S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THESE two petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India raise a short question about applicability of period of limitation as prescribed by sec. 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) to complaints filed under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) THE petitions challenge the decisions arrived at by the second labour court Rajkot in criminal complaints Nos. 1 and 3 of 1978 as well as the revisional decisions arrived at by the Industrial court Gujarat in exercise of its powers under sec. 88 of the Act whereby the authorities below have taken the view that these complaints are barred by limitation. The complainant who is the petitioner in both-these petitions contends to the contrary. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the grievance of the petitioner in both these petitions it will be necessary to have a look at a few relevant facts culminating into the present proceedings. I. Factual bach-drop. ( 4 ) THE petitioner in these petitions was a permanent employee of respondent Porbandar Commercial Co-operative Bank Limited Porbandar. The Chairman of the said bank is the common respondent in both these petitions. The respondent by an order dated 2-2-1974 dismissed the petitioner from the service of the bank. The petitioner-employee thereupon filed two criminal complaints in the Labour court at Rajkot under sec. 107 of the Act. Those complaints were filed against the Chairman Managing Director and other Directors of the respondent bank. One of them was registered as criminal case No. 1 of 1978 before the second labour court at Rajkot. The case of the petitioner in the said complaint is to the effect that the accused had acted in contravention of the model standing order notified and in operation under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 35 of the Act while dismissing the petitioner from service and hence the concerned accused were required to be dealt with in accordance with law under sec. 107 of the Act. The second criminal complaint filed by the petitioner against the Managing Director of the respondent bank was registered as criminal case No. 3 of 1978 before the same labour court. The said complaint was also filed under sec. 107 of the Act. The second criminal complaint filed by the petitioner against the Managing Director of the respondent bank was registered as criminal case No. 3 of 1978 before the same labour court. The said complaint was also filed under sec. 107 of the Act alleging that the accused Managing Director had acted in contravention of duly notified model standing order by dismissing the petitioner from service on or about 2-2-1974. Both these complaints centering round similar allegations were simultaneously dealt with by the second labour court Rajkot. The concerned accused in both the complaints contended that the complaints were barred by law of limitation as cause of action for the complainant had arisen on the day on which the petitioner was allegedly wrongfully dismissed that is on 2 That as per sec. 468 (2) (a) of the Code the period of limitation prescribed for filing such complaints was six months as the offences alleged were punishable with fine only and that the complaints were filed after number of years and hence they were liable to be dismissed summarily on the ground of limitation. It may be noted at this stage that alongwith the concerned complaints the petitioner had filed applications for condonation of delay. ( 5 ) IN criminal case No. 1 of 1978 the petitioner withdrew his complaint against original accused nos. 2 3 and 10 as per application ex. 11 and so the concerned accused stood acquitted by the court. The complaint thereafter remained surviving against the rest of the accused in that complaint that is accused Nos. 1 4 to 9 11 and 12. The second labour court by its two separate orders dated 14-8-1978 held that both the complaints were liable to be dismissed as time barred as they were filed beyond the period of limitation as prescribed by sec. 468 of the Code. The aforesaid orders of the trial court resulted in two revision applications Nos. 44 and 45 of 1978 before the Industrial court at the instance of the petitioner. These revision applications were filed under sec. 85 of the Act. As both these revision applications arose out of similar orders passed by the labour court and were based on similar facts both the revision applications at the request of the parties were heard together and thereafter they were disposed of by the Industrial court by a common judgment ex. These revision applications were filed under sec. 85 of the Act. As both these revision applications arose out of similar orders passed by the labour court and were based on similar facts both the revision applications at the request of the parties were heard together and thereafter they were disposed of by the Industrial court by a common judgment ex. B to the petitions. By the said common judgment the Industrial court confirmed the decisions of the labour court to the effect that the complaints were time barred under sec. 468 of the Code and accordingly they were held to have been rightly dismissed by the trial court. As noted earlier the impugned common order of the revisional court at annexure B to both these petitions has been brought in challenge by the petitioner by way of the present proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution. III. Points in controversy : ( 6 ) THE aforesaid rival contentions of the learned Advocates of respective parties clearly highlight the moot point in controversy between them viz. whether the period of limitation prescribed by sec. 468 of the Code can be pressed in service while dealing with the complaints filed before the labour court under the Act. In order to resolve this moot point in controversy between the parties it is necessary to have a look at the relevant statutory provisions applicable to the facts of the case. We shall first turn to the relevant provisions of the Act. The act was enacted by the then Bombay legislature to regulate the relations of employers and employees in certain matters to make provision for settlement of industrial disputes and to provide for certain other purposes. Sec. 3 is the definition section. Sub-sec. (16) of sec. 3 defines industrial court to mean the court of industrial arbitration constituted under sec. 10. Sub-sec. (17) of sec. 3 defines industrial dispute to mean any dispute or difference between an employer and employee or between employers and employees or between employees and employees and which is connected with any industrial matter. What is an industrial matter is shown by sub-sec. (18) of sec. 3. Sub-sec. (21) defines labour court to mean a labour court constituted under sec. 9. When we turn to sec. What is an industrial matter is shown by sub-sec. (18) of sec. 3. Sub-sec. (21) defines labour court to mean a labour court constituted under sec. 9. When we turn to sec. 9 it is found provided therein that the State Government shall by notification in the official gazette constitute one or more labour courts having jurisdiction in such local areas as may be specified in such notification and shall appoint persons having the prescribed qualifications specified in sub-sec. (2) to preside over such courts. Sub-sec. (2) is not relevant for our present purpose. However what is worth-noting from the aforesaid provisions is that labour courts are constituted by the Act itself and such labour courts have to deal with the problems arising out of employer and employee relationship and the industrial disputes which result therefrom. ( 7 ) IT is in the background of the aforesaid provisions that we may turn to the chapter with which we are directly concerned. The said chapter is chapter 22 of the Act. It pertains to the constitution and functioning of the labour courts. Sec. 77 lays down territorial jurisdiction of the labour courts and provides that the territorial jurisdiction of labour courts shall extend to the local areas for which they are constituted. Then follows sec. 78 which lays down the powers of the labour courts. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 78 lays down various powers of the labour courts. Sub-para A of sec. 78 (1) empowers the labour court to decide dispute regarding the propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer acting or purporting to act under the standing orders; the application and interpretation of standing orders and any change made by an employer or desired by an employee in respect of an industrial matter specified in schedule 111. It also deals with industrial disputes referred to it under sec. 71 or 72 or in respect of which it is appointed as the arbitrator by a submission. Under sub-sec. (c) of sub-para A of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 78 the labour court is also empowered to decide whether a strike lock out closure stoppage or any change is illegal under the Act. The aforesaid powers of the labour court deal with industrial disputes between the concerned employer and employees and the labour court is constituted an adjudicating authority for such dispute. Then follows para B of sec. 78 the labour court is also empowered to decide whether a strike lock out closure stoppage or any change is illegal under the Act. The aforesaid powers of the labour court deal with industrial disputes between the concerned employer and employees and the labour court is constituted an adjudicating authority for such dispute. Then follows para B of sec. 78 (1) which empowers the labour court to try offences punishable under the Act. It is necessary to extract the said provision in extenso :" B. A labour court shall have power to try offences punishable under this Act and where the payment of compensation on conviction for an offence is provided for determine the compensation and order its payment. "section 79 deals with commencement of proceedings before the labour court. These proceedings pertain to disputes as mentioned in sec. 78 (1) para A (a ). We are not concerned with these types of proceedings in the present case and hence we need not dilate further on sec. 79. Section 80 deals with the procedure to be followed be the labour court in application under sec. 79. As sec. 79 is not relevant at this stage sec. 80 also need not detain us any further. Section 80a prescribes procedure to be followed in application under sec. 79 by an employer when employees employed are numerous. Any further discussion of sec. 80 gets ruled out as we are not concerned with any such application under sec. 79. On the same lines secs. 80b 80 and 80d may also be skipped for our present discussion as all these sections refer to serious other procedural aspects having bearing on the conduct of applications under sec. 79. Section 81 talks of reference to industrial court by labour court on the question of law obtaining in a proceeding before it. Nothing turns on the said section and hence we may turn to the next two sections which have a direct bearing on the result of the present proceedings. The said sections are secs. 82 and 83 of the Act. Section 82 provides that no labour Court shall take cognizance of any offence except on a complaint of facts constituting such offence made by the person affected thereby or by a representative union which is also an approved union or on a report in writing by the labour officer. The said sections are secs. 82 and 83 of the Act. Section 82 provides that no labour Court shall take cognizance of any offence except on a complaint of facts constituting such offence made by the person affected thereby or by a representative union which is also an approved union or on a report in writing by the labour officer. Section 83 provides that in respect of offences punishable under the Act a labour Court shall have all the powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 of a Magistrate of first class and in the trial of every such offence shall follow the procedure laid down in Chapter XXII of the said Code for a summary trial in which an appeal lies; and the rest of the provisions of the said Code shall so far as may be apply to such trial. We shall discuss in details a little later the submissions put forward by the learned Advocates of respective parties on the interpretation of the aforesaid two sections. For the time being we may turn to rest of the relevant provisions of the Act. Chapter XVI deals with penalties. In secs. 101 to 109 are provided various penalties for the offences covered by the aforesaid sections. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned sec. 107 is the only relevant penal section. The same is extracted as under :"any employer who acts in contravention of a model standing older notified and in operation under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 35 of a standing order settled under Chapter VII shall on conviction be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 500. 00 and in the case of a continuing contravention of such standing order with an additional fine which may extend to Rs. 125. 00 per day for every day during which such contravention continues. "a mere look at the said provision shows that when the complainant- employee alleges that his employer who would naturally be an accused in the case has acted in contravention of any of the model standing orders notified and in operation under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 35 or of a standing order settled under Chapter VII of the Act the employer becomes liable to be punished for the Act offence. This offence is a creature of the Act and its punishment is also provided by the Act. (5) of sec. 35 or of a standing order settled under Chapter VII of the Act the employer becomes liable to be punished for the Act offence. This offence is a creature of the Act and its punishment is also provided by the Act. The punishment is maximum fine of Rs. 500. 00 and for continuous contravention of the standing order additional fine of Rs. 125. 00 per day. As we have noted earlier in both the complaints the accused are alleged to have contravened provisions of the model standing orders notified and in operation under sec. 35 (5) of the out while dismissing the petitioner- complainant from service. For such an offence maximum penalty provided is Rs. S00. 