ORDER K.S. Verma, J. - In this petition the petitioner has prayed that the judgment and decree dated 31-1-1983 passed by the Additional District Judge, Lucknow be quashed. Radha Charan Agarwal filed a suit for the ejectment and for arrears of rent against Brahmanand Sharma and others. The plaintiff Radha Charan Agarwal came to court on the allegations that he was the owner and landlord of shops 693 and 694 situate at Aminabad, Lucknow. In the year 1954 Brahmanand Sharma was admitted as a tenant of the premises in suit to run a shop of Ayurvedic medicines. It is stated in the plaint that the plaintiff agreed to give receipts to Brahmanand Sharma when the shops in question were allotted in his name. Brahmanand Sharma paid up the arrears of rent due against Sri Krishna and Gauri Shanker, previous tenants, and started business of his own. After that Brahmanand Sharma illegally sublet the premises in question to the defendant Om Prakash Sharma. Subsequently, Brahmanand Sharma fell in arrears of rent and thereafter notice for payment of arrears and ejectment was served upon him and defendant Om Prakash Sharma. The defendants did not pay up the arrears and the tenancy stood terminated on service of notice. In spite of service of notice, the defendants have neither paid up the arrears of rent nor vacated the premises in question, hence the suit for ejectment and for arrears of rent was filed by Radha Charan Agarwal. The plaint filed by Radha Charan Agarwal is marked as Annexure 4 to the writ petition. At this stage, it may be noted that Brahmanand Sharma neither filed any written statement nor did he appear in the witness box during the progress of the suit. Om Prakash Sharma filed a written statement which is annexure 5 to the writ petition. The case put forward by Om Prakash Sharma is that shops 693 and 694 situate at Aminabad, Lucknow were originally in the tenancy of Sri Krishna and Gauri Shankar Rastogi. Brahmanand Sharma entered into partnership with Sri Krishna Gupta and Gauri Shanker Rastogi. After some time Sri Krishna Gupta retired from the firm and thereafter Brahmanand Sharma, Gauri Shanker and others carried on business in partnership. Brahmanand Sharma entered into partnership with Sri Krishna Gupta and Gauri Shanker Rastogi. After some time Sri Krishna Gupta retired from the firm and thereafter Brahmanand Sharma, Gauri Shanker and others carried on business in partnership. Ultimately, Gauri Shanker also retired from the firm on 31-10-1965 and Brahmanand Sharma and Om Prakash Sharma entered into partnership and thereafter they carried on business in the name and style Dhanwantari Aushadyalay. It is stated by Om Prakash Sharma that Brahmanand Sharma also retired on 31-3-1971 and thereafter he is carrying on the business as sole proprietor and paying rent to the plaintiff who has full knowledge of the said facts. For the last few months the plaintiff in collusion with Brahmanand Sharma avoided to receive the rent and allowed it to accumulate with ulterior motive. 2. The trial of the case proceeded before the Civil Judge Malihabad exercising the powers of Judge Small Cause, Lucknow. Brahmanand Sharma did not appear before the trial Court and the trial proceeded ex parte against him. The trial court by its judgment and decree dated 3-9-1979 held that the notice of demand and the notice terminating the tenancy were served on the defendants and their tenancy stood determined on the expiry of 30 days i.e. with effect from 24-10-1975. The trial Court held that Brahmanand Sharma had been in actual possession of the shops in question and he was the tenant of the same. It was also found by the trial Court that Brahmanand Sharma had illegally sublet the shops in dispute to Om Prakash Sharma. On recording these findings the trial court decreed the plaintiffs suit for arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 1415.22 and for the ejectment from the shop in question. A copy of the judgment of the trial Court is Annexure 7 to the writ petition. 3. It may be noted that Om Prakash Sharma defendant No. 2 in the suit did not challenge the decree passed by the trial Court and the same has become final so far as he is concerned. However, a revision application under Section 25 of the U.P. Small Cause Courts Act was filed by Brahmanand Sharma after impleading Radha Charan Agarwal, the plaintiff, and Om Prakash Sharma. A copy of the grounds of revision is Annexure 8 to the writ petition. However, a revision application under Section 25 of the U.P. Small Cause Courts Act was filed by Brahmanand Sharma after impleading Radha Charan Agarwal, the plaintiff, and Om Prakash Sharma. A copy of the grounds of revision is Annexure 8 to the writ petition. From a perusal of the grounds of revision it appears that Brahmanand Sharma raised the plea that the Court below erred in holding that the defendants are the tenants of the shops in suit. It was also stated in the grounds of revision that the Court below erred in holding that the defendants fell in arrears of rent. It was also pleaded that the suit, was bad for misjoinder of causes of action and for non-joinder of necessary parties. The revision application District Judge, Lucknow who by his judgment and decree dated 31-1-1983 maintained the decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the revision application. A copy of the judgment rendered by the Additional