JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an application for further attachment of interest accruing on amounts of bank deposits to the tune of Rs. 1. 11 crores already attached arid a house property at 7, Queen's Park, Calcutta-19, in clarification or in furtherance of our earlier order of attachment dated September 15, 1982. The application is made on behalf of the State of Bihar by the Inspector general of Police, Cabinet (Vigilance) Department of the State Government 2. AN Investigation having been initiated against the opposite party Kesab Narayan banerji for having committed different offences including some specified in the schedule to the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance 1944, in the matter of obtaining compensation money from the state of Bihar amounting to more than Rs. 2 crores, the Inspector General of Police on January 22,1982, obtained from the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas an order of ad interim attachment under section 3 of the said Ordinance in respect of fixed deposit amounts of Rs. 1. 11 crores land premises No. 7, Queen's Park, Calcutta. That proceeding for attachment was, however, frustrated by Kesab Narayan Banerji in the manner indicated in our order dated September 15, 1982. In that background the inspector General of Police, as aforesaid filed a fresh application under section 3 of the Ordinance before the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas, which was dismissed on Augusts, 1982, in limine on the view that successive applications under section 3 of the Ordinance are not maintainable. . Feeling aggrieved the inspector General of Police filed an appeal before this court under section 11 of the Ordinance and in the said appeal the appellant filed an application for interim relief which being heard on contest was allowed by us on September 15, 1982. We allowed the said prayer for reasons given in the said order. In allowing the application we made an order of ad interim attachment of a sum of Rs. 1. 11 crores lying in fixed deposit accounts with the banks specified in pages 157 to 168 of the original application pending disposal of the appeal. 3. ONCE such an interim attachment wee made by us a dispute has been raised to whether such order of attachment would cover the interest accruing on the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1. 11 crores. 11 crores lying in fixed deposit accounts with the banks specified in pages 157 to 168 of the original application pending disposal of the appeal. 3. ONCE such an interim attachment wee made by us a dispute has been raised to whether such order of attachment would cover the interest accruing on the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1. 11 crores. Since the respondent Kesab Narayan Banerji has put forward a claim that notwithstanding such attachment he is entitled to withdraw the interest accruing on the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1. 11 crores, the appellant, Inspector general of Police has filed the present application for clarification of our earlier order and if necessary, granting a further attachment in respect of interest accruing on the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1. 11 crores. In this application it has further been pointed out that the immovable property above referred to is a part of the property acquired but of the money procured by commission of the scheduled offences and, was covered by the proceeding under section 3 of the ordinance under appeal and this aspect was lost sight of by us when we granted the prayer on behalf of the appellant on September 15, 1982, omitting the said property from the purview of the attachment made by us. 4. THIS application is being contested on behalf of the contesting respondents including Kesab Narayan Banerji. This application came up for hearing at first on December 22, 1982, when Mr. Chakrabarti appearing on behalf of the contesting' respondents raised a preliminary objection. The preliminary objection so raised is to the effect that our original order of attachment dated September 15, 1982, stands dissolved on the efflux of 3 months from the date of the order in terms of section 10 of the said Ordinance and, as such, a prayer for clarification and/or extension of such an order is no longer sustainable. Such an objection having been raised by a supplementary affidavit we adjourned further hearing of the application in order to enable the appellant to meet the point so raised. Thus, we have heard the application further both on the preliminary objection as also on its merits and we propose to dispose of the same by this order of ours. 5. IN fitness of things we should first consider and dispose of the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Chakrabarti. Thus, we have heard the application further both on the preliminary objection as also on its merits and we propose to dispose of the same by this order of ours. 5. IN fitness of things we should first consider and dispose of the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Chakrabarti. This necessitates consideration of the scheme of the Ordinance and some of its provisions. The object of the Ordinance is "to prevent the disposal or concealment of property procured by means of certain offences. " section 3 provides that where the State government has reason to believe that any person has committed any scheduled offence it can authorize the making of an application to the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the said person ordinarily resides or carries on business for attachment under the Ordinance, of the money or the other property by which the State Government believes the said person to have procured by means of the offence or if such money or property cannot for any reason be attached of other property of the said person of value as nearly as may be equivalent to that of the