00. The contravention alleged is to the effect that while dismissing the petitioner from service provisions of the standing orders were not kept in view and were on the contrary violated. The said offence under sec. 107 of the Act is punishable with fine only. It is also obvious that offence complained of is not a recurring one as it got completed when the alleged contravention resulted in the dismissal of the employee. For filing complaint for the said offence the procedure for taking cognizance as laid down by sec. 82 read with sec. 78 (1)B would naturally spring in action. The petitioner-complainant has therefore rightly approached the labour court having the territorial jurisdiction in the local area for which it was constituted with a request to try the accused for the alleged act offences with which they were charged. As laid down in sec. 82 of the Act the labour court before it can take cognizance of such act offence is to be properly moved by way of a complaint to be filed by the person affected thereby or by the representative union or on the basis of the report in writing by the labour officer. In the present case the petitioner complainant himself had moved the labour court by written complaints as a person affected by the offence. Mr. Arun H. Mehta for the petitioner submitted that on a combined reading of secs. 78 (1)B 82 and 107 a clear legislative intention is discernible viz. In the present case the petitioner complainant himself had moved the labour court by written complaints as a person affected by the offence. Mr. Arun H. Mehta for the petitioner submitted that on a combined reading of secs. 78 (1)B 82 and 107 a clear legislative intention is discernible viz. that once contravention of the model standing order is alleged by the complainant- employee against the accused-employer and once such complaint in writing is filed by the concerned affected party as complainant before the competent labour court as per sec. 78 (1)B the concerned labour court has to proceed with the complaint on merits according to the procedure laid down by sec. 83 of the Act. That no question of limitation would at all arise in such a case. That these provisions of the Act are a complete Code by themselves and the period of limitation cannot be brought in by back-door by having reference to the general provisions of the Code which can be directly applied to criminal courts functioning under the Code and not to such labour courts constituted and acting under the Act. In short Mr. Mehta submitted that the procedure for taking cognizance of the Act offence is laid down by sec. 82 of the Act and the said section being silent on the question of limitation by judicial interpretation no period of limitation can be engrafted in the said section when the legislature in its wisdom had not thought it fit to do so. Mr. Mehta submitted that as per sec. 82 moment the competent labour court is moved by the complainant by filing a complaint as laid down by the said section the labour court is bound to proceed with the same on merits as there is no further letter on its power to take cognizance of the offence to the effect that cognizance of such Act offence cannot be taken if the complaint is time barred. Mr. Mehtas submission would have remained unanswerable if it was found that sec. 82 is a complete Code on the question of taking of cognizance of the Act offences. A close reading of sec. 82 however does not reflect any such legislative intention. All that sec. 82 provides is that no labour court shall take cognizance of the Act offences except on the basis of the complaint filed by the concerned person mentioned therein. A close reading of sec. 82 however does not reflect any such legislative intention. All that sec. 82 provides is that no labour court shall take cognizance of the Act offences except on the basis of the complaint filed by the concerned person mentioned therein. It therefore lays down a procedure for taking cognizance of the Act offences. It relates to a stage anterior to the taking of actual cognizance of the offences as alleged in the complaint. The section merely states as to who shall be competent to move the labour court as a complainant in connection with the Act offences. The section does not go further and say as to what further steps shall be taken by the labour court before taking actual cognizance of the Act offences. Thus in short the section nowhere deals with actual taking of cognizance of the Act offences by the concerned labour court but it deals with a stage prior thereto. All that sec. 82 does is to lay down the qualifications for becoming a complainant for Act offences. It stops short of providing for any fetters on the powers of the labour court properly moved by a qualified complainant in the taking of cognizance of alleged offences disclosed by such a complaint. The term cognizance of offence is not defined in the Act. Therefore we can turn to the dictionary meaning of the word cognizance. In Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary 1964 edition one of the meanings of the word cognizance is stated as under Knowledge or notice judicial or private. Thus judicial notice of the offence alleged in the complaint would result into taking cognizance of such offence by the concerned labour court. Sec. 82 nowhere states as to under what circumstances labour court can be said to have taken cognizance of the offence by taking judicial notice of the facts contained in the complaint. The term taking of cognizance has also a well settled connotation in criminal law. The Supreme Court while dealing with the question as to when the Magistrate functioning under the Code can by said to have taken cognizance of the offence has laid down in various decisions that only at the stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the allegations in the complaint he can be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. We may note a few of them in this connection. We may note a few of them in this connection. In NIRMALJIT V. STATE OF W. B. A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2639 J. M. Shelat J. speaking for the Supreme Court in para 35 of the report at page 2650 had to consider the question whether the documents produced before the police in the course of investigation by them as ordered by the Magistrate under sec. 156 (3) of the Code can be said to have been produced and/or tendered in evidence before the learned Magistrate. Answering this question it was held by the Supreme Court that such production of documents before the police cannot be treated to be their production in evidence before the court. In the background of the aforesaid facts of the case it was further observed by Shelat J. that while ordering investigation under sec. 156 the learned Magistrate cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. Hence there was no occasion for any document being produced before him as evidence in the case. In this connection the following pertinent observations are worth noting. "secondly it is well settled that before a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence under sec. 190 (1) (a) of the Code he must have not only applied his mind to the contents of the complaint presented before him but must have done so far the purpose of proceeding under sec. 200 and the provisions following that section. But where he applied his mind only for ordering an investigation under sec. 156 (3) or issuing a warrant for purposes of investigation he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. "the Supreme Court in Nirmaljits case (Supra) also placed reliance on its earlier Judgments in R. R. CHARI V. STATE OF U. P. A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 1541 AND JAMUNA SINGH V. BHADAI SAH A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1541 for taking the aforestated view. ( 8 ) IN MOWU V. SUPDT. SPECIAL JAIL NOWGONG ASSAM (1971) (3) S. C. C. 936 the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider this very question once again. ( 8 ) IN MOWU V. SUPDT. SPECIAL JAIL NOWGONG ASSAM (1971) (3) S. C. C. 936 the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider this very question once again. J. M. Shelat JJ speaking for the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision held that taking cognizance of a criminal offence is a judicial act and that the District Magistrate Kohima had taken cognizance of the offence atleast on 23-11-1969 when on the first information report having been produced before him he noted that he was prima facie satisfied that the accused persons had committed the offence set out in that document. This was clearly not an administrative act on his part but a judicial act after he had applied his mind to the contents of the first information report before him for the purpose of initiation of proceedings before him. ( 9 ) THE aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court as well as the dictionary meaning of the word cognizance clearly indicate that before cognizance of the offence can be said to have been taken by any competent court which can try such an offence it must be shown that the concerned court had applied its judicial mind on the allegations mentioned in the complaint and having been prima facie satisfied has decided to initiate proceedings against the concerned accused. Sec. 82 is miles away from any such situation. It nowhere contemplates a procedure to be followed by the labour court for applying its judicial mind on the allegations in the complaint with a view to proceeding with the same. It is therefore not possible to agree with the submission of Mr. Mehta that sec. 82 is a complete Code dealing with taking of cognizance of the alleged offences under the Act and that nothing further can be read in it on the aspect of taking of cognizance of such offences. As seen earlier the section really deals with a stage prior to taking of cognizance of the Act offence by the concerned labour court. How the concerned labour court has to deal with the complaint and proceed with the same is a topic which is not covered by the sweep of sec. 82. ( 10 ) IN this connection we may also profitably refer to sec. 190 of the Code. It also deals with taking of cognizance by Magistrate. Sub- sec. (1) of sec. How the concerned labour court has to deal with the complaint and proceed with the same is a topic which is not covered by the sweep of sec. 82. ( 10 ) IN this connection we may also profitably refer to sec. 190 of the Code. It also deals with taking of cognizance by Magistrate. Sub- sec. (1) of sec. 190 provides as under: (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter any Magistrate of the first class and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub- sec. (2) may take cognizance of any offence. (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence. (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. " The aforesaid provisions of sec. 190 (1) of the Code lay down a legislative scheme which is parallel to sec. 82 of the Act. Both these provisions therefore deal with a stage anterior to the actual taking of the cognizance of the concerned offence disclosed by the complaint by the concerned competent court. If there are any fetters on the powers of the concerned competent court in taking cognizance of such complaints duly filed under sec. 190 of the Code the same may flow from any other statutory provisions and they cannot be said to be ruled out only because the procedure for approaching the competent court is laid down by statutory provisions like sec. 82 of the Act or sec. 190 (1) of the Code and which provisions are silent about such fetters. They in fact are not meant to touch upon the fetters on the powers of the concerned competent court of taking cognizance of the concerned offences. At this stage it would be useful to have a look at a decision of the Supreme Court in GOVIND MEHTA V. STATE OF BIHAR A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1708. The Supreme Court in that case was concerned with the question of the duty of a Magistrate taking cognizance of cases under sec. 190 of the Code and the further question as to how this duty. is to be discharged. The Supreme Court in that case was concerned with the question of the duty of a Magistrate taking cognizance of cases under sec. 190 of the Code and the further question as to how this duty. is to be discharged. In the case before the Supreme Court certain criminal complaints were filed against the appellant Govind Mehta who at the relevant time was posted at Patna as a Magistrate. First class. He was alleged to have committed forgery in judicial records and used forged document as genuine in order to cause injuries to others. While considering the question as to whether the learned Magistrate before whom complaints for alleged offences were filed against the appellant was required to consider the question whether there was any alleged breach of sec. 195 (1) (b) and (c) and sec. 476 of the Code before he could take cognizance of the offence under sec. 190 of the Code the Supreme Court speaking through Vaidialingam J. made the following pertinent observations:"the proposition that the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken is to be adjudged is the time when cognizance is actually taken is laid down by this court in M. L. SETHI V. II. P. KAPUR (1967) A SCR 520= (AIR 1967 S. C. 528 The Magistrate has normally got jurisdiction to take cognizance under sec. 190 of the Code in the circumstances enumerated therein. Sec. 195 is in fact a limitation on the unfettered powers of a magistrate to take cognizance under sec 190 of the Code. Therefore at the stage when the magistrate is taking cognizance under sec. 190 he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under sec. 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of sec. 195 (1 ). Therefore it is needless to state that if there is a non-compliance with the provisions of sec. 195 the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to the cognizance of any of the offences enumerated therein. 