JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition has been preferred by the party No. 2 in the lower court against the order of the District Magistrate, Bundi, dated 21.6.1983 ordering and attaching under Section 146 (1) Cr.P.C. and appointing Tehsildar, Bundi as Receiver of the property. 2. The brief facts of this case are that petitioner party No. 1 moved an application addressed to Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bundi for taking action under section 145/146 Cr.P.C. He has mentioned in the application that he is in possession of the property which is a shop situated at Reghuveer Bhawan, Bundi for the last 48 years and he is running a restaurant known as `Bhati Restaurant' where in petitioner No. 1 Shri Kishan Behari Birla has been employed as servant to run the restaurant. 3. It was further alleged that the petitioner along with his father has been selling tea, sweets and namkeen in the restaurant and the petitioner No. 1 was serving as their servant and drawing salary. It was further alleged in that application that the petitioner} with bad intention started quarrelling with the non-petitioner On 7-6-83 the non-petitioner went to see the accounts on which Kishan Behari petitioner told him to sit and said him that he will show the accounts. However, the two sons of Kishan Behari tried to pick up quarrel. According to the non-petitioner some persons intervened otherwise the petitioners would have killed the non-petitioner party No. 1. Non-petitioner party No. 1 has also alleged in the application that on 17.6.1983, when he came from Jaipur and went to the hotel, P the younger son of Kishan Behari started abusing him. Kishan Behari has said that he would show the accounts in the evening. Thus it is said that this dispute went upto 19th June, 1983 and since the petitioner intended to take law-in their own hands and tried to be-labour them they have no other option but to move this application to the police. On this Application which was moved on 19.6.83 to the police by non-petitioner party No. 1. The sub Inspector Shri Madan Lal reported that a dispute has arisen between the parties. This report was submitted on 21.6.1983 by the S.H.O. Kotwali, Bundi along with his own affidavit to the District Magistrate, Bundi. On this Application which was moved on 19.6.83 to the police by non-petitioner party No. 1. The sub Inspector Shri Madan Lal reported that a dispute has arisen between the parties. This report was submitted on 21.6.1983 by the S.H.O. Kotwali, Bundi along with his own affidavit to the District Magistrate, Bundi. On the receipt of this report the learned District Magistrate passed the impugned order without issuing any notice to the petitioners. While passing this order the learned District Magistrate did not record any statement of persons neighbour-hood of the restaurant and on the report of the S. H. O. only issued this impugned order The District Magistrate has passed this order expat and directed the Tehsildar to take over the property. 4. In the revision petition the petitioner has also mentioned that the shop in dispute belong to the royal house and formerly late H. H. Bahadur Singh had let it out to Shri Poonam Chand Bhati-Power of Attorney holder of the non-petitioner at the monthly rent of Rs. 9/-. This shop was used for the different purposes earlier. Shri Poonam Chand Bhati used to run his own business but later on he sub-let it out to different parties However, keeping the condition that the name of the restaurant to be run in the premises would be Bhati restaurant so that the H.H. may not know the internal arrangement between him and tenant. H.H. Bundi filed a suit for eviction against P. C. Bhati on the ground of sub-letting. In that suit Shri Bhati wanted to contest the position of sub-letting and he asked the petitioner to sign Vakalat Nama and also sign one blank paper and assured the petitioner that he himself would contest the matter and he need not worry about it. The petitioners without knowing as to what written statement would be given, signed on blank paper. The joint written statement, it is now known was filed by Shri P C. Bhati and thereafter, entered into a compromise with H. H. and the rent of the shop was raised to Rs. 75/-per month. Now the suit of eviction was dismissed as compromised. The petitioners have mentioned that they had taken shop on rent of Rs 250/- per month besides electric and water charges which was later on increased to Rs. 300/-per month and finally from 1.3.1983 the rent was increased to Rs. 450/- per month. 75/-per month. Now the suit of eviction was dismissed as compromised. The petitioners have mentioned that they had taken shop on rent of Rs 250/- per month besides electric and water charges which was later on increased to Rs. 300/-per month and finally from 1.3.1983 the rent was increased to Rs. 450/- per month. The petitioners were again asked to increase rent and when they refused to do so, Shri P. C. Bhati asked to vacate the shop. Since the petitioners had only a shop as a source of their livelihood they entered into a negotiation with Shri Ranieet Singh, S/o late H. H. Bundi. When the respondent non-petitioners, and his father came to know about this, they tried to forcibly evict the petitioners and as such the petitioner No. 1 filed a civil suit in the court of Civil Judge, Bundi on 2i 6 1983 The learned Civil Judge appointed Shri Raghuveer Singh, Advocate as the Commissioner to report about the matter as to which party is in possession of the property. The Commissioner while he was taking down the conditions prevailed on the spot, the Tehsildar reached with the orders of the District Magistrate, Bundi and wanted to seal the shop. The Commissioner thereupon asked Tehsildar that he must complete the list of the property which is lying there as directed by the Court. The Commissioner Submitted his report to the Court. The petitioners have also mentioned that for running