Judgement V. K. KHANNA, J.:- This writ petition has been filed by petitioner No. 1, which happens to be a Housing Co-operative Society registered under the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act and also by other petitioners who happen to be its office-bearers. The petitioner-society was formed with the object of acquiring land for its members in order to build their own houses and to do incidental work in connection therewith. More than 60 acres of land situated in village Chhalera Bangar and Suthari were acquired by the Society between Jan., 1973 to Sept., 1975. 2. U. P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 was enacted for the constitution of an authority for the development of certain areas in the State into industrial and urban township and for matters connected therewith. The State of U. P. by a notification dated April 17, 1976 declared the area comprising the villages mentioned in the Schedule annexed to the notification to be an industrial development area within the meaning of the 1976 Act to be called "New Okhla Industrial Development Area (hereinafter referred to as the "NOIDA"). Soon after the constitution of the Noida Authority a notification under Sections 4 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act was published in the U. P. Gazette extraordinary dated 30-4-1976 stating that the land in village Chhalera Bangar was needed for the planned industrial development. The land of the petitioner-society was included in this notification (Annexure-3 to the writ petition). Notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was thereafter issued on 1-5-1976 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition). In respect of the other land of the Society situated in village Suthari on 1st June, 1976 a notification under Section 4 was issued which was followed by a notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act on 16-9-1976 (Annexures-7 and 8 respectively to the writ petition). 3. It appears that the petitioner-society and also a large number of other registered co-operative societies, whose land has been acquired by the NOIDA authority for the purposes of an Industrial Development of the Area made representation to the concerned authorities for getting land in lieu of the land acquired in the Complex NOIDA. 3. It appears that the petitioner-society and also a large number of other registered co-operative societies, whose land has been acquired by the NOIDA authority for the purposes of an Industrial Development of the Area made representation to the concerned authorities for getting land in lieu of the land acquired in the Complex NOIDA. After exchange of correspondence between the Society and the NOIDA Authority a Sub-Committee was constituted under the Chairmanship of Sri B.J. Khodaiji, Commissioner and Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Government of U. P. to look into the matter. The Sub-Committee invited the representatives of the Co-operative Societies also which included the representative of the petitioner-Co-operative Society. It appears that the first meeting of the Sub-Committee was held on 10-12-1977 in which the co-operative societies suggested that they be given land according to their requirement in the complex which may be nearest to Delhi. The next meeting was held on 4th Mar., 1973 (Annexure-15 to the writ petition) and in this meeting it was agreed that only the land of the society acquired by the authority would be considered for giving alternative land and that too upto the maximum of 35 to 40 per cent of the total area. The representative of the Society told the Sub-Committee that the views of the members of the Co-operative Societies will be informed to the Sub-Committee. It appears that thereafter the petitioner-Society was pressing for allotment of land at the place where their original land was situated and also that the development charge should not be charged more than Rs. 40 to 50 per square meter including the cost of the land. The next important meeting of the Sub-committee was held on 19-10-1978 in which it was decided that sites will be given to various Co-operative Housing Societies on the land nearest to Delhi on the basis of the Noida Master Plan which was under consideration and was yet to be finalised. It was also clarified by the Chief Executive Officer that 35 per cent of the area offered to the members of the society will be plotted area out of the total acquired area of the society. It was also clarified by the Chief Executive Officer that 35 per cent of the area offered to the members of the society will be plotted area out of the total acquired area of the society. The Chief Executive Officer NOIDA by his letter dated 21st April, 1980 (Annexure-20 to the writ petition) informed that it was proposed to offer developed plots of land to bona fide members of a registered co-operative house building society whose lands were acquired by U. P. Government for NOIDA. The approximate rate at which land was offered was Rs. 130/- per square meter in sectors 30, 31, 34, 39 and 40. In para 3 of the aforesaid letter certain conditions were laid down and one of the conditions was that amount equal to 20 per cent of the price of the area of developed plots computed at Rs. 130/-per square meter will have to be sent in favour of NOIDA and thereafter tripartite agreement shall have to be entered into between the NOIDA Authority, the Cooperative Housing Society and the Individual Member of the Society after the finalisation of the layout plan and the allotment by the authority. The petitioners and respondents have made a statement before us that the date of deposit of the amount of 20 per cent was extended for all the societies up till 15th Sept., 1980 by the Authority. 