JUDGMENT : B.K. Behera, J. - The Defendants in a suit for partition who succeeded in the trial court, but lost in the first appellate court, are in appeal against the reversing judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Puri, decreeing the suit for partition and allotting half share in favour of the present Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 who were the Plaintiffs in the suit instituted in 1972, 5/12th share in favour of the Appellants 1 to 3 and Suna Bewa (deceased Appellant No. 4 whose name had been expunged as per order No. 11 dated April 13, 1979, passed by this Court at the risk of the Appellants on the basis of a memorandum put in by them that the legal representatives of the deceased Appellant are already on the record) and 1/12th share in favour of the proforma Respondent No. 4. Chaitan Pradhan had four sons, namely Jogi, Gurubari Pandab and Gopi. The case of the Plaintiff Respondents was that while the four brothers were in a state of jointness, Pandab died and on his death, his interest in the properties devolved upon the surviving brothers who continued to live joinly in mess and property with Jogi, the eldest of the brother, who was the Karta of the joint family. According to them the plaint 'A' schedule properties' were acquired from their joint family income and they possessed the same jointly. Jogi died eighteen years prior to the institution of the suit and both the parties continued in a state of jointness as before although they separated in mess and residence about twelve years prior to the suit and they dammed to be in possession of the joint family properties by making an amicable division. Gopi died in the year 1950 and Gurubari died about Six years prior to the suit. The interest of Gurubari devolved on the Plaintiffs and the Defendants as he had no heir. The Defendants refused to get the lands in suit partitioned by metes and bounds on their demand. The Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, who are now the Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, had filed a joint written statement and had contested the claim of the Plaintiffs. The Defendants refused to get the lands in suit partitioned by metes and bounds on their demand. The Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, who are now the Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, had filed a joint written statement and had contested the claim of the Plaintiffs. According to them, prior to the death of Pandab, all the brothers were separate in mess and residence and besides their residential house, they had no other ancestral property and the residential house had been divided amongst the brothers during their life more than forty years ago. After the death of Pandab, his widow Hira re-married Gopi. After the brothers completely separated themselves, Jogi purchased the suit properties which were his self acquisitions and the Plaintiffs could not claim partition in respect of the suit lands. 2. On these pleadings, issues were framed and both the parties went to trial and relied on oral and documentary evidence. The learned Munsif, Puri held that there had been a partition among the parries in respect of the homestead land as sought to be established by the Appellants and the suit lands purchased by Jogi thereafter were his self-acquired properties. It was found that there was no joint nucleus from which the suit properties, could be purchased. The learned Munsif also held that the lands purchased by Jogi had not been thrown to the enjoyment of all. The story of the Plaintiffs with regard to the joint possession and division of the usufruct by an amicable arrangement was discarded. It was held that the suit lands were not the joint properties of the parties and were not available for partition. 3. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge did agree with the finding recorded by the learned Munsif that there was no sufficient nucleus out of which the suit properties could have been acquired by Jogi. He, however, held that being the eldest of the tour brothers, Jogi would be deemed to be the Karta, if there was existence of a joint family and therefore, the proper approach would be to find out as to whether the family was joint when the properties were acquired. He, however, held that being the eldest of the tour brothers, Jogi would be deemed to be the Karta, if there was existence of a joint family and therefore, the proper approach would be to find out as to whether the family was joint when the properties were acquired. Having thus formulated the point for determination the first appellate court found that there had been no partition amongst the brothers in respect of the suit homestead land and disagreeing with the finding recorded by the trial court, held that the suit properties purchased by Jogi were the joint family properties acquired at a stage when there had been no partition amongst the parties and therefore, the properties were liable to partition. Accordingly the appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed as stated above. 4. Mr. S. Mohanty, the learned Counsel for the Appellants has contended that in view of the concurrent finding recorded by both the courts that there was no joint nucleus out of which the properties purchased by Jogi could be acquired and in view of the acceptable evidence from the side of the Appellants that there had been a partition amongst the brothers in respect of the homestead land and they were separate in mess, residence and property long prior to the acquisition of the lands by Jogi, the appellate courts findings are perverse and unreasonable calling for interference by this Court. Mr. P.K. Misra appearing for the Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 has submitted that the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court would not call for interference by this Court in second appeal as they are well-founded and conclusive. The Respondent No. 4 Suruja Dei, who was the Defendant No. 3 in the trial court, has not entered appearance in spite of service of notice on her. 5. It is not a case where concurrent