restaurant it was essential for them to apply for licence from the Municipal Board and he obtained such licence from the Board. Thereafter, the shop had to be registered with the Sales Tax Department and a Sales Tax Registration under Section 17 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act was also issued in the name of Kishan Behari Birla on 1.10.1977. The shop has also been registered under Section 4 of the Shops Commercial Act, 1958 and was initially registered in the year 1977 in the name of Bhati Restaurant under the owner-ship of Shri Kishan Behari Birla. Now, after the purchase from H H , the name of this restaurant has been changed to Birla Restaurant and consequently changes have been done in the aforesaid registration. The petitioner Kishan Behari Birla has also been assessed as proprietor of Bhati Restarant, Bundi in his capacity as an individual. Now, after the purchase from H H , the name of this restaurant has been changed to Birla Restaurant and consequently changes have been done in the aforesaid registration. The petitioner Kishan Behari Birla has also been assessed as proprietor of Bhati Restarant, Bundi in his capacity as an individual. Thus the contention of the petitioners is that all these facts mentioned in the revision petition goes to show that the owner of the restaurant is petitioner No. 1 Kishan Behari Birla and this shop had been sub let to him on monthly rent by Shri Poonam Chand Bhati who was the lease of H.H. Bundi Since the income of Shri Poonam Chand Bhati is stopped, he being influential person, used the good office of District Magistrate, Bundi in getting expats order under Section 146 (1) Cr.P.C. The petitioners have mentioned that in view of the facts that the Sessions Judge, Bundi is on leave and also that the father of the non-petitioner is a very influential person in the city and happens to be the personal friend of the father of the District Magistrate, Bundi, this revision is directly being submitted to this court as they apprehend that they would not get proper justice in Bundi, challenging the legality, proprietary and otherwise of the order of the District Magistrate, Bundi dated 21.6.1983. 5. I have perused the order dated, 21.6.1983 passed by the learned Distriet Magistrate, Bundi. In this order in the first part after considering the police report he issued a preliminary order under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C. and notice was ordered to be issued to the opposite party Kishan Behari Birla and others to submit their claim about the possession of the disputed shop on 4.7.1983. In the second part of this order, the District Magistrate mentioned that he is satisfied that without issuing an order of the attachment of shop in question the breach of peace cannot be maintained. As such, he passed this attachment of the Bhati restaurant, the disputed shop and appointed-Tehsildar, Bundi as the receiver of this shop. He directed the receiver to proceed immediately on the spot and took immediate possession of the disputed shop. Thus, the order dated. 31.6.1983 is a composite order under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C. and 146 (1) Cr.P.C. 6. As such, he passed this attachment of the Bhati restaurant, the disputed shop and appointed-Tehsildar, Bundi as the receiver of this shop. He directed the receiver to proceed immediately on the spot and took immediate possession of the disputed shop. Thus, the order dated. 31.6.1983 is a composite order under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C. and 146 (1) Cr.P.C. 6. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner Shri N. L. Tiberwal in his arguments contended that the order under Section 145 (1) Cr. P C. was issued by the District Magistrate after receiving the report of the S. H. O that the dispute is likely to cause a breach of peace and after satisfying himself the learned District Magistrate has passed the order. The contention is that it is only the satisfaction of the District Magistrate for passing an order under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. This satisfaction can not be challenged As such, the revision petition challenging the order of the learned District Magistrate passed under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. is not maintainable. The party cannot challenge the satisfaction of the Magistrate concerned. In reply to this arguments the learned counsel for the petitioner Shri V. S. Dave has argued that he has not come in revision against the order passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. The impugned order dated 21-6-83 is in two parts The first part is an order under Section 145 (l)Cr. p. c. and the second part of these impugned order is under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. In the present revision petition he has only challenged the order passed by the learned District Magistrate under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. only. He has not challenged the first part of the order. So the objection raised by Shri Tibrewal has no meaning The revision petition filed before this court is only against the order of attaching the property and appointing the receiver and ordering the receiver to take possession of the disputed shop. Thus, we are only concerned with the Second part of the order dated 21-6-1983 pertaining to an order under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. Shri V. S. Dave has accrued that the learned Magistrate has passed the order attaching the disputed shop and appointing the receiver expat i. e. without hearing the petitioners. Thus, we are only concerned with the Second part of the order dated 21-6-1983 pertaining to an order under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. Shri V. S. Dave has accrued that the learned Magistrate has passed the order attaching the disputed shop and appointing the receiver expat i. e. without hearing the petitioners. In view of the facts mentioned by the petitioner in the revision petition Shri Dave argued that it was necessary for the District Magistrate to issue notice to the petitioners and hear them on the point of attaching the disputed shop and appointing receiver. The contention of Shri N. L. Tibrewal learned counsel for the non-petitioners is that the Court has to see whether the order passed by the learned Magistrate is an interlocutory order or is a final order. This Court being a revision court, what are its limitations while disposing a revision petition is also to be seen. It has been contended by Shri Tibrewal that can this Court look into this matter and decide accordingly or a direction (ii) to be given to the petitioners to move to the Magistrate concerned and get the expert order- removed from him. 7. I have considered the arguments. 