decree, based ;on compromise, is set aside, being invalid on certain grounds. The compromise, embodied in it, dies with it and it cannot be read and relied upon in evidence. If the compromise itself has 'not been set aside on the ground that it stands vitiated, having been secured by practising fraud, undue influence or coercion, it can be referred to in respect of admission, if any, contained therein, as admissible substantive evidence relevant to the issues involved in the case. 11. If the compromise itself has 'not been set aside on the ground that it stands vitiated, having been secured by practising fraud, undue influence or coercion, it can be referred to in respect of admission, if any, contained therein, as admissible substantive evidence relevant to the issues involved in the case. 11. It is well-settled that admission is a best piece of evidence and decisive of the matter provided it is clear, certain and unambiguous and not vitiated by fraud, undue influence or coercion and should not have been extracted by misrepresentation or extending false promises. What is admitted by a party to be true must be presumed to be true unless the contrary is shown. (See AIR 1954 SC 355 ). However, the admission previously made can be allowed to be explained in order to show that it was erroneous or vitiated on aforesaid grounds. The maker of the admission can very well show that the facts admitted are not correct, but the admission will be used as substantive evidence even if he fails to step into the witness box. It can be read and relied upon in evidence without even being referred to the maker for contradiction in witness box under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It will be admissible as substantive evidence by itself in view of Sections 17 and 21 of the Evidence Act though it is not conclusive proof of the matter admitted. What weight may be attached to the admission by a party is a matter different from its use as admissible evidence, and the same would depend on the consideration in totality of the facts and circumstances and other evidence on record. (See AIR 1966 SC 405 , AIR 1974 SC 117 and AIR 1977 SC 409 ). 12. In the present case we find that petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 did not step into the witness box to deny the admission contained in the said compromise which was filed and duly verified before two members of the Consolidation Committee in aforesaid reconciliation proceedings before the Assistant Consolidation Officer. They had also not filed appeal against the said order, nor they had joined in the appeal which was filed by petitioner No. 4. They had also not filed appeal against the said order, nor they had joined in the appeal which was filed by petitioner No. 4. The order passed by Assistant Consolidation Officer was set aside in appeal on the technical ground that the compromise was not written in the handwriting of the Assistant Consolidation Officer, although it could not be set aside on that ground, as held in Hori Lal's case (1982 All LJ 223) (supra). The compromise was not set aside in appeal being vitiated by fraud, undue influence or coercion, nor any evidence was led by the petitioners, after remand of the case, to establish that fact. In this view of the matter, I am of opinion that the compromise could be referred to in evidence for ascertaining the admission contained therein with regard to the claim of co-tenancy rights of opposite party No. 3 Bhagelu. Whether opposite party No. 3 Bhagelu is co-tenant in the holding in dispute is a question of fact and so the admission, contained in the compromise, about that fact cannot be said to be not binding on the petitioners. The impugned orders passed by opposite parties Nos. 1 & 2, therefore, cannot be said to be vitiated on the aforesaid ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners in the end contended that the petitioner No. 4 Ganga Din had not joined , in the compromise and he had denied to have affixed his thumb-impression on it. He further contended that the admission of the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3, therefore, could not bind petitioner No. 4 Ganga Din, nor it could be read and relied upon for holding opposite party No. 3 Bhagelu to be co- tenure-holder in the holding in dispute. I am unable to agree with this contention as well. It is not disputed that the petitioners are contesting on the common ground having joint interest in the land in dispute. No doubt, it is correct to say that a compromise to which a person is not a party cannot bind such person but at the same time it cannot be said that it has no evidentiary value. It could be admitted under Section 13 of the Indian Evidence Act and could be taken into consideration by the Courts. (See 1965 Rev Dec 267). 14. In Mst. It could be admitted under Section 13 of the Indian Evidence Act and could be taken into consideration by the Courts. (See 1965 Rev Dec 267). 14. In Mst. Ramjhari Kuer v. Dayanand Singh (AIR 1946 Pat 278) it was observed that : "When several persons are jointly interested in the subject-matter of the suit, an admission of any one of these persons is receivable, not only against himself but also against the other defendants, whether they be all jointly suing or sued, provided that the admission relates to the subject-matter in dispute and is made by the defendant in his character of a person jointly interested with the party against whom the evidence is tendered. The requirement of the identity in legal interest between the joint owners is of fundamental importance." Similar view was taken in Yoggana Obanna v. K. Gangaiah ( AIR 1945 Mad 361 ) and H.R. Mohapatra v. N.R. Mohapatra (AIR 1963 Orissa 45). 15. In view of the above, I am of opinion that where several persons are jointly interested in the subject-matter of the suit, the general rule is that the admission of any one of these persons is receivable not only against himself but also against the others, whether they be all jointly suing or sued or whether the action be brought in favour of or against one or more provided the admission is not collusive and is not vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation so as to deprive the joint owner of the property against whom the admission is relied upon. 16. In the present case, I find that the admission contained in the said compromise is not vitiated by collusion between petitioners Nos.1 to 3 and opposite party No. 3 Bhagelu, nor it is vitiated by fraud. undue influence or coercion of any kind whatsoever. Thus opposite parties Nos. 1 & 2 have committed no error in placing reliance upon that admission while upholding the claim of opposite party No. 3 Bhagelu regarding co-tenancy rights in the land in dispute, which was held to have come down from the common ancestor Parautan. 17. No other point was raised or pressed before me. 18. In the result the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. 19. I, however, direct the parties to bear their own costs.