ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This petition by a decree holder is directed against an order dated 15- 10-1981 passed by the I Additional District Judge, Allahabad, staying the execution proceedings commenced by the petitioner for the recovery of a certain sum of money against the respondents Nos. 2 to 6 in pursuance of a decree dated 31-3-1975 passed against the aforesaid respondents by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge. Banda. The impugned order has been passed by the learned I Additional District Judge, Allahabad, the court to which the aforesaid decree has been transferred for execution, in the purported exercise of power under Or. 21 R. 29 of the C. P. C., the order of stay having been made to operate till the final disposal of a civil Suit No. 12 of 1981 filed by the respondent No. 2 against the petitioner and some others in the court of the learned Civil Judge, Banda. 2. The principal question which was debated before me was whether the court at Allahabad, to which the decree in question has been sent for execution, was competent to grant stay of the execution proceedings, under Or. 21 R. 29 of the C. P. C. pending the disposal of suit No. 12 of 1981 and if the answer is in the negative, whether the impugned order can be sustained under section 42 of the C. P. C. as amended by the U. P. Legislature. 3. The essential facts which do not appear to be in dispute are that the petitioner filed a Suit No. 12 of 1974 against Satish Chandra Agarwal and Girish Chand Agarwal, both sons of Kishori Lal Agarwal M/s Tony Jewellers, Shanti Sagar and Nitya Kishore Chaubey (respectively respondents nos. 2 to 6 herein) for the recovery of Rs. 51,625/- on the assertion that the respondents nos. 2, 3, and 5 were partners of the respondent no. 4 firm which was' constituted for doing the business of costume jewellery, precious stones & silver wares etc. The said partners approached the petitioner and persuaded him to give them a loan of Rs. 51.000/- which was duly paid by the petitioner through cheque no. PB 944058 on 1-6-1973 on the State Bank of India at Karvi. The further assertion in the plaint was that the said respondents paid the amount of interest on the aforesaid loan on a few dates and thereafter stopped payment. 51.000/- which was duly paid by the petitioner through cheque no. PB 944058 on 1-6-1973 on the State Bank of India at Karvi. The further assertion in the plaint was that the said respondents paid the amount of interest on the aforesaid loan on a few dates and thereafter stopped payment. The petitioner thereupon demanded the amount due from the said respondents and on their refusal to make payment, he filed a suit which was decreed ex parte on 31-3- 1975. Thereupon the respondent no. 2 filed an application dated 4-8-1975 under Order 9 Rule 13 C. P. C. A similar application was moved by his brother, respondent no. 3. Both these applications were dismissed for default on 10-9-1976. Subsequent applications made by the said respondents also met the same fate and were dismissed as not pressed on 30-11-1976. Yet another attempt was made by the respondent no. 2 somewhere in 1980 to get the earlier application restored and to have the ex parte decree set aside. But this application was also dismissed and the said respondents remained unsuccessful right up to the Supreme Court. Thereafter the petitioner moved the present execution application in the court at Banda but the same was transferred to Allahabad as the execution sought by the petitioners was thorough sale of certain agricultural properties.belonging to the respondent no. 2 which were located within the district of Allahabad. This gave rise to a Misc. Case no. 54 of 1980. In these proceedings the respondent no. 2 apart from filing objection under section 47 of the C. P. C. also filed an application on 25-7-198 1, stating that he had filed a Suit No. 12 of 1981 at Banda against the petitioner for getting the decree obtained by the petitioner declared null and void on the ground that the same had been obtained on false assertions. After stating these bald facts-without disclosing anything else it was prayed that the execution proceedings be stayed until the suit of the respondent no. 2 pending before the Civil Judge at Banda is disposed of. 4. The aforesaid application was strongly opposed by the petitioner, who pleaded, inter alia, that the court at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to stay the execution proceedings merely on the ground that a suit has been filed against the decree-holder by the judgment-debtor at Banda. It was also asserted that the application of the respondent no. 4. The aforesaid application was strongly opposed by the petitioner, who pleaded, inter alia, that the court at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to stay the execution proceedings merely on the ground that a suit has been filed against the decree-holder by the judgment-debtor at Banda. It was also asserted that the application of the respondent no. 2 was mala fide designed only to delay the execution of the decree. The petitioner filed before the court a true copy of his written statement filed in suit no. 12 of 1981. In the written statement it was asserted that the suit filed by the respondent no. 2 against the petitioner at Banda is mala fide, vexatious and based on entirely wrong allegations, and is, besides, ex facie barred by limitation as admittedly the plaintiff of that suit had come to know of the decree passed in petitioner's suit as early as 3-8-1975. It was contended that the court at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to stay the execution under Order 21 rule 29 C. P. C. 5. The court below has by the impugned order overruled the objections of the petitioner, and after holding that it has power to stay the execution proceedings under Order 21 rule 29 C. P. C. directed the stay of the execution proceedings, almost as a matter of course,until the disposal of Suit No. 12 of 1981 pending at Banda. 