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of sec. 195 (1 ). Therefore it is needless to state that if there is a non-compliance with the provisions of sec. 195 the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to the cognizance of any of the offences enumerated therein. "the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court lays down two propositions (i) that the act of taking cognizance of offence is a judicial act where the concerned competent court has to judicially examine the facts of the complaint and ( while taking such cognizance of the offence disclosed by the complaint the concerned competent court has also to consider whether it has power to take cognizance of the offence alleged in the complaint and whether the said power is otherwise fettered by any other statutory provisions. It is obvious that fetters on the powers of the competent court to take cognizance of the given offence may not necessarily be found in the same section which lays down the procedure for taking cognizance of offences by the said court and may be found elsewhere as was the case before the Supreme Court where fetter on the power of the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offences was found to flow not from sec. 190 but from sec. 195 of the Code. As we have already shown earlier the scheme of sec. 190 of the Code is parallel to the scheme of sec. 82 of the Act. If Mr. Mehtas contention was right and if the entire topic of taking of cognizance of act offence was to be considered to be circumscribed only by sec. 82 of the Act then the fetter on the powers of the court regarding taking cognizance of offences would have been required to be culled out only from the four corners of sec. 82 or parallel provisions of sec. 190 of the Code and no inquiry beyond the concerned sections could have been made permissible. But the Supreme Court in the above case has clearly negatived this line of reasoning by holding that fetter on the power of the Magistrate to take cognizance can be ascertained from any other relevant statutory provision. If sec. 190 of the Code and no inquiry beyond the concerned sections could have been made permissible. But the Supreme Court in the above case has clearly negatived this line of reasoning by holding that fetter on the power of the Magistrate to take cognizance can be ascertained from any other relevant statutory provision. If sec. 190 of the Code is not treated by the Supreme Court to be a complete Code for determining the question of taking of cognizance of offences by a criminal court then by a parity of reasoning parallel provision of sec. 82 of the Act cannot likewise be treated to be a complete Code on the question of taking of cognizance of Act offences. The contention of Mr. Mehta therefore has got to be repelled as it flies in the face of the clear language of sec. 82 of the Act and the well settled connotation of the word taking of cognizance of offence as well as the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Govind Methas case (supra ). ( 11 ) THAT takes us to the consideration of sec. 83 of the Act. Mr. Mehta submitted that sec. 83 of the Act refers to provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 which held the field when the Bombay legislature enacted the present Act in 1945. To that extent he is right. The Bombay legislature in 1946 could not have imagined that in 1973 any future Parliament would repeal and re-enact with substantial modification the present Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 But sec. 8 of the General Clauses Act 1897 clearly steps in in such contingencies. It provides for construction of the references to repealed enactments. Sub-sec. (1) states. "where this Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals and re-enacts with or without modification any provision of a former enactment then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall unless a different intention appears be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted. "thus the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 which was referred to by the Bombay Legislature while it enacted sec. 83 of the present Act can be construed as reference to the re-enacted Code of 1973. However Mr. Mehta pointed out that sub-sec. (1) of sec. "thus the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 which was referred to by the Bombay Legislature while it enacted sec. 83 of the present Act can be construed as reference to the re-enacted Code of 1973. However Mr. Mehta pointed out that sub-sec. (1) of sec. 8 of the General Clauses Act cannot be pressed in service as a clear different intention appears from sec. 83 itself. Let us therefore turn to this question. Sec. 83 which we have reproduced earlier talks of three types of powers and procedure of labour court in trials and states that (1) a labour court shall have all the powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 of the Magistrate of first class; and (2) in the trial of every such offence shall follow the procedure laid down in chapter XXII of the said Code for a summary trial in which an appeal lies; and (3) the rest of the provisions of the said Code shall so far as may be apply to such trial. So far as the first part of sec. 83 is concerned it deals with conferment of all the powers of the Magistrate first class on the labour court constituted under the Act. So far as this part of the section is concerned it cannot be said that reference to new Code of 1973 is ruled out on account of any contrary legislative intention made visible in the said section. Mr. Mehta is however right when he contends that new chapter 36 of the Code 1973 deals with certain fetters on the powers of the Magistrate taking cognizance of offences and does not deal with express conferment of any positive powers on the Magistrate and therefore those limitations on the powers of the Magistrate as laid down in chaptar 36 of the new Code cannot automatically get incorporated in the first part of sec. 83 even while reference to Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 therein may be construed as reference to succeeding Code of 1973. So far as the second part is concerned it deals with the procedure to be followed by the labour court while trying offences under the Act and it enjoins upon the labour court to follow the procedure of chapter 22 for summary trial in which aqppeal lies. The corresponding provision in the new Code is found in Chapter 21 of the new Code. The corresponding provision in the new Code is found in Chapter 21 of the new Code. Even here there is nothing contraindicated in sec. 83 which would rule out reference to the new Code of 1973 in place and stead of old Code of 1898. Then remains the last part of sec. 83 which lays down that rest of the provisions of the said Code shall so far as may be apply to such trial. It is on this part of sec. 83 that a strong debate ensued between the advocates of rival parties. According to Mr. Mehta the remainder provisions of the Code have to be applied only with a view to seeing that they make the trial effective while the learned Advocate General for the respondent contended that the last part of sec. 83 nowhere lays down that only those remaining provisions of the Code have to be applied which would make the trial effective and that other provisions which may put any further fetter on the powers of the Magistrate to try the offences on merits are all ruled out. It is not possible for us to agree with the contention of Mr. Mehta that the last part of sec. 83 would rule out applicability of chapter 36 of the Code of 1973 as the provisions contained therein instead of trying to make the trials of the Act offences effective have a tendency to scuttle the same. In express terms the legislature has provided in last part of sec. 83 that the remaining provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply to trials of Act offences as far as may be meaning thereby that in trying to make these provisions applicable to such trials the scheme of trial of such offences as laid down by any of the provisions of the Act is not rendered otiose or inconsistent. It is not possible to agree with Mr. Mehta that the last part of sec. 83 reflects a legislative intention to import only a limited category of remaining provisions of the Code which can make the trial effective like issuance of summonses and warrants etc. On the contrary a clear legislative mandate is found that all the remaining provisions of the Code shall apply to such trial so far as they may be. 83 reflects a legislative intention to import only a limited category of remaining provisions of the Code which can make the trial effective like issuance of summonses and warrants etc. On the contrary a clear legislative mandate is found that all the remaining provisions of the Code shall apply to such trial so far as they may be. While applying any such provisions if any provision of the act is rendered inconsistent then of course on a combined reading of sec. 8 of the General Clauses Act and the phrase so far as may be as employed by the legislation in the third part of sec. 83 such inconsistent provision of the Code will have to be ruled out. But if such an eventuality does not happen there is no reason why any other general provision of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 should not be held applicable to the trial of the act offences under the Act. Let us therefore see whether the application of the provisions of chapter 36 of the Code of 1973 to trials of Act offences by labour courts would render any existing provisions of the Act inconsistent or otiose. For deciding this question we must look to the four corners of the Act and try to fir d cut as to whether there is any express provision in the Act laying down any period of limitation for trying the Act offences. Once we do so we find that there is no such provision. Therefore the question of limitation for trying Act offences was not touched by the Bombay legislature at all while it enacted the Act in 1946. Consequently if the provisions of sec. 468 are held applicable to trials of Act offences by the labour court no existing provision of the Act on the topic of limitation for trials of offences would be rendered inconsistent or otiose. If for example the Act had provided a limitation period of one year for trial of offences under the Act the provisions of sec. 468 of the Code could not have been made applicable to trials of such Act offences as in that eventuality provisions of section 468 would have directly conflicted with the express provisions of the Act. The net effect of the employment of the words so far as may be by the legislature while it enacted the third part of sec. 468 of the Code could not have been made applicable to trials of such Act offences as in that eventuality provisions of section 468 would have directly conflicted with the express provisions of the Act. The net effect of the employment of the words so far as may be by the legislature while it enacted the third part of sec. 83 is that only inconsistent provision of sec. 468 if any would get ruled out. If the words so far as may be would not have been employed by the legislature in the third part of sec. 83 even then the result would have been the same as sec. 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act would have ruled out the applicability of such inconsistent provision of sec. 468 indicating different legislative intention. But unfortunately for the petitioner nowhere in the Act is found any such different legislative intention laying down a different period of limitation than the one which is now tried to be provided by general provisions of chapter 36 of the Code of 1973. In fact there is no conflict between sec. 4g8 of the Code on the one hand and sec. 83 or for that matter any other provisions of the Act on the other and all of them can harmoniously co-exist. It must therefore be held that applicability of chapter 36 of the Code of 1973 gets attracted to trials of Act offences under the Act by virtue of the third part of sec. 83 which as seen above clearly lays down that rest of the provisions of the Code (which shall be read as succeeding Code of 1973 by virtue of sec. 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act) shall apply to such trials. If Mr. Mehtas contention to the effect that only those remaining provisions of the Code can be made applicable to the trial of Act offences which can make such trial effective and no others is accepted then it would result in re-writing the-last part of sec. 83 and would require addition of the words insofar as such trials are to be rendered effective. Such words are conspicuously absent in the third part of sec. 83 and by no process of judicial interpretation such words can be added to the section as Mr. Mehtas submission would logically require us to do. 83 and would require addition of the words insofar as such trials are to be rendered effective. Such words are conspicuously absent in the third part of sec. 83 and by no process of judicial interpretation such words can be added to the section as Mr. Mehtas submission would logically require us to do. ( 12 ) IT is now time for us to refer to the alternative contention raised by Mr. Mehta in connection with sec. 83 of the Act. He submitted that sec. 83 represents a legislative incorporation by reference or in other words it is a legislative shorthand. That the Bombay legislature while enacting sec. 83 in 1946 had in view the then prevailing Code of 1898 and instead of referring to the said Code in extenso by way of legislative incorporation referred the same in sec. 83. Consequently any subsequent alternation in the said Code or its repeal or re-enactment can have no effect on the incorporated provisions of the old Code of 1898 in sec. 83. If that is so new chapter 36 in 1973 Code could not be made applicable to trials held as per sec. 83 of the Act. He submitted that old Code of 1898 got incorporated by reference in sec. 83 of the Act which would represent an entirely different legislative scheme so far as applicability of sec. 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act is concerned and therefore the later provision cannot be pressed in service by the respondents to bring in the applicability of the Code of 1973 to the trial of Act offences as contemplated by sec. 83. The aforesaid alternative contention of Mr. Mehta squarely raises a question as to what was done by the Bombay legislature in 1946 when it enacted sec. 83 amongst others. If it represents a scheme of legislative incorporation by reference and if old Code of 1898 got incorporated in sec. 83 then Mr. Mehta would be right in his submission that the subsequent repeal of the said Code and its re enactment in 1973 with modification cannot automatically be read in sec. 83 vice the old Code of 1898 and sec. 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act would get excluded. If on the other hand as submitted by the learned Advocate General sec. 83 vice the old Code of 1898 and sec. 