JUDGMENT V.P. Gupta, J.—The plaintiff has filed this suit for recovery of Rs. 3,87,042.11 on the allegations that the plaintiff (a registered co-operative society) with a view to launch extension of technical education scheme in Kangra District, started a polytechnic institute (hereinafter called the institute) at Baijnath. The plaintiff-society raised loans from Kangra Central Go-operative Bank against the security of both movable and immovable assets and share money of the society and also raised loans from private individuals. Out of this fund the plaintiff-society constructed buildings etc. The plaintiff-society also purchased necessary equipments for starting the institute. The Central and the State Government also sanctioned grants for further development of the institute and this system worked for a period of about five years. Subsequently the Government proposed to add mechanical and electrical classes to this institute but the plaintiff-society was not in a position to contribute its l/3rd share of the estimated deficit of Rs. 83,000. A general meeting of the public of the locality was called by the Director Technical Education Punjab in which the Technical Advisor to the Central Government also participated. It was decided that the institute be handed over to the Government on certain conditions to be agreed upon between the Government and the society. The matter regarding handing over of the institute was discussed on various occasions till a meeting was held a Chandigarh on 27-11-1962 in the room of Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon, the then Chief Minster of erstwhile State of Punjab. In this meeting it was decided that the government would take over the institute and that the amount due to the society would be calculated and paid to the plaintiff society. An estimate of all the properties was to be made and the payment was also to be made to the society. A Schedule regarding the movable properties is attached with the plaint. 2. A formal deed of transfer was drafted which was approved by both the parties and in terms of clause 6 of the proposed deed of transfer, the Government was to pay compensation to the society. A Schedule regarding the movable properties is attached with the plaint. 2. A formal deed of transfer was drafted which was approved by both the parties and in terms of clause 6 of the proposed deed of transfer, the Government was to pay compensation to the society. Due to the reorganisation of the State of Punjab, the territories of District Kangra were transferred to the State of Himachal Pradesh and thus it became the duty of the Government of Himachal Pradesh and the Union of India to implement the agreement arrived at between the plaintiff-society and the erstwhile State of Punjab, 3. The Director of Education, Himachal Pradesh, visited the institute and submitted his report. The movable property of the institute was formally handed over by the society to the State of Punjab in anticipation of the execution of the deed of transfer and these properties subsequently came in the hands of Himachal Pradesh government due to reorganisation. The Himachal Pradesh government finally decided to close down the institute and ordered the removal of the assets. It is now alleged that the Himachal Pradesh government and the Union of India have no right, title and interest in the assets of the society as they have refused to execute the deed of transfer and compensation the society. It is also alleged that the agreement of transfer has frustrated and the Government of Himachal Pradesh is liable to handover the possession of the properties to the plaintiff and is also liable to pay the full amount of all the assets of the society which are in possession of the defendant. The plaintiff has also claimed compensation of Rs. 3,87,042.11 for five items as detailed in para 9 (B) of the plaint. Claim Nos. 1 and 2 are with respect to the movable assets. Claim Nos. 3 and 4 are with respect to the compensation for use and occupation of the buildings and claim No. 5 is with respect to the filling up of the gap of deficit for the recurring grants. 4. The plaintiff initially filed the suit in forma pauperis in 1971. Permission to sue as a pauper was given vide order dated 14-3-1975 and it was registered as a suit. The plaintiff moved an application (O.M.P. No. 91 of 1979) seeking permission to amend the plaint. The plaintiff was allowed to amend the plaint vide order dated 21-6-1979. 4. The plaintiff initially filed the suit in forma pauperis in 1971. Permission to sue as a pauper was given vide order dated 14-3-1975 and it was registered as a suit. The plaintiff moved an application (O.M.P. No. 91 of 1979) seeking permission to amend the plaint. The plaintiff was allowed to amend the plaint vide order dated 21-6-1979. The plaintiff withdrew his claim for immovable property as the same was acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It restricted its claim to the movable properly and in the alternative for recovery of Rs. 3*87,042.11. In the amended plaint the particulars of the various claims were not mentioned specifically and the pi in-tiff was asked to furnish particulars of the various claims. The plaintiff filed the last amended plaint on 9-11-1980 and gave the particulars of the various items in para 9 (B) of the plaint. 