6. For the petitioner it was contended that the court below had no jurisdiction under Order 21, Rule 29 to stay the execution proceedings until the disposal of Suit No. 12 of 1981. It was urged that the court below not being the court where any suit of the nature referred to in Order 21, Rule 29 may be pending against the decree- holder, it has no jurisdiction to exercise the power of stay contemplated under that provision. Learned counsel submitted that in order to attract the application of Order 21 Rule 29 there have to be simultaneously two proceedings pending in one court, namely, (1) a proceeding in execution of the decree of that court started at the instance of the decree-holder against the judgment-debtor and (2) a suit at the instance of the same judgment-debtor either against the holder of a decree of that court or of a decree which is being executed by such court. Learned counsel argued that in the present case "such court" means in the context of Order 21, Rule 29 the court of the Civil Judge at Banda where Suit No. 12 of 1981 is pending. In the alternative learned counsel submitted that even if the court below did have the power to grant stay under Order 21, Rule 29, the same has not been exercised judicially and properly in that stay has been granted entirely as a matter of course without application of the mind to the relevant facts. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find the above contentions to be well founded, and indeed they are supported by two authorities of the Supreme Court, quite apart from the plain language of Order 21 Rule 29. 8. In order to appreciate the contentions it will be useful to have the Order 21, Rule 29 (as amended by Central Act No. 104.of 1976) extracted here : "29. Stay of execution pending suit between decree-holder and judgment-debtor - Where a suit is pending in any Court against the holder of a decree of such Court or of a decree which is being executed by such Court on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided : Provided that if the decree is one for payment of money, the Court shall, if it grants stay without requiring security, record its reasons for so doing." 9. A plain reading of the above provision leaves no manner of doubt that the power of stay is exercisable only by the court where a suit may be pending against decree-holder at the instance of the judgment-debtor provided that such a suit is directed against either the holder of a decree of such court or of a decree which is being executed by such court. Grammatically, the words "such court" obviously refer in the context of Or. 21 R. 29 C.P.C. to the court where the suit is pending. Grammatically, the words "such court" obviously refer in the context of Or. 21 R. 29 C.P.C. to the court where the suit is pending. In any case, even if there was some room for any doubt as to the precise implications of the words "such court" the same has been put beyond controversy by two decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR 1973 SC 528 , (Shaukat Hussain v. Smt. Bhuneshwari Devi) and 1982 All LJ 193 : ( AIR 1982 SC 686 ) (Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir) according to both which they mean the court where the suit is pending. 10. In Shaukat Hussain's case (supra) ( AIR 1973 SC 528 ) the Supreme Court, after analysing the context in which Order 21, R. 29 is set and after quoting Or. 21 R. 29 (as it then stood) held that for the application of Or. 21 R. 29 there should be simultaneously two proceedings pending in one court : one, a proceeding in execution at the instance of the decree-holder against the judgment-debtor and the other a suit at the instance of the judgment-debtor against the decree- holder. The Supreme Court ruled that this was a condition under which the court in which the suit is pending may stay the execution before it. After stating the law thus, the Supreme Court observed thus at page 531 : "The words "such court" are important "Such Court" means in the context of that rule the court in which the suit is pending. In other words, the suit must be one not only pending in that court but also one against the holder of a decree of that Court. That appears to be the plain meaning of the rule." 11. In that case a Small Cause Court decree had been transferred for execution to the Court of a Munsif. The judgment-debtor's suit to set aside that decree had been filed against the decree-holder in the transferee court, namely, the Munsif. The stay was applied for before and granted by the learned Munsif. The Supreme Court held that the learned Munsif was incompetent to grant stay under Order 21, rule 29 (as it then stood) because the decree had not been passed by the court before which the suit was pending. The stay was applied for before and granted by the learned Munsif. The Supreme Court held that the learned Munsif was incompetent to grant stay under Order 21, rule 29 (as it then stood) because the decree had not been passed by the court before which the suit was pending. This decision no doubt was rendered at a time when Order 21, Rule 29 did not contain the words "or of a decree which is being executed by such court." The ratio of this decision however, remains unaffected, in so far as the construction of the words "such court" is concerned, by the amendment of Order 21 Rule 29 by the Central Act of 104 of 1976, as the words "such court" appear even in the amended provision. 