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act would get excluded. If on the other hand as submitted by the learned Advocate General sec. 83 merely refers to the procedural Code by way of general reference and without letting the same get incorporated by reference in sec. 83 itself then just the contrary result would ensue viz. that any subsequent repeal and re-enactment with modification of the general Code would automatically get attracted to trials of Act offences as per the last part of sec. 83. ( 13 ) BEFORE we turn to various authorities cited by the learned Advocates on this point it would be profitable to have a look at what a standard work has to say on the point. ( 14 ) CRAIES on Statute Law 1971 edition at page 29 has the following observations to offer on the point:"legislation by reference occurs where an earlier enactment is amended applied etc. by a mere specific reference to the section or part affected without any description of its subject matter necessitating in consequence resort to the enactment cited to appreciate what the later enactment is effecting. Nowadays where such a procedure is unavoidable it is becoming usual to add in brackets a precis of the subject matter of the enactment which is referred to. " ( 15 ) WE may now turn to the consideration of various authorities on the point. In COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS V. SAMPATHU CHETTY A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 316 the question before the Supreme Court was whether prohibition incorporated in sec. 23a of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947 would take in its sweep sec. 178a of the Sea Customs Act 1878 which was enacted by amending Act of 1955. It was contended that sec. 23a of the Regulation Act when it was enacted in 1952 in fact incorporated in the said provision of the Regulation Act all the relevant provisions of the Sea Customs Act 1878 as stood in 1952 with the result that any subsequent amendment to the Sea Customs Act did not and could not affect modify or enlarge the scope of incorporated Sea Customs Act which had become a part of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The Supreme Court in this connection noted the language of sec. 23a of the Regulation Act which read as under:"the restrictions imposed by sub-secs. The Supreme Court in this connection noted the language of sec. 23a of the Regulation Act which read as under:"the restrictions imposed by sub-secs. (1) and (2) of sec. 8 sub-sec. (1) of sec. 12 and clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec 13 shall be deemed to have been imposed under sec. 19 of the Sea Customs Act 1978 and all the provisions of that Act shall have effect accordingly. "the Supreme Court also noted the language of sec. 19 of the Sea Customs Act 1878 which read as under:"the Central Government may from time to time by notification in the official gazette probihit or restrict the bringing or taking by sea or by land goods of any specified description into or out of India across any customs frontier as defined by the Central Government. "by a later amendment to the Sea Customs Act 1878 in 1955 sec. 178a was introduced therein which laid down as under:" (1) Where any goods to which this section applies are seized under this Act to the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized. "the question before the Supreme Court was as to whether sec. 23a of the Regulation Act incorporated the existing provisions of the Sea Customs Act in 1959 when the Regulation Act was enacted with the result that subsequent amendments to the Sea Customs Act in 1955 by introduction of sec. 178a could not be pressed in service in cases governed by the provisions of the Regulation Act. Answering the question in the negative Ayyangar J. speaking for the Supreme Court in this connection observed that this conclusion is reinforced by a comparison of the usual and normal or recognised formulae generally employed to effect incorporation such that changes in or even repeal of the incorporated statute is not intended per se to affect the operation of the incorporating legislation. It is sufficient to pick out a few of the well known formulae employed which would indicate that normally the draftsman does not leave his intentions in doubt. The Supreme Court then noted a few instances of legislative incorporating by reference. The instances were noted as under. 1. In sec 20 of 53 and 54 Vict. Ch. It is sufficient to pick out a few of the well known formulae employed which would indicate that normally the draftsman does not leave his intentions in doubt. The Supreme Court then noted a few instances of legislative incorporating by reference. The instances were noted as under. 1. In sec 20 of 53 and 54 Vict. Ch. 70-Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890 the words used were: shall for that purpose be deemed to form part of this Act in the same manner as if they were enacted in the body thereof. " 2. In 54 and 55 Vic. Ch. 19-sec. 1 (3) the language employed was: "the provisions of sec. 134 of the said Act (set out in the Schedule) shall apply as if they were herein re-enacted. " 3. 10 and 11 (1947) George VI 51 (the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 sec. 44 (1) enacted:"secs. 19 to 30 of the Act of 1944 which provide for the disposal and appropriation by local planning authorities of land acquired or appropriated under Part I of that Act for the carrying out by such authorities of development of such land (and for other matters arising in relation to the acquisition of land in that part) shall except so far as repealed by this Act be incorporated with this part of this Act subject to the amendments specified in the second column of the 8th Schedule of this Act and of the following provisions of this section. "4. 1958 6 and 7 Eliz. 2 Ch. (the Park Lane Improvement Act 1958 S. 5 read:"the land Clauses Act (other than excepted provision) so far as they are applicable for the purposes of this Act and are not inconsistent. It with the provisions thereof are hereby incorporated with this Act. "having noted the aforesaid examples of legislative incorporation by reference Ayyangar J. for the Supreme Court made the following pertinent observations in para 41 of the report :"a comparison of these formulae with the text of sec. 23a shows that the reference in it to sec. It with the provisions thereof are hereby incorporated with this Act. "having noted the aforesaid examples of legislative incorporation by reference Ayyangar J. for the Supreme Court made the following pertinent observations in para 41 of the report :"a comparison of these formulae with the text of sec. 23a shows that the reference in it to sec. 19 of the Sea Customs Act is merely for rendering notification under the named provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act to operate as notification under the Sea Customs Act and that it cannot have the effect of incorporating the relevant provisions of the earlier Act into the Act of 1947 so as to attract the rule formulated by Brett L. J. in (1851) 8 QBD which provided that "where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the second. " ( 16 ) IN RAM SARUP V. MUNSHI A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 553 the Supreme Court was concerned with the question as to whether the definition of the word `agricultural land as employed in sec. 3 (1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 would become otiose and inoperative on account of the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900 by Adaptation of laws (third Amendment) Order 1951 Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 employed the words in respect of agricultural land. agricultural land was defined under sec. 3 (1) of the Act as Under agricultural land shall mean land as defined in the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900 (as amended by act I of 1907) but shall not include the rights of a mortgagee whether usufructuary or not in such land. By Adaptation of Laws (Third Amendment) Order 1951 the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900 came to be repealed. The question was whether after such repeal reference to the repealed Act in the definition of agricultural land as found in sec. 3 (1) of the Punjab-Pre-emption Act could be validly made or whether definition had become inoperative and otiose on account of the repeal of the referred Act. The Supreme Court took the view that on the statutory language of sec. 3 (1) of the Punjab-Pre-emption Act could be validly made or whether definition had become inoperative and otiose on account of the repeal of the referred Act. The Supreme Court took the view that on the statutory language of sec. 3 (1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act definition of the word agricultural land as found in Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900 had got incorporated by reference into the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 and consequently the later repeal of the referred Act did not have any effect on the operation of the definition sec. 3 (1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. It was held that the expression agricultural Act in the Punjab Pre-emption Act had bodily lifted the definition in the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900 and the said definition had been bodily transposed into the Punjab Pre-emption Act. Consequently repeal of the referred statute had no effect on the operation of the adopting statute. Thus in the later judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Sarups case (supra) a different view was taken by the Supreme Court on the express language of the Punjab Pre-emption Act and it was laid down that if by reference by incorporations provisions of any statute were bodily lifted and incorporated into an adopting Statute then the subsequent repeal of the referred statute had no effect on the former. But in the earlier judgment in the case of Collector of Custom; (supra) the statutory language of the adopting Act was construed in a different manner in the light of the language of that enactment. ( 17 ) WE may now turn to a later decision of the Supreme Court which has a direct bearing on the resolution of the present controversy. In STATE OF MAHARASHTRA V. MADHAVRAO A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 1395 the constitutional bench of the Supreme Court was concerned with the question of constitutional validity of the Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act 1961 (Maharashtra Act 27/61) as amended by Amending Act 18 of 1962. The parent Act viz. Maharashtra Act 27/61 was specified in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution as a result of which it got immunised from constitutional attacks by virtue of Article 31b of the Constitution. However when the said Parent Act got amended by the Amending Act 13/62 the Amending Act was not brought on the 9th Schedule. The parent Act viz. Maharashtra Act 27/61 was specified in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution as a result of which it got immunised from constitutional attacks by virtue of Article 31b of the Constitution. However when the said Parent Act got amended by the Amending Act 13/62 the Amending Act was not brought on the 9th Schedule. The question before the Supreme Court was as to whether reference to the Parent Act in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution necessarily applied to all later amendments to the Parent Act or whether the reference was to the existing parent Act without later amendments and which required in their turn their fresh insertion in the 9th Schedule to earn the protection of Article 31b. The High Court of Maharashtra had taken the view that subsequent amendments in the parent Act also got covered by Article 31b even though these amendments were not specifically mentioned in the 9th Schedule. In para 11 of the report Sikri J. speaking for the Supreme Court while agreeing with the view of the High Court made the following pertinent observations :"11. Regarding the first point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant it seems to us that the High Court was right in holding that Article 31b does protect the impugned Act from challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental rights. There is no doubt that Article 31b should be interpreted strictly. But even interpreting it strictly the only requirement which is laid down by Article 31b is that the Act should be specified in the Ninth Schedule. Now the question arises whether the impugned Act has been specified in the Ninth Schedule or not It is true that what is mentioned in Entry 34 of the Ninth Schedule is The Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act 1961 (Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961 which may be referred to as the Principal Act and no mention is made of the Amending Act namely Maharashtra Act XIII of 1962. Ordinarily if an Act is referred to by its title it is intended to refer to that Act with all the amendments made in it upto the date of reference. For instance the Constitution refers to the General Clauses Act 1897 in Art. 367. Ordinarily if an Act is referred to by its title it is intended to refer to that Act with all the amendments made in it upto the date of reference. For instance the Constitution refers to the General Clauses Act 1897 in Art. 367. This article provides that unless the context otherwise requires the General Clauses Act 1897 shall subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under Article 372 apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted it would mean that for the purposes of the interpretation of the Constitution the General Clauses Act as originally enacted in 1891 would alone be taken into consideration. We can hardly imagine that this was the intention of the Constitution makers. Further when one refers to the Code of Civil Procedure or the Criminal procedure Code or the Indian Penal Code one ordinarily means to refer to them as amended upto date. There is no reason why this ordinary manner of referring to Acts should not be borne in mind while interpreting the Ninth Schedule. "the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court clearly lays down that when a statute is referred by its title in another Act it would not be a case of reference by incorporation and all the amendments in the referred statute would automatically be read in the referring statute or adopting statute. We may also emphasis the underlined portion in para 11 of the report where a clear view is taken that when reference to Code of Civil Procedure Criminal Procedure Code and/or Indian Penal Code is made reference is ordinarily to the said provisions as amended upto date and this is the ordinary manner of referring to these Acts. Now in the present case also it is to be emphasised that sec. 83 of the Act refers to the Code of Criminal Procedure by its title Consequently as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra (supra) that reference would be considered to be reference to the concerned Code as amended upto date. That would clearly contraindicate any reference by incorporation of the said general provisions of the Code in sec. That would clearly contraindicate any reference by incorporation of the said general provisions of the Code in sec. 83 of the Act when it was originally enacted in 1946 as submitted by Mr. Mehta. In our view therefore the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra (supra) clearly clinches the issue against the petitioner so far as the question of legislative incorporation of the Code of Cri. Procedure by reference in sec. 83 of the Act is concerned. ( 18 ) WE may now turn to the few decisions cited by Mr. Mehta on the point. He first invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in NAROTTAMDAS V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1667. In that case the constitutional bench of the Supreme Court was concerned with the question as to whether reference to the Minimum Wages Act 1948 as contained in sec. 