S.K. MAL LODHA, J.—This is a criminal revision under s. 397/461 read with s. 482, Cr.P.C. against the order and directions dated June 8, 1983 made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sriganganagar. 2. The petitioner is the Chairman of the Urban Improvement Trust, Sri-Ganganagar (for short the U.I.T.). Non-petitioner No. 2 Om Prakash Bansal filed a complaint under secs. 406, 409, 420, 465, 467, 471 and 408 and 120-B, I.P.C. against the petitioner as Chairman of the U.I.T. and non-petitioner No. 3 to 6 in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sriganganagar on June 2, 1983. The Chief Judicial Magistrate proceeded to hold an enquiry under s. 202 (1), Cr.P.C. Before examining the witnesses in support of the complaint, a date was fixed for report Before producing the evidence in support of the complaint, the complainant filed an application on June 6, 1983 for summoning of the record mentioned in the application from the office of the U.I.T., Sriganganagar. On June 7, 1983, the Chief Judicial Magistrate was of the opinion that requisitioning of the record was necessary. He, therefore, ordered that the letter summoning the record be sent to the U.I.T. and it may be directed to send the record before the next date of hearing. In pursuance of the order dated June 7, 1983, a letter dated June 8, 1983 was sent by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sriganganagar to the Chairman, U.I.T., Sriganganagar stating that in connection with the complaint filed by Om Prakash Bansal against Radhey Shyam and others, the record mentioned therein is necessary and, therefore, it may be sent without delay. On receipt of this letter, as this letter was issued to the Chairman, U.I.T. Sriganganagar, the petitioner has filed this criminal revision as aforesaid. 3. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. 4. Mr. B.R. Arora, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sriganganagar had no jurisdiction to pass the order and make the directions contained in the letter dated June 8, 1983 as s. 91, Cr.P.C. does not apply to an accused-person and no summons can be issued to the accused compelling him to produce the documents, which incriminate him. He referred to Art. 20(3) of the Constitution showing that an accused-person cannot be compelled to disclose documents, which are incriminatory and based on his knowledge. Mr. He referred to Art. 20(3) of the Constitution showing that an accused-person cannot be compelled to disclose documents, which are incriminatory and based on his knowledge. Mr. M.L. Garg appearing for non-petitioner No.2 (complainant) not only resisted the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, but also pressed that the petitioner cannot file this revision as cognizance has not been taken against him by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and, therefore, the revision should be dismissed as pre-mature and non-maintainable. 5. In these circumstances, two questions crop up for my determination in this criminal revision, namely, (1) whether the petitioner, against whom cognizance has not been taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, can agitate the order and directions nnade in the letter dated June 8, 1983, for production of the record mentioned therein as the letter was addressed to the Chairman, U.I.T., Sriganganagar and the petitioner holds that office and (2) whether no order or direction could be given under s. 91, Cr.P.C. and it is in breach of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. 6. It may be stated that the certified copy of the order-sheet dated June 7, 1983 was placed for my perusal by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner complainant. Its correctness was not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is written therein as follows :- ^^esjs fopkj esa mDr fjdkMZ ryc fd;k tkuk vko;d izrhr gksrk gSA fjdkMZ rych dh fpVBh ;w-vkbZ-Vh- ds uke fy[kh tkosA fjdkMZ vne rkjh[k iskh ls iwoZ Hkstus dks fy[kk tkosA^^ In pursuance of that, the letter dated June 8, 1983 was written to the Chairman, U.I.T., Sriganganagar. 7. 1 take up the first question first. 8. The complaint was filed on June 2,1983. The Chief Judicial Magistrate proceeded to hold an enquiry under s. 202(1), Cr.P.C. No process has been issued against the petitioner by the Chief Judicial Magistrate as yet. There is no dispute with respect to these facts. On these facts, it is to be determined whether the petitioner is a person accused of any offence as used in Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. In this connection, it is relevant to notice the decisions of the Supreme Court bearing on the question. 9. In M.P. Sharma V. Satish Chandra (1), search warrants were issued against the persons, who were included in the category of accused in the first information report. In this connection, it is relevant to notice the decisions of the Supreme Court bearing on the question. 9. In M.P. Sharma V. Satish Chandra (1), search warrants were issued against the persons, who were included in the category of accused in the first information report. The question arose whether these persons can be said to be persons accused of an offence. It was observed therein as follows:- "Nor is there any reason to think that the protection in respect of the evidence as procured is confined to what transpires at the trial in the court room. The phrase used is Article 20(3) is "to be a witness" and not to "appear as a witness": It follows that the protection afforded to an accused in so far as it is related to the phrase "to be a witness" is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the court room but may well extend to compelled testimony previously obtained from him. It is available therefore to a person against whom a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in prosecution. Whether it is available to other persons in other situations does not call for decision in this case." This question was considered in Raja Narayan Lal V. Bansi Lal Maneek Phiroz Mistry (2), wherein, Gajendra Gadkar,J., as he then was, ruled as under:- "Similarly, for invoking the constitutional right against testimonial compulsion guaranteed under Art. 20(3) it must appear that a formal accusation has been made against the party pleading the guarantee and that it relates to the commission of an offence which in the normal course may result in prosecution." The expression "accused of any offence" used in Art. 20(3) again came up for consideration in Ramesh Chandra