1 will not deal in this revision petition the order passed by the learned District Magistrate under Section 145 (I) Cr. P. C. I will only deal the order passed by him under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. he order of attachment passed in case of emergency continuous till the dispute is finally decided. The order of attachment is not an interlocutory order. In Umrao v. Sheonarain, 1975 R. L.W.P. 353 a similar objection was raised that under proviso to Sub Section (1) of Section 146 Cr. P. C. a Magistrate can raise an attachment whenever he has satisfied that likelihood of a breach of peace no longer exist. In that case also argued that in view of this proviso, no finality is attached to an order of attachment under Sub-section (1) of Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. This argument was not accepted by Hon'ble Sharma and it was decided that the order passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate attaching land in dispute on the ground of emergency under Section 146 Cr. P. C. is final order. P. C. This argument was not accepted by Hon'ble Sharma and it was decided that the order passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate attaching land in dispute on the ground of emergency under Section 146 Cr. P. C. is final order. In a Division Bench case Sitaram v. Ghasiram, 1980 R. L.W.P. 155 their Lordship observed as under: "The learned Sessions Judge has dismissed the revision holding that the order of the attachment was only an interlocutory order, but we are of the opinion that the order of attachment under Sub-S. (1) of Section 146 of the New Code is a final order and not an interlocutory order. While holding such the Hon'ble Judges of the Division Bench have agreed with the observations given in Umarao v. Sbeonarain, 1975 R.L.W. P. 353 Mansuk Ram v. the State and Ganesh Ram, 1976 R.L.W.P. 443 , and Malan Singh v. the State of Rajasthan, 1976 R.L.W.P 523 . Thus, am not in agreement with the arguments of Shri N. L. Tibrewal and hold that the order under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. is not interlocutory or but a final order. 8. The argument is that the revisional court has limited powers while setting aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate under his satisfaction. This argument is correct so far as the order passed under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. it is only satisfaction of the learned Magistrate to pass the order. If the Magistrate is satisfied that there is like hood of breach of peace, he is fully competent and justified in proceeding under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. Similarly the Magistrate is to satisfy that there is an emergency in attaching the property under Section 146 (1)Cr. P. C. There is a distinction in Section 145 and 146 Cr. P. C. while passing an order under Section 145 Cr. P. C. it is the only satisfaction of the Magistrate to pass an order. But under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. the Magistrate has to look into three conditions mentioned in the Section. In case the Magistrate did not consider the matter in the prospect as envisaged in Section 146 Cr. P. C. then certainly this Court can interfere to remove the abuse of the process of law and meet the ends of justice. P. C. the Magistrate has to look into three conditions mentioned in the Section. In case the Magistrate did not consider the matter in the prospect as envisaged in Section 146 Cr. P. C. then certainly this Court can interfere to remove the abuse of the process of law and meet the ends of justice. Similarly, the party can apply to the Magistrate to cancel this order under Section 146 Cr. P. C. which was passed expat. But this Court can also look into this matter and passes necessary order if it is thought so in the interest of justice. As such, the points raised by Shri N. L. Tibrewal learned counsel for the non-petitioners has no force. 9. Section 146 Cr. P. C. relates to the power of the Magistrate to attach the subject matter of the dispute and appointing a receiver. This Section contemplates the attachment of the disputed property by the Magistrate under three conditions namely, (1) if the case is one of emergency. (2) if upon enquiry the Magistrate comes to a decision that none of these parties was then in possession and (3) if Magistrate is unable to decide who was in actual possession. Thus Section 146 (1) is quite clear. It says that if the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub Section (1) of Section 145 considers the case falling in one of the three conditions mentioned above, he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties there to with regard to the person entitled to the possessions thereof. The expression "after making this order" makes it clear that the proceedings under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. should proceed the order attaching that property. So before passing any order of attaching the property, the Magistrate is to pass an order under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. When an order