JUDGMENT : N.D. Ojha, J. Respondents 3 to 4 are the landlords of an accommodation of which the petitioner is the tenant. A suit was instituted by respondents 3 to 5 against the petitioner for his ejectment and arrears of Rent etc. on the ground that he was a defaulter in payment of rent and that his tenancy had been duly terminated by serving upon him a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit was contested by the petitioner by filing a written statement. On an application made by respondents 3 to 5, however, the defence of the petitioner was struck off on the ground that he had failed to comply with the requirements of Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. Against the order of Judge, Small Causes, striking off his defence the petitioner filed a revision before the District Judge, Varanasi, which was issued by the IInd Additional District Judge, respondent No. 1. Aggrieved he has filed writ petition with a prayer to quash the two orders referred to above. 2. It has been urged by counsel for the petitioner that on the facts of the instant case the defence of the petitioner did not deserve to be struck off. 3. Having heard counsel for the parties I am of opinion that no good ground has been made out for interference with the impugned order under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. Before dealing with the submission made by counsel for the petitioner it would be useful to give certain facts. As is apparent from the order of the Additional District Judge, 5th of October, 1978 was the date fixed before the Judge, Small Causes, for hearing of the suit. As is well known the date fixed before a Judge, Small Causes, is the date which is meant for filing written statement as also for hearing, On an application made by the petitioner for time to file a written statement the hearing of the case was adjourned from 5.10.1978 to 5.12.1978 by which date the petitioner was directed to file his written statement. On 5.12.1978 the petitioner applied again for time to file his written statement. This application too was allowed and the case was fixed for 5.1.1979. The Petitioner, however, did not file his written statement even on that date and made another application for time to file written statement. On 5.12.1978 the petitioner applied again for time to file his written statement. This application too was allowed and the case was fixed for 5.1.1979. The Petitioner, however, did not file his written statement even on that date and made another application for time to file written statement. Even this application was allowed and 5th February, 1979 was the next date fixed. The petitioner chose not to file his written statement even on that date and 19.2.1979 was fixed for final hearing. An application for further time to file written statement was made by the petitioner on 19.2.1979 also and even this application was allowed and 12th March, 1979 was the next date fixed. The petitioner filed his written statement on 13th March, 1979. Since the rent which had fallen due and was payable by the petitioner had not been deposited by aim as contemplated by Order 15, Rule 5 C.P.C. even till 12th March, 1979, on which date the petitioner filed his written statement an application was moved on behalf of the landlord-respondents on 28th May, 1979 which was the next date fixed for hearing after 12th March, 1979, for striking off the defence of the petitioner. It is thereafter that the rent payable up to June, 1979, was deposited by the petitioner on 11th July, 1979. It further appears from the order of IInd Additional District Judge that there was default on the part of the petitioner in compliance with the second part of Order 15, Rule 5 C.P.C. also which as substituted by the State of Uttar Pradesh requires that the tenant "shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual," inasmuch as the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, eleventh and twelfth deposits were not made by the petitioner within the time prescribed by Order 15, Rule 5 referred to above. 5. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was misled in not making the deposits contemplated by the first part of Order 15, Rule 5 C.P.C. which requires deposit of the entire amount admitted by the tenant to be due with interest thereon at or before the first hearing of the suit, by a decision of this Court in Mathura Prasad v. Vikram Jeet Singh 1978 A.W.C. 523. So far as this submission is concerned it may be pointed out that the decision in Mathura Prasad's case has been over-ruled by a Division Bench of this Court in Jagannath and another v. Ram Chandra Srivastava and another, 1982 A.R.C. 665. It has been held that on the plain language of Explanation 1 to Order 15, Rule 5 the date of first hearing means the date mentioned in the summons. It was further held that the object of Order 15, Rule 5 being the payment by defendant of the entire arrears of rent admitted to be due from him on the very first date of hearing there is no ground for introducing a legal fiction such as was sought to be done in the case of Mathura Prasad (supra) namely that where the Court adjourns the hearing of the suit even though at the instance of the defendant from the date fixed in the summons to some other date it would be the adjourned date which would automatically be deemed to be the date of the first hearing in the suit. 6. Since the Courts do not legislate but only interpret the law the effect of the interpretation of the