JUDGMENT - Tated A.D. J.-The original plaintiffs in Special Civil Suit No. 165 of 1971 decided by the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur by his judgment and decree dated 10-8-1973 preferred First Appeal No. 29 of 1974. The original defendant no. 2 preferred First Appeal No. 35 of 1974 against the same judgment and decree. The defendant no. 1 filed cross-objections. Both the appeals and cross-objections are being disposed of by this judgment. 2. The following facts are not disputed before me. The suit house bearing No. 10 (new 04) situated at Ward No. 26(New) of Kelibag Road, Mahal, Nagpur was owned by Dattatraya Pandurang Vaidya having inherited it from his father. Dattatraya died in the, year 1963, leaving behind him, his widow Indirabai, plaintiff no. 1 and his sen Vijaya, defendent no. 1 and his wife Mamta, plaintiff no. 2. The plaintiffs 3(a) and (b) are the daughters and plaintiff no. 3(c) is the son Ketan of defendant no. 1 Vijaya and his wife Mamta. Ketan was born on 7-4-1970. The defendant no. 1 on 31-1-1969 executed a document of agreement of sale in respect of the suit house in favour of defendant no. 2 for a consideration of Rs. 15000/-, out of which, it is mentioned therein that RS. 7,500/-were paid as earnest money. As the defendant no. 1 failed to execute the sale-deed as per the agreement of sale dated 31-1-1969, the defendant no. 2 instituted a Special Civil Suit No. 78 of 1969 in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur against the defendant no. 1 for specific performance of the agreement. The suit was resisted by the defendent no. 1 on the ground that he obtained a loan of Rs. 5,000/-from the defendant no. 1 and the document dated 31-1-1969 was executed by way of security for repayment of the loan. The defence raised by the defendant no. 1 in that suit was negatived and the suit was decreed. The original defendant in that suit i.e. Vijaya preferred First Appeal No. 91 of 1971 in this Court. That appeal was dismissed on 26-3-1981. 198!. After the Special Civil Suit No. 78 of 1969 was decreed, the appellants in First Appeal No. 29 of 1974 on 30-4-1971 instituted Special Civil Suit No. 465 of 1971. 3. The original defendant in that suit i.e. Vijaya preferred First Appeal No. 91 of 1971 in this Court. That appeal was dismissed on 26-3-1981. 198!. After the Special Civil Suit No. 78 of 1969 was decreed, the appellants in First Appeal No. 29 of 1974 on 30-4-1971 instituted Special Civil Suit No. 465 of 1971. 3. The case of the appellants, who were plaintiffs, was that the suit house was the ancestral property in the hands of Dattatraya and on the death of Dattatraya in the year 1963 the plaintiffs and the defendant became the owners thereof. They averred that on .the death of Dattatraya the widow Indiraba (plalntiffno. 1) was in possession of the ancestral property left by Dattatraya and she was managing the property. She avers that she was the manager of the joint family property and the defendant no. 1 was never incharge of the property nor he had any control over the same. She further averred that the defendant no. 1 was in the habit of wasting money and his activities were adverse to the interest.of the family and the family property. He was secretary of one physical institution and it appeared that for raising funds for the said institution, he had taken loan from defendant no. 2 without the knowledge of the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs were not at all concerned with the said loan. They alleged that the alleged agreement of sale dated 31.1.1969 was not binding on the shares of the plaintiffs in the property as the said transaction was not for the benefit of the family or for legal necessity. They submitted that they were never parties to the proceedings in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur and, therefore, they were not bound by the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 78 of 1969. According to them, they learnt about the transaction in or about the month of February, 1971 and, therefore, they instituted the suit for declaration that the alleged agreement of sale dated 31.1.1969 between defendants nos. 1 and 2 in respect of the suit property was unlawful, illegal and not enforceable under the law and for further declaration that the plaintiffs were the owners of the suit property and without their consent and knowledge the property could Jot be disposed of by the defendant no. 1. 3. The respondent no. 1 and 2 in respect of the suit property was unlawful, illegal and not enforceable under the law and for further declaration that the plaintiffs were the owners of the suit property and without their consent and knowledge the property could Jot be disposed of by the defendant no. 1. 