District Judge is Annexure 9 to the writ petition. In the revision application a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the plaintiff opposite party No. 1 that the revision application at the instance of Brahmanand Sharma was not maintainable. The Court of revision overruled the preliminary objection and held that since the decree for ejectment had been passed against Brahmanand Sharma, he is entitled to challenge the decree even though the case proceeded ex parte against him before the trial Court. The Court of revision held that Brahmanand Sharma was the tenant of the shops in question and Om Prakash Sharm was a sub-tenant and that in spite of notice of demand Brahmanand Sharma did not pay up the arrears of rent nor did he vacate the shops in question. After recording these findings, the Additional District Judge dismissed the revision application and maintained the decree for ejectment and for arrears of rent passed by the trial Court. It appears that during the pendency of the revision application Brahmanand Sharma died and his heirs were brought on record. The said heirs aggrieved by the decree passed by the Additional District Judge have filed the present writ petition and have prayed that the decree for ejectment passed by the Additional District Judge, Lucknow be quashed. 4. It appears that during the pendency of the revision application Brahmanand Sharma died and his heirs were brought on record. The said heirs aggrieved by the decree passed by the Additional District Judge have filed the present writ petition and have prayed that the decree for ejectment passed by the Additional District Judge, Lucknow be quashed. 4. The first point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that a close scrutiny of the allegations in the plaint indicates that Gauri Shankar and Sri Krishna were the previous tenants of the shops in question and that their tenancy never came to an end even according to the plaintiff's version. In this respect the attention of the Court was drawn to paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of the plaint. The specific case of the plaintiff is that Sri Krishna and Gauri Shankar were persuaded to relinquish the tenancy in respect of the shops in question and Brahmanand Sharma wanted to run a shop of Ayurvedic Medicines. According to the plaintiff Brahmanand Sharma was admitted as a tenant of the shops informally with the condition that his tenancy would be recognised after he had secured the order of allotment. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the facts stated in the plaint indicate that the tenancy of Sri Krishna and Gauri Shankar never came to an end and Brahmanand Sharma was not treated as a tenant as he had not obtained an allotment order. By reference to Annexures 1 and 2, notices terminating the tenancy, it was contended that the plaintiff treated Sri Krishna and Gauri Shanker as tenants, otherwise there was no necessity of giving notices to them along with Brahmanand Sharma. In my opinion, the points raised involve determination of questions of fact. It is admitted position that Brahmanand did not file any written statement nor did he put himself into witness box. If Brahmanand wanted to raise these questions and build up an argument, he could do so by controverting the facts alleged in the plaint by filing a written statement and by appearing in the witness box in support of his case. If Brahmanand wanted to raise these questions and build up an argument, he could do so by controverting the facts alleged in the plaint by filing a written statement and by appearing in the witness box in support of his case. On the other hand, Om Prakash Sharma filed a written statement and in paragraph 35 of his written statement he clearly put forward the plea that Brahmanand Sharma retired from business and after that Om Prakash Sharma had been carrying on business as the sole proprietor and was paying rent to the plaintiff. The categorical case put forward by Om Prakash Sharma was that he was the tenant and that Brahmanand Sharma in collusion with the plaintiff allowed the rent to accumulate and then he did not pay up the arrears of rent demanded from him. On the basis of the averments in the plaint and the averments made by Om Prakash Sharma in his written statement the only question that arose for consideration of the Court was whether Om Prakash Sharma was the sole proprietor of the business and was the tenant of the accommodation in question. It has again to be emphasised that Brahmanand Sharma never filed any written statement nor did he appear in the witness box in support of his case. On the basis of the pleadings on record the Court below came to a finding that Brahmanand was the tenant of the accommodation in question and that Om Prakash Sharma was a subtenant. In my opinion, on the basis of the facts that were in issue and the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court as also the Court of revision were justified in coming to a finding that Brahmanand Sharma was the tenant and defendant No. 2 Om Prakash Sharma was his sub-tenant. This finding was arrived at on the basis of the evidence led by the plaintiff and defendant No. 2. The question that now arises is whether on the basis of evidence on record, the Courts below were justified in coming to a finding that Brahmanand was the tenant and Om Prakash Sharma was