4. The petitioner, however, filed the present writ petition on July 29, 1980. The writ petition was admitted. The stay application was, however, rejected. It may also be noticed that on 29th April, 1980 (Annexure-22 to the writ petition), the Acting Chairman of the petitioner-society informed the Chief Executive Officer that the arbitrary decision taken by the NOIDA Authority in its letter dated 24-4-1980 was not acceptable to the Society. The emphasis in the letter was that assurance was given to allot the land in Sector 27 for which the Society had submitted several representations earlier to allot the same on the basis of the policy of the Government to rehabilitate the Society members on the original land. The emphasis in the letter was that assurance was given to allot the land in Sector 27 for which the Society had submitted several representations earlier to allot the same on the basis of the policy of the Government to rehabilitate the Society members on the original land. The Chief Executive Officer by his letter dated May 15, 1980 however, intimated the General Secretary of the Federation of the Cooperative Housing Society that the authority has finally decided to offer Sectors 30, 31, 36, and 40 to the Cooperative House Building Societies and that 20 per cent of the amount has to be deposited. Admittedly the petitioner did not deposit the 20 per cent amount as fixed by the Authority by 15th Sept., 1980. However, it sent a telegram on 30th April, 1980 which has been quoted in para 11 of the supplementary affidavit to the following effect : "Re our legal notice twentieth May stop writ petition challenging land acquisition prices and location of plots admitted in the Allahabad High Court on twentynine July stop in the meantime without prejudice request extend date of offer to our society for depositing twenty per cent until Thirty September because all members have not paid the money stop request confirm stop letter follows stop regards. The U. P. Residents Employees Co-operative House Bldg. Society Ltd. 1/5139 Lane 5 Balbir Nagar Shahadara-Delhi-119932." It appears that NOIDA Authority did not extend the time and the petitioners have not been allotted any land in the NOIDA Complex. 5. In the present writ petition the petitioner has first challenged the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act contained in Annexures-3, 4, 7 and 8 to the writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner in connection with the challenge of the aforesaid notifications has only adopted the points which had been raised in Civil Misc. Writ No. 4220 of 1979, Kendriya Karamchari Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Limited Chhalera District Ghaziabad v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (decided on Dec. 11, 1981)*. As has been observed above, all these notifications were published in the year 1976. The writ petition has been filed in the year 1980 i.e. more than 3 years after the publication of the notifications. The writ petition in so far as the aforesaid challenge is concerned suffers from the vice of laches. 11, 1981)*. As has been observed above, all these notifications were published in the year 1976. The writ petition has been filed in the year 1980 i.e. more than 3 years after the publication of the notifications. The writ petition in so far as the aforesaid challenge is concerned suffers from the vice of laches. Moreover, the impugned notifications have been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court by a reasoned order. We agree with the reasoning given in the aforesaid decision and negative the contentions of the petitioners regarding the challenge to the aforesaid notifications on merits also. * Reported in 1983 UPLBEC 240. 6. It has then been urged that the action of the authority in not allotting land to the petitioner was mala fide. Reliance has been placed on the supplementary affidavit which has been filed along with an amendment application which has been allowed by us. On the basis of the averments made in para 13 onwards of the supplementary affidavit the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the action of the authority in not allotting land to the petitioner was mala fide. If one reads the aforesaid paragraphs it becomes clear that mala fides have been alleged against Sri N.S. Chaudhari, Chairman, Neo Okhla Industrial Development Authority, mainly. Sri N.S. Chaudhari has not been made a party in person and the averments in the supplementary affidavit in connection with mala fide cannot even otherwise be relied upon. The Supplementary affidavit has been sworn by one Ved Prakash Sharma and the contents of paras 13, 14 and 15 have been sworn on the basis of the information received from Sri Dan Singh. Sri Dan Singh has not chosen to file an affidavit. The affidavit of Sri Ved Prakash Sharma is thus based only on hearsay and no reliance can be placed on such affidavit. Plea of mala fide raised by the petitioner is thus liable to be rejected in the absence of Sri N.S. Chaudhari as a party in the writ petition and also because affidavit of Dan Singh, who could have personal knowledge of the averments made in paras 13, 14 and 15 of the supplementary affidavit has not been filed. 7. Plea of mala fide raised by the petitioner is thus liable to be rejected in the absence of Sri N.S. Chaudhari as a party in the writ petition and also because affidavit of Dan Singh, who could have personal knowledge of the averments made in paras 13, 14 and 15 of the supplementary affidavit has not been filed. 7. The next point which has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that non-extension of time by the authority as prayed in the telegram is arbitrary and discriminatory. The precise argument, which has been raised is that there had been a policy decision to provide land to those housing cooperative societies whose land had been acquired by the NOIDA authority. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner fixation of time for payment of 20 per cent of the money had no nexus with the object sought to be achieved in the policy. It has been argued that by fixing the date 15th Sept., classification has been created between the societies which pay 20 per cent money by 15th Sept., and those who do not pay. It has been urged that this classification is arbitrary. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu and Kashmir ( AIR 1980 SC 1992 ); D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, ( AIR 1983 SC 130 ); Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works ( AIR 1974 SC 2349 ) and on a decision of this Court in Durga Associates, Raipur v. State of U. P., ( AIR 1982 All 490 ). The learned counsel for the petitioner has further amplified his argument by urging that adherence to a demand of money by a certain date is arbitrary and that not extending the date was also unreasonable and arbitrary. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent has, however, urged that the offer by the Authority to give developed plots to the petitioner-society was only a concession and the offer was like any other contract and that the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution shall if at all apply only in so far as granting of concession to similarly situated societies are concerned and cannot apply beyond it. It has also been argued that the concession granted by the authority not being a legal right no mandamus can be sought for by the petitioner. Reliance has been placed on M.S. Jain v. State of Haryana, ( AIR 1977 SC 276 ); K.V. Rajalaskshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore, ( AIR 1967 SC 993 ) and Mrs. Sheila Kapur v. Chief Commr., Delhi, (AIR 1968 Delhi 146). It has also been argued that in case power of extension had been exercised only in the case of petitioner-society it would have amounted to discrimination inasmuch as there were other cooperative societies whose members had not deposited the amount by 15th September, and thus have not been allotted developed plots. 9. The cases on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner lay down that the State, which would include an authority constituted within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, cannot discriminate or act arbitrarily and unreasonably. The learned counsel for the respondent has frankly conceded to this position. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, conceded that there was no discrimination practised by the authority while granting the concession and extending the date up till 15th Sept., 1980. What has been urged is that non-extending the date in pursuance of the telegram sent by the petitioner was unreasonable and arbitrary and thus hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 10. The question which has thus to be considered is regarding the legal right of the petitioner and also as to whether the action of the authority in not extending the date for depositing the money was unreasonable and arbitrary. The land which was owned by the petitioner-society has been legally acquired by the NOIDA Authority and thus the Authority was its owner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that the petitioner-society had any legal right to get land from the NOIDA Authority. From the narration of the facts, which have been stated in detail above, it appears that in view of the representations made by Housing Co-operative Societies, whose land had been acquired, the Authority had agreed to provide land up to 40 per cent of the total area acquired. From the narration of the facts, which have been stated in detail above, it appears that in view of the representations made by Housing Co-operative Societies, whose land had been acquired, the Authority had agreed to provide land up to 40 per cent of the total area acquired. The question arises as to whether this decision by the Authority would be termed as a concession granted by the Authority or it would create some sort of legal right in the petitioner-society. The petitioners counsel has not been able to show any statutory obligation cast on the authority to allot land to the Housing Co-operative Societies whose land had been acquired by the Authority. In these circumstances it would be taken that the Authority had only sympathetically considered the representations of the various Housing Co-operative Societies whose land had been acquired and has agreed to grant a concession in their favour as owner and offered to allot developed plots for the purposes of building houses by the members of those co-operative societies. This decision of the Authority will clearly give no legal right to the petitioner-Cooperative Society. In the case of Mrs. Sheila Kapur, (AIR 1968 Delhi 146 at p. 149) (supra) it has been held : "As no legal right vested in the appellant to get alternative plots, the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution would not be attracted, even if the Government adopted a policy of pick and choose and allotted alternative plots to some owners, as concession, and refused to allot plots to the appellants. Of course, the Government is expected to act in consonance with the principle of fair play even while extending concessions to citizens and to treat them, as far as possible, on equal basis. But it is a question of propriety and not of any legal obligation. Any discrimination in the matter of extending concessions, which the Government is not under any legal obligation to do, cannot per se attract the provisions of Art.14 of the Constitution." In the case of K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty ( AIR 1967 SC 993 ) (supra), the Supreme Court held (at p. 996) :- "There is some force in some of the contentions put forward on behalf of the State of Mysore. It is not necessary to test them as we find ourselves unable to uphold the contention of the appellants. It is not necessary to test them as we find ourselves unable to uphold the contention of the appellants. No doubt, some concession had been shown to the first batch of 41 persons and the batches of persons who had come in after the batch of 63 persons also received some concession, but after all these were concessions and not something which they could claim as of right. The State of Mysore might have shown some indulgence to this batch of 63 persons but we cannot issue a writ of mandamus commanding it to do so. There was no service rule which the State had transgressed nor has the State evolved any principle to be followed in respect of persons who were promoted to the rank of Assistant Engineers from surveyors. The indulgence shown to the different batches of persons were really ad hoc and we are not in a position to say what, if any, ad hoc indulgence should be meted out to the appellants before us." (Emphasis provided.) Here, as has been observed above the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show any legal right for getting the plots allotted in their favour. There has been no discrimination practised as similarly situated societies have been treated alike i.e. all of them have been offered alternative plots and were required to deposit 20 per cent of the amount by 15th Sept., 1981. Up to this stage therefore, the action of the authority even according to the petitioner, suffers from no vice. Let us, however, now examine the real question raised by the petitioner as to whether non-extension of time for depositing 20 per cent of the money, as prayed by the petitioners, was unreasonable and arbitrary and thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 11. Once it is held that what had been done by the authority was a concession and not a legal right available to the petitioner, in our opinion, the authority was not bound to extend the date. The fixation of the time schedule was necessary to achieve the object sought by the policy decision and the object for which the authority had been constituted. How could the planned development proceed unless the authority knows as to whether the developed plots offered to a class of societies were going to be purchased by their members. The fixation of the time schedule was necessary to achieve the object sought by the policy decision and the object for which the authority had been constituted. How could the planned development proceed unless the authority knows as to whether the developed plots offered to a class of societies were going to be purchased by their members. The matter could not hang on and had to be finalised so that the entire scheme may work out by selling developed plots to various categories of persons. However, in any view of the matter the condition for deposit of 20 per cent amount by 15th September was a uniform condition which applied to all the Housing Co-operative Societies to whom the concession had been granted. There was no discrimination thus practised. There being no legal right in the petitioner to enforce the concession the necessary corollary which follows is that there was no legal right in the petitioner to get the time extended and there was thus no corresponding duty in the authority to extend the time. The concession was to be availed by the Cooperative Society on the conditions which had been laid down by the authority and in case the petitioner did not choose to avail the concession by following the conditions laid down then by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the action of the authority in not extending the date was either unreasonable or arbitrary. In this connection useful reference may be made to what has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works etc. ( AIR 1974 SC 2349 at p. 2352) (supra): "In the matter of granting concession or exemption from tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need not give exemption or concession to everyone in order that it may grant the same to some. As we said, the object of granting the coneessional rate of duty was to protect the smaller units in the industry from the competition by the larger ones and that object would have been frustrated if, by adopting the device of fragmentation the larger units could become the ultimate beneficiaries of the bounty. That a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable has been held by this Court in several decisions ....... . . That a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable has been held by this Court in several decisions ....... . . .......The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark." (Emphasis provided.) The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the case of D.S. Nakara ( AIR 1983 SC 130 ) (supra) in which it has been held that classification between pensioners who had retired before a particular date and after that date was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 as the same was not based on any discernible rational principle and being wholly unrelated to the object sought to be achieved by grant of liberalised pension and the eligibility criteria devised being thoroughly arbitrary, the eligibility for liberalised pension scheme of "being in service on the specified date and retiring subsequent to that date" in the memoranda, violates Art.14 and is unconstitutional and liable to be struck down. However, the aforesaid case does not help the petitioner. In the case of D.S. Nakara (supra) the date itself created a classification between the retired employees who were similarly situated. Here, all the co-operative societies, which were similarly situated, has been given the concession subject to the condition that they deposit the 20 per cent of the amount by 15th September. The condition imposed was thus uniform for the similarly situated societies. 