3. The respondent no. 2, who was the defendant no.2 by his written statement Ex. 19 opposed the claim of the plaintiffs. His case was that the defendant no. 1 sold the house for legal necessity within the full knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs 1 and 2. He submitted that the present suit was dishonestly brought by the defendant no. 1 and the plaintiffs 1 and 2 only lent their signatures. He denied that the plaintiff no. 1 was Karta of the family. According to him, defendant no. 1 was the Karta of the family and his alienation is binding on the plaintiffs, especially when the alienation is made by him for discharging his legal liability. He denied that the transaction between him and defendant no. 1 was that of loan. He submitted that the plaintiffs had full knowledge of the agreement of sale and also of the suit instituted by him against the defendant no. 1 for specific performance of the agreement. They were watching the result of the suit and purposely with mala fide intention did not put in their say so that if the decision went against them they should be free to challenge the same by a separate suit. He submitted even if the plaintiffs were not parties to the suit for specific performance of the agreement brought by him against defendant no. 1, defendant no. 1 properly guarded the interest of the plaintiffs, taking all the pleas now taken by the plaintiffs and did his utmost to defeat the claim of this defendant and therefore, the plaintiffs had no cause of action to bring this suit. He further submitted that the agreement dated 31.1.1969 having been merged into decree for specific performance of contract, that agreement did not exist and as such it cannot afford any cause of action to the plaintiffs to bring the persent suit. 4. The defendant no. 1 Vijay Vaidya by his written statement at Ex. 26 supported the claim of the plaintiffs. He maintained that he borrowed Rs. 5000/- from the defendant no. 4. The defendant no. 1 Vijay Vaidya by his written statement at Ex. 26 supported the claim of the plaintiffs. He maintained that he borrowed Rs. 5000/- from the defendant no. 1 and as a security for the loan, he executed the suit agreement in favour of the defendant no. 2. 5. On the above pleadings, the learned Trial Judge raised necessary issues and after referring them to trial, he held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the agreement entered into by the defendant no. 1 with defendant no. 2 on 3-1-1969 was a loan transaction. That the plaintiffs proved that the defendant no. 1 had no right to disnose of the suit property and that the agreement was not binding on their shares in the suit property. He held that the plaintiffs proved that the suit house was the ancestral property of the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 1 but the plaintiffs failed to prove that the plaintiff no. 1 was the manager of the joint Hindu family. He held that the defendant no. 1 was the Karta or manager of the family of the plaintiffs and defendant no. 1 and as such he was competent to alienate the suit property for legal necessity. He found that the defendant no. 2 failed to prove that there was any legal necessity for the sale of the suit property. He also found that the plaintiffs 1 and 3(c) were entitled to 1/2 and l/4th share respectively in the suit property and they were entitled to the relief of declaration, to the effect that they were owners of 3/4th share in the suit property and the agreement of sale dated 31.1.1969 filed at Ex. 19 in Special C.S.No. 78 of 1969 was not binding on them for want of legal necessity. On those findings he decreed the plaintiffs' suit for declaration of their share in the suit property and further declared that the agreement of sale dated 31.1.1969 was not binding on them and it could not be enforced against their shares in the property. He accordingly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs 1 and 3(c) and dismissed the suit concerning plaintiffs 2, 3 (a) and 3(b) 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur as stated in the opening para, the plaintiffs and the defendant no. He accordingly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs 1 and 3(c) and dismissed the suit concerning plaintiffs 2, 3 (a) and 3(b) 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur as stated in the opening para, the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 2 have preferred separate appeals and the defendant no. 1 submitted cross-objections. 