JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, C.J. - Respondent filed a Title Suit on 1-9-1975 in the Court of Munsif, Puri, for declaration that the order of suspension dated 27-4-1971 was illegal, invalid and contrary to law and natural justice and asked to be reinstated in service. Alternative, he prayed for compensation. He alleged that the Plaintiff joined service as a clerk under the Defendant No. 1 - the United Puri Nimapara Central Co-operative Bank Limited-in terms of the order of appointment dated 19-10-1966. While he was so working, on 12.9.1970, he was put under suspension though by then his status had really become that of a confirmed employee. Plaintiff with a view to avoiding the unpleasantness arising out of the situation had tendered his resignation 6-10-1970, but on the 27th of that month he had withdrawn his resignation. A disciplinary proceeding followed in which the Plaintiff showed cause and denied all the charges. He claimed a personal hearing and asked for payment of subsistence allowance. No enquiry was held no evidence collected in his presence and the Plaintiff was not given any personal hearing. Yet, he was intimated that his resignation had been accepted. Plaintiff contended that the communication of acceptance of resignation dated 27-4-1971 was totally invalid in view of the withdrawal of the resignation on 27-10-1970. Plaintiff filed a writ application before this Court being O.J.C. No. 498 of 1971 asking for quashing of the acceptance of the resignation with effect from 6-10-1970. The writ application was dismissed on 5-9-1973. Thereafter the Plaintiff instituted the title suit on 1-9-1975 asking for the reliefs already indicated. 2. The Defendants who are the employer-Bank, its president and secretary respectively, filed a common written statement. They took the stand that the suit was not maintainable for want of notice provided u/s 127 of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act of 1962. Plaintiff had been appointed purer on temporary basis and his appointment was terminable at any time as per condition of service. He was guilty of gross negligence of duty, breach of trust and irresponsibility for which he was suspended on 12-9-1970 and detailed charges followed. After, receiving the order of suspension, the Plaintiff tendered his resignation 6-10-1970 with a view to avoiding the proceeding. He had no right to withdraw his resignation on 27-10-1970, as there was no such provision in the Bye-laws. After, receiving the order of suspension, the Plaintiff tendered his resignation 6-10-1970 with a view to avoiding the proceeding. He had no right to withdraw his resignation on 27-10-1970, as there was no such provision in the Bye-laws. The question of payment of subsistence allowance did not arise as the Plaintiff did not remain at the place fixed as his headquarters during suspension. The suit was barred by limitation and the Plaintiff was not entitled to the reliefs claimed in the suit. 3. As many as nine issues were framed in the trial court and learned Munsif decreed the suit by holding that the order of suspension and the order dated 27-4-1971 were illegal, invalid and contrary to law. The Defendants appealed and the learned Additional Subordinate Judge upheld the decree of the trial court by dismissing the appeal. Against the concurrent appellate judgment, the second appeal was filed. 4. The contentions have mainly been raised in appeal by Mr. Rath for the Appellants, namely (i) the suit instituted on 1-9-1975 on a cause of action of 12-9-1970 when suspension was made or 27-41971 when acceptance of resignation was communicated, should have been dismissed as baited by limitation; and (ii) specific performance of restoration of service in the instant case could not have been claimed or decreed. 5. The suit as framed would admittedly be governed by Article 7 of the Limitation Act. In essence, Plaintiff claimed that the order of suspension should be vacated and he should be compensated. That Article provides limitation of 3 years from the date when the wages accrued due. The appellate court dealt with this question in paragraph 13 of its judgment and stated: It has been next contended by the learned Counsel for the Appellants that the suit is barred by limitation and in support of his contention he relies on ILR 1963 Cuttack 741. The suit was filed on 1-9-1975: The O.J.C. No. 498 of 1971 was filed in the Hon'ble High Court on 7-5-1971 (see deposition of P.W. 1). The judgment in the above O.J.C. 498/71 was delivered on 5-9-1973. The period of two years three months and 10 days is sought to be excluded u/s 14 of the Limitation Act. Article 7 of the new Limitation Act is applicable to the case and the period of limitation is three years. On 27-4-1971 the order of acceptance of resigntion was passed. The period of two years three months and 10 days is sought to be excluded u/s 14 of the Limitation Act. Article 7 of the new Limitation Act is applicable to the case and the period of limitation is three years. On 27-4-1971 the order of acceptance of resigntion was passed. If the above period of two years three months and 10 days is excluded then the suit is in time. The learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that such period cannot be excluded on the authority of ILR 1963 Cuttack 741. The above decision is not an authority for Section 14 of the Limitation Aft and so the principles laid down therein are not applicable to the present case. On the other hand in ILR 1962 Andhra Pradesh 865 (867) in AIR Manual Vol. 13 at page 492 it has been laid down that where a bona fide wait petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing an order is dismissed not on merits but on ground that there is another remedy open, the time taken in the writ proceedings can be excluded u/s 14 of the Limitation Act in computing the Limitation for a suit to set aside the order. So the above suit has been filed in time. No application under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act has, as a fact, been presented before the trial court along with the plaint. Plaintiff was satisfied by pleading in paragraph 10 of the plaint: that after the Plaintiff was wronged by the Defendants as aforesaid to ventilate his grievances the Plaintiff in bonafide belief and due diligence that the wrong be remedied by Hon'ble High Court filed a writ and pursed the same in good faith till dated 5-9-1973 when it was found that the Defendants did not come within the purview at the writ jurisdiction. In paragraph 14 of the written statement, the Defendants Contended: ...It is true that the Plaintiff filed a writ in the Hon'ble High Court but it is false to allege that the Plaintiff was wronged by the Defendants and that the Plaintiff is bonafide belief and due diligence pursued the writ to get the relief the Plaintiff knew it fully well that the writ, does not he to Hon'ble High Court and hence the Plaintiff cannot get any benefit for tiling the same. Plaintiff examined himself as P.W. 1 and led no other oral evidence. In his deposition, he also did not refer to facts and circumstances which would have given rise to application of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. 