5. The defendant contested the suit and also raised a preliminary objection regarding limitation. Upon the pleadings of the parties, the following preliminary issues was framed on 29-6-1981 r "Whether the claim of the plaintiff in respect of the amounts mentioned in sub-paras 1, 2, 5 of para 9-B of the plaint amounting to Rs. 1,76,632.37, Rs. 33,936.85 and Rs. 88,080.99 respectively is within time ?" By order dated 20-10-1982 it was held that the claim of the plaintiff for these items is time barred. The plaintiffs counsel further stated on 20-10-1982 that the claim of the plaintiff mentioned in sub-para (3) of para 9-B of the plaint pertains to compensation for use and occupation of the building of the S.D. Pratinidhi Sabha Polytechnic institute other than the hostel building for the use and occupation of which the claim has been separately made in sub-para (4) of para 9-B. It was stated that the words "land and equipments" in sub-para (3) of para 9-B were inadvertantly written. 6. On merits the defendant contested the plaintiffs claim and alleged that the plaintiff was estopped from filing the suit and that the plaintiff had gifted the property to the defendant and that the plaintiff was not entitled to any amount of compensation. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed 20-10-1982 : 1. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing this suit ? 2. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed 20-10-1982 : 1. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing this suit ? 2. Whether the plaintiff-society made a gift of the institute known as S. D. P. Polytechnic Baijnath including the buildings of the institute as also the hostel attached therewith ? 3. If the above issue is found against the defendant to what amount of compensation is the plaintiff entitled for use and occupation of such buildings and for what period ? Issue No. 1. 8. The learned counsel for the defendant could not advance any arguments on this issue. He only contended that the buildings etc. of the institute were built with government funds, that is, with the loans and the grants given by the government and for this reason the plaintiff was estopped from filing this suit. Simply because the government had given grants and loans to the plaintiff, cannot amount to an estopped. The necessary ingredients for estopped are not proved and therefore this issue is decided against the defendant. Issue No. 2. 9. The learned counsel for the defendant contended that a gift deed was executed. He referred to the statements of Amar Nath (PW 1), Kewal Krishan (DW 2) and also relied upon the documents Ex. D-l, D-2, P-l, DW4/A, DW 3/B and DW 2/A in support of his contention. The learned counsel also contended that in any case the doctrine of part performance was applicable and the defendant was proved to be the owner of the disputed property. 10. Amar Nath (PW1) states that the plaintiff-society started a Polytechnic institute for imparting technical education in the year 1954. The plaintiff was receiving some grants from the government for running this institute. The institute was under the exclusive control of the society till 1963. In 1964 the plaintiff-society faced financial difficulties because mechanical and electrical engineering subjects were to be started in the institute. The plaintiff approached the Punjab government with the suggestion that the Punjab Government should take over the institute and the Punjab Government agreed to this suggestion. He also states that negotiations were in progress when due to the reorganisation of the State of Punjab the area of District Kangra merged in Himachal Pradesh. Negotiations also continued with the Government of Himachal Pradesh but the same failed in 1969. He also states that negotiations were in progress when due to the reorganisation of the State of Punjab the area of District Kangra merged in Himachal Pradesh. Negotiations also continued with the Government of Himachal Pradesh but the same failed in 1969. The Government of Himachal Pradesh closed the institute in 1968. He states that the plaintiff never gifted the disputed property to the defendant. He has proved Ex. D-l (copy of the minutes of the meeting) and Ex. D-2 (copy of the resolution dated 21-6-1968). He further states that the plaintiff was demanding compensation from the government for its equipments etc. 11. Kewal Krishan (DW2) has only proved his report Ex. DW 2/A but has stated that he did not remember if his report was accepted or not. 12. Now Ex. D-1 is a copy of the minutes of the meeting held on 27-11-1962 in the Chief Ministers room regarding this institute. These minutes of the meeting do not prove that the institute was gifted to the defendant. They only prove that it was decided that the government should take over the institute and that the institutes name be given as G.G.D. Government Polytechnic Institute, Baijnath. The Chief Minister had desired that an advisory committee be set up with regard to the institute. In this meeting it-was agreed that the amount due to the plaintiff society be calculated and this amount would be paid to the plaintiff-society. 