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act 1962 would stand in any way affected by the later changes in the definition of the corresponding terms as defined in the Minimum Wages Act 1948 On interpretation of sec. 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Act it was held by the Supreme Court that sec. 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Act laid down that the expressions used in that Act shall have the same meaning for the purpose of that Act as defined in the Minimum Wages Act 1948 The definition of expressions used in an Act with reference to other Act is a well known device in legislative practice generally adopted for the sake of brevity. The definition would remain effective even after the other Act with reference to which the definition was given ceases to exist. This fact of defining expressions in an Act with reference to some other Act cannot therefore have the effect of making that Act dependent on such other Act. It was thus held on the language of sec. 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Act that the said provision incorporated by reference to the definitions of the relevant terms as mentioned in the incorporated Act vi. Minimum Wages Act 1948 The contention of Mr. Mehta would be right if it is found that sec. It was thus held on the language of sec. 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Act that the said provision incorporated by reference to the definitions of the relevant terms as mentioned in the incorporated Act vi. Minimum Wages Act 1948 The contention of Mr. Mehta would be right if it is found that sec. 83 of the Act also incorporates by reference the provisions of the then existing Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court therefore does not advance the contention of Mr. Mehta any further save and except reiterating the well settled legal position. ( 19 ) WE may now turn to the later decision of the Supreme Court in BAJYA V. GOPIKABAI A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 793 to which our attention was invited by Mr. Mehta. In fact the entire law on the question has been crystalised by the Supreme Court in BAJYAS CASE (SUPRA ). In order to appreciate the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision it is necessary to note a few relevant facts pertaining to the said decision Sec. 151 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1954 had laid down than subject to his personal law interest of a tenure-holder shall on his death pass by inheritence survivorship or bequest as the case may be. The tenure-holder whose tenure was governed by the provisions of the aforesaid Code died on 6-11-1956. The question was as to who were the heirs of the deceased tenure-holder when he died in 1956. On the one hand it was contended that sec. 151 of the said Code referred to personal law as existing at the time of enactment of the said Code; while on the other hand it was contended that reference to the words personal law in sec. 151 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code pertained to general personal law and did not involve any incorporation of existing personal law by reference and consequently any changes in the personal law that might have come to be effected after the enactment of the M. P. Land Revenue Code and which would be holding the field at the time the concerned tenure-holder died intestate would also get included in the general words his personal law as employed by sec. 151 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. It was submitted before the Supreme Court that sec. 151 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. It was submitted before the Supreme Court that sec. 151 of the said Code incorporated by reference the existing personal law of the tenure holder and could not therefore be construed to have taken in its fold subsequent changes in the personal law of the tenure-holder that might be holding the field at the time of his death. Sarkaria J. speaking for the Supreme Court negatived the said contention and while doing so made the following pertinent observations:"broadly speaking legislation by referential incorporation falls in two categories; First where a statute by specific reference incorporates the provisions of another statute as of the time of adoption. Second where a statute incorporates by general reference the law concerning a particular subject as a genus. In the case of the former the subsequent amendments made in the referred statute cannot automatically be read into the adopting statute. In the case of latter category it may be presumed that the legislative intent was to include all the subsequent amendments also made from time to time in the generic law on the subject adopted by general reference. This principle of construction of a reference statute has been neatly summed up by Sutherland thus. A statute which refers to the law of a subject generally adopts the law on the Subject as of the time the law is invoked. This will include all the amendments and modifications of the law subsequent to the time the reference statute was enacted (vide Sutherlands Statutory Construction Third edition Art. 5208 p. 5209. CORPOUS Luris Secundum also enunciates the same principle in these terms : ". . . . . . Where the reference in an adopting Statute is to the Law generally which governs the particular subject and not to any specific statute or part thereof. . . . . . the reference will be held to include the law as it stands at the time it is sought to be applied with all the changes made from time to time at least as far as the changes are consistent with the purpose of the adopting statute. "in para 28 of the report it has been held that the expression personal law referred to in sec. "in para 28 of the report it has been held that the expression personal law referred to in sec. 151 of the Code comprehends the Hindu Succession Act 1956 which will undoubtedly govern the inheritance to the estate of Smt. Sarji who died on 6/11/1956 much after the coming into force of that Act. Thus when the law of subject is generally referred to as genus there would be presumption of legislative intention to include all subsequent amendments made from time to time in the generic law on the subject adopted by the general reference. As we have already shown earlier all that sec. 83 of the Act does is to refer to the Criminal Procedure Code as genus by its title. Consequently in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtras case (supra) as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in Bajyas case (supra) the conclusion is inevitable that sec. 83 is not an example of legislation where in there is total incorporation of existing provisions of a given statute by reference so that the referred statute gets sub merged and transplanted into the referring statute. On the contrary it is a case of referential legislation of the second category as envisaged in Bajyas case (supra ). Consequently the repeal of referred provisions of generic nature and their re-enactment alongwith modifications can be read into the provisions of sec. 83 of the Act in the light of sec. 8 of the General Clauses Act and also in the light of the aforesaid settled legal position on the point. Mr. Mehtas submission that sec. 83 of the Act falls in the first category of the cases envisaged by the Supreme Court in Bajyas case (supra) therefore cannot be accepted. ( 20 ) THAT takes us to the consideration of a Division bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in EMPEROR V. HARJI BHAIJI 52. B. L. R. 321 on which strong reliance was placed by Mr. Mehta. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Bavdekar and Chainani JJ was concerned with the question of interpretation of sec. 116 of the Bombay Prohibition Act which provided that in all trials for offences under the said Act the Magistrates shall follow the procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the trial of summary cases in which an appeal lies. 116 of the Bombay Prohibition Act which provided that in all trials for offences under the said Act the Magistrates shall follow the procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the trial of summary cases in which an appeal lies. The accused of that case was prosecuted under sec. 65 (f) of the Bombay Prohibition Act on the allegation that he was found in possession of 5 seers of soacked mohura flowers. He was tried by the Additional Resident Magistrate First class Dohad who was not empowered to try cases summarily. The accused pleaded guilty to the charge. His plea was accepted and he was sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 500 His appeal to the Sessions Judge Panchmahals was accepted on the ground that under sec. 116 of the Act the accused should have been tried summarily by the learned Magistrate who was empowered to try the accused in summary manner and that as the accused had been tried by a Magistrate who was not so empowered his conviction was illegal. The Sessions court ordered re-trial of the accused. The State of Bombay went in appeal to the High Court. While accepting the appeal on behalf of the State of Bombay the Division Bench took the view that sec. 116 of the Prohibition Act dealt only with the mode of trial. It did not curtail the ordinary powers of Magistrate to take cognizance of and try offences. It authorised all Magistrates to follow the summary procedure while trying offences under the Act and consequently the trial of the accused was not incompetent. It was further held that the words the Magistrates as employed by sec. 116 of the Act were general in nature and no further words who are competent to try cases can be introduced in the said section while interpreting the same. That when the words the Magistrates were read in ordinary manner the effect was to indicate the procedure which can be followed by any Magistrate while trying the cases under the Prohibition Act. Thu s on the interpretation of sec. 116 of the Act the view was taken that any Magistrate though not necessarily empowered to try summary cases under the Code can try cases in summary manner under sec. 116 of the Act. The aforesaid decision based on the interpretation of specific words employed in sec. Thu s on the interpretation of sec. 116 of the Act the view was taken that any Magistrate though not necessarily empowered to try summary cases under the Code can try cases in summary manner under sec. 116 of the Act. The aforesaid decision based on the interpretation of specific words employed in sec. 116 of the Prohibition Act cannot be pressed in service by Mr. Mehta in support of his present contention that sec. 83 of the Act incorporates by reference the provisions of the Code as existing in 1946 only. . ( 21 ) THAT takes us to the consideration of the two other decisions of this court relied upon by Mr. Mehta to support his contention that no period of limitation can be implied while interpreting the scheme of secs. 82 and 83 of the Act. He first invited our attention to the decision of a Division Bench of this court in ASOKA MILLS V. INDUSTRIAL COURT 5 G. L. R. 300. The short question with which the Division Bench was concerned was as to whether declaration about illegal change under sec. 78 (1) A (a) of the Act was a condition precedent to the filing of any complaint for an offence under sec. 106 (1) of the Act. Sec. 106 of the Act provides for penalty for illegal change and states that any employer who makes an illegal change shall on conviction be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 5 0 while sec. 78 (1)A (c) empowers the labour court to declare any change affected by the employer to be an illegal charge. On the express language of the aforesaid two provisions the Division Bench speaking through Bhagwati J. (as he then was) took the view that sec. 106 stood by itself and there was nothing in the Act to suggest that before any complaint under sec. 106 (1) can be filed the complaint had to wait for adjudication from the labour court regarding alleged illegality of the impugned change. It is obvious that we are not concerned with such a question in the present proceedings. Mr. Mehta for the petitioner also fairly accepted this position but he invited our attention to the observations of the Division Bench in para 9 of the report wherein it has been observed as under:-". . . the consequence of accepting the construction contended for by Mr. Mr. Mehta for the petitioner also fairly accepted this position but he invited our attention to the observations of the Division Bench in para 9 of the report wherein it has been observed as under:-". . . the consequence of accepting the construction contended for by Mr. P. B. Patwari would be to introduce by the backdoor a period of limitation for a prosecution for the offence under sec. 106 (1) which would be contrary to the ell accepted principle of criminal law that there can be no limitation in enforcement of a criminal liability against an offender unless the statute creating the offence so provides. There is nothing in sec. 82 or sec. 106 (1) which prescribes any period of limitation for a prosecution for the offence under sec. 106 (1) nor is there any other provision in the Act which lays down any such period of limitation and it would indeed be remarkable that the legislature should have chosen to enact such period of limitation in this indirect manner by leaving the legislative intent in that behalf to be gathered from the language of the second proviso to sec. 79 (4) or the context of the Act. "it is true that the aforesaid observations clearly indicate that on the language of sec. 82 or sec. 106 (1) no period of limitation is prescribed under the Act for the Act offences. It is also true that even under sec. 83 of the Act reference to the earlier Code of 1898 cannot bring in any period of limitation for prosecuting any employer for the Act offences. Consequently the observations of the Division Bench in Asoka Mills case (supra) have to be read in the light of the statutory provisions which held the field in 1959 when the complaint in that case was filed under sec. 106 (1) by the employee before the labour court. It is obvious that no period of limitation could have been implied for prosecution under sec. 106 in those days even in the light of sec. 83 of the Act read with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 which held the field in those days. Consequently the observations of the Division Bench in para 9 have to be read in the light of the then existing statutory provisions. 106 in those days even in the light of sec. 83 of the Act read with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 which held the field in those days. Consequently the observations of the Division Bench in para 9 have to be read in the light of the then existing statutory provisions. These observations would obviously not apply to the fact situation which has emerged after the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 saw the light of the day as it is by that Code that the concept of limitation for trying offences got introduced for the first time in the criminal procedural law. It is further pertinent to note that the Division Bench in the above case while making its observations on the question of limitation in para 9 of the report has not noticed sec. 83 of the Act. Even if the said section would have been noticed the observations would have remained the same for the simple reason that sec. 83 referred to the Code of 1898 which then held the field and as the said Code had nothing to say about limitation for trials of offences reference to sec. 83 also would not have made any difference Consequently the effort made by Mr. Mehta to draw sustenance for his submission from the observations of the Division Bench in para 9 of the report in Asoka Mills case (supra) remains a futile one. ( 22 ) THAT takes us to the decision of a Full Bench of this court in TEXTILE LABOUR ASSOCIATION AHMEDABAD V. ASOKA MILLS LTD. AHMEDABAD 18 G. L. R. 241. The Full bench of this court consisting of S. Obul Reddi C. J. and J. B. Mehta and B. K. Mehta JJ. had to consider a short question about the starting of the period of limitation under sec. 79 (4) of the Act. Under the said provision it has been laid down that an application in respect of a matter falling under clause (e) of paragraph A of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 78 shall be made within six months of the commencement of the strike lock out closure or stoppage or of the making of the illegal change as the case may be. A Division Bench of this court consisting of B. J. Divan (as he then was) and P. D. Desai JJ. (1) of sec. 78 shall be made within six months of the commencement of the strike lock out closure or stoppage or of the making of the illegal change as the case may be. A Division Bench of this court consisting of B. J. Divan (as he then was) and P. D. Desai JJ. in NAGRI MILLS V. THE TEXTILE LABOUR ASSOCIATION AHMEDABAD 12 G. L. R. 417 had taken the view that in the employer commits an illegal change the period of limitation for an application for getting it declared as such by the labour court as provided by sec. 78 (1)A (c) would start running from the date on which first such illegal change was made by the employer. Disagreeing with this view J. B. Mehta J. speaking for the Full Bench observed that when the employer had committed an illegal change which was of a recurring nature fresh period of limitation would be available every time such recurring illegal change saw the light of the day. On the facts before the Full Bench illegal change alleged against the employer was that customary concession of amenity in the form of an allowance of Rs. 4-50 per month in lieu of house rent was being denied to the employees by the employer mill. J. B. Mehta J. held that such type of illegal change was of recurring nature as every month there was a fresh breach on the part of the employer. thus by refusal to give this customary concession to the concerned permanent employees the employer obviously committed an illegal change every month and any application for declaration of such an illegal change would not get time barred. The aforesaid decision of the Full Bench has no application to the facts of the present case Mr. Mehta also in fairness stated that the ratio of the Full Bench does not directly apply to the facts of the present case. He however sought reliance on certain general observations made by the Full Bench while interpreting various provisions of the Act. There cannot be any dispute about the general scheme of various provisions of the Act. But the moot question with which we are concerned is as to whether on a combined reading of secs. He however sought reliance on certain general observations made by the Full Bench while interpreting various provisions of the Act. There cannot be any dispute about the general scheme of various provisions of the Act. But the moot question with which we are concerned is as to whether on a combined reading of secs. 82 83 and 107 of the Act any period of limitation can be said to have been laid down for the trial of such Act offences especially in the light of chapter 36 of the Code of 1973. For resolving this controversy the aforesaid judgment is totally besides the point and consequently we need not dilate on the same any further. ( 23 ) MR. Mehta then submitted placing strong reliance on various Supreme Court judgments reported in A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 488; 1973 (2) L. J. J. 436 at 441; 1957 (1) L. L. J. 448 at page 451 and 1957 (2) L. L. J. 490 and 494; that the interpretation of labour legislations should be so made as to advance the beneficial intention of the legislature underlying those legislations. There cannot be any dispute on this aspect. But we are concerned in the present case with the legal effect of the statutory provisions contained in the Act itself and for interpreting such provisions we have got to keep in view the express language used by the legislature while enacting these provisions. As a result of the aforesaid discussion it is obvious that both the authorities below were justified in taking the view that for trial of offences under sec. 107 of the Act period of limitation as laid down by sec. 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 would get attracted on a conjoint reading of secs. 82 and 83 of the Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. The aforesaid conclusion of ours would put art end to the main controversy between the parties in the present proceedings. However we must notice a few alternative contentions raised on behalf of the respondents by the learned Advocate General and on the basis of which he tried to support the final conclusions reached by both the authorities below on this question. ( 24 ) THE learned Advocate General firstly contended that the Code of 1973 defines offence vide sec. However we must notice a few alternative contentions raised on behalf of the respondents by the learned Advocate General and on the basis of which he tried to support the final conclusions reached by both the authorities below on this question. ( 24 ) THE learned Advocate General firstly contended that the Code of 1973 defines offence vide sec. 2 (n) to mean any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force and includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under sec. 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act 1871 (1 of 1871 ). He submitted that sec. 107 of the present Act is a law for the time being in force which makes punishable an act by the employer by which he contravenes the model standing order. He also invited our attention to sec. 2 (y) of the Code which states Words and expressions used herein and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. Therefore we can fall back upon the definition of the word Judge as found in sec. 19 of the I. P. Code. Similarly he submitted that expression court of justice is defined by sec. 20 of the I. P. Code. Having made the aforesaid preliminary submissions he straightway took us to sec. 468 of the Code which lays down that Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-sec. (2) after the expiry of the period of limitations. It was contended that the aforesaid section falls in the group of sections found in chapter 36 of the Code when deals with limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences. It was contended that the labour court is also a court as it has all the at tributes and trappings of a judicial authority and therefore on a combined reading of definition of offence contained in section 2 (n) of the Code and sec. It was contended that the labour court is also a court as it has all the at tributes and trappings of a judicial authority and therefore on a combined reading of definition of offence contained in section 2 (n) of the Code and sec. 468 (1) of the Code it would be obvious that the labour court is bound by the legislative mandate covered by the later provision of the Code and that it is not necessary to go to any other provisions of the Act or the Code to come to the conclusion about applicability of period of limitation for trial of act offences. It is not possible to accept the aforesaid extreme contention of the learned Advocate General for the simple reason that even though it is true that sec. 468 by itself mandates that no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-sec. (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation and that the offence may be any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force still however all that sec. 468 directly provides is the putting of an embargo on taking cognizance of certain offences by the courts functioning under the Code and not necessarily by special courts functioning under different other statutes. Chapters 2 and 3 of the Code deserve to be noticed in this connection. Chapter 2 of the Code deals with constitution of criminal courts and offices and lays down in sec. 6 thereof that besides the High Courts and the courts constituted under any law other than this Code there shall be in every state the following classes of criminal courts namely- (I) courts of session; (ii) Judicial Magistrates of the First Class and in any metropolitan area Metropolitan Magistrates; (iii) Judicial Magistrates of the Second Class: and (iv) Executive Magistrates. Chapter III deals with power of courts. Sec. 26 of the Code provides- "subject to the other provisions of this Code (a) any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be tried by - (i) the High Court or (ii) the court of session or (iii) any other court by which such offence is shown in the first schedule to be triable. Sec. 26 of the Code provides- "subject to the other provisions of this Code (a) any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be tried by - (i) the High Court or (ii) the court of session or (iii) any other court by which such offence is shown in the first schedule to be triable. (b)any offence under any other law shall when any court is mentioned in this behalf in such law be tried by such court and when no court is so mentioned may be tried by: (i) the High Court or (ii) any other court by which such offence is shown in the First Schedule to be triable. "thus if sec. 468 had stood by itself reference to the term court therein could have been directly inter-connected with criminal courts as constituted by the Code and as envisaged by sec. 6 read with sec. 26. Other courts exercising powers under special statutes can obviously not be considered to be criminal courts constituted under the Code. ( 25 ) HOWEVER the argument of the learned Advocate General regarding applicability of sec. 468 to the courts constituted under other Acts gets fortified on a combined operation of sec. 4 (2) of the Code and sec. 468 thereof. It is therefore necessary for us to turn to the consideration of sec. 4 of the Code especially sec. 4 (2) thereof. Sec. 4 of the Code provides thus :" (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated inquired into tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All offences under any other laws shall be investigated inquired into tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating inquiring into trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. "sub-sec. 2 (1) of sec. 4 clearly lays down that all the provisions of the Code shall apply to courts trying offences under the Indian Penal Code. We are directly concerned with sec. 4 (2) of the Code. There is no doubt that the offences under the present Act are required to be tried by the labour courts constituted under the Act. But as per the requirement of sub-sec. (2) of sec. We are directly concerned with sec. 4 (2) of the Code. There is no doubt that the offences under the present Act are required to be tried by the labour courts constituted under the Act. But as per the requirement of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 4 of the Code even such offences under other laws have to be tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions meaning thereby provisions referred to in sub- sec. (1) of sec. 4 viz. the provisions contained in the Code. The only restriction engrafted by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 4 is to the effect that if any enactment for the time being in force refers to manner or place of investigating inquiring into trying or otherwise dealing with such offence then to that extent the provisions of the special enactment would prevail. We have therefore to see as to whether there is any provision in the present Act which expressly provides for period of limitation for trying such Act offences. If there is any such provision in the present Act then of course it would be a provision regarding otherwise dealing with such Act offences. But if there is no such provision then general provisions of the Code pertaining to trial of such Act offences and/or otherwise dealing with the same would apply to such Act offences by virtue of the express language of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 4 of the Code. As we have already discussed earlier there is no express provision in the present Act providing for any period of limitation for trial of offences under the Act. Consequently it must be held that so far as this aspect of the matter is concerned the provisions contained in chapter 36 of the Code would get attracted to trials of such offences under the Act by express language of sub- sec. (2) of sec. 4 of the Code. It may be stated that sec. 83 of the Act provides for the manner of trial of Act offences. But even that provision is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Code as sec. 83 itself imports the machinery of the Code to the extent indicated therein for trial of an Act offence. As we have shown earlier provisions of Chapter 36 of the Code 1973 get attracted to the trial of the Act offences even by the express language of sec. 83 itself. 