7. The Appellants in First Appeal No. 35 of 1974 preferred Civil Application No. 1065 of 1983 for permission to produce documents. The documents sought to be produced are certified copies of the extracts from the birth register in respect of son and daughter of the defendant no. 1. The application is not opposed as it is not disputed now before me that the appellant no. 2(c) was born on 7.4.1970. Hence the Civil Application is allowed. The appellant in First Appeal no. 35 of 1974 filed a Civil Application No. 1098 of 1983 for permission to take document on record. The document sought to be produced on record is certified copy of the judgment of this Court in First Appeal No. 91 of 1971, delivered on 26.3.1981. It is not opposed. Hence the Civil Application is allowed. The appellants in First Appeal No. 29 of 1974 filed an application for amendment of the plaint under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. The respondents by their reply dated 28.11.83 opposed the application for amendment. I find that the amendment sought for by the appellants is not necessary for the proper decision of the suit and the appeal. Hence the Civil Application is rejected. 8. On the contentions raised and argued before me by the learned counsel for the parties, following points arise for determination in this appeal : (i) Whether the plaintiff no. 1 Indirnhai wife of Dattatraya Vaidya was manager of the joint family consisting of the plaintiffs and the defendent no. 1 ? (ii) Whether the transaction evidenced by Agreement of sale dated 31.1.1969 was . a loan transaction ? (iii) Whether the plaintiffs 1 and 2 expressly or impliedly consented to the . agreement of sale dated 31.1.1969 in respect of the suit house ? (iv) Whether there was legal necessity or benefit to the estate justifying the sale of the suit property by the defendant no. 1 ? a loan transaction ? (iii) Whether the plaintiffs 1 and 2 expressly or impliedly consented to the . agreement of sale dated 31.1.1969 in respect of the suit house ? (iv) Whether there was legal necessity or benefit to the estate justifying the sale of the suit property by the defendant no. 1 ? (v) Whether the present suit was not tenable in view of the decree for specific performance of agreement of sale passed against the defendant no. 1, who was manager of the joint family ? 9. I shall take up the above points seriatim. It is not disputed that the suit house was owned by Dattatraya as his ancestral property and Dattatraya died in the year 1963 leaving behind him his widow Indirabai and son Vijay, Vijay was bom on 15.9.1941 and he was about 22 years of age at the time of death of his father and about 28 years of age at the time of suit transaction. Under Hindu Law, coparcenership is a necessary qualification for the managership of the joint Hindu family. A window is not a co-'parcener and as such she has no legal qualification to become a manager of the joint Hindu family. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision in (Commissioner of lncometax M.P., Nagpur and Bhandara v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills)1 It is in the evidence of the plaintiff no. 1 Indirabai that it was only after the earlier suit was decreed against Vijay, she applied to the Municipal Corporation for mutating the house in her name and got entries changed. Before she got the entries changed in the mutation register property stood in the name of defendant no. 1 Vijay. In this connection, a reference was made to Corporation Receipt Ex. 44 and notice Ex, 45 received by the defendant no. 1 from the Municipal Corporation to pay the house tax. Consequently I find that the learned Trial Judge was right in finding that it was the defendant no. 1 and not plaintiff no. 1 who was the manager of the joint family of the plaintiffs and the defendant no.l. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants in First Appeal No. 35 of 1974 contended that the defendant no. 1 Vijay borrowed Rs. 5000/-from the defendant no. 2 Rambhau and to secure the repayment of loan executed agreement of sale dated 31.1.1969. 1 who was the manager of the joint family of the plaintiffs and the defendant no.l. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants in First Appeal No. 35 of 1974 contended that the defendant no. 1 Vijay borrowed Rs. 5000/-from the defendant no. 2 Rambhau and to secure the repayment of loan executed agreement of sale dated 31.1.1969. According to him, that document was not intended to be acted upon as agreement of sale. The respondent no. 1 Vijay who was defendant in the Special Civil Suit No. 78 of 1969 had raised a contention that he had borrowed Rs. 5000/-from the defendant no. 2 Rambhau and to secure the repayment of the loan he had executed the agreement dated 31.1.1969. His contention was negatived in that suit and the appeal preferred by him against that decision i.e. First Appeal No. 91 of 1979, of which a certified copy is on record, was dismissed. Therefore, it is no longer open for the defendant no. 1 Rambhau to contend that the transaction evidenced by the agreement of sale dated 31.1.1969, was a loan transaction between him and the defendant no. 2. The plaintiffs in