aforesaid money or the other property. On such an application being made, the District judge is required to make an ad interim attachment under section 4 unless for reasons to be recorded in writing the District judge is of opinion that there exists no prima facie grounds for the belief. Once an ad interim attachment is made the statute provides for issue of notice on persons interested and investigation of claims made and after such, investigation the District Judge shall pass an order either making the ad interim order absolute or varying it by releasing a portion of the property from attachment or withdrawing the order. Then section 10 provides as follows: "an order of attachment of property under this Ordinance shall, unless it is withdrawn earlier in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance continue in force: -a) where no court has taken cognizance of the alleged schedule offence at the time when the order is applied for, for 3 months from the date of the order under subsection (1) of section 4 or subsection (2) of section 6 as the case may be,. unless cognizance of such offence is in the meantime so taken or unless the District Judge on application by the agent of the State Government thinks it proper and just that the period should be extended and pass an order accordingly. b) Where a court has taken cognizance of the alleged schedule offence whether before or after the time when the order was applied for, until orders are passed by the District Judge in accordance with the provisions of this ordinance after the termination of the criminal proceeding. " Section 11 provides for appeals against orders passed by the District Judge. 6. IN support of the preliminary objection raised, Mr. Chakrabarti contends that in the present case the order passed by us on september 15, 1982, must be deemed to be 9h order of ad-interim attachment in terms of section 4 of the Ordinance. As admittedly no cognizance by a court of any alleged scheduled offence has been taken and no extension of the attachment has been obtained from us the said order must be deemed to have lapsed on the expiry of 3 months from the date of our order in view of the provision of section) 10 (a) as aforesaid. According to Mr. Chakrabarti, this court exercising powers as an appellate authority from the District Judge can have no wider powers than that of the district Judge so that the statutory limits for an ad interim attachment is equally applicable to an appellate order of ad interim attachment made by us. This contention of Mr. Chakrabarti has been seriously contested by Mr. Prasad appearing on behalf of the appellant. According to Mr. Prasad, section 10 contemplates a statutory limit only for an order made under either section 4 (1) or section 6 (2) of the Ordinance and not to any other order. According to Mr. Prasad, the ad interim order which this court had passed in the appeal cannot be said to be such an order as is contemplated by section 10 (a ). It is an order, according to Mr. Prasad, passed by us as an appellate authority in exercise of our ancillary and implied powers in support of the appeal to render it effective as otherwise the appeal itself would be frustrated. In order to decide this contested issue we would refer to section 11 which is set out hereunder: "11. It is an order, according to Mr. Prasad, passed by us as an appellate authority in exercise of our ancillary and implied powers in support of the appeal to render it effective as otherwise the appeal itself would be frustrated. In order to decide this contested issue we would refer to section 11 which is set out hereunder: "11. Appeals:- (1) The State government or any person who has shown cause under section 4 or section 6 or has made an objection under section 4 or has made an application under section 8 or section 9, if aggrieved by any order of the District Judge under any of the foregoing provisions of this Ordinance, may appeal to the High Court within thirty days from the date on which the order complained against was passed (2) Upon any appeal under this section the High court may, after giving such parties, as it thinks proper an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it thinks fit. (3) Until an appeal under this section is finally disposed of by the high Court no Court shall, otherwise, than in accordance with the provisions of section 8 or Sec. 13, order the withdrawal or suspension of any order of attachment to which the appeal relates. " 7. ON a careful consideration of the provisions of sections 4, 6, 10 and 11, we are of the view that all and every order that we pass as an appellate authority is not an order made under section 4 (1) or section 6 (2) of the Ordinance. An order under section 4 (1) can be made only on application of a judicial mind for being satisfied about the requirements of that section. Similarly an order under section 6 (2) can be made only on an adjudication made as contemplated by the said provision. Neither of the situations arises in the present case, as the application under section 3 being dismissed in limine, the appellant has challenged the said order in the appeal before us. We do not dispute the contention of Mir. Chakrabarti that as an appellate authority our powers cannot but be co-extensive with the powers of the District Judge but that is the limit attached to our powers when we dispose of the appeal by making an order either under section 4 (1) or under section 6 (2) of the Ordinance. We do not dispute the contention of Mir. Chakrabarti that as an appellate authority our powers cannot but be co-extensive with the powers of the District Judge but that is the limit attached to our powers when we dispose of the appeal by making an order either under section 4 (1) or under section 6 (2) of the Ordinance. But in an appeal preferred under section 11, it may be necessary for us to pass interim orders in order to sustain the appeal or make it effective pending the disposal thereof. Such orders are not really orders made under section 4 (1) or 6 (2) of the Ordinance. Though Mr. Chakrabarti seriously challenges the existence of any such jurisdiction in us to make any such order independent of section 4 (1) or section 6 (2) of the Ordinance we are unable to accept the challenge so put forward. Subsection (2)of section 11 invests us with wide powers' to make any order that we may think proper. We have some doubt in our mind as to whether subsection (2) at all contemplates making of ad interim orders or providing powers therefore. But, even independent thereof, we possess the necessary powers to make such an ad interim order as would be necessary to render the appeal effective and meaningful. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of income tax Officer, Kanore v. Md. Kunhi AIR 1969 SC 430 that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. The Supreme Court was approving the principles referred to at page 350 of the 11th Edition of Maxwell's Interpretation of statutes and Articles 5401 and 5402 of the 3rd Edition of Sutherland's Statutory Construction. In the present case, we have already pointed out that an application under section 3 of the Ordinance had been thrown out in limine on the ground that it is not maintainable as a successive application. The learned District Judge has not at alt considered as to whether a case for ad interim attachment under section 4 has been made out or not. In an appeal against such an order we are now to consider whether the application could have been rightly thrown out in limine or not. The learned District Judge has not at alt considered as to whether a case for ad interim attachment under section 4 has been made out or not. In an appeal against such an order we are now to consider whether the application could have been rightly thrown out in limine or not. If we set aside that order then either we ourselves consider whether an ad interim attachment could be made under section 4 (1) or not or in all probability we have to remand the proceeding for reconsideration of that issue by the District Judge. Hence, it is not possible for us to hold that at the time when we granted the ad interim attachment in the appeal were doing so in exercise of powers under section 4 (1). That was an order made as a step in aid of the appeal because if such an attachment was not made the right of appeal would be frustrated. This is the reason why we expressly directed the interim attachment to continue till disposal of the appeal. Therefore, we are of the opinion that our order dated September 15, 1982, is an order independent of section 4 (1) and had been made in exercise of our powers as an appellate authority by virtue of ancillary powers vested in us as such. Since as yet no order either under section 4 (1) or section 6 (2) has been made, limitation prescribed by section 10 (a)does not start to run and in that view the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Chakrabarti fails and is overruled. 8. NEXT we proceed to consider the merits. So far as the merits are concerned, we propose to consider the present claim of the appellant in respect of the immovable property and the interest on the fixed deposits separately. So far as the immovable property is concerned, it is not in dispute that the State Government prayed for an interim attachment thereof in the application under section 3 as; it Was reasonably believed to have been acquired out of the money procured means of the scheduled offence now under investigation. In our order dated September 15, 1982, we failed to grant any ad interim attachment in respect of this property not on merits but through oversight when we failed to take note of this aspect. In our order dated September 15, 1982, we failed to grant any ad interim attachment in respect of this property not on merits but through oversight when we failed to take note of this aspect. Therefore, we are fully satisfied that this part of the appellant claim was not considered by us through oversight so that if we have granted an interim attachment in respect of the fixed deposit amounts, there is no reason why we should not have granted a similar order of attachment in respect of this immovable property. The other claim of the appellant is with regard to the interest accruing on Rs. 1. 11 crores which had already been attached. According to Mr. Chakrabarti, the interest accruing on the aforesaid sum cannot come within the purview of a proceeding on an application under section 3 of 'the Ordinance. Mr. Chakrabarti contends that section 3 contemplates an application for attachment of money or other property reasonably believed to have been procured by means of a scheduled offence. Unless the money or the property is so procured it does not come within the purview of the section. According to Mr. Chakrabarti, even if the State Government believes that the attached sum of Rs. 1. 11 crores had been procured by means of commission of a scheduled offence, such belief cannot cover the interest accruing on that amount because the interest is earned on that amount but the interest is not the money procured by the offence. This contention of Mr. Chakrabarti has been seriously contested by Mr. Prasad appearing on behalf of the appellant. According to Mr. Prasad, the terms procured by means of the offence" do not mean the money or the property directly so acquired. According to Mr. Prasad, it covers as a whole money or property so acquired either directly or indirectly. Mr. Prasad points out that it does not stand to reason to think that while the original amount of Rs. 1. 11 crores which is reasonably believed to have been procured by means of a scheduled offence should be attached at the same time one who has so procured the said sum should enjoy the usufruct thereof so that by enjoying the usufruct for a few years a sum equivalent to the principal would be acquired by him. 9. 