findings of facts have been recorded by the courts below except with regard to the nonexistence of joint nucleus. A finding of fact of the first appellate court, which is the final court of facts is normally not to he interfered with. See Madan Lal Vs. Mst. Gopi and Another, and K.C. Kapoor Vs. Smt. Radhika Devi (Dead) by Lrs. and Others. In this connection, reference may also be made to the principles laid down in V. Ramachandra Ayyar and Anr. v. Ramalingam Chettiar and Anr. See Madan Lal Vs. Mst. Gopi and Another, and K.C. Kapoor Vs. Smt. Radhika Devi (Dead) by Lrs. and Others. In this connection, reference may also be made to the principles laid down in V. Ramachandra Ayyar and Anr. v. Ramalingam Chettiar and Anr. 1962 S.C.D. 982 and Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur Rai and Ors. 1992 S.C.D. 902. A finding on the question of partition taken by the first appellate court is not ordinarily to be disturbed. See E. Mahboob Saheb Vs. N. Sabbarayan Chowdhary and Others. But a finding of reversal recorded by the first appellate court being influenced by inconsequential matters and by taking a very unreasonable view of things while appreciating the evidence in coming to its own independent conclusion should not (supra) be allowed to stand. See Madan Lal Vs. Mst. Gopi and Another. In this connection, the court may also keep in mind the observation of the Supreme Court in Madhusudan Das Vs. Smt. Narayanibai (Deceased) by Lrs. and Others to the following effect: ...At this stage, it would be right to refer to the general principal that, in an appeal against a trial Court decree, when the appellate Court considers an issue turning on oral evidence it must bear in mind that it does not enjoy the advantage which the trial Court had in having the witnesses before it and of observing the manner m which they gave their testimony. When there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the witnesses, the general rule is that the appellate Court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial Court to prevail unless it is clearly appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial Court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace its opinion as to where the credibility lies.... In this reported case, reference had been made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court to the cases reported in W.C. Macdonald v. Fred Latimer AIR 1929 P.C. 15 , AIR 1949 32 (Privy Council) and Sarju Pershad Vs. Raja Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh and Others, . 6. In this reported case, reference had been made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court to the cases reported in W.C. Macdonald v. Fred Latimer AIR 1929 P.C. 15 , AIR 1949 32 (Privy Council) and Sarju Pershad Vs. Raja Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh and Others, . 6. On a careful consideration of the oral evidence adduced by both the parties recorded by him and taking into consideration the documentary evidence supporting the case of the Appellants and demolishing that at the Respondents the learned Munsif had recorded his findings in favour of the Appellants and dismissed the suit. It would admit of no doubt from the evidence that the four sons of Chaitan had no landed property save two cents of home stead land having their ancestral residential house which they had inherited from Chaitan. Apart from the clear and cogent evidence from the side of the Appellants that the brothers had effected a partition, divided their homestead land and had been in separate residence years prior to the acquisition of the lands by Jogi. Ext. H would show that Jogi had sold away a portion of the homestead land which had been a part of the ancestral homestead land allotted to him on partition and of which he was in exclusive possession to Gopi and this document was dated as far back as August, 1945. The appellate court in my view was wrong in throwing out the case of the Appellants and observing that Ext. H by itself would not show that the brothers were separate in or about the year 1930 before the other lands in suit were acquired as besides the oral evidence, the Appellants had led documentary evidence including Ext. A to be discussed hereinafter. Merely because a document showing partition had been executed, as stated by D.W. 1 (Appellant No. 1), who must have been very young at the time of the partition, had not been produced, the evidence of D.Ws. 1 to 4, which along with the documentary evidence, conclusively proved partition among the parties, as found by the trial court, was not to be thrown out. 7. As found by both the courts, the brothers were not possessed of any joint family nucleus for the acquisition of the suit lands in the name of Jogi. 1 to 4, which along with the documentary evidence, conclusively proved partition among the parties, as found by the trial court, was not to be thrown out. 7. As found by both the courts, the brothers were not possessed of any joint family nucleus for the acquisition of the suit lands in the name of Jogi. It has been submitted before me on behalf of the Respondents, on the principles laid down in Sankaranarayanan and Another Vs. The Official Receiver, Tirunelveli and Others to which reference had been made by the appellate court, that being the eldest of the four brothers. Jogi would be deemed to be the Karta of the joint family and as he had acquired the properties while he was the Karta of the joint family, the onus would be on the Appellants to show that he had, acquired the properties by his separate funds. In this connection my attention ha s also been invited to the principles laid down in Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai and Others Vs. Desai Mallappa and Others to the effect that where a manager claims that any immoveable property has been acquired by him with his own separate funds and not with the help of the joint family funds of which he was in possession and charge, it is for him to 'prove by clear and satisfactory evidence his plea that the purchase money proceeded from his separate fund. The onus of proof must in such a case be placed on the manager and not on his coparceners. In this connection, reference has also been made on behalf of the contesting Respondents to the observation of this Court in Lingaraj Misra v. Ananta Misra and Ors. ILR 1957 Cutt 134. 8. In the instant case the evidence would not warrant a conclusion that there existed a joint family of which Jogi as the Karta. Moreover, there is no presumption that a Hindu family merely because it is joint possesses any joint property. The law does not prohibit a member even of a joint family from acquiring any property for his own benefit. The burden of proving that any particular property is joint primarily rests on the party who alleges the same. Moreover, there is no presumption that a Hindu family merely because it is joint possesses any joint property. The law does not prohibit a member even of a joint family from acquiring any property for his own benefit. The burden of proving that any particular property is joint primarily rests on the party who alleges the same. Where, however, it is established that there was nucleus of joint family property and that nucleus was such as did or might have contributed to the property claimed to be self-acquired, the onus shifts on to the person who claims the property as his self-acquisition to establish that the property was acquired without any aid from the joint family. The doctrine of nucleus has application only when there is existence of a coparcenary. Any acquisition subsequent to the severance of joint status is the self-acquisition of the person who acquires the property. See Appalaswami v. Suryanarayanamurty and Ors. AIR 1947 P.C. 189 . Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango Vs. Narayan Devji Kango and Others Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh Vs. Ram Chandra Ravagowda Sankh Umesh Mahanta and Ors. v. Kali Charan Mahanta and Ors. 41 (1975) C.L.T. 861 and Arta Naik v. Balaknshna Naik and Ors. 42 (1976) C.L.T. 45. 9. When a joint family is possessed of nucleus sufficient to make the Impugned acquisition, a presumption would arise that the acquisition standing in the name of the person in the 'management' of the family is a family acquisition. In order, however, to draw this presumption, there must be a joint family, the joint family must be in possession of nucleus sufficient to make the acquisition and the acquisition must have been made by the person in charge of the management of the family. In the instant case as rightly found by the trial court, there had been a partition among the brothers with regard to the homestead land prior to the acquisitions by Jogi and both the courts had found that there was no joint nucleus for such acquisitions. In view of the clear findings recorded by the trial court, it must be held that Jogi was not in management of any joint family property when the acquisitions were made. 10. Jogi had acquired 1.60 acres of paddy land by registered sale deed (Ext. In view of the clear findings recorded by the trial court, it must be held that Jogi was not in management of any joint family property when the acquisitions were made. 10. Jogi had acquired 1.60 acres of paddy land by registered sale deed (Ext. B) in the year 1933 and had purchased 6 decimals of the suit homestead land in the year 1936 as per Ext. A. the certified copy of the sale deed. It had been established by the Appellants by their evidence, as rightly found by the trial court, that the properties had been acquired by Jogi while he was in a state of separation from the other brothers and that he was in exclusive possession of the same. Referring to a statement, made in paragraph 9 of the written statement, the lower appellate court was no correct in observing that the homestead land forming part of the suit properties mentioned in Schedule 'A' was the ancestral property, of the parties in view of the specific averment in the plaint that the properties mentioned in Schedule 'A' had been jointly acquired by the parties and the evidence led by both the sides on this question. Jogi sold a portion of the suit properties to Mohan Pradhan by the registered sale deed (Ext. E) on August 10, 1943 for a consideration of Rs. 50/- and Mohan, possessed that land and after the death of Jogi, he (Mohan) sold away the same land in favour of Suruja Dei, wife of the Appellant No. 1, on May 12, 1959 by, a registered sale deed (Ext. D) for the same consideration which he bad paid far its acquisition. These documents could nor be characterised as nominal documents nor could it reasonably be said that these documents, executed years prior to the institution of the suit had been fabricated for the purpose of defence in a future suit for partition. The Parcha slips (Exts. F and F/1) would show that the suit lands had been recorded in the name of the Appellant No. 1 and he had paid rent in respect of the lands, as evidenced by Exts. C and G, rent receipts. These documents and circumstances appearing in favour of the case of the Appellants would not he. The Parcha slips (Exts. F and F/1) would show that the suit lands had been recorded in the name of the Appellant No. 1 and he had paid rent in respect of the lands, as evidenced by Exts. C and G, rent receipts. These documents and circumstances appearing in favour of the case of the Appellants would not he. The trial court, on a proper analysis of the cases of both the parties and a careful consideration of the oral evidence, besides the documentary evidence, had recorded findings in favour of the Appellants and dismissed the suit. The appellate court, however, without giving due importance to the reasonings adopted by the trial court which had the advantage of having the witnesses before it, reversed the findings without justifiable reasons. The findings recorded by the lower appellate court are factually unfounded and unreasonable and cannot he sustained in law. 11. In the result the appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the appellate court are set aside and those of the trial court are restored. In the circumstances of the case, however, I would make no order as to cost of this appeal. Final Result : Allowed