12. So far as the case of Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works ( AIR 1974 SC 2349 ) (supra) is concerned, it has been held by the Supreme Court that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. All decision must be accepted unless one can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark. All decision must be accepted unless one can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark. In this case it is admitted that 15th Sept., 1980 was an extended date. The fixation of the date has to be seen in the context of the entire facts and circumstances of the case as has been quoted above and by no stretch of imagination it can be said that it could be termed as either capricious or whimsical or very wide of any reasonable mark considering the entire circumstances. In this connection it may also be mentioned that the contents of the telegram sent for extension of time are also very relevant. The writ petition had been filed in which notifications, price and other things had been challenged. The stay application had been rejected. The telegram for extension of time had been sent. on 30th April, 1980 which only prayed extension till 30th September. The authority had uniformally granted extension up to 15th Sept., 1980. The society could not itself take a decision for the extension of the time. Reasonable time had already been granted to all the co-operative societies to deposit money by 15th September. The petitioner society, in case it wanted to avail of the concession, ought to have deposited money by 15th Sept., 1980. It appears that the petitioner-society did not deposit the amount because of the filing of the present writ petition as the petitioner-society was not prepared to pay the money asked by the Authority and was also not inclined at that stage to take the plots in the sectors offered to the society. In this view of the matter also it cannot be said even otherwise that the action of the authority in not allowing time till 30th Sept., 1980 and only allowing time till 15th Sept., 1980 was either unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. 13. In this view of the matter also it cannot be said even otherwise that the action of the authority in not allowing time till 30th Sept., 1980 and only allowing time till 15th Sept., 1980 was either unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has then urged that from a reading of Annexure-15 to the writ petition and Annexs.25 and 30 to the Supplementary Affidavit it is clear that the Authority was bound to give land our of the land acquired by the State Government for NOIDA Authority belonging to the petitioner-society and it having not offered the plots out of the land of the petitioner-society, there has been a breach of the decision taken by the Authority and the Authority is bound to allot developed plots from the land which was owned by the petitioner-society. A bare perusal of these Annexures would show that the interpretation which is being put forward by the petitioner-society is not correct. Clause 4 of Annex.15 to the writ petition shows that the Chief Executive Officer explained that only up to the extent of 35 to 40 per cent of the total area owned by the societies might be provided to them as alternative land. *(Emphasis provided.) Great stress has, however, been laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner on clause 8 on the basis of which it has been said that 35 to 40 per cent of the total area had to be given out of the land of the society acquired. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. The reference to the land of the society in the aforesaid clause was only for the purposes of knowing the area of the society and not for indicating that 35 to 40 per cent had to be given out of the land acquired. Clause 8 again mentions that the Authority would give alternative land. In case the intention was to give the same land there was no question of mentioning that alternative land was to be given by the Authority to the society. As far as Annexure-25 of the Supplementary Affidavit is concerned, clause 1 is very relevant. Clause 8 again mentions that the Authority would give alternative land. In case the intention was to give the same land there was no question of mentioning that alternative land was to be given by the Authority to the society. As far as Annexure-25 of the Supplementary Affidavit is concerned, clause 1 is very relevant. It clearly says that it has been decided that sites will be given to various co-operative housing societies on the land nearest to Delhi on the basis of the NOIDA Master Plan, which is under consideration and is yet to be finalised. Clause 6 again mentions the allotment of alternate sites to the society. In case the decision was to give the very same land, there was no reason to mention in clause 1 that the various societies will be given land nearest to Delhi on the basis of the NOIDA. Master plan which was under consideration and was yet to be finalised. Annexure-30 to the Supplementary Affidavit can hardly throw any light as it is a letter written by the society itself to one of the officers of the Authority. In this connection para 17 of the Supplementary Affidavit filed by the petitioner is also very important. In the last sentence it has been clearly stated that the land of some of the co-operative societies does not fall in residential area. If the interpretation which is being sought to be given by the petitioner is taken to be correct, the result will be that some of the co-operative societies would not get any land