his sub-tenant. Before the trial Court the plaintiff examined himself. His statement is Annexure 6 to the writ petition. The question that now arises is whether on the basis of evidence on record, the Courts below were justified in coming to a finding that Brahmanand was the tenant and Om Prakash Sharma was his sub-tenant. Before the trial Court the plaintiff examined himself. His statement is Annexure 6 to the writ petition. A perusal of the said statement indicates that the plaintiff clearly stated that in 1971 he treated Brahmanand Sharma as his tenant and he was paying rent of the shops in question. He has proved the notices which he sent to Brahmanand Sharma and stated that in spite of notice, he did not pay the rent. He denied that he accepted Om Prakash Sharma as a tenant of the shops in question. The Courts below relying upon the evidence of the plaintiff and also the evidence led by defendant No. 2 Om Prakash Sharma came to a finding that Brahmanand Sharma was a tenant and Om Prakash Sharma was his sub-tenant. 5. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that even though Brahmanand Sharma did not file his written statement but since a decree for ejectment had been passed against him, he is entitled to challenge the decree on the (basis?) of the infirmities which are apparent in the plaintiffs case. In this respect it was again reiterated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that from a perusal of the plaint and the notices Annexures 1 and 2, it does not appear that there is any allegation about the termination of the tenancy of Sri Krishna and Gauri Shankar. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the fact that notices, Annexures 1 and 2 were addressed to Sri Krishna and Gauri Shankar also along with Brahmanand Sharma indicates that the tenancy of Sri Krishna and Gauri Shankar subsisted. If the tenancy of Sri Krishna and Gauri Shankar subsisted then obviously the decree for ejectment could not be passed against Brahmanand Sharma. In my opinion, this argument has to be relied (repelled?). In paragraph 7 of the plaint it has been clearly averred that Brahmanand Sharma wanted to run the business. He persuaded Sri Krishna to relinquish the tenancy in his favour. Sri Krishna, accordingly, gave up possession and Brahmanand was admitted as a tenant. In my opinion, this argument has to be relied (repelled?). In paragraph 7 of the plaint it has been clearly averred that Brahmanand Sharma wanted to run the business. He persuaded Sri Krishna to relinquish the tenancy in his favour. Sri Krishna, accordingly, gave up possession and Brahmanand was admitted as a tenant. In paragraph 8 of the plaint it is further averred that Brahmanand Sharma arranged to pay the arrears of rent due from Sri Krishna and the rent was paid and on the request of Brahmanand Sharma the receipts were issued in the name of Sri Krishna through Brahmanand Sharma till such time as the allotment of the shops in question in the name of Brahmanand Sharma was brought into effect. It is apparent from the two paragraphs that the plaintiff asserted that Brahmanand is the tenant. In my opinion, the allegations are not open to the interpretation that the plaintiff treated the tenancy of Sri Krishna and Gauri Shankar as subsisting. On the other hand there are definite averments in the plaint which indicate that the plaintiff treated Brahmanand Sharma as his tenant. In this view of the matter, it is not possible to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that on the pleadings of the parties, the plaintiff treated the tenancy of Sri Krishna and Gauri Shankar as subsisting. As observed earlier, if Brahmanand Sharma really wanted to avoid the decree for ejectment he could have filed his written statement and contended that he was not the tenant of the accommodation in question. In the absence of any such pleading Brahmanand Sharma cannot be allowed to challenge the decree for ejectment passed against him as the averments in the plaint clearly indicated that the plaintiff treated Brahmanand Sharma as his tenant and that position could be controverted only by filing a written statement and contesting the suit in a regular manner. I am accordingly of the view that since Brahmanand Sharma did not contest the suit by controverting the allegations made in the plaint, it is not possible for him to raise pleas in his support before a Court of revision. I am accordingly of the view that since Brahmanand Sharma did not contest the suit by controverting the allegations made in the plaint, it is not possible for him to raise pleas in his support before a Court of revision. The points raised by Brahmanand Sharma raised questions of fact and unless those questions of fact are put in issue and a finding is recorded by the trial Court, it is not open to Brahmanand Sharma to raise the pleas raised by him for the first time before the Court of revision. 