order to prove that the transaction between defendant no. 1 and the defendant no. 2 was a loan transaction, besides, the plaintiff no. 1 exaimined plaintiff no. l's brother Narain P.W. 2, Gajanan Dandige P.W. 3 and Manikrao Kapse, P.W.4 one of the tenants occupying a portion of the property. The defendant no. 1 Vijay also examined himself.. Plaintiff no. 1 Indirabai P.W. 1 does not claim to have any personal knowledge about the transaction between defendant no. 1 and the defendant no. 2. Her brother Narain also has no personal knowledge about the transaction between the defendants nos. 1 and 2. Gajanan is also closely related to plaintiff no. 7. Narain P.W. 2 and Gajanan P.W. 3 gave evidence that the suit house was worth Rs. 75000/-but their interested testimony cannot be relied upon in the absence of any evidence of the sales of the neighbouring houses. The plaintiff no. 1 Indirabai during her eross-examination admitted that in the neighbourhood of the suit house, one Shri Vele's house was sold but no evidence regarding the price of this house was led. There is the sole testimony of the defendant no. 1 Vijay that the transaction between him and the defendant no. The plaintiff no. 1 Indirabai during her eross-examination admitted that in the neighbourhood of the suit house, one Shri Vele's house was sold but no evidence regarding the price of this house was led. There is the sole testimony of the defendant no. 1 Vijay that the transaction between him and the defendant no. 1 was that of a loan. Defendant no. 2 Rambhau denied that the transaction between him and defendant no. 1 Vijay was of loan. The interested testimony of the defendant no. 1 Vijay is inconsistent with the recitals of the agreement of sale dated 31,1,1969, It cannot be relied upon. Consequently I find that the learned Trial Judge was right in finding that the transaction evidenced by the agreement of sale dated 31,1.1969 was not a loan transaction but it was a transaction of agreement for sale. 11, It takes me to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the plaintiffs 1 and 2 had expressly or implledly consented to the agreement of sale dated 31.1,1969, The only evidence in support of the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that of the defendant no. 2 Rambhau (2D.W.1) and the attesting witness Ramgopal (2 D.W.2), The defendant no. 2 Rambhau gave evidence that the defendant no. 1 Vijay told him that his agriculture was failure and, therefore, he wanted to sell his house and thereafter he saw his mother and told her that Vijay intended to sell the suit house. He states that Indirabai told him that she was agreeable to the sale of the suit house and thereafter the agreement of sale was written by the petition writer in the presence of defendant no. 1, his mother, his wife and two other persons viz. Shrivas and Manikrao Deshmukh. Shrivas P.W. 2 is the attesting witness to the agreement of sale*. He states that the mother and wife of defendant no. 1 were present when the agreement of sale was written by Mahajan petition writer. According to him, they never raised any objection to the agreement of sale. During cross-examination, he admitted that before that day, he did not know the mother and wife of defendant no. 1. It was when the defendant no. 1 handed over the amount to his mother that he knew her. He states that he never advised the defendant no. According to him, they never raised any objection to the agreement of sale. During cross-examination, he admitted that before that day, he did not know the mother and wife of defendant no. 1. It was when the defendant no. 1 handed over the amount to his mother that he knew her. He states that he never advised the defendant no. 2 to obtain the signatures of the mother and wife of defendant no. 1 on the agreement of sale. Manikrao also states that the mother and wife of defendant no. 1 were present when the agreement of sale was executed by defendant, no. 2 and they raised no objection. He deposed that they said that Vijay was the owner of the house. Cross-examination of Manikrao reveals that his relations with the defendant no. 1 are strained. It is difficult to believe the testimony of the defendant no. 2 Rambhau and the two witnesses that the mother and wife of the defendant no. 1 were present when the agreement of sale was written and they expressed their consent to the sale of the house. It is pertinent to note that it is the case of the defendant no. 2 that the house in question was exclusively owned by the defendant no. 1. He denied that it was the ancestral house of the defendant, no. 1, and therefore, it can be legitimately inferred that he never thought of obtaining consent of the mother and wife or the defendant no. 1 to sell the house in question. Had he considered it necessary to obtain the consent of the