JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - Respondent No. 3 Smt. Mohinder Kaur is the landlord of an accommodation of which the Petitioner is the tenant. An application was made by Respondent No. 3 on 27-8-1980 u/s 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for release of the aforesaid accommodation in her favour on the ground that she needed it bonafide for her own use. This application was allowed ex parte on 12-3-1981. The Petitioner made an application for setting aside the ex parte order aforesaid under Rule 32 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Rules), 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) on 7-4-1981. This application was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority on 25-4-1981. The Petitioner preferred an appeal against that order which was, however, got dismissed as not pressed on 7-11-1981 presumably because appeal against the order dated 25-4-1981 was not maintainable. Thereafter the Petitioner preferred an appeal on 13-5-1981 against the ex parte order dated 12-3-1981 before the District Judge. The said appeal was transferred to the XVth Additional District Judge, Kanpur who dismissed it on 12-1-1983. The present writ petition was filed with a prayer to quash the order dated 12-3-1981 whereby the application of Respondent No. 3 for release of the accommodation was allowed ex parte and the order dated 12-1-1983 whereby the Petitioners appeal against that order was dismissed by Respondent No. 1. 2. The writ petition came up for hearing on 11-4-1983. The hearing of the writ petition could not be concluded on that date and it was ordered to be put on 12-4-1983. An application was made by the Petitioner on 12-4-1983 for amendment of the writ petition. The amendment which was sought was that the order dated 25-4-1981 passed by the Prescribed Authority dismissing the Petitioner's application dated 7-4-1981 may also be quashed. Counsel for Respondent No. 3 prayed for and was granted a week's time to file a counter-affidavit. The writ petition was ordered to be listed for hearing as part heard on 26-4-1983. A rejoinder affidavit was permitted to be filed on or before that date. 3. Counsel for Respondent No. 3 prayed for and was granted a week's time to file a counter-affidavit. The writ petition was ordered to be listed for hearing as part heard on 26-4-1983. A rejoinder affidavit was permitted to be filed on or before that date. 3. Before dealing with the submissions made by counsel for the Petitioner it may be mentioned that Counsel for the Respondent No. 3 has straneously opposed the application for amendment on the ground that it was highly belated and does not deserve to be allowed. According to him once the Petitioner himself got his appeal against the order dated 25-4-1981 dismissed as not pressed on the ground that the appeal was not maintainable he should have filed a writ petition challenging the order dated 25-4-1981 within a reasonable time, at any rate, from 7-11-1981 when the appeal was got dismissed as not pressed. Counsel for Respondent No. 3 has further emphasised on the circumstance that in the application which has been made for amendment of the writ petition virtually no cause has been shown as to why the order dated 25-4-1981 was not challenged within a reasonable time. 4. Having heard Counsel for the parties on this point I am of opinion that the application for amendment deserves to be allowed. It is true that in the application for amendment no specific cause has been assigned as to why the order dated 25-4-1981 was not challenged by the Petitioner shortly after the dismissal of his appeal against that order on 7-11-1981, but from a perusal of the memorandum of appeal which was filed against the ex parte order dated 12-3-1981, a copy whereof has been attached as Annexure 4 to the writ petition, it appears that the question that the ex parte order had been passed without service of notice upon him had been raised by the Petitioner in the said memorandum of appeal. Not only that a perusal of even the impugned order passed by Respondent No. 1 indicates that this point was also pressed in the appeal but was repelled. Not only that a perusal of even the impugned order passed by Respondent No. 1 indicates that this point was also pressed in the appeal but was repelled. At best it could be said that on the plea raised by the Petitioner in his appeal against the ex parte order dated 12-3-1981 in regard to the non-service of notice upon him being repelled by Respondent No. 1 on 12-1-1983 the Petitioner should have while challenging the order dated 12-1-1983 simultaneously challenged the order dated 25-4-1981 also. In my opinion, however, that does not stand in the way of the Petitioner in as much as it is the settled principle of this Court that a writ petition is not considered to be barred by laches if it is filed within 90 days from the date of the impugned order. Calculating this period from 12-1-1983 on which date the appeal was dismissed the present writ petition could have been filed by 12-4-1983. Since the application for amendment was filed on 12-4-1983 it cannot be said to be barred by laches. 5. There is another reason why the application for amendment deserves to be allowed. As would be shown presently even if the application for amendment is not allowed, on the facts of the instant case the order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 25-4-1981 would not in my opinion stand in the way of the orders dated 12-3-1981 and 12-1-1983 being quashed. 