6. It was next contended that the averments made in the plaint indicate that the tenancy of Brahmanand Sharma, if any, was dependent upon an allotment order being procured by him. Since, admittedly, the accommodation in question has not been allotted to Brahmanand Sharma, the contract of tenancy between the plaintiff and Brahmanand Sharma would be hit by S. 11 of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972. The said section provides that no person shall let out a building except by an allotment order issued under S. 16 of the said Act. S. 13 of the Act provides that if a landlord or tenant ceases to occupy a building no person shall occupy it in any capacity on his behalf, otherwise than under an order of allotment or release under S. 16 of the Act and if a person so purports to occupy it he shall, without prejudice to the provisions of S. 31 of the Act, be deemed to be an unauthorised occupant of such building. S. 31 of the Act provides for penalty for contravening the provisions of the Act. A close analysis of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act would indicate that no person shall let any building except in pursuance of an allotment order and if any person occupies any building otherwise than under an order of allotment, he shall be deemed to be an unauthorised occupant of such building. The consequence of failure to obtain allotment order would have the effect of treating the occupant as an unauthorised occupant and any person who contravenes the provisions of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act would be liable to be punished under S. 31 of the Act. The consequence of failure to obtain allotment order would have the effect of treating the occupant as an unauthorised occupant and any person who contravenes the provisions of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act would be liable to be punished under S. 31 of the Act. A perusal of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act also reveals that a contract of tenancy between a landlord and a tenant otherwise than under an alloment order would not bind the prescribed authority constituted under U.P. Act 13 of 1972 and it may treat such an occupant as an unauthorised occupant liable to be evicted as such. 7. In Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 1924 , the question arose whether a contract of tenancy otherwise than in accordance with Section 7(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 was valid or not. The said section provided that the District Magistrate may by general or special order require a landlord to let or not to let to any person any accommodation which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant. S. 7-A (1) of U.P. Act III of 1947 provided that if any person was found to be an occupant of any accommodation in contravention of the order of ,District Magistrate under S. 7(2) of the Act, the District Magistrate may call upon the person in occupation to show cause why he should not be evicted therefrom. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the tenancy created otherwise than by an order of allotment made by the District Magistrate would be void and no rights would flow from such a contract between the contracting parties. The Supreme Court on a consideration of the authorities bearing on the point held that a lease made in violation of S. 7(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 would be valid between the parties and would create a relationship of landlord and tenant between them although it may not bind the authorities concerned. The Supreme Court on a consideration of the authorities bearing on the point held that a lease made in violation of S. 7(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 would be valid between the parties and would create a relationship of landlord and tenant between them although it may not bind the authorities concerned. At page 1927 of the said report, the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court observed as follows : "In Udhoo Das v. Prem Prakash, 1963 All LJ 406 : AIR 1964 All 1 (FB), a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court took the view that a lease made in violation of the provisions of S. 7(2) would be valid between the parties and would create the relationship of landlord and tenant between them although it might not bind the authorities concerned. In the light of this ruling - the correctness of which we see no reason to doubt - we think that the respondent was a tenant." 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, 1982 All LJ 857. The decision has considered the scope of Sections 11 and 31 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. A perusal of the said decision indicates that the question involved was whether the accommodation in question was vacant or not. One D. P. Singh moved an application for allotment of the accommodation in question and in pursuance of the application the Inspector made a spot inquiry and submitted a report that Nizam Shervani was the occupant of the aforesaid accommodation and had vacated the same. On being satisfied from the report of the Inspector, the Rent Control authorities declared the vacancy and fixed a date for consideration of the allotment application. Before the allotment applications could come up for consideration, the petitioner in that case, Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd., Allahabad filed an objection and claimed that it was contended that the report submitted by the Inspector was incorrect and hence the order dated 23-11-1981 declaring the vacancy was liable to be recalled. To this reply of the petitioner, respondent No. 3 in that case, D. P. Singh filed objections to the effect that Nizam Shervani was in illegal possession of the disputed premises and as he had vacated the same on 18-11-1982, the premises