6. Section 14 of the Limitation Act provides: (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the Plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or, revision, against the Defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. It was for the Plaintiff to establish that he was prosecuting the proceeding before this Court in writ jurisdiction with due diligence and in good faith. I have already indicated that there is no material to support this stand apart from the pleading in paragraph 10 of the plaint and that had been controverted. The judgment in the writ application has not been produced on his side but has been marked as Ext. J having been produced by the Defendants. This being the position, I do not think, Plaintiff could claim the benefit of Section 11 of the Limitation Act. There is no dispute that if the period during which the writ application was pending in this Court is not excluded, Plaintiffs suit is barred by limitation Disagreeing with the courts below, I would accordingly held, that Plaintiffs suit when filed was already barred by limitation. 7. The second point is with reference to maintainability of the suit for relief or specific performance relating to service. Once I have held that the suit was barred by limitation, it is wholly unnecessary to get into the contentions issue yet, as the question has been raised earlier and canvassed in second appeal, I think it appropriate to briefly deal with it. In the judgment of this Court, in the writ application (Ext. J). it was held: Jurisdiction of this Court to give relief to the Petitioner has been questioned on behalf of the opposite parties. In the judgment of this Court, in the writ application (Ext. J). it was held: Jurisdiction of this Court to give relief to the Petitioner has been questioned on behalf of the opposite parties. A Co-operarive Society, as the opposite party No. 1 is not state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution Improvement under the Cooperative Society cannot be held to public employment and in view of the law indicated in the case of Executive Committee, U.P. Warehousing Corporation Vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi the Petitioner cannot be restored to service. At best the Petitioner is entitled, in case he is able to satisfy that the order of termination by way of acceptance of his resignation is bad, to get compensation in an appropriate forum. This judgment of the Division Bench is inter-patties and being decision of a larger Bench is binding on me. In the decision reported in Executive Committee, U.P. Warehousing Corporation Vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi it was stated: From a review of the English decisions, referred to above the position emerges as follows: The law relating to master and servant is clear. A contract for personal service will not be enforced by an order for specific performance not will it be open for a servant to refuse to accept the repudiation of 3 contract of service by his master a-ad say that the contract has never been terminated. The remedy of the employee is a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal or for breach of contract.... In paragraph 23 of the repeated judgment, dealing with the law in India, the Court observed: From the two decisions of this Court, referred to above, the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will he normally granted But there are certain well recognised exceptions to this rule and they are: To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding (1) A public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311; (2) Reinstatement of a dismissals worker under Industrial law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals: (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory ob1igation, imposed by a statute. The Defendant No. 1 is not a statutory body nor would the other two clauses apply. The Defendant No. 1 is not a statutory body nor would the other two clauses apply. As such, the employment in the instant case does not come with in the ambit of any of the three classifications Same was the view of the two learned Judges who formed the majority in the case of Executive Committee of Veish Degree College, Shamli and Ors. v. Lakshmi Narain and Ors. AIR 1976 S.C. 888 . In fact, the principles indicated in Tyagi's case (supra) were clearly adopted in paragraph 17 of the Vaish Degree College judgment. A bench of this Court in the case of Narayan Rath v. Nayagarh Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and Ors. 43 (1977) C.L.T. 119, held that a co-operative society was not a statutory body as if was neither created by a statute not owed its existence to any statute. It was like any company under the Companies Act. That being the position, the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court have full application. Respondent's counsel relied upon two later decisions of the Supreme Court, one in the case of U.P. Cooperative Cane Union Federation Ltd. and Another Vs. Liladhar and Others and the other in the case of The Allahabad District Coop. Ltd. v. Hanuman Dutt Tewari AIR 1982 S.C. 120 . In Liladhar's case 1981 S.C. 152 (supra) the Court was of more concerned with what constituted "business of the society" I than the aspect which is in issue. The earlier judgments indicated above were not referred to. In the latter case of Allahabad District Co-op. Ltd. AIR 1982 S.C. 120 , the same question again arose, namely what constituted business at the Society and the other aspect did not come fat consideration. 8. In view of the direct decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court are binding on me, as Indicated above, it must follow that the Plaintiff was not entitled to relief of restoration to service. He could have laid claim for compensation, if any, but such a claim as made by him in this suit is clearly barred by limitation. I would accordingly allow this appeal, vacate the concurrent decisions and decrees, of the courts below and direct that the suit be dismissed. There would, however, be no order for costs. Final Result : Allowed