at all inasmuch as no house can be built on their original land according to the Master Plan. This decision would clearly be discriminatory. However, on a close reading of all these Annexures it becomes clear that the land of the petitioner-society was only being referred for the purposes of finding the area of the developed plots which could be allotted. It was not being referred in connection with allotment of the developed plots out of the original land of the society. * Emphasis not given in original - Ed. 14. The petitioners counsel has also challenged the price which has been fixed by the NOIDA Authority as being arbitrary and discriminatory. The petitioner has been offered land at Rs. 130/-. It was not being referred in connection with allotment of the developed plots out of the original land of the society. * Emphasis not given in original - Ed. 14. The petitioners counsel has also challenged the price which has been fixed by the NOIDA Authority as being arbitrary and discriminatory. The petitioner has been offered land at Rs. 130/-. The petitioners counsel has not been able to show that anybody was offered developed plots for a price less than Rs. 130/-. Moreover, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Premji Bhai Parmar v. Delhi Development Authority ( AIR 1980 SC 738 ) (para 9): "......... How the seller works out his price is a matter of his own choice unless it is subject to statutory control. Price of property is in the realm of contract between a seller and buyer. There is no obligation on the purchaser to purchase the flat at the price offered ....... It is difficult to appreciate how Art.14 can be attracted in the circumstances hereinabove mentioned. Cost price of a property offered for sale is determined according to the volition of the owner who has constructed the property unless it is shown that he is under any statutory obligation to determine cost price according to certain statutory formula ....... The Authority having the trapping of a State might be covered by the expression other authority in Art.12 and would certainly be precluded from according discriminatory treatment to persons offering to purchase flats in the same scheme. Those who opt to take flats in a particular incomewise areawise scheme in which all flats came up together as one project, may form a class and any discriminatory treatment in the same class may attract Art.14. But to say that throughout its course of existence the authority would be bound to offer flats income-groupewise according to the same price formula is to expect the authority to ignore time, situation, location and other relevant factors which all enter the price structure. In price fixation executive has a wide discretion and is only answerable provided there is any statutory control over its policy of price fixation and it is not the function of the Court to sit in judgment over such matters of economic policy as must be necessarily left to the Government of the day to decide. In price fixation executive has a wide discretion and is only answerable provided there is any statutory control over its policy of price fixation and it is not the function of the Court to sit in judgment over such matters of economic policy as must be necessarily left to the Government of the day to decide. The experts alone can work out the mechanics of price determination; Court can certainly not be expected to decide without the assistance of the Expert (see Prag Ice and Oil Mills v. Union of India, 1978-3 SCR 293 at p. 330: ( AIR 1978 SC 1296 at p. 1316). In the leading judgment it has been observed that the mechanics of price fixation have necessarily to be left to the executive and unless it is patent that there is hostile discrimination against a class processual basis of price fixation has to be accepted in the generality of cases as valid ..... ." The petitioner-society was being offered a concession in the shape of developed plots like any other by the purchaser. The petitioner could either accept or rejects the aforesaid offer. It has not been shown to us that any one has been given plots at a price lower than Rs. 130/- and thus the decision of the authority in fixing Rs. 130/-as price of the developed plots cannot be said to be either arbitrary or discriminatory. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner in the end has urged that the original land of the petitioner-society has now been offered to Army Officers Welfare Society, which is evident from Annexure-26 to the Supplementary Affidavit. It has been urged that the petitioner-society had prayed for extension of time and thus should have been allotted the same land and the Army Welfare Officers Society should not have been preferred and this preference has amounted to discrimination. We are unable to accept the aforesaid argument. As has been observed above, the petitioner-Society was offered land. It was within the domain of the Authority to offer any land possessed by it. The petitioner has no legal right to get a particular land. We are unable to accept the aforesaid argument. As has been observed above, the petitioner-Society was offered land. It was within the domain of the Authority to offer any land possessed by it. The petitioner has no legal right to get a particular land. Moreover, Army Welfare Society is a class by itself and the petitioner-Society cannot be said to be a society similarly situated and in view of the fact that the petitioner-Society did not avail of the concession granted by the authority it does not lie in the mouth of the Society to complain of any discrimination on the ground that it has not been allotted developed plots. 16. No other point has been pressed before us. 17. For the reasons stated above the present writ petition is dismissed, with costs. Petition dismissed.