83 itself imports the machinery of the Code to the extent indicated therein for trial of an Act offence. As we have shown earlier provisions of Chapter 36 of the Code 1973 get attracted to the trial of the Act offences even by the express language of sec. 83 itself. But even otherwise by the combined operation of sec. 4 (2) of the Code read and chapter 36 thereof an inevitable conclusion follows that for trial of offences under this Act provision of limitation as engrafted by chapter 36 of the Code in the absence of there being any contrary provision in the special Act viz. the present Act would get attracted to the trials of offences under the present Act. The phrase otherwise dealt with as employed by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 4 is very widely worded. It cannot be gainsaid that how a particular offence is to be dealt with would also bring in its wake the question about period of limitation for trial of such offences. How a court trying offences has to deal with the offences is a question which can squarely encompass the further question as to within what time such offences can be tried on merits by the concerned court. It is therefore obvious that the concept of otherwise dealing with the offence includes the question of limitation for trial of such an offence. The Supreme Court had an occasion to interpret the words otherwise dealt with as found in pari-materia provision of sec. 5 (1) of the old Code of 1898. In R. P. KAPUR V. PRATAP SINGH 1964 (1) CR. L. J. 224 the Supreme Court speaking through Das Gupta S. interpreted the words otherwise dealt with as follows:"sec. 5 (1) of Criminal PC. provides thatall offences under the Penal Code shall be investigated inquired into tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. The words otherwise dealt with in this section refer to such dealing with offences as is provided for in the provisions of the Code apart from the provisions for investigation enquiry or trial. Such provisions are to be found in the Code for instance in Chapter IV and v. Thus the provisions in sec. The words otherwise dealt with in this section refer to such dealing with offences as is provided for in the provisions of the Code apart from the provisions for investigation enquiry or trial. Such provisions are to be found in the Code for instance in Chapter IV and v. Thus the provisions in sec. 54 of the Code for an arrest by a police officer without warrant in certain cases may come into operation even before any investigation enquiry or trial in connection with an offence has commenced. "it is therefore obvious that the limitation for trial of offences would squarely be covered by the words otherwise dealt with as found in sec. 4 (2) of the Code and as there is no specific provision on the question of limitation in the Special Act viz. the present Act the general provisions of Chapter 36 of the Code of 1973 would get attracted on the facts of the present case. ( 26 ) IN deciding the question about applicability of sec. 4 (2) of the Code to trials of act offences a recent judgment of the Supreme Court is required to be usefully noted. In MIRZA IQBAL HUSSAIN V. STATE OF U. P. A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 60 the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether a special Judge exercising jurisdiction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act while convicting the accused under sec. 5 (1) (e) thereof had jurisdiction to pass an order of confiscation of property which formed the subject matter of the charge. The power of confiscation of property was not conferred on the special Judge under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act itself. The question was-whether such power of confiscation could be invoked under sec. 452 of the Code read with sec. 4 (2) of the Code. Answering this question in the affirmative the Supreme Court held as under:" Sec. 4 (2) of the Code of Criminal Proc. provides that all offences under law other than the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated inquired into tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating inquiring into trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. provides that all offences under law other than the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated inquired into tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating inquiring into trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. It is clear from this provision that in so far as the offences under laws other than the Indian Penal Code are concerned the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply in their full force subject to any specific or contrary provision made by the law under which the offence is investigated or tried. Therefore what we have to ascertain is whether the Code of Criminal Procedure confers the power of confiscation and secondly. whether there is anything in the Prevention of Corruption Act which militates against the use of that power either by reason of the fact that the latter Act contains a specific provision for confiscation or contains any provision inconsistent with the power of confiscation conferred by the Code of Cr. Pro. On the first of these questions sec. 452 of the Code provides by sub-sec. (1) inso far as material that if the trial in any criminal court is concluded the court may make such order as it thinks fit for the disposal of property by confiscation. This power would therefore be available to a court trying an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act unless that Act contains any specific or contrary provision on the subject matter of confiscation. None of the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act provides for confiscation or prescribes the mode by which an order of confiscation may be passed. The Prevention of Corruption Act being totally silent on the question of confiscation the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply in their full force with the result that the court trying an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act would have the power to pass an order of confiscation by reason of the provisions contained in sec. 452 of the Code of Cr. Pro. The order of confiscation cannot therefore be held to be without jurisdiction. "the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court really clinches the point against the petitioner on the applicability of sec. 4 (2) of the Code read with sec. 452 of the Code of Cr. Pro. The order of confiscation cannot therefore be held to be without jurisdiction. "the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court really clinches the point against the petitioner on the applicability of sec. 4 (2) of the Code read with sec. 468 thereof to the trials of Act offences. The Supreme court in the aforesaid decision found that no provision about confiscation was provided in the Prevention of Corruption Act. Consequently general provision regarding confiscation as laid down in sec. 452 of the Code applied to the trials of offences under the said Act. Similarly in the present case there is nothing in the Act which provides for any period of limitation for trial of Act offences nor is there any other provision in the Act which is inconsistent with the scheme of limitation as laid down in sec. 468 of the Code. Consequently on a parity of reasoning as adopted by the Supreme Court while deciding the question of applicability of sec. 452 of the Code to the trials of Act offences under the Special Act it must be held that sec. 468 of the Code will also get attracted to trial of Act offences in the facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 27 ) IN this connection the learned Advocate General also invited our attention to the two decisions of the Supreme Court. In STATE OF PUNJAB V. SARWAN SINGH A. I. R. 1981 S. C. 1954 the Supreme Court speaking through Murtaza Fazal Ali J. had an occasion to consider the scope of sec. 468 of the Code of 1973. It has been observed in that connection:"the object of criminal P. C. in putting a bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time as a result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence. The object which the statute seeks to subserve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution. The object which the statute seeks to subserve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution. It is therefore of the utmost importance that any prosecution whether by the State or a private complainant must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation. "it is true that the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court are confined to sec. 468 of the Code in connection with the offences under the Indian Penal Code. But as seen earlier the term offence is defined by the Code to cover any act or omission which is made created by a special statute like the present Act would also get covered by the sweep of general observations of the Supreme Court on the scope of sec. 468 of the Code provided the said provision applies to trial of such Act offences. As we have already shown above sec. 468 gets attracted to such trials. Consequently the observations of the Supreme Court on the scope of sec. 468 of the Code would also squarely get attracted to the trials of the offences under the present Act. Mr. Mehta for the petitioner on the other hand placing reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in NITYANAND V. L. I. C. OF INDIA A. I. R 1970 S. C. 209 submitted that the labour court functioning under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is held by the Supreme Court not to be a Court for the purposes of Limitation Act sec. 4 and 5 read with Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The aforesaid decision cannot assist Mr. Mehta for the simple reason that in Nityanands case (supra) the Supreme Court was concerned with the question as to whether the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would be applied to applications under sec. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the labour court. The Supreme Court took the view that Article 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to courts as envisaged by secs. 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act. That the labour court cannot be considered to be a court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the labour court. The Supreme Court took the view that Article 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to courts as envisaged by secs. 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act. That the labour court cannot be considered to be a court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. On the aforesaid reasoning the Supreme Court took the view that the period of Limitation envisaged by Article 137 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied to proceedings under sec. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the labour courts. The above decision proceeds on its own facts and deals with a question which is entirely different from the one with which we are concerned in the present proceedings. It may be that the labour court functioning under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be treated to be a Court for the purpose of the Limitation Act and Article 137 thereof. Still however as it has all the trappings of a court being empowered to decide judicially a lis between the parties it would be a judicial court for other purposes. Consequently the decision of the Supreme Court in Nityanands case (supra) cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. Before parting with the discussion on this point it will be apposite to refer to one more submission raised by the learned Advocate General for respondent. He invited our attention to Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act 1974 whereunder the Parliament being conscious of the fact that sec. 468 of the Code may get attracted to offences under various special statutes holding the field had to enact the aforesaid Act to exclude certain economic offences from the net-work of sec. 468 on the ground of public policy. The learned Advocate General submitted that as the present Act is not covered by any such legislation excluding operation of the general provision of sec. 468 of the Code it would clearly reflect the legislative intention that it is meant to be covered by sec. 468 of the Code. The aforesaid contention of the learned Advocate General has lot of force. The Parliament which enacted sec. 468 of the Code laying down the period of Limitation for trial of various offences enacted the aforesaid Act for excluding the operation of sec. 468 of the Code. The aforesaid contention of the learned Advocate General has lot of force. The Parliament which enacted sec. 468 of the Code laying down the period of Limitation for trial of various offences enacted the aforesaid Act for excluding the operation of sec. 468 of the Code vis-a-vis certain specified economic offences made punishable under various special statutes. The enactment of the aforesaid Act clearly reflects the legislative intention that but for the said exclusion even these economic offences constituted under various special statutes would have been covered by the general net-work and sweep of sec. 468 read with secs. 2 (n) and 4 (2) of the Code. Enactment of Economic Offences Act 1974 therefore supplies an added support to the argument on behalf of the respondent that the general provisions of limitation for trial of offences as found in chapter 36 of the Code would get attracted to the trials of offences under special statutes like the present Act. ( 28 ) IT is now time for us to consider one submission put forward by Mr. Mehta with reference to the applicability of sec. 4 (2) of the Code. He submitted that sec. 5 of the Code excludes operation of sec. 4 (23. Section 5 of the Code is a saving provision which states:"nothing contained in this Code shall in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary affect any special or local law for the time being in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. "the said argument of Mr. Mehta is totally devoid of any substance for more than one reasons. Firstly it is a saving provision. It cannot be said that having enacted sec. 4 (2) the Parliament in the next breath made it redundant and otiose by enacting sec. 5 which according to Mr. Mehta supersedes sec. 4 (2 ). Secondly the saving clause has a limited effect of protecting the existing rights against the provisions of the main enactment. But if it is in irreconcilable conflict with the body of the statute of which it is a part it is unlike a proviso ineffective and void. Thirdly the operation of sec. Mehta supersedes sec. 4 (2 ). Secondly the saving clause has a limited effect of protecting the existing rights against the provisions of the main enactment. But if it is in irreconcilable conflict with the body of the statute of which it is a part it is unlike a proviso ineffective and void. Thirdly the operation of sec. 5 itself is made subject to a rider that saving provision will be of no effect if there is any specific provision in the code to the contrary. There are two specific provisions in the Code to the contrary which would contra-indicate operation of sec. 5. One such provisions is sec. 4 (2) itself which is a contrary provision which makes the provision of the Code applicable to any investigation inquiry and trial under the special Acts subject to the limitation contained in sec. 4 (2 ). Second such provision is found in sec. 468 of the Code which gets attracted to the trials of such Act offences by virtue of sec. 4 (2 ). It would also represent a special provision to the contrary. Consequently sec. 5 of the code cannot salvage the situation for the petitioner. ( 29 ) BEFORE parting with the consideration of saving provision of the Code it is necessary for us to refer to a few decisions to which our attention was invited by Mr. Mehta. In BIRAM SARDAR AND OTHERS V. EMPEROR A. I. R. 1941 BOM. 146 a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was concerned with the question as to whether sec. 27 of the Evidence Act was saved by sec. 