13. Ex. D-2 is a copy of resolution dated 21-6-1968. This resolution was passed in the meeting of the plaintiff society which was held under the chairmanship of Pandit Amar Nath Sharma. It proves that the government of Himachal Pradesh had decided to close down the institute and that the institute was handed over to the Government in 1964, under certain conditions vide a gift deed executed by the society in favour of the Punjab Government, dated 20-7-1963. 14. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that the execution of a gift deed is mentioned in this resolution. It is true that the words used m the resolution are such from which it can be inferred that a gift deed was executed on 20-7-1963 by the society in favour of the Punjab Government, : but this is not a fact. The property of the institute was admittedly worth more than Rs. 100. It is true that the words used m the resolution are such from which it can be inferred that a gift deed was executed on 20-7-1963 by the society in favour of the Punjab Government, : but this is not a fact. The property of the institute was admittedly worth more than Rs. 100. A transaction of gift regarding this property could not be effected without a registered deed because the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act were applicable in Punjab of which Kangra district was a part in the year 1963. The learned counsel for the defendant frankly conceded that there was no registered gift deed. This was rightly conceded because if there had been any registered gift deed on a duly stamped paper, then evidence of the stamp vendor regarding the purchase of the stamp papers and the evidence from the registration office regarding the registration of a gift deed could be produced. A copy of a registered gift deed could also be procured. Hence it is held that no registered gift deed was ever executed. 15. Ex. DW 4/A is the copy of a letter dated 14-11-1967 from the Secretary of the plaintiff society. It is mentioned that the copy of the gift deed executed between the plaintiff and the Punjab Government was despatched along with this letter to the Principal G.G.D. Government Polytechnic Institute Baijnath, Kangra. For the reasons already given while discussing Ex. D-2, this letter is not sufficient to prove that a gift deed was executed. 16. Ex., DW3/B is a photostat copy of a draft gift deed. In this draft gift deed the date, month and year are not given. Further there are no signatures of any person on this draft gift deed. This can only show that the proposed draft of the gift deed as alleged in the plaint was prepared but a gift deed was never executed. 17. Ex. DW 2/A is the copy of the report of Shri Kewal Krishan. It does not prove the execution of any gift deed. It only gives the assets and liabilities of the institute. Similarly Ex. P-l is the copy of notice dated 17-9-1970 issued by the plaintiff and in this notice the execution of a gift deed is denied. 18. Ex. DW 2/A is the copy of the report of Shri Kewal Krishan. It does not prove the execution of any gift deed. It only gives the assets and liabilities of the institute. Similarly Ex. P-l is the copy of notice dated 17-9-1970 issued by the plaintiff and in this notice the execution of a gift deed is denied. 18. Hence in view of the above discussion, it is proved that no gift deed was executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant. 19. The principle of part performance is also not applicable in the present case. Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act reads as follows : "53-A. Part performance.—Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of, the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the-terms of the contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof." For the applicability of this principle the transferee should be transferee of immovable property for consideration. This principle cannot be applied in case of gifts. Under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act a gift of immovable property must be effected by a registered instrument. 20. This principle cannot be applied in case of gifts. Under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act a gift of immovable property must be effected by a registered instrument. 20. The learned counsel for the defendant also referred to Bhaskar Narayan Deshmukh v. Mohammad Alimulhhkhan, [AIR 1953 Nag 40], for the proposition that an unregistered document is admissible for a collateral purpose. It is correct that for collectoral purposes even an unregistered document can be looked into although the document requires registration. In the present case, this position never arises. The existence of any document registered or unregistered is not proved and further the defendant does not want to prove the document for a collateral purpose. In fact the defendant wants to show that he is the owner of the property by transfer. This judgment is of no help to the defendant. Another judgment relied upon is Rana Vidya Bhushan Singh v. Rati Ram, [AIR 1963 HP 49]. This judgment is distinguishable. It is on the principle that an unregistered document can be looked into to prove collateral purposes and a document can become admissible under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. I have already held that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable in the case of gifts and the purpose for which the plaintiff wants to prove the draft is not a collateral purpose. The next case is Mohammad Musa and others v. Aghore Kumar Ganguli and others, [AIR 1914 PC 27]. This was a case of mortgage and the principle of part performance is enunciated in this judgment. For the reasons already given, this judgment is again not applicable to the facts of the present case. 21. In view of above discussion, it is not proved that the plaintiff-society made any gift in favour of the defendant. This issue is decided against the defendant. Issue No. 3. 