6. Coming to the submissions made by Counsel for the Petitioner in support of this writ petition it may be pointed out that three points have been raised by him-(1) that the Act does not permit service of notice by publication under Order V Rule 20 Code of Civil Procedure; (2) that in the alternative the conditions which authorise a Court to take recourse to substituted service by publication under Order V Rule 20 CPC have not been satisfied on the facts of the instant case; and (3) that in the regular appeal which the Petitioner had filed against the ex parte order dated 12-3-1981 the question about service of notice could be raised and the Additional District Judge has committed a manifest error of law in taking a contrary view. 7. 7. Taking the last point first, it may be pointed out that in Shri P.P. Mahadeoji v. Nagar Mahapalika 1979 AWC 305 a Division Bench of this Court has held that it is open to a Court hearing appeal against an ex parte decree to go into the ground of non-appearance of the defaulting party unless it be debarred from doing so either under the doctrine of res-judicata or any other positive rule of law. As a general rule, therefore, the submission made by Counsel for the Petitioner that notwithstanding the order dated 25-4-1981 passed by the Prescribed Authority the appellate Court was entitled to go into the question of non-appearance of the Petitioner on 12-3-1981 when the ex-parte order was passed cannot be accepted because the order dated 25-4-1981 would operate as res-judicata. On the facts of the instant case, however, I am of opinion that the order dated 25-4-1981 would not operate as res-judicata. For the reasons to be recorded while dealing with point No. 1. I am further of opinion that service of notice of an application u/s 21 of the Act by publication under Order V Rule 20 CPC is not contemplated either by the Act or by the Rules. 8. A copy of the order-sheet of the Court of the Prescribed Authority has been filed along with the writ petition and a certified copy thereof has been filed along with the rejoinder-affidavit. It indicates that before passing the order for the notices being published in a newspaper the Prescribed Authority was of the view that service of notice by other methods was not sufficient. If, therefore, it was not possible to serve the notice u/s 21 by publication it is a case where even on the own finding of the Prescribed Authority the notice of application u/s 21 had not been served under any of the modes provided under Rule 28 of the Rules. Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act contemplates that no order shall be made under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (1-A) or Sub-section (2) of Section 21 except after giving to the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The process of granting of reasonable opportunity of being heard starts by serving of notice on the person concerned to appear in order to have his say in the matter. The process of granting of reasonable opportunity of being heard starts by serving of notice on the person concerned to appear in order to have his say in the matter. As such, service of a notice u/s 21 of the Act is sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the said section. In Shantanu v. State 1970 ALJ 1174 a Full Bench of this Court has held that service of a notice where such notice is required is preliminary to the acquisition of the jurisdiction to proceed in the matter. It was further held relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh and Others Vs. Chaman Paswan and Others, AIR 1954 SC 340 that it was well settled that an objection to lack of jurisdiction can be taken at any stage of the proceedings and even in collateral proceedings. It is settled law that plea of res-judicata raises a question of jurisdiction (See AIR 1949 239 (Privy Council) . It is again settled law that if a statute requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not at all (See Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta Division Vs. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 2563 and Ramchandra Keshav Adke (Dead) by Lrs. and Others Vs. Govind Joti Chavare and Others, AIR 1975 SC 915 . In the case of Ramchandra (supra) it was emphasised that failure to comply with the prescribed provisions would vitiate the consequential order and render it non est. As already seen above Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act contemplates a notice being given in order to enable the Respondent to the application to have a say in the matter. In Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai AIR 1971 SC 2356 it was held that a question relating to jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of that Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has the jurisdiction, the question would not operate as res-judicata. In Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai AIR 1971 SC 2356 it was held that a question relating to jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of that Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has the jurisdiction, the question would not operate as res-judicata. Similarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res-judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise, because, if these decisions are considered as conclusive, it will assume the status of a special rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in derogation of the rule declared by the legislature. It is for the aforesaid reasons that I am of opinion that the order dated 25-4-1981 even if it is not quashed would not operate as res-judicata and the question as to whether any notice had been served on the Petitioner of the proceedings u/s 21 of the Act as contemplated by Sub-section (3) thereto could also be decided by the appellate Court in the appeal filed by the Petitioner and the view taken by it to the contrary on the facts of the instant case, suffers from a manifest error of law and cannot be sustained. Since I am of the view that recourse to service of notice by publication under Order V, Rule 20 CPC could not be taken in proceedings under the Act it is not necessary to go into the second point which raises an alternative argument that the conditions contemplated by Order V, Rule 20 CPC for taking recourse to service by publication had not been complied with. 9. Coming to the first point, namely, as to whether notice of an application u/s 21 of the Act could be served by publication or not, it may be pointed out that reliance has been placed by Counsel for the parties on Section 34 of the Act and Rule 28 of the Rules. 