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and was not affected by the sweep of sec. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sec. 1 (2) of the Code of 1898 read as under :" In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary nothing herein contained shall affect any special law now in force. "the said provision is pari mateia with sec. 5 of the present Code. It was held that sec. 27 of the Evidence Act was a special law in force at the date of the passing of the amended sec. 162 and that there was no specific provision to the contrary as found in the Code. In this connection) language of sec. 5 of the present Code. It was held that sec. 27 of the Evidence Act was a special law in force at the date of the passing of the amended sec. 162 and that there was no specific provision to the contrary as found in the Code. In this connection) language of sec. 1 (2) was noticed and it was observed that that the said provision enacts a rule of construction to be applied in the interpretation of the Code. That rule is that where there is a conflict between the Code and a special law the special law is to prevail in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary. But the provision must be to the contrary of the rule of construction and not merely of the special law. The section presupposes a conflict and a conflict is none the less a conflict because it is clear for all to see. That specific provision is a stronger expression than express provision and means a provision clearly expressed. A provision arising by implication cannot be held to be specific. It was found that sec. 162 of the Code was not in conflict with sec. 27 of the Evidence Act. That the language of both the sections was quite distinct and to a large extent the respective subject matters were not identical. Sec. 162 dealt with all statements made to a police officer in the course of an investigation; sec. 27 of the Evidence Act merely dealt with information received from a person accused of an offence in the custody of a police officer which led to a discovery. It was therefore held that sec. 162 did not contain any specific provision which would prevail over sec. 27 of the Evidence Act. It is not possible to appreciate how the aforesaid decision can be of any assistance to Mr. Mehta. It is not the contention of Mr. Mehta that there is any express provision in the special Act dealing With the question of limitation of trial of Act offences which can be saved under sec. 5 of the Code of 1973 nor could he submit that there is any express provision in the Act laying down that there would be no period of limitation for trial of Act offences. 5 of the Code of 1973 nor could he submit that there is any express provision in the Act laying down that there would be no period of limitation for trial of Act offences. Thus on one side the special Act has not at all dealt with the question of limitation for trial of Act offences; while on the other the Code of 1973 expressly deals with this question. Consequently it has got to be held as a specific provision to the contrary within the meaning of sec. 5 of the Code. Such a situation was not there before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Biram Sardars case (supra ). Hence the said decision cannot advance the case of the petitioner. ( 30 ) MR. Mehta then invited our attention to a case in NARESH CHANDRA DAS AND ANOTHER V. EMPEROR A. I. R. 1942 CAL. 593. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court also dealt with similar question which was posed for consideration before the Bombay High Court in BIRAM SARDARS CASE (SUPRA ). While interpreting the Code of 1898 it was held as under :"the word in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary in sec. 1 (2) mean and contemplate a provision specific in affecting the special or local law. This specific provision to the contrary need not be in the Criminal Procedure Code itself. It may be in the special or local law also. These words cannot be read as referring to any possible contrariety between a specific provision in the Criminal Procedure Code and a provision in a special statute. In order that one provision can be said to be a specific provision to the contrary it must competely cover the field of operation of the other and must lay down a contrary rule for the entire field so as altogether to nullify the other. "even on the aforesaid interpretation of the words in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary as employed by sec. 1 (2) of the Code of 1898 the situation is not changed a bit as on the aspect of limitation the special Act is silent; while on the question of limitation the general Code of 1973 fully covers the field. Consequently the pro visions in the Code get precedence over the provisions of the Special Act which are silent on the point. Consequently the pro visions in the Code get precedence over the provisions of the Special Act which are silent on the point. ( 31 ) WE may in this connection also usefully refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in CENTRAL TALKIES LTD. KANPUR V. DWARKA PRASAD A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 606. The question before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision was as to whether the provisions of sec. 10 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be considered to be specific provision to the contrary within the meaning of sec. 1 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 and consequently could supersede the provisions of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (3 of 1947) on that aspect. Under sec. 3 of the U. P. Act it has been mentioned that no suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds. The term District Magistrate was defined by sec. 2 (d) to include an officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act; while under sec. 10 (2) of the Code it was provided that the provincial Government may appoint any Magistrate of the first class to be an Additional District Magistrate and such Additional District Magistrate shall have all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate under the Code or under any other law for the time being in force as the Provincial Government may direct. As per the notification issued by the Government under sec. 10 (2) of the Code one Brijpal Singh Seth was invested with all powers of the District Magistrate under the Code as well as under any other law for the time being in force. He was thus competent to deal with any application made under the said U. P. Act for permission to file a civil suit without special authorisation from the District Magistrate. He was thus competent to deal with any application made under the said U. P. Act for permission to file a civil suit without special authorisation from the District Magistrate. It was contended on behalf of appellants before the Supreme Court that as per the Eviction Act the only authority which could permit filing of the suit could be either the District Magistrate himself or any officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act and the said provision of the special Act was saved by sec. 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and consequently Brijpal Singh Seth could not act as District Magistrate under the Special Act viz. the Eviction Act. Repelling the said argument it was held by the Supreme Court:"the argument overlooks the words in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary and because there is in the Code of Criminal Procedure such a provision in sec. 10 (2) sub-sec. (2) of sec 1 is excluded and an additional District Magistrate must be regarded as possessing the powers under any other law includeing the Evidence Act. "in the present case also there is a specific provision as found in sec. 4 read with sec. 468 of the Code. A combined reading of both these provisions therefore can be said to be a specific provision to the contrary which would exclude operation of the saving clause contained in sec. 5 of the Code. It is therefore obvious that for trial of offences under the special Act. viz. the Bombay Industrial Relations Act general period of limitation as provided by sec. 468 of the Code would squarely get attracted. The conclusions to that effect as reached by both the courts below are well sustained and have got to be upheld. ( 32 ) HOWEVER this will not put an end to to controversy between the parties. Even if it is held that the complaints filed by the petitioner under sec. 107 of the Act before the labour court would be covered by the limitation provision that is-under Chapter 36 of the Code even then the said complaints could not have been straightway dismissed by the labour court as barred by limitation when the complainant-petitioner had applied for condonation of delay under sec. 473 of the Code. 107 of the Act before the labour court would be covered by the limitation provision that is-under Chapter 36 of the Code even then the said complaints could not have been straightway dismissed by the labour court as barred by limitation when the complainant-petitioner had applied for condonation of delay under sec. 473 of the Code. The labour court did not come to the grip of the problem on this aspect and did not consider all the pros and cons of the case centering round the question of condonation of delay nor did it consider the question from the angle as to whether delay was properly explained or not or whether it was necessary to condone the delay in the interest of justice. In special civil application No. 2794 of 1980 which arises from criminal complaint No. 3 of 1978 the labour court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was time barred under sec. 468 but the question of condonation of delay under sec. 473 of the Code was not considered at all though the complainant had prayed for condonation of delay. The passing observations of the labour court that the complaint was barred under sec. 300 of the Code were also besides the point as the labour court had dismissed the complaint on the ground of limitation. Consequently no further consideration on merits could have survived before the labour court for its own finding. The question regarding the complaint being barred lay sec. 300 would have arisen for decision on merits after the labour court had taken the view that the complaint was required to be taken up on file despite bar of limitation by condoning delay under sec. 373 of the Code. As that stage never arrived the passing ovservations of the labour court on the applicability of sec. 300 of the Code have remained in the realm of mere obiter dicta and that too without coming to the grip of the problems. So far as the Industrial court is concerned it dismissed the revision application only on the ground of of limitation. ( 33 ) IN special civil application No. 2795 of 1980 arising out of criminal complaint No. 1 of 1978 the position is no better. Criminal case No. 1 of 1978 was dismissed by the labour court on the ground of limitation. ( 33 ) IN special civil application No. 2795 of 1980 arising out of criminal complaint No. 1 of 1978 the position is no better. Criminal case No. 1 of 1978 was dismissed by the labour court on the ground of limitation. The labour court has noted the submission on behalf of the petitioner that no effort was made to justify delay. Therefore the only question which the labour court was required to decide was as to whether period of limitation applied to the complaint. However the fact remains that the complainant-petitioner had prayed for condonation of delay. In fairness to the complainant if the labour court took the view that sec. 468 of the Code applied the alternative question of condonation of delay under sec. 473 of the Code ought to have been considered on merits. The labour court had not come to the grip of the said problem and had bypassed the same. The Industrial court in revision did nothing better and dismissed the revision application on the ground of limitation. Consequently even while confirming the conclusions of the labour court as well as the Industrial court on the question of applicability of sec. 468 of the Code 1973 to the complaints filed by the petitioner under sec. 107 of the Act and while upholding their decisions to that effect it will be necessary to remand the proceedings to the labour court with a direction to restore both the complaints on file and to decide the question about condonation of delay under sec. 473 of the Code after hearing both the sides and after giving them adequate opportunity of leading whatever evidence they what to lead on the point. After deciding the question of condonation of delay the labour court shall deal with the remanded complaints in accordance with law. It must be stated that the learned Advocate General for the respondent in fairness submitted that the question of condonation of delay deserves to be gone into by the labour court and for that purpose proceedings deserve to be remanded to the labour court. ( 34 ) RULES issued in the petitions are accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid limited extent. The orders of the labour court at annexure A and the common order of the Industrial court at annexure B are quashed and set aside subject to the observations made and directions contained in this judgment. ( 34 ) RULES issued in the petitions are accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid limited extent. The orders of the labour court at annexure A and the common order of the Industrial court at annexure B are quashed and set aside subject to the observations made and directions contained in this judgment. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs in both these petitions. .