22. It is admitted that from the year 1964 onwards the defendant was in possession of the property. The plaintiff has claimed compensation for use and occupation from the year 1965 to 1970. The present suit was filed in forma pauperis in November 1971 and after removing certain office objections it was again filed on 3-12-1971. 23. A claim for compensation for use and occupation can be filed within a period of three years under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. The present suit was filed in forma pauperis in November 1971 and after removing certain office objections it was again filed on 3-12-1971. 23. A claim for compensation for use and occupation can be filed within a period of three years under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. Hence the plaintiff can only claim compensation for use and occupation from November 1968 onwards. The plaintiff has claimed compensation upto December 1970. From November 1968 to December 1970, the property admittedly remained in possession of the defendant, while legally the defendant had no right to retain possess on of this property. 24. There is no positive and convincing evidence regarding the amount of compensation which can be allowed to the plaintiff. Gopai Dass (PW 3) states that he rented out his building to Him Ayurvedic College Paprola in the year 1978-79 at an annual rent of Rs. 8000 and the disputed building is larger in size than his building. There is nothing on record to prove the measurement of the building of this witness and the measurement of the present disputed building. Further his evidence relates to the year 1978-79 and is not relevant for the present controversy. Dulo Ram (PW 4) states that he has been charging a rent of Rs. 60 per month for two rooms prior to 1980 and from 1980 onwards the rent has been enhanced to Rs. 80 per month. Again this evidence is of no relevance for the present issue. No other evidence has been produced by the plaintiff on this issue. The defendant has produced Ex. DW I/A, DW 1/B, DW 1/C and DW 1/D. These are rent reasonability certificates issued by the Executive Engineer Palampur Division (P.W.D.). The P. W.D. Department after considering the various aspects has fixed reasonable rent for the portions mentioned in these certificates. A rent of Rs. 126 per month was considered to be reasonable for the portion rented out to Assistant Engineer Baijnath. Similarly a rent of Rs. 66 per month was considered to be reasonable for a portion rented to Circle Area Organiser Baijnath. A rent of Rs. 172 per month was held to be reasonable for the portion occupied by Assistant Engineer Baijnath and a rent of Rs. 67 per month was also held to be reasonable for the portion occupied by Assistant Engineer Baijnath. All these certificates were issued in January 1976. A rent of Rs. 172 per month was held to be reasonable for the portion occupied by Assistant Engineer Baijnath and a rent of Rs. 67 per month was also held to be reasonable for the portion occupied by Assistant Engineer Baijnath. All these certificates were issued in January 1976. These certificates relate to a very small portion of the building. It is a matter of common knowledge that the rents in the year 1976 were on the higher side than the rent which was prevalent in the year 1968 to 1970. The plaintiff has failed to produce any other evidence. Therefore, taking a just and equitable view of the matter and considering the circumstances that the property in possession of the defendant was much more, I consider it reasonable to allow the plaintiff an amount for use and occupation as is mentioned in these certificates. The total rent for the portions occupied by the different departments comes to Rs. 431 per month. Calculating the rent for 26 months, the total amount comes to Rs. 11,206. It is possible that the defendant may have realised more rents for the property, but for want of proof the plaintiff cannot be allowed relief on conjectures, 25. The learned counsel for the defendant contended that the plaintiff had received grants and loans from the defendant and therefore the plaintiff should not be allowed any amount. This plea is not raised in the written statement and there is no issue regarding this contention. Hence this contention is not accepted. 26. As a result of the above discussion I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to Rs. 11206 as compensation for use and occupation of the building from November 1968 to December 1970. Relief. 27. In view of my findings on various issues, the plaintiffs suit for recovery of Rs. 11,206 is decreed with proportionate costs. Order accordingly.