12. Indeed in the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Singh (1982 All LJ 193) (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court after quoting with approval a passage from the decision of Shaukat Husain repelled the submission that the addition of the words in Order 21 Rule 29 C. P. C. by section 72 of Act No. 104 of 1976 had made any difference to the construction of the words "such court". Their Lordships stressed that the words "such court" appeared in the amendment also. 13. It is thus abundantly clear that in order to attract the application of O. 21 R. 29 C. P. C. it is basic that the power of stay can be exercised only by the court where a suit may be pending against the holder of a decree of such court or of a decree which is being executed by that court on the part of the judgment-debtor. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Shaukat Hussain ( AIR 1973 SC 528 ) (supra) for the application of O. 21, R. 29 two proceedings must be simultaneously pending in one court, namely, (1) a proceeding in execution of the decree started at the instance of the decree-holder against the judgment-debtor and (2) a suit at the instance of the same judgment-debtor either against the holder of a decree of that court or holder of a decree which is being executed by such court, that is, the court where the suit referred to above may be pending. 14. 14. That being so, it is apparent that, the court at Allahabad not being the court where the suit started by the judgment debtor against the decree-holder is pending, was not competent to grant stay under O. 21, R. 29. On the undisputed facts of the present case none of the ingredients mentioned in O. 21, R. 29 is present. For the suit is pending before the Civil Judge, Banda and the decree which is being sought to be executed was passed by the II Additional Civil Judge, Banda. The II Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad was hence entirely wrong in assuming that he had jurisdiction to grant stay under O. 21, R: 29. The impugned order which has been passed expressly in the purported exercise of power under Order 21, Rule 29 C. P. C. is thus manifestly incompetent in law. 15. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor respondent no. 2, placed reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1978 Mad 269 (H. L Natha v. T. C. Ramalingam Pillai). That decision is clearly distinguishable. In that case the judgment-debtor had instituted a suit against a decree-holder in the court of the District Munsif, Tenkasi. Earlier the decree- holder had obtained a decree in Original Suit No. 20 of 1974 against the judgment-debtor granted by the sub-Court of Tirunelveli. Admittedly the decree in Original Suit No. 20 of 1974 had been transferred for execution to the court of the District Munsif, Tenkasi. The consequence was that before the District Munsif, Tenkasi two proceedings were simultaneously pending, namely, (1) the suit filed by the judgment-debtor against the decree-holder and (2) the execution proceedings started by the decree-holder against the judgment-debtorin Original Suit No. 20 of 1974. The stay for execution proceedings in Original Suit No. 20 of 1974 had been applied for by the judgment-debtor before the District Munsif at Tenkasi under Order 21, Rule 29. It was dismissed by that Court on the ground that it had no jurisdiction of grant stay because the decree sought to be executed had not been passed by it. The Madras High Court in a revision against this order held that on the facts of the case the learned District Munsif was clearly competent to consider the prayer for stay under Order 21, R. 29 C. P. C. 16. The Madras High Court in a revision against this order held that on the facts of the case the learned District Munsif was clearly competent to consider the prayer for stay under Order 21, R. 29 C. P. C. 16. It will thus be seen that to the case before the Madras High Court Order 21, Rule 29 applied in terms. The stay had been applied for before the court before which a suit had been filed by the judgment debtor against the decree-holder and further the execution proceedings started by the decree-holder was also being executed by the same court. The position in the case at hand, as demonstrated above, is completely different. Here, the suit is pending at Banda, whereas the execution proceedings are pending before the 1st. Additional District Judge, Allahabad, and, of course, the decree sought to be executed was passed by yet another court, namely, the II Additional District Judge, Banda. 