9. Coming to the first point, namely, as to whether notice of an application u/s 21 of the Act could be served by publication or not, it may be pointed out that reliance has been placed by Counsel for the parties on Section 34 of the Act and Rule 28 of the Rules. Sub-sections (1) and (8) of Section 34 of the Act which are relevant for purposes of this case read as follows: (1) The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or any appellate or revising authority shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No.v. of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) receiving evidence on affidavits; (c) inspecting a building or its locality, or issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents or local investigation; (d) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (e) awarding, subject to any rules made in that behalf, costs or special costs to any party or requiring security for costs from any party; ( f) recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith; (g) any other matter which may be prescribed. (8) For the purposes of any proceedings under this Act and for purposes connected therewith the said authorities shall have such other powers and shall follow such procedure, principles of proofs, rules of limitation and guiding principle as may be prescribed. (8) For the purposes of any proceedings under this Act and for purposes connected therewith the said authorities shall have such other powers and shall follow such procedure, principles of proofs, rules of limitation and guiding principle as may be prescribed. Rule 28 of the Rules on the other hand reads: Service of notice (1) A notice Issued by the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate or Revising Authority under the provisions of the Act shall be served on the person concerned (a)by giving or tendering it to such person, or his Counsel, or (b) by giving or tendering it to any adult member of his family ; or (c) if no such person is found, by leaving it at his last known place of abode or business or in the case of an appeal or revision at his address as given under Rule 6, or (d) if none of the means aforesaid is available by affixing it on some conspicuous part of his last known place of abode, or business or in the case of an appeal or revision at his address as given under Rule 6. (2) If a party files a duly stamped and addressed envelope for service of any notice, then it shall be served by registered post. (3) In the case of an appeal or revision unless the Appellant has taken action under Sub-rule (2), the Appellate or Revising Authority shall send the notices to the District Magistrate or the Prescribed Authority, as the case may be for having service effected. In Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 34(1) of the Act specific matters are mentioned in respect of which power under the CPC could be exercised by the authorities acting under the Act. Clause (g) on the other hand provides prescription of procedure by rules. Sub-section (8) as seen above contemplates that the authorities mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 34 shall have such other powers and shall follow such procedure, principles of proofs, rules of limitation and guiding principle as may be prescribed. The words "such other powers" are relevant. 10. Clause (g) on the other hand provides prescription of procedure by rules. Sub-section (8) as seen above contemplates that the authorities mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 34 shall have such other powers and shall follow such procedure, principles of proofs, rules of limitation and guiding principle as may be prescribed. The words "such other powers" are relevant. 10. The only clause on which reliance has been placed by Counsel for Respondent No. 3 in support of his submission that recourse to service of notice by publication could be taken is Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Act which reads: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath. A perusal of Rules 9 to 20 of Order V CPC indicates that all the modes of service which are prescribed in Rule 28 of the Rules are to be found in one or the other rule between these Rules 9 to 20 of Order V. If Clause (a) of Section 34(1) of the Act is interpreted in such a manner as to confer on the authorities mentioned in Section 34 of the Act the power to take recourse to the modes of service prescribed in Order V, Rules 9 to 20 CPC there would have been apparently no necessity of enacting Rule 28 of the rules at all inasmuch as whatever is prescribed in Rule 28 is already to be found in one or the other of the rules between Rules 9 and 20 of Order V Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-clause (g) of Section 34(1) contemplates exercise of power in regard to any other matter which may be prescribed. Likewise Sub-section (8) of Section 34 contemplates prescription by rules in regard to such other powers. The expression "such other powers" obviously means what has not already been provided in any of the Sub-clauses (a) to (f). This also makes it clear that the provisions contained in Rules 9 to 20 of Order V CPC had not been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act and Clause (a) of Section 34(a) of the Act cannot therefore be interpreted in a manner to include that power. 