1. 11 crores which is reasonably believed to have been procured by means of a scheduled offence should be attached at the same time one who has so procured the said sum should enjoy the usufruct thereof so that by enjoying the usufruct for a few years a sum equivalent to the principal would be acquired by him. 9. ON a careful consideration of rival contentions thus put forward before re us we are of the view that there is ample substance in the contention of Mr. Prasad. We think that it would not be correct to interpret the term 'procured' in a narrow sense as suggested by Mr. Chakraborty to mean that which it self bad directly been procured by the offence. In that event any money or property so procured if converted into a different form would go beyond the reach of the provision. That was never the intention of the legislature nor will it be consistent with the statute. In our view, therefore, the term should be interpreted to have a wider connotation to include any money or property the basis for the acquisition of which is the commission of the scheduled offence. In that sense, the interest earned on any sum procured by a scheduled offence would as well be the property so procured. 10. MOREOVER, on the scheme of the ordinance the attachment provided for is in the nature of attachment before judgment subject to the fulfilment of specific requirement as also subject to the limitations prescribed. The intention is that pending the trial of the scheduled' offence any money or property procured by such offence by the accused should be kept in custodial legist and beyond the reach of the accused so that on the conclusion of the trial if the accused is convicted and it is found that the money or the property was so procured the same may be forfeited to the state as prescribed by the Ordinance. By the attachment the person whose money or property is so attached is not deprived of his right, title and interest in the same; it is merely the custody thereof which is taken over for its preservation during the trial of the offence so that at the conclusion of the trial what is prescribed by the Ordinance may be implemented Where therefore, the District Judge takes over the custody of the property or the money he necessarily assumes control over the income or the profits arising therefrom. There is no contrary indication in the provisions of the statute. On the other hand, section 7 of the Ordinance adopts the provision of the Code of Civil procedure in the matter of execution of an order of attachment. When we refer to the relevant provisions of the Code, namely, Order 38 Rule 7 read with Order 21 Rules 43 and 52, we find that the court by an order of attachment can not only take over custody of the property or the money itself but if such money is lying with a court or a public officer it can direct withholding of payment of interest or dividend payable thereon. Again, the Ordinance in section 9 provides that the District Judge on making an order of attachment may take over the administration of the property so attached by appointing a Receiver in respect thereof. If by the order of attachment the District Judge is not supposed to take control over the income or the usufruct of the property or the money in respect of which, the attachment is made, we find no reason or utility of making a provision like that in section 9 of the finance. Hence, we are, unable to accept be contention of Mr. Chakrabarti that once the interest accruing on the sum rs. 1. 11 crores could not have come within the purview of a proceeding for attachment on an application under section 3 of the Ordinance, we in our turn cannot in an appeal under section 11 of he Ordinance make any order of interna attachment in respect thereof. On the merits of the claim of the appellant in this regard we cannot but accept the contention of Mr. Prasad that if we have thought fit to pass an interim order of attachment in respect of the said sum of Rs. 1. On the merits of the claim of the appellant in this regard we cannot but accept the contention of Mr. Prasad that if we have thought fit to pass an interim order of attachment in respect of the said sum of Rs. 1. 11 crores based on a claim of the appellant that the same is reasonably believed to have been procured by means of a scheduled offence, there is no reason why we should allow, the interest accruing, thereon to be appropriated by the person who is alleged to have so procured the same. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Chakrabarti to an order passed by the Supreme court made in Annexure 'a' to the affidavit-in-opposition where the Supreme court had directed that the original order of attachment passed by us would not entitle the State Government to instruct the banks to withhold payment of interest on the amounts so attached. Our attention has also been drawn by Mr. Prasad to the fact that the Supreme court had later explained the said order leaving it open to us to consider the prayer of the appellant made in the present application on its merits. In that view, we have gone into the merits and in our considered opinion it would not be just and proper to allow the respondents including Kesab Narayan Banerji to withdraw the interest accruing on the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1. 11 crores pending the continuance of the attachment 11. WE, therefore, clarify and/or modify our earlier order by extending the same to cover not only the sum of Rs. 1. 11 crores already attached but also the interest accrued or accruing thereon as also the immovable property above referred to. The application is disposed of accordingly on contest but we make no order as to costs. 12. CERTIFIED copy of this order, as and when applied for be issued within 10 (ten days from the date of application, application allowed without cost.