Mehta V. State of W.B. (3). After reviewing various authorities, it was stated as under;- "Normally a person stands in the character of an accused when a First Information Report is lodged against him in respect of an offence before an Officer competent to investigate it, or when a complaint is made relating to the commission of an offence before a Magistrate competent to try or send to another Magistrate for trial of the offence." All the aforesaid authorities were considered in R.B. Shah V. D.K. Guha (4). In that case the question was whether a person against whom F.I.R. in respect of an offence, inter alia, under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is lodged, being a person accused of an offence, is entitled to the protection under Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. It was observed in para 18, as follows:- "It is well settled that with the lodging of a first information report a person is accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20(3)." The principle that can safely be deduced from the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court is that protection under Art. 20(3) of the Constitution is available to a person against whom a formal accusation relating to the commission of offence had been levelled, which in the normal course, may result in prosecution. In the case on hand, non petitioner No.2 had made formal accusation against the petitioner and non-petitioners No.3 to 6. The Chief Judicial Magistrate is holding enquiry into the complaint under s. 202(1), Cr.P.C. In these circumstances, I hold that though the Chief Judicial Magistrate had not taken cognizance against the petitioner, still he (petitioner) can agitate the order and directions made in the letter dated August 8, 1983 for production of the record mentioned therein. The letter was addressed to the Chairman of the Urban Improvement Trust and the petitioner holds that office. In these circumstances, the first question formulated by me above is answered in the affirmative. 10. Regarding second question, I may read s. 91, Cr.P.C. It is as under:-"91. Summons to produce document or other thing:- (1) Whenever any Court or any officer-in-charge of a police station considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings under this Code by or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue a summons, or such officer a written order, to the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order. (2) Any person required under this section merely to produce a document or other thing shall be deemed to have complied with the requisition, if he causes such document or thing to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same. (2) Any person required under this section merely to produce a document or other thing shall be deemed to have complied with the requisition, if he causes such document or thing to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same. (3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed- (a) to effect sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), or the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891 (13 of 1891), or (b) to apply to a letter, postcard, telegram or other document or any parcel or thing in the custody of the postal or telegraph authority. Art. 20(3) of the Constitution is as follows:- "(3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." 11. The Supreme Court, while considering sec. 94(1) (old), Cr. P.C., has heldin ShyamLal Mohan Lal vs. State of Gujarat (5) that on true construction, s. 94 (old), Cr.P.C. does not apply to in accused person. The decision in ShyamLal Mohan Lals case (supra) was considered in vs. S. Kuttan Pillai vs. Ramakrishna (6) and following that decision, it was held that one must proceed on the basis of that summons to produce a thing or document on contemplated by s. 91(1) cannot be issued to a person accused of an offence calling upon him to produce document or thing considered necessary or desirable for the purpose of investigation, enquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Criminal Procedure Code. It is, thus, clear that the word person mentioned in s. 91(1), Cr.P.C. does not include an accused. 12. The question involved in M P. Sharmas case (1) related to the power of the court to direct search and seizure under s. 96(1)(old),Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court in that case assumed that s. 94(old), Cr.P.C. is applicable to the accused and that there is an element of compulsion implicit in the process contemplated by it, they cannot be read as importing any statutory recognition of a theory that search and seizure of documents to compelled production thereof. It was held that the constitutional protection would be defeated by the statutory provisions for searches 13. Art. 20(3) again came up for consideration in State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu (7). It was observed therein as follows;- "The accused may have documentary evidence in his possession which may throw some light on the controversy. It was held that the constitutional protection would be defeated by the statutory provisions for searches 13. Art. 20(3) again came up for consideration in State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu (7). It was observed therein as follows;- "The accused may have documentary evidence in his possession which may throw some light on the controversy. If it is a document which is not his statement conveying his personal knowledge relating to the charge against him,he may be called upon by the Court to produce that document in accordance with the provisions of sec. 139 of the Evidence Act, which in terms provides that a person may be summoned to produce a document in his possession or power and that he does not become a witness by the mere fact that he has produced it; and, therefore, he cannot be cross-examined. Of course, he can be cross-examined if he is called as a witness who has made statements conveying his personal knowledge by reference to the contents of the document or if he has given his statements in Court otherwise than by reference to the contents of the documents. In our opinion, therefore, the observations of this Court in Sharmas case, 1954 S.C.R. 1977; AIR 1954 SC. 300 , that Sec. 139 of the Evidence Act has no bearing on the connotation of the word witness is not entirely well founded in law. It is well established that clause (3) of Art. 20 is directed against self-incrimination by an accused person, self-incrimination