JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner is a displaced person from Sind and he had a verified claim for compensation in respect of agricultural lands held by him in Sind, which now forms part of the territories of Pakistan. Agricultural land situated in village Jeevandesar in Tehsil Anopgarh measuring 66 bighas and 12 biswas was allotted to the petitioner by the Managing Officer, Sri Gariganagar by his order dated January 20, 1969 in lieu of his verified claim as a displaced person. The petitioner was directed to approach the Tehsildar, Anopgarh for delivery of possession over such land, but the complaint of the petitioner is that in spite of his several requests the Tehsildar, Anopgarh, has not given over possession as yet of the land allotted to him by the aforesaid order of the Managing Officer dated January 20, 1969. According to the petitioner, 66 bighas and 12 biswas of land, which was allotted to him, was earlier khatedari land of Mohd, Hayar son of Mohd. Bux and Mohd. Ramjan and Ali Mohd. sons of Alla Bux, residents of village Jeevandesar situated in the jagir of Chhatargarh and formed part of the former State of Bikaner. The Muslim khatedar tenants ate said to have migrated to Pakistan on account of civil disturbances after March 1947 and the partition of the country and the tenancy rights in lands in question became evacuee property and were acquired by the Central Government under Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. 1954, as part of the compensation pool for the put pose of rehabilitation of displaced persons. The Central Government in the Ministry of Re habilitation. issued a notification dated April 6, 1955 published in the Government of India gazette dated April 16, 1955 declaring that the lands in dispute formed part of the compensation pool. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as the lands in dispute were evacuee property and formed part of the compensation pool and so the Managing Officer was lawfully entitled to allot such lands to the petitioner as displaced per ton against his verified claim and there was no reason as to why possession of such lands should not be handed over to the petitioner by the Telisildar, Anopgarh. 2. 2. The reply of the respondents is that the lands in dispute did not become evacuee property as the muslim khatedar tenants did not leave India during civil disturbances but continued to reside in other areas of Rajasthan. According to the respondents the lands in dispute were never declared as evacuee property at any time and the same did not vest in the Custodian of Evacuee Property. As such, such lands never formed part of the compensation pool. It was also argued on behalf of the respondents that the lands in dispute were never recorded as evacuee property in the revenue records and they were allotted by the State Government to landless persons to whom possession there of was handed over and as such the possession of the lands in dispute could not be given to the petitioner. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondents that on account of the provisions of Section 15-A of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, khatedari rights could not accrue or deemed to have accrued to any person or persons, including the Custodian of Evacuee Properties nor khatedari rights could be transferred to the petitioner. Respondents also submitted that on account of the resumption of the jagir of Chhatargarh, under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act, 1952, the lands in dispute vested in State Government and only tenancy right in such lands could vest in the Central Government, if at all. 3. It is common ground between the parties that lands in dispute sere formerly under the tenancy of muslim tenants, who, according to the petitioner had migrated to Pakistan on account of civil disturbances after March 1947 and on account of the partition of the country. However, the respondents have asserted that the muslim tenants did not migrate to Pakistan, but they continued to reside in other parts of Rajasthan. The respondents have not disclosed as to the place where the muslim tenants of the lands in dispute have migrated, nor it is their case that the said muslim tenants or their legal representatives ever returned to claim khatedari or other tenancy rights in the lands in dispute. The respondents have not disclosed as to the place where the muslim tenants of the lands in dispute have migrated, nor it is their case that the said muslim tenants or their legal representatives ever returned to claim khatedari or other tenancy rights in the lands in dispute. Clause 4 of the Bikaner State Evacuee (Administration of Property) Order, 1948 which was issued on December 20 1948 and was published in the Bikaner State Rajpatra dated December 21, 1948 provide that all evacuee properties situated within the State of Bikaner shall vest in the Custodian of Evacuee Property soul shall continue to remain so vested until otherwise directed. Evacuee Property has been defined in clause (2) of the said Order is including all properties which an evacuee had any rights or interest "Evacuee" has been defined in clause 2 (b) of the aforesaid Order as under:- "2 (b) "Evacuee" means a person ordinarily resident in or owning property or carrying on business within the territories comprised in the Bikaner State, wino on account of civil disturbance, or the fear of such disturbance or the partition of the country: (i) if leaves, or has since the first day of March 1947 left the said territories for a place outside the State of Bikaner, of (ii) cannot personally occupy or supervise his property or carry on his business or watch his interests or enforce his rights." Thus, so far as Bikaner law was concerned, if a person left the territories of the erstwhile State of Bikaner for a place outside that State, on account of civil disturbance or for fear of such disturbance or on account of the partition of the country, then such person would fall within the definition of an evacuee given in clause 2(b) of the 1946 Order and the property in which such a person had any right or interest would become evacuee property. According to clause 4 of the 1948 Order all evacuee property situated within the State of Bikaner would vest in the Custodian and would continue to he so vested. Thus, the question whether the muslim tenants left for Pakistan or migrated to other parts of Rajasthan is of no consequence so far as the Bikaner law is concerned. According to clause 4 of the 1948 Order all evacuee property situated within the State of Bikaner would vest in the Custodian and would continue to he so vested. Thus, the question whether the muslim tenants left for Pakistan or migrated to other parts of Rajasthan is of no consequence so far as the Bikaner law is concerned. as it is not in dispute that the muslim tenants of the lands in question had left their respective villages and had migrated to a place outside the former State of Bikaner. 4. According to the aforesaid Bikaner law, no declaration of the property of such evacuees as evacuee property was necessary. But as soon as the persons who had any right or interest in such property, become 'evacuees', the properties belonging to them or the right or interest of the evacuees in such properties automatically became evacuee property and such rights or interest in the lands in question became vested in the Custodian of Evacuee property. Thus, on account of the provisions containted in the Bikaner Order, whatever rights or interests the muslim evacuees had in the lands in dispute became evacuee property as soon as they left the territories which then formed part of the State of Bikaner on account of civil disturbances or fear of the partition of the country. In this manner the lands in dispute automatically vested in the Custodian Thereafter, they were acquired by the Central Government and were made parts of compensation pool under Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1934 by the notification dated April 6, 1955 published by the Central Government. It is not the case of the respondents that any action was taken since April 1955 by the evacuees or their legal representatives for seeking a declaration that the tenancy of the lands in question was not evacuee properties. 5. It is not the case of the respondents that any action was taken since April 1955 by the evacuees or their legal representatives for seeking a declaration that the tenancy of the lands in question was not evacuee properties. 5. In Hamid v. Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, Sri Ganganagar and another (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 395-D of 1960 , decided by a learned judge of the Delhi High Court on August 11, 1969), the provisions of the Bikaner law were considered and it was held that a plain reading of clause 4 and 6(1) of the 1948 order shows that their effect was that the evacuee property, as defined in the Order, vested in the Custodian automatically and thereafter any person happening to holding the property, would continue to hold the same until the Custodian assumed possession or control over such property. Thus by virtue of the provisions contained in clause 4 of the 1948 Order, the tenancy rights of the muslim tenants in the lands in the question became evacuee property in relation to those person leaving the territories of the former State of Bikaner on account of civil disturbances or fear of such disturbance or the partition of the country and the said tenancy rights in the lands in dispute automatically vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property on December 21, 1948 and continued to vest in him since that date until such rights were subsequently acquired by the Central Government and were made part of the compensation pool by the notification dated April 6, 1955. 6. It may be pointed out that the 1948 Order was continued even after the formation of the State of Rajasthan, on account of the provisions of the Rajasthan Administrative Ordinance, 1949 and was subsequently replaced by the Rajasthan Evacuee Property Ordinance, 194) and ultimately it was replaced by the Central Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. However, the subsequent laws which came into force on the subject or evacuee properties saved anything done or any action taken under the 1948 Order. However, the subsequent laws which came into force on the subject or evacuee properties saved anything done or any action taken under the 1948 Order. Any doubt about the validity of the vesting of the tenancy rights in the lands in question in the Custodian, as evacuee property of any defect or invalidity in such vesting has been cured by the retrospective enactment of sub-section 2-A of Section 8 of the Act of 1950, which removed the lacuna, if any, that might have remained in the provisions of sub-section 2 of Section 8 of the aforesaid Act. Sub-section 2 and 2-A of Section 8, which are relevant for the present purpose, are as under : "(2) Where immediately before the commencement of this Act, any property in a State had vested as evacuee property in any person exercising the powers of Custodian under any law repealed hereby, the property shall on the commencement of this Act, be deemed to be evacuee property declared as such within the meaning of this Act, and shall be deemed to have vested in the Custodian appointed or deemed to have been appointed for the State under this Act, and shall continue to vest : Provided that where at the commencement of this Act, there is pending before the High Court, the Custodian or any other authority for or in any State any proceeding under Section 8 or Section 30 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 (XII of 1949). then notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for time being in force, such proceeding shall be disposed of as the definition of 'evacuee property' and 'evacuee' contained in Section 2 of this Act had become applicable thereto. then notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for time being in force, such proceeding shall be disposed of as the definition of 'evacuee property' and 'evacuee' contained in Section 2 of this Act had become applicable thereto. (2-A) Without prejudice to generality of the provisions contained in sub-section (2), all property which under any law repealed hereby purports to have vested as evacuee property in any pet sons exercising the powers of Custodian in any State shall notwithstanding any defect in, or the invalidity of such law or any judgment, decree or order of any court, be deemed for all purpose to have validly vested is that person, at if the provisions of such law had been enacted by Parliament and such property shall, on commencement of this Act, be deemed to have been evacuee property declared as such within the meaning of this Act and accordingly, any order made or other action taken by the Custodian or any other authority in relation to such property shall be deemed to have been validly and lawfully made or taken. 7. The provisions of sub-section 2-A of Section 8 of the aforesaid Act came up for considerstion before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (1) Azimunnian and others v. The Deputy Custodian, Evacuee Properties, and others ( AIR 1961 S.C. 365 ), and their Lordships observed as under in the aforesaid case : "We think it unnecessary to decide as to whether the deeming provisions of Section 8(2) of the Act or of Ordinance XXVII of 1949 was sufficient to give validity to the vesting. Section 8 (2-A) as introduced into the Acct, in our opinion, makes the vesting valid, because it gives validity to the vesting which purported to have taken place as a result of Ordinance XXVII of 1949 even though it was only apparently so and was not so in law, because that is what 'purport' implies. Section 8 (2-A) as introduced into the Acct, in our opinion, makes the vesting valid, because it gives validity to the vesting which purported to have taken place as a result of Ordinance XXVII of 1949 even though it was only apparently so and was not so in law, because that is what 'purport' implies. The effect of Section 8(2-A) is that what purported to have vested under Section 8(2) of Ordinance XXVII of 1949 and which is to be deemed to be vested under Section 8 of the Act which repealed that Ordinance notwithstanding any invalidity in the original vesting or any decree or order of the Court shall be deemed to be evacuee property validly vested in the Custodian and order made by the Custodian in relation to the property shall be deemed to be valid. Thus retrospective effect given to the Act to validate (1) what purports to be vested; (2) removes all defects or invalidity in the vesting or fictional vesting under Section 8 (2) of the Ordinance XXVII of 1949 or Section 8(2) of the Act, which repealed the Ordinance; (3) makes the decrees and judgments to the contrary of any court in regard to the vesting ineffective; (4) makes the property evacuee property by its deeming effect; and (5) validates all orders passed by the Custodian in regard to the property." 8. Thus, it is amply clear that in the first place no declaration by the competent authority under the provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 was necessary, in view of the provisions of the Bikaner law contained in the 1948 Order. Further, if there was any invalidity or defect attached to the vesting of the tenancy rights in respect of the lands in question in the Custodian of Evacuee Properties, the same was cured on account of the provisions of sub-section 2-A of Section 8 of the Act. It may also be observed here that neither the evacuees nor the State Government have taken any proceedings at any time for getting the lands in question released from the compensation pool, before the tenancy rights in such lands were allotted by the Managing Officer to the petitioner. It may also be observed here that neither the evacuees nor the State Government have taken any proceedings at any time for getting the lands in question released from the compensation pool, before the tenancy rights in such lands were allotted by the Managing Officer to the petitioner. Although in the reply to the writ petition the respondents stated that proceedings were going on but it has not been disclosed as to what proceedings are being taken and by whom and before which court or authority proceedings have been taken in respect of the lands in dispute or the tenancy rights therein. 9. It was further argued by the learned Deputy Government Advocate that the lands in question became vested in the State as soon as the Jagir of Chhatargarh was resumed by the State Government under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act with effect from July 1, 1954. There is no doubt that after resumption of the Jagir of Clihatargarh, all lands including the lands in question situated in the Jagir of Chhatargarh vested in the State Government and the State thereby became the owner of the lands in dispute. However, the question in the present case is not of corpus or ownership rights in such lands which admittedly belongs to the State, but the question is merely of tenancy rights, which belonged to the muslim khatedars, in accordance with the provisions of the Bikaner State Tenancy Act, 1945. The effect of the resumption of the Jagir of Chhatargarh was that the State Government stepped into the shoes of the jagirdar and the corpus of such lands vested in the State Government. As mentioned above, what became evacuee property was only the right or interest of the muslim tenants in the lands in question and only those rights or the interest of the tenants in such lands became evacuee property and was acquired by the Central Government and then formed part of the compensation pool. The lands undoubtedly remained the property of the State Government but what formed part of the compensation pool was the tenancy rights in such lands and only those rights were allotted to the petitioner by the Managing Officer by his order dated January 20, 1969. The lands undoubtedly remained the property of the State Government but what formed part of the compensation pool was the tenancy rights in such lands and only those rights were allotted to the petitioner by the Managing Officer by his order dated January 20, 1969. The allotment of agricultural land mentioned in the aforesaid order of the Managing Officer in reality refers to the allotment of tenancy rights in the lands in question and not to the ownership of the said lands. The ownership rights or corpus of such lands vested in the State Government and the Managing Officer could not have allotted the same to the petitioner. 10. It may also be pointed out here that although the muslim tenants might be khatedar tenants under the Bikaner State Tenancy Act, 1945 but the petitioner succeeded to the tenancy rights as were admissible under the relevant laws. The provisions of Section 15-A of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act are applicable to the lands in question as the same are situated in the Rajasthan Canal Project area and as such khatedari rights cannot accrue in such lands to the petitioner, unless acquired under Section 15-AAA. But in any event the petitioner would hold the tenancy rights in the lands in dispute, by virtue of the order of allotment passed by the Managing Officer in his favour of January 20, 1965. 11. The case of the State Government is that as in the Records of Rights the lands in question were described as Government lands and were not recorded as evacuee lands, the said lands were allotted to the landless persons and those persons were in possession of the lands allotted to them. The State Government has not disclosed the date of allotment of portions of lands in dispute to the so-called landless persons. The reply to the writ petition was filed by the State Government on November 8, 1979 and if the State Government would have transferred the tenancy rights in the lands in dispute to other persons after the filing of the present writ petition by the petitioner, then such allotment orders did not create any tight in the landless persons. The reply to the writ petition was filed by the State Government on November 8, 1979 and if the State Government would have transferred the tenancy rights in the lands in dispute to other persons after the filing of the present writ petition by the petitioner, then such allotment orders did not create any tight in the landless persons. Moreover, in any view of the matter, the State Government had no right to make any allotment of tenancy rights in the lands in question to any person so long as the petitioner lawfully held the tenancy rights therein and any such allotment of land by the State Government is illegal and void on its very face, since tenancy rights in the lands in question had become evacuee property and thereafter became vested in the Custodian of evacuee property and the said property subsequently formed part of the compensation pool, then were allotted to the petitioner by the Managing Officer. The State Government had no right to make an allotment of tenancy rights in the lands in dispute, which was evacuee property, and no person could have obtained any right or interest in such lands. 12. It may be observed that the mere fact that the names of the muslim tenants were recorded in the record of rights pertaining to the lands in question, even after the commencement of the 1948 Order or the Act of 1950, would not make any alteration in the situation, so far as the vesting of the tenancy rights in the Custodian and subsequently in the compensation pool is concerned. The muslim tenants having become evacuees, no body cared to make the requisite corrections in the record of rights. But the absence of any correction in the records of rights cannot affect the tenancy rights in such lands, which was vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property and then became part of the compensation pool. It is really unfortunate that after the order of the Central Government passed in the year 1955 and until the year 1969, nobody bothered to get the record of rights corrected. 13. It is really unfortunate that after the order of the Central Government passed in the year 1955 and until the year 1969, nobody bothered to get the record of rights corrected. 13. It may also be observed that similar writ petitions relating to allotment of tenancy rights in adjacent lands, situated in the Jagir of Chhatargarh in the former State of Bikaner, which became evacuee properties like the lands in question, came up before this Court in Asha Ram v. Union of India. (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1632/70) and Ratiram v. Union of India (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1640/70) which were decided by Tyagi, J , as he then was, by his order dated April 24, 1972. In those cases it was held that the lands in question formed part of the compensation pool and were rightly allotted by the Managing Officer to the displaced persons and the State Government had no right or authority to interfere with the tenancy rights of those allotments. Another case in respect of a parcel of land situated in village Jeevandersar came up before Agaiwal. J. in (2) Deeparam v. State of Rajasthan (1978 W L N. (U. C.) 400) and same view was taken by the learned judge, who observed as under : "The question that arises from the pleading of the parties is whether the lands in dispute had become evacuee property under the law relating to the declaration of Evacuee Property which was in operation in the erstwhile State of Bikaner and whether it is open to the State Government to challenge the order of allotment dated 28th February, 1966 passed by the Managing Officer, Sri Ganganagar whereby the lands in dispute have been allotted to the petitioner on the footing that the same was evacuee property and had vested in the Central Government under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. Similar question arose before this Court in Smt. Rajibai v. Union of India and others (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 159/1973 decided on 30-8-78), wherein it has been held that if the State Government has failed to take steps to challenge the orders of the Managing Officer, allotting a particular lands on the footing that it was evacuee property and forms part of the compensation pool, it is not open to the State Government ignore the said order. The aforesaid decision is fully applicable to the facts of present case and it is, therefore, held that the respondents are not entitled to ignore the order dated 28th February, 1966 passed by the Managing Officer, Sri Ganganar, allotting the lands in dispute to the petitioners and to allot the said lands, either temporarily or permanently to other persons." 14. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by Tyagi. J. in Asharam and Ratiram's cases (Supra) and Agrawal, J. In Deeparam's case (2). 15. For the aforasaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 are directed to comply with the order Ex. 2 passed by the Managing Officer, Sri Ganganagar dated January 20, 1969, allotting the tenancy rights of the land in question to the petitioner. It is, however, made clear that the petitioner would not be entitled to possession of land over and above the ceiling limit applicable to him. 16. The parties are left to bear their own costs. *******