17. Faced with the plain language of Or. 21 r. 29 C. P. C. as well as the Supreme Court authorities mentioned above, learned counsel for the judgment-debtor contended that the impugned order could be sustained under section 42 of the C. P. C. as amended by the U. P. Legislature. 18. I find no merit in the above contention. Section 42 is so far as it is relevant, as amended by the State Legislature with effect from 2-12-1968 and as it stood on the date on which the Central Act 104 of 1976 came into force, reads as follows : "42. Power of Court in executing transferred decree- (1) The Court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself. All persons disobeying or obstructing the decree shall be punishable by such Court in the same manner as if it had passed the decree, and its order in executing such decree shall be subject to the same rules in respect of appeal as if the decree had been passed by itself. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the powers of the Court under that sub-section shall include the following powers of the Court which passed the decree. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the powers of the Court under that sub-section shall include the following powers of the Court which passed the decree. namely : (a) power to send the decree for execution to another Court under section 39; (b) power to execute the decree against the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor under section 50; (c) power to order attachment of a -decree; (d) power to decide any question relating to the bar of limitation to the executability of the decree; (e) power to record payment of adjustment under Rule 2 of Order XXI; (f) power to order stay of execution under Rule 29 of Order XXI: (g) in the case of a decree passed against a firm, power to grant leave to execute such decree against any person other than a person as is referred to in clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 50 of Order XXI." 19. Section 42 of the C. P. C. in so far as it is relevant for our purpose as amended by the Central Legislature by Act No. 104 of 1976 stands thus - "42. Powers of Court in executing transferred decree.- (1) The Court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself. All persons disobeying or obstructing the execution of the decree shall be punishable by such Court in the same manner as if it had passed the decree. And its order in executing such decree shall be subject to the same rules in respect of appeal as if the decree had been passed by itself. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the powers of the Court under that sub-section shall include the following powers of the Court which passed the decree, namely (a) power to send the decree for execution to another Court under Section 39; (b) power to execute the decree against the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor under section 50; (c) power to order attachment of a decree." 20. Section 97 (1) of the Amending Act, namely, Act No. 104 of 1976 says : "97. Section 97 (1) of the Amending Act, namely, Act No. 104 of 1976 says : "97. Repeal and Savings- (1) Any amendment made or any provision inserted in the Principal Act by a State Legislature or a High Court before the commencement of this Act shall, except in so far as such amendment or provision is consistent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by this Act, stands repealed." 21. It will thus be seen that the Central Legislature deliberately omitted to include clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 42 as amended by the State Legislature is Section 42. It, however, retained clause (a) to (o) of Section 42 (2) verbatim and omitted to include clauses (d) to (g) of the State Amendment. The omission seems to me to have been deliberate in view of the fact that the first three clauses of sub-section (2) of Section 42 of the State Amendment were retained, word for word. That being so, the conclusion seems inescapable that CL (f) of Section 42 (2) (as amended by the State Legislature) did not survive after the amendment of S. 42 by the Central Act No. 104 of 1976 as the - same was not consistent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by the Central Act No. 104 of 1976. 22. Further, sub-sec. (2) of S. 42 (as amended by the State Legislature) only provides that the transferee court shall have the same powers as the court which passed the decree itself under O. 21, R. 29 C. P. C. Now as demonstrated above, even the court which passes the decree cannot claim the power of granting a stay under O. 21, R. 29 C. P. C. if it was not the court before which the suit of the nature mentioned in O. 21, R. 29 of the C. P. C. is pending. That being so, the court executing the decree sent to it could not ipso facto claim the right to stay the execution of the decree by virtue merely of the power conferred under sub-sec. (2) (f) of S. 42. 23. That being so, the court executing the decree sent to it could not ipso facto claim the right to stay the execution of the decree by virtue merely of the power conferred under sub-sec. (2) (f) of S. 42. 23. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor next contended that clause (f) of sub- section (2) of Section 42 as applicable in U. P. was consistent, at any rate, with sub- section (1) of section 42 of the Central Act and hence the same could not be deemed to have been repealed by section 97 (1) of the Central Amendment. 