must mean conveying information based upon the personal knowledge of the person giving the information and cannot include merely the mechanical process of producing documents in Court which may throw a light on any of the points in controvercy, but which do not contain any statement of the accused based on his personal knowledge. For example, the accused person may be in possession of a document which is in his writing or which contains his signature or his thumb-impression. For example, the accused person may be in possession of a document which is in his writing or which contains his signature or his thumb-impression. The production of such a document, with a view to comparison of the writing or the signature or the impression, is not the statement of an accused person, which can be said to be of the nature of a personal testimony." It is clear from State of Bombays case (supra), that whether or not the order requiring the production of a document by an accused person is hit by the prohibition contained in Art. 20(3) of the Constitution would depend upon the nature of that document and if the document is such as is not his statement conveying his personal knowledge relating to the charge against him, he may be called upon by the Court to produce that document, but if the order relates to a document, which contains any statement of the accused based on his personal knowledge, the order for its production will attract the bar of the Art. 20(3) against testimonial compulsion. 13. S. 100 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act (No. XXXV of 1959) (for short the Act), deals with restriction on the summoning of Trust servants to produce documents. It is clear from this section that no trustee or officer or servant of the Trust can in any legal proceeding to which the Trust is not a party be required to produce any register or document the contents of which can be proved under the preceding section by a certified copy, or to appear as a witness to prove the matters and transection recorded therein unless by order of the Court made for special cause. 14. Sec. 99 of the Act deals with mode of proof of Trust records. 14. Sec. 99 of the Act deals with mode of proof of Trust records. It is as under:- "Mode of proof of Trust records-A cony of any receipt, application, plan, notice, order entry in a register or other document in the possession of the Trust shall, if duly certified by the legal keeper there of, or the secretary of the Trust or any person authorised by the Trust in this behalf be received as prima facie evidence of the entry or document and shall be admitted as evidence of the matters and transection therein recorded in every case where, and to the same extent as, the original entry or document would, if produced, have been admissible to prove such matter." 15. In Madan Lal Jajodio v. State(8), the petitioner was prosecuted under s. 409, I.P.C. The learned Magistrate, at the request of prosecution called upon the petitioner to produce his Food-grains Procurement Stock Register. That order seemed to have been passed under s. 94 (old), Cr.P.C. The order was challenged in revision before the High Court relying on m.p. Sharmas case (1). It was held by the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court that the register was a public record and a public document and that the accused must comply with the order of the Magistrate issued under s. 94 (old), Cr.P.C. and produce the register. The reason given was that apart from the statutory duty of maintaining the Foodgrains Procurement Stock Register, cast on the accused by the Orissa Foodgrains Control Order, 1951, and the license issued thereunder, the accused by acting as the agent of the Government had undertaken to maintain this register in accordance with the directions that may be issued from time to time by a public officer. It is not the case of the petitioner that the record which has been summoned from the U.I.T. contain information based upon his personal knowledge which is to be used as incriminating evidence a gainst him. In these circumstances, it is not open to the learned counsel for the petitioner to contend that no order or directions for the production of the record could be given. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has merely ordered, as is clear from the letter dated June 8, 1983, that the record mentioned therein may be sent without delay. No Trust or Officer has been summoned under s. 100 of the Act. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has merely ordered, as is clear from the letter dated June 8, 1983, that the record mentioned therein may be sent without delay. No Trust or Officer has been summoned under s. 100 of the Act. It may, however, be observed that it will be open to the U.I.T. to invite the attention of the Chief Judicial Magistrate to the provisions contained in ss. 99 and 100 of the Act. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on R.C. Gupta vs. State (9), Baedya v. Smt. Kamli Bai (10) and Alladeen vs. the State of Rajasthan (11). 17. What was held in R.C. Guptas case (supra) was that the expression to be a witness used in Art 20(3) has to be read in a wide sense and that expression includes furnishing evidence. An order was made under s. 94 (old), Cr. P.C. directing to produce the document before the Court. It was held that such an order is clear an order to furnish evidence and, therefore, attracts the prohibition contained in Art. 20 (3/ of the Constitution. 18. In Badyas case (supra), s.94 (old) Cr.P.C. came up for consideration. In that case, the accused was directed to produce the she buffaloes alleged to have been stolen by them in the Court when the complainants evidence was to be recorded. State of Gujarats case (supra) was noticed. It was held that such directions could not have been made. 19. While granting anticipatory bail on condition of producing articles alleged to be stolen, it was held in Alladeens case (supra) that such condition cannot be imposed. In my opinion, this authority has no relevance to the case on hand. The order and directions made in the letter dated June 8, 1983, cannot be said to be in disregard of Art. 20(3) of Constitution. It is well settled that inherent powers under Sec. 482, Cr.P.C. are to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases for correcting patent illegalities. It is not a case where powers under Sec. 482 should be invoked. 20. For the aforesaid reasons, this, petition cannot be entertained. It is, accordingly, dismissed.