requirements of Order 15, Rule 5 C.P.C. by the Division Bench of this Court in Jagannath's case (supra) would be that the law laid down in this case would be deemed to be the law right from the commencement of the provision which has been interpreted in the said case. 7. What was, however, urged by counsel for the petitioner was that since Order 15, Rule 5 C.P.C. gives a discretion to the Court to strike off or not to strike off the defence, it was a fit case where the defence of the petitioner should not have been struck off if it was established that the petitioner acted bona fide on the law laid down in Mathura Prasad's case (supra). In my opinion even if the impugned orders are considered on this criterion they do not deserve to be quashed inasmuch as the facts of Mathura Prasad's case (supra) are clearly distinguishable. In that case 5th April, 1977 was the date shown in the summons. At the instance of the tenant this date was adjourned to 10th May, 1977. In my opinion even if the impugned orders are considered on this criterion they do not deserve to be quashed inasmuch as the facts of Mathura Prasad's case (supra) are clearly distinguishable. In that case 5th April, 1977 was the date shown in the summons. At the instance of the tenant this date was adjourned to 10th May, 1977. It appears that on that date the tenant filed his written statement as also a tender for the deposit of the amount of admitted rent in accordance with the requirement of Order 15, Rule 5 C.P.C. The amount of rent was actually deposited on 12th May, 1977, in pursuance of the tender submitted as aforesaid. Since the amount had been deposited on 12th May, 1977 in pursuance of the tender dated 10th May 1977, the deposit was taken to have been made on 10th May, 1977. The question, however, which was raised in that case was that the date of first hearing was 5th April, 1977, and not 10th May, 1977 and since the deposit had not been made on 5th April, 1977, the defence was liable to be struck off. This submission was repelled and it was held that since the suit was adjourned on 5th April, 1977, for 10th May 1977, it is the 10th May, 1977, and not 5th April, 1977 which would be taken to be the date of first hearing. It was further held that since the deposit contemplated by Order 15, Rule 5 had been made on 10th May, 1977 the defence of the tenant could not be struck off. In this connection it would be useful to refer to certain observations made in Mathura Prasad's case (supra). It was held that when the Court passes the order changing the date mentioned in the summons for the hearing of the case, it means that the date of hearing given in the summons had been altered and another date of hearing had been substituted, and it is the latter date which becomes the date of hearing and the earlier date mentioned in the summons ceases to be such a date and must be deemed to have been substituted by the later date. Since in Mathura Prasad's case, the case was adjourned from 5th April, 1977, which was the date mentioned in the summons, to 10th May, 1977, even though on the application of the tenant himself, it is the latter date namely 10th May, 1977, which was taken as the first date of hearing and since the amount contemplated by Order 15, Rule 5 C.P.C. was deposited on that date the requirement of that provision was taken to have been fulfilled. In the instant case, however, as already seen above after successive adjournments at the instance of the petitioner 12th March, 1979, was the date fixed for hearing and the petitioner was entitled to file his written statement on or before that date. Even though he did file his written statement on 12th March, 1979, he did not make necessary deposits contemplated by Order 15, Rule 5 C.P.C. This deposit was on the other handmade on 11th July, 1979. It is, therefore, apparent that even if the law laid down in Mathura Prasad's case (supra) which has, as already pointed out above, been over-ruled was taken into consideration by the petitioner he should have made the necessary deposit on or before 12th March 1979, which even according to Mathura Prasad's case would be the first date of hearing. This not having been done it was not open to the petitioner to have taken the stand that non-compliance of requirements of Order 15, rule 5 C.P.C. was on account of the fact that he was misled by the decision of this Court in Mathura Prasad's case (supra). That apart as already seen above the petitioner made defaults in depositing the subsequent monthly rent also. The only ground explaining this default as shown by the petitioner, and as is apparent from the order of the additional District Judge, was that he was keeping bad health and was ill. The cause shown has been considered by the Additional District Judge and has been found not to have been established. The finding, in this behalf recorded by the Additional District Judge is essentially one of fact. The cause shown has been considered by the Additional District Judge and has been found not to have been established. The finding, in this behalf recorded by the Additional District Judge is essentially one of fact. The scope of the requirement of Order 15, rule 5 C.P.C. to the effect that the tenant shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual and the effect of its non-compliance was considered by this Court in Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal 1982 A.R.C. 638. 8. In the result I find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs.