JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed challenging the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 29-9-1982 and the order passed in revision u/s 12C(6) of U.P. Panchayat Raj Act by the District Judge, Agra, on 13th January, 1983. 2. Respondent 3 Jawahar Singh filed an election petition u/s 12C of the Panchayat Raj Act challenging the election of the Petitioner on a number of grounds. The difference of votes between the Petitioner and Respondent 3 was only that of one. Respondent 3 alleged that out of the total number of votes cast, he secured 181 valid votes, whereas the votes secured by the Petitioner were 180. The Returning Officer, however, in collusion with the Petitioner wrongly rejected one vote of Respondent 3 and reduced his votes from 181 to 180, while he increased the votes of the Petitioner from 180 to 181, by including one vote which did not have a seal mark. The election petition was contested by the Petitioner. On 28th August, 1982, Respondent 3 filed an application for inspection of ballot papers on the ground stated above. The application for inspection was contested by the Petitioner. 4. On 29th September, 1982, the Sub-Divisional Officer, who was the Tribunal trying the election petition, allowed the inspection. Against this order, the Petitioner went up in revision to the District Judge u/s 12C(6) of U.P. Panchayat Raj Act. The learned District Judge held that the Tribunal had power to grant inspection and recount the votes after it was satisfied that a prima facie case for the same had been made out by an election Petitioner for the said purpose. The District Judge, however, found that in the instant case no satisfaction for recounting had since been recorded by the Tribunal, the Tribunal was required to enter into that controversy afresh and then to make an order of recounting if the facts of the case needed the same. 5. Being dissatisfied, Kedar Singh, who was successful at the election, has filed the present writ petition. 6. Sri. 5. Being dissatisfied, Kedar Singh, who was successful at the election, has filed the present writ petition. 6. Sri. S. Singh Chauhan, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, contended before me that as the District Judge had found that the order of the Tribunal for inspection and recounting was illegal, being not in conformity with the principles of law applicable to the same, the said order should have been set aside by the District Judge. According to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, he was not justified in maintaining the order. 7. I have heard counsel for the parties. The first objection raised by Dr. J.N. Dubey, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 3 was that the revision preferred by the Petitioner before the District Judge was not maintainable inasmuch as the order passed was only an interlocutory one and against such an order no revision is provided u/s 12C(6). Sub-section (6) of Section 12C lays down that: any party aggrieved by an order of the Prescribed Authority upon an application under Sub-section (1) may ...file a revision to the District Judge. 8. Sub-section (1) of Section 12C provides for challenging an election of a Gaon Sabha by means of an application. The expression "application" used in Sub-section (6) is with respect to the application by which the election is challenged or questioned. The intention appears to be that when an application challenging the election has been finally determined or decided only then a revision will lie to the District Judge under Sub-section (6) of Section 12C. Sub-section (6) of Section 12C does not contemplate of filing of a revision against any other order that may be passed by the Tribunal dealing with an election petition. The purpose of providing for relief by means of an election petition would be completely defeated if against every petty order that is passed during the course of proceedings by the Sub-Divisional Officer, a revision is taken to the District Judge. An interlocutory order, which is something intervening between the commencement and the end of the proceedings and which decides some point of matter, being not a final decision of the whole controversy, could not be challenged by means of a revision under Sub-section (6) contemplates of a revision against an order of the Prescribed Authority upon an application, which clearly refers to the final order that may be passed on the election petition. I am, therefore, in agreement with the counsel for Respondent 3 that the revision filed by the Petitioner before the District Judge against the order of inspection made by the Sub-Divisional Officer was not revisable. 9. However, since the Petitioner has challenged the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 29th September, 1982, directing for inspection and recounting, the validity of the same may also be examined. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that as there was no evidence on record at the time of making of the impugned order for inspection and recounting, there was no occasion for the Tribunal being prima facie satisfied about the same. What is required in law is that when a petition for relief of scrutiny and recounting on the allegation of wrong counting is made, the Petitioner must offer prima facie proof of errors in counting and if errors in counting are prima facie established, recount can be ordered. The proof required should not be confined to the oral evidence of the parties. It can be documentary or circumstantial as well. Any fact or circumstance, which leads the mind to the affirmative or negative of any proposition, could also be proved. Proof is the logically sufficient reason for assenting to the truth of a proposition advanced. In its juridical sense, is it a term of wide import and comprehends everything that may be adduced at a trial for the purpose of producing conviction in the mind of Judge it, therefore, appears to me that the submission of the Petitioner's learned Counsel that Respondent 5 should have produced a witness and that he should have been subjected to cross-examination, only then that the order of recounting could be made, is not correct. Proof seems properly to mean anything which serves to convince the mind of the truth or falsehood of a fact or proposition. 10. In the Instant case, the counter-affidavit indicates that Respondent 3 had filed certain documentary evidence to show that one vote had been wrongly counted in favour of the Petitioner. If, therefore, from these documents and circumstances, the Tribunal was satisfied that a case for recounting had been made out, no exception to the same can be taken. 10. In the Instant case, the counter-affidavit indicates that Respondent 3 had filed certain documentary evidence to show that one vote had been wrongly counted in favour of the Petitioner. If, therefore, from these documents and circumstances, the Tribunal was satisfied that a case for recounting had been made out, no exception to the same can be taken. It is true that a Tribunal does not have the discretion to allow inspection of ballot papers to enable a party to make a roving or fishing enquiry in order to discover materials for declaring the election void. 11. In the instant case, that does not appear to be the position. On the facts and circumstances of the present case it appears that from the materials produced before it, the Tribunal was satisfied in the interest of justice to make an order for recount. Recounting was ordered by Tribunal holding that there could be a mistake in counting. 12. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the Tribunal wrongly held that it had inherent jurisdiction to make an order of inspection and recounting True it is that such a power did not exist. The Tribunal did not have any inherent power as it claimed to possess for ordering recounting. In Rameshwar Das v. S.D.M. Ghatampur 1961 RD 195 , a Division Bench of this Court held that inherent power is not available to Election Tribunals. Be that as it may, the mere mentioning of the fact that the Tribunal had inherent power, the impugned older could not be set aside. The Tribunal has recorded its prima facie satisfaction on the proof offered by Respondent 3 that error in counting had been made. That being so, the Tribunal's order is perfectly legal and cannot be set aside. 13. For these reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. The stay order dated 2-2-1983 is discharged.