Judgment Satyeshwar Roy, J. 1. Plaintiff is appellant. He filed the suit challenging the order of termination of his service as a Headmaster of Sijua Middle School in the district of Dhanbad on the ground, inter alia that the order was passed in violation of Rule 45 of the Bihar Primary and Middle Education Rules, 1961 (the Rules) framed under the Bihar Local Self-Government Act, 1885. 2. According to the appellant, he was initially appointed on 12-2-1941 as an Assistant Teacher in Malker Lower Primary School owned by respondent 1. On 1-3-1957 he was promoted as Headmaster. On 1-11-1970 he was transferred to Sijua as Headmaster. While working as such, respondent 1 terminated the service of the appellant with effect from 1-5-1971 by letter dated 26th/ 28th April, 1971 (Ext. 1/a). The appellant filed a writ application challenging that order but the same was permitted to be withdrawn with the observation that the appellant might file a suit for appropriate relief. The appellant thereafter filed the suit challenging Ext. 1/a, inter alia, on the ground that it was in violation of Rule 45 of the Rules. According to the appellant, the school was receiving grant-in-aid from the State Government and, therefore, Ext. 1/a issued by respondent 1 was without jurisdiction. 3. A joint written statement was filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2, (defendants 1 and 2). In the written statement, inter alia, it was pleaded that it was wholly owned, managed and financed by respondent 1. The teachers of the school were within the disciplinary control of respondent 1 only and therefore, it had power to terminate the service of appellant. Plea was also taken with regard to bar of Sec.14 of the Specific Relief Act (the S.R. Act) inasmuch as, according to them, the suit was by it servant for enforcement of contract of personal service and, therefore, not enforcement of plea was also taken about maintainability of the suit on the ground of limitation in as much as the suit was filed more than 3 years from the date of termination of service of the appellant. 4. 4. The Court below has found that the school in question was not a grant-in-aid school as defined in the Rules, It has further found that even assuming that the school was a grant-in-aid school, in view of Sec.14 of the S.R. Act, no declaration can be made as prayed for on behalf of the appellant. 5. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has challenged the finding of the Court below that it was not a grant-in-aid School. He placed judgment of the Court below before me to show that it was held against the appellant only on the ground that no application in terms of the Rules had been made by the managing committee of the school, for its inclusion for grant out of the District Education Fund and no agreement was forwarded by the managing committee to the District Superintendent of Education agreeing that the School would be conducted in accordance with the condition of the grant. 6. In point 2, the Court below has discussed the issue whether the school in question was a grant-in-aid school. It has found as a fact on the basis of the evidence led by the parties that financial assistance was being received by the school from the State Government out of its consolidated fund. Yet it held against the appellant mainly on the grounds that no application for including this school as a grant-in-aid school in terms of Rule 50 was made by the managing committee and no agreement was accepted by the managing committee in terms of Rule 62 accepting that the school would be conducted in accordance with the conditions of the grant, there is no dispute that the District Superintendent of Education is a competent authority in the distribution of grants-iu-aid and in exercising general supervision over all matters connected with the finance, accounts, maintenance and management of all aided schools subject to the general control of Director of Education. The District Superintendent of Education has been empowered under Rule 45 to exercise powers regarding appointment, posting, promotion and disciplinary action including removal or dismissal of teaching and non-teaching staff of the aided schools. The District Superintendent of Education is respondent 3 in this appeal and was defendant 3 in the suit. No written statement was filed on his behalf. The suit was also not contested by him. The District Superintendent of Education is respondent 3 in this appeal and was defendant 3 in the suit. No written statement was filed on his behalf. The suit was also not contested by him. In fact, he did not appear in the suit although summons was served. As noticed above, the Court below has found as fact that the school used to receive aid from the State Government. Nothing has been shown on behalf of either respondents 1 and 2 or respondent 3 to indicate that the aid granted to the school was an aid granted under any law other than the Rules. It was within the special knowledge of respondents 1 and 3 to say whether any application was filed on behalf of the managing committee of the school in terms of Rule 50 or an agreement was executed by respondent 1 in terms of Rule 62. D.W. 1 has stated that the school used to receive furniture from the State Government. The dearness allowance for the teacher of the School used to be received from the State Government. The school used to be inspected by the Sub-Inspector of Schools. D.W. 2 has said that he has no knowledge about the Rules. Therefore, respondent I did not come forward to deny that although it was receiving financial assistance or aid from the State Government, it never made an application in terms of Rule 50 or executed an agreement in terms of Rule 62. Since nothing has been shown as to under what provision of law the school was getting aid from the State Government, it must be held that the aid at the School used to get was under the provisions of the Rules as a grant-in-aid school. 