24. I find it difficult to accept the above contention. However broadly one might construe the ambit of S. 42 (1), it cannot, in my opinion, be deemed to include the power of granting stay under O. 21, Rule 29. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 42 states that the court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same power in executing such decree of execution as if it had been passed by itself he power of execution, in my opinion, does not include within its sweep the power to grant stay till the pendency of another suit without the aid of some specific provision such as O. 21, R. 29 C. P. C. Such a power of stay is neither ancillary nor necessary to the proper exercise of power of executing a decree. In Shaukat Husain's case ( AIR 1973 SC 528 ) the Supreme Court had occasion to analyse the scope and power of granting stay vested in a court to which a decree is sent for execution and it observed that such a court has been invested only with a very limited power to stay under Order 21, Rule 26. 25. In my opinion, the power of granting stay until the pendency of the suit mentioned in O. 21, R. 29 has serious implications and repercussions on the rights of the parties. The execution proceedings are stalled until the final disposal of another suit. Some High Courts have taken the view that final disposal of the suit implies the disposal of the same by the appellate court. See AIR 1928 Cal 222 (224), AIR 1935 Ran 389 (390), for example. 26. The execution proceedings are stalled until the final disposal of another suit. Some High Courts have taken the view that final disposal of the suit implies the disposal of the same by the appellate court. See AIR 1928 Cal 222 (224), AIR 1935 Ran 389 (390), for example. 26. Such being the consequence of granting stay under O. 21, R. 19 the power of granting stay cannot be assumed as implied or included in the exercise of power of execution. That being so, the power of granting stay under O. 21, R. 29 C. P. C. cannot in my judgment be deemed to be included in the generality of power granted under sub-sec. (1) of S. 42. 27. Moreover, in Shaukat Husain's case ( AIR 1973 SC 528 ) the Supreme Court was directly considering the question whether the transferee court had jurisdiction to grant stay under Order 21, Rule 29 C. P. C. and even though it noticed section 42 (in paragraph 21 of the judgment) it came to the conclusion that the transferee court did not have that power because Order 21, Rule 29 was not applicable to the facts of the case. If section 42 had included the power of granting stay as contended by the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor before me, the Supreme Court would have sustained the order of stay on the alternative ground that the power was traceable to section 42. It, however, did not do so. It must therefore follow by necessary implication that according to the Supreme Court such a power did not vest in the transferee court even under section 42 of the C. P. C. 28. This Court, therefore, holds that the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction. The court below had no power to grant stay for the duration of the suit pending at Banda. 29. In the view which I have taken in regard to the jurisdiction of the court to grant stay, it is not necessary to dilate on the petitioner's second contention as regards the propriety of the impugned order beyond observing that the court below was not justified in granting the stay, as a matter of course, without considering in any depth whether this was a fit case in which stay should have been granted. In Krishna Singh's case (1982 All LJ 193) (supra) the Supreme Court has stressed that the power of stay under Order 21, Rule 29 has serious implications and it ought to be exercised with great care and only under special circumstances. No such circumstances have been pointed out by the court below. Indeed the court below did not address itself at all to such vital questions as to whether the judgment-debtor has a prima facie case in the suit filed by him at Banda and whether the loss likely to be suffered by him by the refusal to grant stay would be irreparable. The impugned order is thus liable to be quashed in any view. 30. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor finally urged that this was not a fit case for interference as the decree sought to be executed wag an ex parte decree and the suit was based on a mere bearer cheque. 31. I am unable to accept the above contention. Neither of the two grounds mentioned above affords a valid justification for refusing to interfere with the impugned order which is ex facie without jurisdiction. The attempts of the judgment-debtor to have the ex parte decree set aside have failed right upto the Supreme Court. As regards the fact that the suit was decreed on the basis of a cheque the same relates to the merits of the decree-holder's claim in the suit which cannot be the subject-matter of investigation in execution proceedings. 32. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the I Additional District Judge, Allahabad dated 15-10-1981, is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs from the respondent no. 2.