under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. is said to have been passed, when the Magistrate puts his signature on that order. When the Magistrate passes an order under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C, and puts his signature on that order, then that order is complete and would be an order under Section 145 (1). P. C. is said to have been passed, when the Magistrate puts his signature on that order. When the Magistrate passes an order under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C, and puts his signature on that order, then that order is complete and would be an order under Section 145 (1). After passing that order as said above the Magistrate if considers the case to be one of emergency requiring attachment of property, may pass an order under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. So the importance is that an order under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C is to be issued first and then after making this order if the Magistrate considers at any time the case to be one of emergency, he can pass an order under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. it means that there will be two separate orders one under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. and the other under Section 146 (1) Cr. P.C. There cannot be a single order under Section 145 (1) and 146 (1) Cr. P. C. So when a preliminary order under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. has been issued by the Magistrate and when the Magistrate considers under the emergency to attach the property, he has powers to issue fresh order of attachment followed by appointing of receiver. Thus, there cannot be a common order or say a single order under Section 145 (1) and 146 (1) Cr. P.C. 10. In Kottarathil Mavunni v. State of Kerala and another, (5) I.L.R. 1982 P. 96 . it has been held as under : From this, it is clear that the Magistrate gets jurisdiction to pass an order of attachment under sub-section (1) of section 146 only after a preliminary order under sub-section (1) of Section 145 is passed. The view expressed by Janaki Amma, J. in 1977 K. L. T. 871 that a composite order under sub-section (1) of Section 145 and under sub-section (1) of section 146 is beyond the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is not overruled by the Division Bench of this Court in 1979 K. L. T. 143. The view expressed by Janaki Amma, J. in 1977 K. L. T. 871 that a composite order under sub-section (1) of Section 145 and under sub-section (1) of section 146 is beyond the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is not overruled by the Division Bench of this Court in 1979 K. L. T. 143. What was overruled was only that part of the dictum laid down in the decision that by effecting an attachment under subsection (1) of section 146 the Magistrate ceases to have jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry and for that reason the order itself is rendered a final order. From the wording of section 146 (1) as well as from the decision of the Supreme Court extracted above, it is clear that a composite order under sub-section (1) of section 145 and under sub-section (1) of section 146 cannot be passed as an order of attachment under sub-section (1) can be passed only after the preliminary order under sub-section (1) of section 145 and already been passed by the Magistrate. The impugned order of the Magistrate dated 4th April, 1981 is valid as a preliminary order under sub-section (1) of section 145, but the later part of the order placing the disputed property under attachment under sub-section (1) of section 146 is without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained in law." 11. In the present case, the impugned order dated, 21.6.83 is a composite order under section 145 (1) and 146 (1) Cr. P. C. This order is without jurisdiction against the spirit of the Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. 12. It was argued on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners Shri V. S. Dave that the learned Magistrate passed this order expat without hearing the petitioner. Passing an exparte order is against the spirit of natural justice and such order cannot be maintained. In reply to this, Shri N. L. Tibrewal has argued that attachment without hearing the parties is justified. In Gaya Singh and others v. Doman Singh Cr. L.G., 1979. P. 1110 . it has been observed by the Full Bench of Patna High Court that the attachments under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. can be issued without hearing the parties. Hence, I agree with the arguments of the learned counsel for the non petitioners and hold that an order under Section 146 (1) Cr. L.G., 1979. P. 1110 . it has been observed by the Full Bench of Patna High Court that the attachments under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. can be issued without hearing the parties. Hence, I agree with the arguments of the learned counsel for the non petitioners and hold that an order under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. for attachment can be passed without hearing the parties on the basis of the material on record. 13. As I have mentioned above that the composite order under Section 145 and 146 cannot be passed as an order of attachment under sub-section 146 (1) . Hence, the order dated 21.6.1983 passed by the learned Magistrate, Bundi is not correct order and cannot be sustained in law. I, therefore, accept this revision petition and set aside the order of attachment under sub-section (1) of Section 146 Cr. P. C. The learned Magistrate is directed to dispose of this proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. within two months after filing respective claims by the parties. I may like to write that this order will not preclude the Magistrate to pass an appropriate order under sub-section (1) of Section 146 Cr. P. C. if occasion arises.The revision petition is, therefore, accepted. *******