plaintiffs nos. 1 and 2 to the sale of the suit house by the defendant no.l, he would have certainly obtained their signatures on the agreement of sale. It is true that the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 1 formed joint Hindu family and they resided together. It is also true that while the earlier suit was pending, plaintiffs did not intervene in that suit and did not raise any objection. The mere fact that the plaintiffs did not raise any objection and instituted the present suit only after that suit was decreed against defendant no. 1 it cannot be inferred that they were the conseating parties to the agreement of sale in respect of the suit house. The plaintiff no. 1, plaintiff no.2 and defendant no. 1 are all serving as teachers. 1 it cannot be inferred that they were the conseating parties to the agreement of sale in respect of the suit house. The plaintiff no. 1, plaintiff no.2 and defendant no. 1 are all serving as teachers. They are all educated persons and resided together and, therefore, the testimony of Indirabai that she learnt about the transaction in question only after the earlier suit was decreed, on receiving a letter Ex. 37 from Shri Vinchure advocate cannot be believed. She must be knowing about the earlier suit while the suit was pending at one stage, defendint no. 1 thought of examining her as a witness in that suit and had sought adjournment for that purpose. Therefore* it can be very well inferred that the plair.tiffs 1 and 2 had learnt about the agreement of sale and they also knew about the earlier suit but they took no action to the defendant no.l. From the mere knowledge of the agreement of sale and their Inaction to take steps to get It declared by the competent Court that it was not binding on their shares, it cannot be inferred that they had implledly consented to the agreement of sale, Consequently, I find that the plaintiffs i and 2 neither expressly nor impliedly consented to the agreement for sale of the suit house and on that ground they are not stopped from challenging the said agreement of sale, 12. It takes me to consider whether there was legal necessity for the sale of the suit house by the defendant no. 1. The defendant no. 2 jn his written statement vaguely averred that there was legal necessity for the sale and the defendant no, 1 had entered into an agreemeent of sale of the suit house for discharging his legal liability. It is not pleaded what was the legal necessity for which the defendant no. 1 was required to sell the suit house. The mere averment that the sale was for legal necessity is not sufficient. The party must allege and prove the requirement which can be held to be legal necessity for the sale of the ancestral property by the Karta of the family. The defendant no. 2 Rambhau deposed that defendant no. 1 told him that his agriculture was failure and therefore, he wanted to sell his house. The party must allege and prove the requirement which can be held to be legal necessity for the sale of the ancestral property by the Karta of the family. The defendant no. 2 Rambhau deposed that defendant no. 1 told him that his agriculture was failure and therefore, he wanted to sell his house. He did not make any independent enquiry whether what was represented to him by defendant no. 1 was true and whether there was necessity to sell the suit house. Besides the interested testimony of defendant no. 2 Rambhau there is no evidence that there was failure of agriculture and therefore, defendant no. 1 wanted to sell the suit house. Defendant no. 1, his wife Mamta and mother Indirabai are all employed as teachers. Besides the pay that they receive as teachers, they also get Rs. 200/-per month as rent. There is no evidence that there was any pressing necessity to raise funds by sale of the suit house. Consequently, I find that the learned Trial Judge was right in finding that there was no legal necessity for sale of the suit house by the defendant no. 1. 13. The learned counsel Shri G.J. Ghate contended that the defendant no. 2 was sued in the earlier suit in his capacity as Karta of Joint family and in that capacity a decree for specific performance of the agreement was passed against him and therefore that decree was binding on the plaintiffs. According to him, the plaintiffs had impliedly consented to the sale of the suit house to the defendant no. 2 and they were silently watching the proceedings in the earlier suit and only after the decision of the said suit, they chose to file the present suit in collusion with the defendant no. 1. According to him, it was defendant no. 1 who filed the present suit through his mother and wife to set at naught the decree obtained by defendant no. 2 against him in the earlier suit. The learned counsel in support of his contention relied on the decision