11. Further as seen above, Clause (a) of Section 34(1) provides for summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath. 11. Further as seen above, Clause (a) of Section 34(1) provides for summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath. This obviously refers to issuing of summons requiring a person to attend and give evidence as witness. It does not refer to service of notice of the proceeding under the Act to the party against whom an action is sought to be taken. When a notice is issued to the Defendant or Respondent in a proceeding he is not required to attend for being examined on oath. Further, he is not compelled to appear. It is left to his choice whether or not to appear and contest the proceedings. In this view of the matter there is no question of enforcing his attendance. On the other hand a witness is required to attend for being examined on oath and if he fails to appear his attendance is to be enforced. On the language used in Section 34(1)(a) of the Act it is plain that this provision refers to the procedure for procuring and enforcing attendance of a witness for being examined on oath. Rule 28 on the other hand provides that a notice issued by the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the appellate or revising authority under the provisions of the Act shall be served on the person concerned in the manner prescribed therein. It is as such this rule which contains the procedure by which a notice contemplated by the Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act had to be issued. 12. It is true that in the instant case notices in the manner contemplated by Rule 28 were sent to the Petitioner but the finding of the Prescribed Authority in regard to those notices was that they had not been sufficiently served on the Petitioner. A perusal of the order dated 25-4-81 indicates that reliance for the finding that notice of the application u/s 21 of the Act was served on the Petitioner was placed on its publication in a newspaper. A perusal of the order dated 25-4-81 indicates that reliance for the finding that notice of the application u/s 21 of the Act was served on the Petitioner was placed on its publication in a newspaper. Since notice of an application u/s 21 of the Act in view of what has been pointed out above could not be served on the Petitioner by publication in a newspaper under Order V, Rule 20 CPC and since the finding of the Prescribed Authority is that notices sent to the Petitioner in the manner prescribed by Rule 28 had not been served on him it is a case where ex parte order dated 12-3-1981 was passed against the Petitioner without any notice to him. This was in clear breach of mandatory requirement of Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act and as already pointed out above went to the very root of the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority to pass an order under Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 21 of the Act. The orders dated 12-3-1981 and 12-1-1983 accordingly deserve to be quashed. For the same reason the order dated 25-4-1981 also deserves to be quashed. 13. Counsel for the parties have made a statement that the Petitioner as well as Respondent No. 3 are present in Court and that they shall appear before the Prescribed Authority, Respondent No. 2, on 23rd May, 1983, so that the application made by Respondent No. 3 for release of the accommodation in question made more than two and a half years back may now be decided expeditiously. 14. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned orders dated 12-3-1981 and 25-4-1981 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the appellate order dated 12-1-1983 are quashed and the Prescribed Authority, Respondent No. 2, is directed to decide the application made by Respondent No. 3 for release of the accommodation in question u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act afresh in accordance with law after giving the Petitioner an opportunity of hearing as contemplated by Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act. In view of the statement made by Counsel for the parties as aforesaid it would not be necessary for the Prescribed Authority, Respondent No. 2, to issue fresh notice either to the Petitioner or Respondent No. 3 and they would themselves appear on the date fixed namely 23-5-1983. In view of the statement made by Counsel for the parties as aforesaid it would not be necessary for the Prescribed Authority, Respondent No. 2, to issue fresh notice either to the Petitioner or Respondent No. 3 and they would themselves appear on the date fixed namely 23-5-1983. Counsel for Respondent No. 3 undertakes to obtain a certified copy of this order and file it before the Prescribed Authority Respondent No. 2 well in advance so that the case is shown in the cause list of the said Prescribed Authority on 23-5-1983 and is called out to enable the parties to put in appearance and obtain further directions from the Prescribed Authority. A certified copy of this order may be supplied to Counsel for the parties by 17th of May, 1983. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs. Since the matter is considerably old the Prescribed Authority shall dispose of the application for release as expeditiously as possible.