ORDER S.K. Dhaon, J. - This writ petition is directed against an appellate order passed by the State Government dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner and upholding the order of the Effluent Board rejecting the application made by the petitioner for the approval of the arrangements made by it for the treatment of waste and effluents discharged by it. 2. The petitioner factory was set up some time immediately before 1963 and it went into production in the year 1963. Having regard to the provisions of S. 12 of the Factories Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and R. 18 of the U. P. Factories Rules, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the rules) the petitioner made an application to the Effluent Board under sub- rule (7) of R. 18. It is not disputed that the application fulfilled the requirements of sub- rule (8) of R. 18. On 28th Jan. 1975, the Effluent Board disapproved the arrangements suggested by the petitioner for the disposal of the effluents into the river from its factory. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the impugned order. 3. In the impugned appellate order it is stated that the content of effluents discharged by the petitioner factory was 750 Biological Oxygen Demand (B. O. D.) parts per million (P. P. M.) whereas the prescribed content was B.O.D 200 P. P. M. The appellate authority took the view that such a high content of B.O.D. effluents was injurious to the public health. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Effluent Board as well as the appellate authority merely assumed that the B.O.D. contents should be 200 P. P. M. He has urged that in fact no limit has been prescribed either in the Act or in the rules. This position has not been controverted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the contesting respondents. I have gone through R. 18 with the help of the learned counsel and the learned Standing counsel is not in a position to lay his finger on any particular rule which prescribes any norm, much less a norm of 200 P. P. M. The learned Standing counsel, however, invited my attention to the mass of correspondence which ensued between the petitioner and the Department. From a perusal of the correspondence it does appear that the Government had set up an enquiry committee known as The Factory Effluent Enquiry Committee'. It appears that, in 1958 the Factory Effluent Enquiry Committee had submitted an enquiry report recommending that certain norms should be adopted. The learned Standing counsel is not incorrect in contending that from a perusal of the documents on record it appears that the Effluent Board had probably accepted the findings of the Factory Effluent Enquiry Committee,. However, the fact remains that the findings contained in the said report were not given a statutory shape. 4A. S. 12 of the Act may be extracted : "12. Disposal of wastes and effluents- (1) Effective arrangements shall be made in every factory for the treatment of wastes and effluents due to the manufacturing process carried on therein, so as to render them innocuous, and for their disposal. (2) The State Government may make rules prescribing the arrangements to be made under sub-sec. (1) or requiring that the arrangements made in accordance with sub-sec. (1) shall be approved by such authority as may be prescribed'". As already indicated, in R. 18 there is no prescription regarding the arrangements to be made in any factory for the treatment of wastes and effluents. However, the said rules require every factory to make the said arrangements and get them approved by the Effluent Board constituted by the State Government. Thus, it is clear that a statutory obligation has been cast upon the owner or occupier of a factory to either make arrangements for the treatment of wastes and effluents in accordance with the norms prescribed by the State Government in this behalf or make its own arrangements and obtain the approval of the Effluent Board. It is clear that in the absence of an approval by the Effluent Board, the arrangements made by any factory will be ineffective and non existent in the eye of law. A perusal of R. 18 would show that, so far, no norm or guideline has been provided for the accord of the approval by the Effluent Board, It is also clear that there is no prohibition express or implied preventing the Effluent board from adopting a norm for the purpose of according approval to the arrangements suggested by a factory. A perusal of R. 18 would show that, so far, no norm or guideline has been provided for the accord of the approval by the Effluent Board, It is also clear that there is no prohibition express or implied preventing the Effluent board from adopting a norm for the purpose of according approval to the arrangements suggested by a factory. On the contrary, such a power in the Effluent Board is implicit, in the provisions as contained in S. 12 of the Act. The provisions of S. 12 of the Act constitute a restriction on the right of an owner or occupier of a factory to carry on trade and business as guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. Of course, it is always open to the Legislature to impose reasonable restrictions. Therefore, the norm or guide-line, which the Effluent Board may adopt for the purpose of approving the arrangements made in a factory for the treatment of wastes and effluents, should pass the test of reasonableness as required by the provisions of Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. The requirement of that provision is that the restrictions should be reasonable and they should be in the interest of the general public. That apart, the norm or guideline to be adopted by the Effluent Board should neither be arbitrary, nor capricious, nor unjust, nor unfair, nor oppressive. They should have a rational relationship with the object of the Legislature in enacting S. 12 of the Act. A balance should be drawn between the public interest and the right of the owner or occupier of a factory to carry on its business. It appears that the prime intention of the Legislature in enacting S. 12 is that public health should be allowed to suffer as little as possible as a result of the discharge of wastes and effluents due to the manufacturing process carried on in a Factory. 5. In this court a copy of the report of the Factory Effluent Enquiry Committee has not been filed by either side. Neither in the order of the appellate authority nor in the order of the original authority, the contents of the report of the said Enquiry Committee have been disclosed. The effluent Board, could, and even now can, adopt the norms suggested by the said Enquiry Committee instead of laying down its own norms. Neither in the order of the appellate authority nor in the order of the original authority, the contents of the report of the said Enquiry Committee have been disclosed. The effluent Board, could, and even now can, adopt the norms suggested by the said Enquiry Committee instead of laying down its own norms. In that situation, the report of the Enquiry Committee containing the norms will have to undergo a judicial scrutiny on the touchstone of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. 6. I am constrained to take the view that the order of the appellate authority stands vitiated because it has not disclosed any reason as to how and why it considered 200 P. P. Ni as the prescribed norm. It was open to the appellate authority to have stated in its order that it had adhered to that norm as the Effluent board had accepted the report of the Factory Effluent Enquiry Committee. It was also open to the appellate authority to have recorded a finding that the petitioner had itself accepted the norm of 200 P. P.M. and had been in the past taking time at different stages for taking steps to conform to that norm, However, the appellate authority left the entire matter to be speculated upon. Had it discharged its statutory functions of passing a speaking order and had it not shirked its responsibility of deciding the matter as a final authority under the Act and the Rules, probably the petitioners would not have been in a position to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this court. Be that as it may the order of the appellate authority, as it stands, has got to be set aside, and the matter has to sent back to it for reconsideration on merits and in accordance with law. Since the matter is pretty old, it is expected that the appellate authority shall decide the appeal of the petitioner expeditiously. 7. In the result, this petition succeeds. It is allowed. The order dated 1st May 1975, passed by the State Government the respondent no. 1 is quashed. The State Government is directed to admit the appeal of the petitioner to its original number and dispose of the same on merits in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. However, there shall be no order as to costs.