in (K.C.Kapoor v. Radhikadevi)2. That case is dinstinguishable on facts. In that case it was found that the alienation was for legal necessity. It was also found that the alienor was in exclusive possession of the property and his widowed mother had impliedly consented to the 5. The learned counsel in support of his contention relied on the decision in (K.C.Kapoor v. Radhikadevi)2. That case is dinstinguishable on facts. In that case it was found that the alienation was for legal necessity. It was also found that the alienor was in exclusive possession of the property and his widowed mother had impliedly consented to the 5. On those findings, the learned Trial Judge had dismissed the suit of the widow and the sons and the findings of the Trial Court were confirmed by the First Appellate Court. However, the High Court reversed the findings on the question of estoppel and sale for necessity and allowed the appeal. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court against the judgment and decree of the High Court. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and restored that of the First Appellate Court. In the present case, it is not proved that the plaintiffs expressly or impliedly consented to ' the sale. It is also not proved that there was legal necessity for the sale. Hence this decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the earlier Special Civil Suit no, 78 of 1969 filed by the vendor Rambhau against the vendse Vijay, Vijay was not described as Karta of the joint family but as Vijay, who is defendant no, 1 in this suit was Karta of the joint family, consisting of himself, his mother Indirabai, wife Mamta and children, it can be assumed that he was sued in the earlier suit in his capacity as manager or Karta of the joint family. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in Amrit Vs. Sudesh, A.I.R, 1970 S.C. 5 lay down that it is not necessary, in order that a decree against the manager may operate as resjudicata against coparceners who were not parties to the suit that the plaint or written statement ' should state in express terms that he is suing as manager or is being sued as a manager. It is sufflcjent if the manager was in fact suing or being sued as representing the whole family. It is sufflcjent if the manager was in fact suing or being sued as representing the whole family. The suit by or against the manager will be deemed to be one brought by him or against him as representing the family if the circumstances of the case show that he is the manager of the family and the property involved in the suit is family property. In the earlier suit, a decree for specific performance was passed against the vendor Vijay. ' The copies of pleadings in that suit are not on record but from the certified copy of judgment in F.A.No.91/71 decided on 26.3.81 against the judgment and decree in Spl. C.S.No.78/69 it Appeared that the plaintiff in that suit had not pleaded that the sale of the suit property was either for legal necessity or for benefit to the estate. No issue on that point was raised in that suit. In that suit plaintiff sought specific performance of agreement for sale dated 31.1.1969 and it was resisted by the defendant Vijay on the ground that the transaction was of loan and the document dated 31.1.1969 was never intended to be acted upon as agreement for sale. The defence was negatived and the suit for specific performance was decreed. As in the earlier suit there were no pleadings and no decision that the sale of the suit property by defendant no. 1 was for legal necessity, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel that the present suit was not in view of the decree for specific performance passed against the manager of the joint family in the earlier suit. . 15. The learned counsel Shri G.J. Ghate next contended that the plaintiff no.2(c) Ketan was not conceived on the day i.e. on 31.1.1969 when the agreement for salt in question was made and therefore, he alongwith other plaintiffs could not sue for declaration of his share in the suit property after a decree for specific performance was passed in the earlier suit. It is true that the plaintiff no.2(c) was born on 7.4.1970 i.e. about 15 months after the date of the agreement and as such it must be held that he was not even conceived on the date of agreement of sale. It is true that the plaintiff no.2(c) was born on 7.4.1970 i.e. about 15 months after the date of the agreement and as such it must be held that he was not even conceived on the date of agreement of sale. The earlier suit for specific performance was instituted in the year 1969 and it was decreed in 1971 and thereafter the plaintiffs on 30.4.71 instituted Sp. C.S. No. 165/71 for declaration that the agreement for sale dated 31.1.1969 was not enforceable under the law and the