were vacant and were open for allotment. To this reply of the petitioner, respondent No. 3 in that case, D. P. Singh filed objections to the effect that Nizam Shervani was in illegal possession of the disputed premises and as he had vacated the same on 18-11-1982, the premises were vacant and were open for allotment. According to respondent No 3 D. P. Singh, Nizam Shervani was in ockpation in his own right and had telephone connection in the name and style of Sigma Chemicals in which name Nizam Shervani was running the business at Kanpur Road near Subedar- ganj Allahabad. It was contended that Nizam Shervani was not an employee of Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd. Allahabad. The Rent Control authorities rejected the application of the petitioner Company for recalling the order dated 23-11-1981 and held that Nizam Shervani was never an employee or an officer of M/s. Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd. Allahabad and hence his possession was invalid and unauthorized. The order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was challenged by the petitioner on a number of grounds. At page 860 of the aforesaid report, the Division Bench in paragraph 12 discussed the scope of Sections 11 and 13 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. By reference to Sections 11 and 13 it was observed that no one can either let out any premises without any allotment order nor can anyone occupy the same and if anyone does so without an allotment order such a person would be treated as an unauthorised occupant and his possession would be no possession in the eye of law. In such circumstances, it was held that the accommodation could be treated as vacant by the Rent Control authorities and the same would be available for allotment under S. 16 of the Act. It was ultimately held that the accommodation was vacant as the petitioner was not in possession under an order of allotment. It has to be noted that the case of Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd. is a case governed by U.P. Act XIII of 1972. In this writ petition the contract of tenancy, according to the plaintiff was entered into between him and Brahmanand prior to the enforcement of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. The decision in Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 1924 (supra) is under U.P. Act III of 1947. In this writ petition the contract of tenancy, according to the plaintiff was entered into between him and Brahmanand prior to the enforcement of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. The decision in Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 1924 (supra) is under U.P. Act III of 1947. The position that emerges is that a contract of tenancy between the parties when U.P. Act III of 1947 was in force, otherwise than by means of an order of allotment would be a valid contract of tenancy between the parties but such a contract would not be binding on the Rent Control authorities who may treat the accommodation as vacant and available for allotment. In- the instant case, the Courts below have found that Brahmanand Sharma was the tenant of the accommodation in question. This finding was recorded on the basis of the averment in the plaint that Brahmanand was admitted as a tenant before the enforcement of U.P. Act XIII of 1972, and on the basis of the statement of the plaintiff. Such a contract of tenancy was between Brahmanand Sharma and the plaintiff would be valid in view of Murlidhar's case (Supra) but would not be binding on the Rent Control authorities and they may if they think proper treat the accommodation as vacant. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon Naveen Chandra Sharma v. 6th Addl. District and Sessions Judge Meerut, AIR 1983 All 116 and by reference to the said decision it was contended that the contract of tenancy otherwise than by an order of allotment would not be binding between the parties also. A perusal of the decision would indicate that the decision of the case proceeded on the assumption that the accommodation in question had been let out at a time when U.P. Act 13 of 1972 had already come into operation. Before the learned Judge reliance was placed on Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 1924 (supra) for the proposition that a tenancy created otherwise than by an order of allotment may be binding between the parties but would not be binding on the Rent Control authorities. Before the learned Judge reliance was placed on Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 1924 (supra) for the proposition that a tenancy created otherwise than by an order of allotment may be binding between the parties but would not be binding on the Rent Control authorities. In this respect the learned Judge at page 121 of the said report observed as follows :- "In my humble view it would not be right to apply the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Murlidhar Agarwal, AIR 1974 SC 1924 to a contract of tenancy entered into subsequent to the coming into force of the 1972 Act. The provisions of the 1972 Act are radically different in material aspects from the provisions of the 1947 Act." At page 122 of the aforesaid report, the learned Judge also observed as follows :- "With great respect, on this controversy, I would prefer to follow the decision of our own Court in the case of Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd., 1982 All LJ 857 (Supra). I fully agree with the view expressed by the Division Bench of our Court that the ratio of the decision in the case of Murlidhar Agarwal, AIR 1974 SC 1924 cannot be applied to cases governed by the 1972 Act." The said decision may be an authority in respect of a contract of tenancy entered into after the enforcement of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. If after the enforcement of that Act a contract of tenancy is entered into otherwise than by an order of allotment the tenancy may be void as between the parties also as held by the learned Judge in the decision referred to above. In the present writ petition there is a clear averment in the plaint filed by Radha Charan Agarwal that Brahmanand Sharma was the tenant of the said two shops with the consent of the landlord long before the commencement of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. The plaintiff in his statement Annexure-6 to the petition has stated that he recognised Brahmanand Sharma as a tenant of the shops in question in,1971 Brahmanand Sharma did not file any written statement nor did he appear in the witness box. In these. The plaintiff in his statement Annexure-6 to the petition has stated that he recognised Brahmanand Sharma as a tenant of the shops in question in,1971 Brahmanand Sharma did not file any written statement nor did he appear in the witness box. In these. circumstances the allegations in the plaint and the statement of the plaintiff that Brahmanand Sharma wasa tenant of the shops in question from before the enforcement of U.P. Act 13 of 1972' stand unchallenged. The evidence of the plaintiff in this respect has been accepted by the two courts below. The irresistible conclusion deducible from the above facts is that Brahmanand was admitted as a tenant prior to the enforcement of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. In this view of the matter the case will be governed by the decision of the Supreme Court. reported in Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 1924 (supra) and the decision rendered by this Court in Naveen Chandra Sharma v. 6th Addl District and Sessions Judge, AIR 1983 All 116 (supra) will have no application to the facts of the present case. 10. From a perusal of the plaint it appears that the plaintiff treated Brahmanand Sharma as a tenant. Of course, there is an averment that the tenancy was to be regularised by an order of allotment. On a correct interpretation of paragraph 7 of the plaint, I am of the view that the existence of the tenancy was not depended upon securing an order of allotment. The words used in paragraph 7 of the plaint are "he would also make efforts to have the Shop formally allotted in his name." The contract of tenancy had been entered into and Brahmanand Sharma was required to get the premises allotted in his favour so that regular receipts may be issued by the land- lord. It appears that the question raised before the Court of Revision was as to whether Brahmanand Sharma was a tenant or not. In the instant case, the plaintiff proceeds on the assumption that the plaintiff is the landlord and' Brahmanand Sharma is the tenant. In such an eventuality, relationship of landlord and tenant will be taken to subsist between the parties as found by the Courts below and such a relationship is not, in my view, dependent upon obtaining an order of allotment. 11. In such an eventuality, relationship of landlord and tenant will be taken to subsist between the parties as found by the Courts below and such a relationship is not, in my view, dependent upon obtaining an order of allotment. 11. It was next contended that the suit filed by Radha Charan Agarwal is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. According to the petitioner the necessary parties are Gauri Shanker and Sri Krishna. The finding recorded by the court of revision is that the said persons had ceased to be tenants and Brahmanand Sharma was admitted as a tenant by the plaintiff in respect of the premises in suit. In view of this finding the court below was justified in holding that the suit was not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. If on the date of the filing of the suit Gauri Shanker and Sri Krishna were held not to be tenants but Brahmanand Sharma was held to be a tenant the said persons cannot be said to be necessary parties to the suit. 12. It was next contended that the suit filed by the plaintiff was bad on account of misjoinder of causes of action. The plaintiff came to Court with the plea that Brahmanand Sharma was the tenant and Om Prakash Sharma was his sub-tenant. The ejectment of the defendants was sought both on the ground of non-payment of rent in pursuance of the notices and also on the ground of sub-letting by Brahmanand Sharma. The cause of action for the suit was non-compliance with the provisions of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. The relief for ejectment on the ground of sub-letting could also be joined with the relief for ejectment for non- payment of rent as a sub-tenant claims through a tenant and if the tenant has to be evicted on the ground of non-compliance of the provisions of U.P. Act 13 of 1972, the sub-tenant also will meet the same fate. No other point has been present. 13. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.