7. The disciplinary authority for the teachers as well as non-teaching staff of an aided school is the District Superintendent of Education as provided in Rule 45. Rule 45 reads as follows: The power regarding the appointment, posting, and promotion of and disciplinary action, including removal and dismissal of, masters and assistant masters and other members of the establishment of aided school shall be exercised by the District Superintendent, in consultation with the District Board. The District Superintendent shall, ordinarily, obtain the opinion, of the managing committee concerned and such committee may also initiate proposals or send recommendation on these matters to the District Superintendent. The District Superintendent shall, ordinarily, obtain the opinion, of the managing committee concerned and such committee may also initiate proposals or send recommendation on these matters to the District Superintendent. It will be noticed that normally the disciplinary proceeding shall be started by the District Superintendent but in such a case before a final order is passed, the District Superintendent shall ordinarily obtain the opinion of the managing committee. The managing committee of an aided school has also been given power to initiate proposals and sent recommendation on disciplinary matters to the District Superintendent. In this case no notice to show cause was served on the appellant by the managing committee, before terminating his services. From Ext. 1/a. the order of termination of appellants services, it appears that the termination was by way of punishment. The managing committee, therefore, was not competent to pass a final order in this regard and the proper course for it was to recommend action against the appellant to the District Superintendent of Education. Admittedly, that has not been done in this case. It must, therefore, be held that the termination of service of the appellant is in violation of Rule 45, 8. It was submitted on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 that even if there has been a violation of Rule 45, Sec.14 of the S.R. Act was bar for the appellant to get any relief and the appeal must be dismissed. Sec.14(1)(b) of the S.R. Act provided that no contract of personal service can be enforced. In this case, the condition of service of the appellant is governed by the Rules. In my opinion, the provision of the S.R. Act shall not be a bar for granting relief to the appellant. 9. It was submitted on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 that the suit itself was barred by limitation. The trial Court has found that the suit was not barred by limitation. The matter was not agitated before the Court below, I do not find any reason to disagree with the finding of the trial Court on this issue. 10. The maintainability of the suit was challenge on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 on the ground that the appellant was a workman as defined in Sec.2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act (the Act). Reliance was placed in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board V/s. Rajappa A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 548. 10. The maintainability of the suit was challenge on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 on the ground that the appellant was a workman as defined in Sec.2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act (the Act). Reliance was placed in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board V/s. Rajappa A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 548. In that case also, the Supreme Court did not decide whether a teacher was a workman within the meaning of the Act. The right that the appellant claims flows from the Rules. In my opinion, there was no bar for the appellant to file a suit for a declaration that the termination of his service was bad in law. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside and the suit is decreased. It is declared that the termination of the service of the appellant by Ext. 1/a with effect from 1-5-1971 was void and the appellant shall be deemed to be in service and shall be entitled to all the benefits. The appellant shall also be entitled to costs throughout. 12. After I had dictated the judgment, it was brought to my notice that even if Ext. 1/a is declared to be void, the appellant, by this time, must have superannuated. I am not making any observation with regard to this. If, according to service record of the appellant, he was superannuated mean while, he shall not be entitled to join his duties.