suit property could not be sold without their consent. The agreement for sale does not create any interest in the immoveable property and a decree for specfic performance on the basis of the said agreement does not create better rights. It only super-added the sanction of the Court to enforce the decree through the medium of the Court. In (Hiraial Agrawal v. Bhagirathi and others)3 Their Lordships stated the law thus: “In our view a decree for specific performance passed on the basis of contract of sale of immoveable property does not create any interestin the property in favour of the Decree-holder. It only supper-added the sanction of the Court to enforce it through the medium of the Court, as such the Decree-holder can enforce the said contract and get it enforced through Court, subject to whatever interest the judgment-debtor had at the time of execution.” A son having interest by birth in the ancestral property gets right to challenge the alienation of the property on the date of alienation. If the property is alienated by a stle surviving coparcener before a son is conceived or born, such an after born son cannot challenge the alienation effected by his father, but if a sole surviving coparcener enters into an agreement of sale and before he executes a sale-deed in pursuance of that agreement, a son is born, that son will certainly be entitled to challenge the alienation, which has been effected by executing a sale-deed after his birth. Right to challenge the alienation accrues only after the alienation is complete by execution and registration of, a sale-deed in respect of the immoveable property worth more than Rs.100/-. Right to challenge the alienation accrues only after the alienation is complete by execution and registration of, a sale-deed in respect of the immoveable property worth more than Rs.100/-. From the mere fact that an agreement to sell the immoveable property has been entered into before a son is conceived, the son will not be prevented from challenging the transaction, if the sale-deed is executed after his conception or birth. This is obvious because right to challenge the transaction entered into by the father or manager accrues only on completion of the alienation. In this connection, a reference may be, made to a note appearing at page 369 of Mulla's Hindu Law 15th Edn. It is as follows : “The above case assumes that there has been a complete transfer of the property to the purchaser. If the transfer is not complete as where there is a mere agreement to sell and a son is bom before the sale is completed, the son is entitled to have the sale set aside in its entirety if the parties are governed by the Mitakshara law as applied in Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, and to the extent of the son's interest, if they are governed by that law as applied in Bombay and Madras.” Consequently, I reject the contention of the learned counsel that the plaintiff no. 2(c) being not even conceived at the time of agreement of sale dated 31.1.1969 cannot challenge the intended sale of the ancestral property in pursuance to the said agreement of sale. The alienation will be complete only on the execution of the sale-deed* The plaintiff no. 2(c) has come into existence before the completion of the alienation and as such he has acquired interest in the ancestraal property belonging to the family. Therefore, he can claim declaration in respect of his share in the property. 16. The learned counsel for the appellant in First Appeal No. 29 of 1974 contends that the learned Trial Judge rather than declaring the shares of the plaintiffs in the suit property and holding that the agreement of sale in question was not binding on their ¦ shares and it could not be enforced against their shares, should have held that the whole of the agreement was not enforceable and that the defendant no. 1 could not sell the property without their consent and knowledge. 1 could not sell the property without their consent and knowledge. According to him, the learned Trial Judge should have struck down the whole of the agreement and should have held that it was not even binding on the share of the defendant no. 1.1 am unable to agree with the learned counsel. As per the Mitakshara law as administered in the State of Maharashtra, a coparcener may sell, mortgage or otherwise alienate for value his undivided interest in the copercenery property without the consent of the other coparceners. Therefore, the defendant no. 1 was competent to sell his share in the suit property and as such the sale of the suit house by him is binding on his share in the suit property. 17. In the result, both the appeals and cross-objections fail. They are hereby dismissed. As appeals by both the rival parties fail, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed ----