JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - This case has a chequered history. Respondent No. 1 P.K. Mukerjee is landlord of an accommodation of which late H.L. Soni, predecessor-in-interest of the Petitioner and Respondents 2 to 4, was the tenant. An application was made by Respondent No. 1 u/s 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act 3 of 1947) for permission to file a suit for ejectment against late H.L. Soni on the ground that the accommodation in question was bonafide needed by him for his own use. The application was contested by H.L. Soni and was dismissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 25-9-1971. Against that order a revision was filed by Respondent No. 1 which was allowed by the Commissioner on 12-11-1971 and the permission prayed for was granted. H.L. Soni made a representation to the State Government u/s 7-F of U.P. Act 3 of 1947, which was rejected by the State Government on 2-8-1972. A writ petition was thereafter filed by H.L. Soni in this Court being writ petition No. 5284 of 1972 which was allowed on 7-2-1975 and the orders of the Commissioner and the State Government were quashed. Respondent No. 1 preferred a special appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 7-2-1975 which was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court on 31-8-1978 whereby the order of the Commissioner granting permission to Respondent No. 1 to file a suit for ejectment of H.L. Soni as confirmed by the State Government was restored. An application was thereafter filed by Respondent No. 1 on 4-10-1978 u/s 43(2)(rr) read with Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act 13 of 1972) for eviction of H.L. Soni on the basis of the permission granted by the Commissioner as aforesaid. During the pendency of that application H.L. Soni died on 12-12-1978. During the pendency of that application H.L. Soni died on 12-12-1978. As is apparent from paragraphs 9 and 10 of the counter-affidavit filed by Respondent No. 1 in the present writ petition an application was made by the Petitioner who is one of the sons of late H.L. Soni for substitution of the heirs of late H.L. Soni and on 3-3-1979 an order was passed inter alia stating that Shri B.B. Tandon, Advocate, who had filed his Vakalatnama for D.K. Soni, one of the alleged legal heirs of late H.L. Soni, undertakes to file Vakalatnama for other heirs of the deceased H.L. Soni. It was further ordered that a substitution application be moved for amendment of the application. 23-3-1979 was fixed for further orders. In paragraph 9 of the rejoinder affidavit it has on the other hand been stated that no application was made by the Petitioner for substitution on 19-12-1978 but only an application was filed on 22-12-1978 intimating the Court that the tenant was dead and had left his heirs. Be that as it may, it is not disputed that the Petitioner did file an application through Shri B.B. Tandon, Advocate, and the order dated 3-3-1979 referred to above was passed. Respondent No. 1 thereafter made an application on 23-3-1979 to substitute the legal representatives of late H.L. Soni. This application was contested by the legal representatives of late H.L. Soni and was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority on 10-11-1979. 2. Respondent No. 1 thereafter made another application on 11-12-1979 u/s 43(2)(rr) read with Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 for eviction of the legal representatives of late H.L. Soni including the Petitioner on the basis of the aforesaid permission granted by the Commissioner. This application was contested by the legal representatives of H.L. Soni but was allowed by the Prescribed Authority on 7-7-1981. An appeal was preferred against that order by the legal representatives of H.L. Soni before the District Judge which was transferred to the Court of the 4th Additional District Judge, Allahabad, Respondent No. 5, who dismissed the said appeal on 25-10-1982. The order of the Prescribed Authority dated 7-7-1981 and that of the Additional District Judge dated 25-10-1982 are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 3. The order of the Prescribed Authority dated 7-7-1981 and that of the Additional District Judge dated 25-10-1982 are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 3. It has been pointed out by Counsel for the Petitioner that on 7-11-1978 Respondent No. 1 entered into an agreement with Smt. Madhu Soni, wife of the Petitioner, and daughter-in-law of late H.L. Soni, for sale of a portion of the accommodation which was in the tenancy of late H.L. Soni. A copy of this agreement has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. On the basis of this agreement it has been urged by Counsel for the Petitioner that the permission which was granted by the Commissioner to Respondent No. 1 for filing a suit for ejectment against late H.L. Soni u/s 3 of U.P. Act 3 of 1947 became redundant inasmuch as in view of the said agreement it was apparent that on the date when the second application u/s 43(2)(rr) read with Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972, in which the impugned orders were passed, was filed on 11-12-1979 the need of Respondent No. 1 for use of the accommodation in question had ceased to exist. It has further been pointed out by Counsel for the Petitioner that on 12-3-1981 i.e. during the pendency of the application dated 11-12-1979 Respondent No. 1 entered into agreements with R.P. Kanodia and P.K. Kanodia for sale of the accommodation in the tenancy of late H.L. Soni. 4. According to Counsel for the Petitioner the subsequent event stated above had to be taken into consideration by the Prescribed Authority as well as the Additional District Judge and in not doing so they have committed a manifest error of law and their orders deserve to be quashed. In support of the submission that subsequent events had to be taken into consideration in such a matter reliance has been placed by Counsel for the Petitioner on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramji Dayawala and Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Invest Import, AIR 1981 SC 2085 where after referring to an earlier decision of that Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. Invest Import, AIR 1981 SC 2085 where after referring to an earlier decision of that Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 it was held that in the very nature of action for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, the Court has not only to be satisfied that the requirement was present at the date of institution of the action but continued to exist at the time of decree and has to mould the decree accordingly. Ramji Dayawala's case (supra) was not a case by a landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement and the observations made above were made in order to explain the import of the decision in P. Venkateswarlu's (supra) the facts of the case of P. Venkateswarlu (supra) were that a landlord had claimed eviction of his tenant u/s 10(3)(iii)(a) and (b) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 which, inter alia, contemplated that the landlord was not occupying a non-residential building in the town. During the pendency of a revision in the High Court a subsequent fact indicating that the landlord had in the meantime been able to occupy a non residential building in the town was brought to the notice of the High Court and on its basis it was contended that the tenant was not liable to be evicted u/s 10(3)(iii) referred to above inasmuch as the requisite condition for invoking that provision namely that the landlord was not occupying a non residential building in the town had ceased to exist. It is in this context that the question as to whether the subsequent event could or could not be taken into consideration came up for consideration and it was held that the aforesaid subsequent fact could be taken into consideration. Suffice it to say so far as these cases are concerned that no exception can be taken to the law laid down therein. There is, however, one distinguishing feature in the instant case on account of which in my opinion the law laid down in these cases cannot be applied and the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in another decision reported in Syed Asadullah Kazmi Vs. Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, AIR 1981 SC 1724 is applicable to the facts of the instant case. Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, AIR 1981 SC 1724 is applicable to the facts of the instant case. In Syed Abdullah Kazmi's case it was laid down that where an order of eviction of a tenant from part of premises had become final proceedings could not be reopened on the basis of subsequent events and in such circumstances subsequent events could not be taken into consideration. 5. Having given my anxious thought to the ratio decidendi of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the three cases referred to above I am of opinion that in all those cases where a finding as to whether the need of the landlord is bonafide or not is capable of being recorded one way or the other subsequent events can always be taken into consideration not only by the trial authority but also by the appellate or the revisional authority and the finding on the aforesaid question can be modified on the basis of the subsequent events. However, the rule of modifying a finding that the need of the landlord was bonafide on the basis of the subsequent events would in my opinion not apply where that finding has attained finality and proceedings for eviction of the tenant are taken on the basis of the finding which has become final or which has been made final by a statutory provision. 6. Reverting to the facts of the instant case it would be seen that the proceedings for the grant of permission u/s 3 of the U.P. Act 3 of 1947 came to an end latest on 31-8-1978 when the special appeal filed by Respondent No. 1 against the judgment of the learned Single Judge quashing the orders of the Commissioner and the State Government was allowed and those orders were restored. In this connection it would be useful to refer to Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of U.P. Act 3 of 1947. The said Sub-section (4) reads: (4) The order of the Commissioner under Sub-section (3) shall, subject to any order passed by the State Government u/s 7-F, be final. It would thus be seen that the order of the Commissioner under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of U.P. Act 3 of 1947 has been made final by the statutory provision contained in this behalf in Sub-section (4) itself of the said Section 3. It would thus be seen that the order of the Commissioner under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of U.P. Act 3 of 1947 has been made final by the statutory provision contained in this behalf in Sub-section (4) itself of the said Section 3. The application in which the impugned orders were passed was made u/s 43(2)(rr) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 which reads: (2) Notwithstanding such repeal - (rr) where any permission referred to in Section 3 of the old Act has been obtained on any ground specified in Sub-section and has become final, either before the commencement of this Act, or in accordance with the provisions of this Sub-section, after the commencement of this Act, whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted, the landlord may apply to the prescribed authority for his eviction u/s 21, and thereupon the prescribed authority shall order the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy, and it shall not be necessary for the prescribed authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid, and such order, shall be final and shall not be open to appeal u/s 22: Provided that no application under this clause shall be maintainable on the basis of a permission granted u/s 3 of the old Act, where such permission became final more than three years before the commencement of this Act; Provided further that in computing the period of three years, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due deligence any civil proceeding whether in a Court of first instance or appeal or revision shall be excluded; The scope of Section 43(2)(rr) came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Chandra v. District Judge, Gorakhpur 1979 ARC 146. It was held that the proceedings before the prescribed authority u/s 43(2)(rr) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 were in the nature of execution proceedings. It was held that the proceedings before the prescribed authority u/s 43(2)(rr) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 were in the nature of execution proceedings. In Kundan LaL v. District Judge 1980 2 RCC 303 it was held: Section 43(2)(rr) on the other hand as it stood after its amendment by U.P. Act No 28 of 1976 permitted the landlord, in those cases where permission u/s 3 of U.P. Act No. III of 1947 had been obtained on any ground specified in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 21 and had become final in the manner stated therein, to make an application to the Prescribed Authority for the eviction of the tenant u/s 21. This could be done whether not a suit had already been instituted on the basis of the permission granted u/s 3 of U.P. Act No. III of 1947. As seen above Section 43(2)(rr), inter alia, provides that upon such an application being made the Prescribed Authority shall order the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy and it shall not be necessary for the Prescribed Authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid and such order shall be final and shall not be open to appeal u/s 22. A perusal of Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 would, however, indicate that it inter alia enables the landlord to make an application for eviction of his tenant if the building is bonafide required either in its existing form or after its demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family. The legal position, in regard to such an application u/s 21 is that the Prescribed Authority has to first record a finding on evidence produced by the parties before it that the need of the landlord was bonafide. Thereafter it has to compare the hardship to be caused to either party in the event of the application being allowed or dismissed as the case may be and it is only if it records a finding that the need of the landlord is bona fide and that greater hardship would be caused to him in the event of the application being dismissed u/s 21 that it can allow the said application. Against an order passed by the Prescribed Authority an appeal is prescribed u/s 22 of the Act. Against an order passed by the Prescribed Authority an appeal is prescribed u/s 22 of the Act. Thus it is celar that the procedure as contemplated by Section 43(2)(rr) is different on almost every material point from that of an application for release made u/s 21 of that Act. It is true that Section 43(2)(rr) speaks of an application being made u/s 21 but in view of the distinguishing features pointed out above it is apparent that an application u/s 43(2)(rr) is meant to be an application of the nature of an execution application to enforce the permission granted u/s 3 of U.P. Act No. III of 1947. It is not an independent application u/s 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. It is thus apparent that the order of the Commissioner under Sub-section of Section 3 of U.P. Act 3 of 1947 granting permission to file a suit for ejectment against the tenant has been made final by a statutory provision contained in Sub-section (4) thereof. It is also apparent that unlike an application u/s 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 an application u/s 43(2)(rr) read with Section 21(1) is in the nature of an application for execution of the permission granted by the Commissioner u/s 3(3) of U.P. Act 3 of 1947, which has been made final by Sub-section thereof. 7. Dealing with the question as to whether in such proceedings which are initiated by the landlord by an application u/s 43(2)(rr) read with Section 21(1) of the Act subsequent events can be or cannot be taken into consideration a Full Bench of this Court in B.L. Sahu v. Prescribed Authority 1980 AWC 148 (FB) held in paragraph 12 of the report: On the other hand, Clause (rr) takes special care to prove that the Prescribed Authority shall not reopen the first question either, namely to satisfy itself all over again as to the grounds. The last part of Clause (rr) says: and it shall not be necessary for the prescribed authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any grounds as aforesaid. In the scheme of Clause (rr), it is apparent that the phrase 'it shall not be necessary' means 'it shall not be open'. The last part of Clause (rr) says: and it shall not be necessary for the prescribed authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any grounds as aforesaid. In the scheme of Clause (rr), it is apparent that the phrase 'it shall not be necessary' means 'it shall not be open'. In other words, the Prescribed Authority has no jurisdiction to reopen the question and satisfy itself afresh that the grounds specified under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 21 do exist. In this respect, the order granting permission u/s 3 of the old Act is final and conclusive. Its jurisdiction is only to see that the grounds on which the permission was obtained answer the description of the grounds specified under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2). If it is so satisfied, then it has no option but to order eviction of the tenant 'from the building under tenancy '. This legal position was reiterated in paragraph 23 of the report as follows: Clause (rr) specifically prohibits the Prescribed Authority from satisfying itself afresh that the grounds exist. It has only to see that the grounds on which permission was granted under the old Act are such as answer the description of the grounds mentioned in Sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 21. It has no power to satisfy itself as to any other matter. While disposing of an application u/s 21(1), it has an additional jurisdiction to decide whether the grounds established by the landlord require eviction from the whole or a part of the building. This latter jurisdiction has not been given to the Prescribed Authority while dealing with an application under Clause (rr) for eviction of the tenant on the basis of the permission granted under the old Act. 8. In this connection it may also be pointed out that prior to the enforcement of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 a suit had to be instituted for the ejectment of a tenant on the basis of the permission granted u/s 3 of U.P. Act 3 of 1947. 8. In this connection it may also be pointed out that prior to the enforcement of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 a suit had to be instituted for the ejectment of a tenant on the basis of the permission granted u/s 3 of U.P. Act 3 of 1947. A question arose in Chhotey Lal v. Sheo Shanker 1950 ALJ 455 as to whether in the suit filed by the landlord on the basis of the permission granted u/s 3 of U.P. Act 3 of 1947 it is necessary for the landlord to prove that the ground on which the permission had been granted still continues to exist. It was held: The Civil Court will not go into the question whether the District Magistrate was justified in granting the permission or not. The permission granted by the District Magistrate removes the obstacle from the path of a landlord in enforcing a right which was his under the contract. It is, therefore, not necessary for the Plaintiff who relied upon the permission of the District Magistrate to prove that any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 exists even though the District Magistrate may have granted the permisson on one of those grounds. A similar question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Durga Prasad v. Rama Kant 1951 ALJ 285. It was held that where the District Magistrate gave permission to the landlord u/s 3 of U.P. Act 3 of 1947 for the institution of a suit for ejectment on the ground that he had no accommodation for himself any subsequent event such as an allegation that the Plaintiff was able to obtain possession of another house for his residence cannot be taken into consideration for decision of the matter in appeal and that the subsequent event even if proved cannot reimpose the bar against the Plaintiff which was removed by the grant of the permission to him by the District Magistrate. The bar once removed could not be reimposed. 9. The bar once removed could not be reimposed. 9. In view of what has been stated above I am of opinion that the application made by Respondent No. 1 for eviction of the legal representatives of late H.L. Soni in which the impugned orders were passed could not have been dismissed on the basis of the agreements relied on by Counsel for the Petitioner which came into being after the permission granted by the Commissioner u/s 3(3) of U.P. Act 3 of 1947 had become final on the special appeal filed by Respondent No. 1 being allowed by this Court on 31-8-1978. 10. At this place I consider it useful to point out another circumstance which in my opinion is relevant. Even though the impugned orders were passed after the agreement dated 7-11-1978 had been arrived at between Respondent No. 1 and Smt. Madhu Soni as aforesaid the plea that the need of Respondent No. 1 had ceased to exist on the basis of that agreement does not appear to have been pressed either before the Prescribed Authority or before the Additional District Judge. A perusal of the impugned order of the Prescribed Authority and ground No. 5 of the memorandum of appeal before the District Judge a copy where of has been filed as Annexure 5 to the Writ petition, indicates that the only argument which was pressed on behalf of the Petitioner on the basis of the aforesaid agreement dated 7-11- 1978 was that on account of the said agreement the position of H.L. Soni and thereafter of his legal representatives had ceased to be that of a tenant and was that of an owner inasmuch as after the agreement they were in possession over the accommodation in question in part performance of the agreement aforesaid. This plea was repelled and in my opinion rightly inasmuch as the agreement afosesaid had not been arrived at between Respondent No. 1 on the one hand and the tenant H.L. Soni on the other so that it could be said that the nature of the possession of the tenant after the agreement became different from that of a tenant. The agreement was arrived at between Respondent No. 1 on the one hand and Smt. Madhu Soni, daughter-in-law of the tenant, who was admittedly not the tenant of the accommodation in question when the agreement aforesaid was arrived at. The agreement was arrived at between Respondent No. 1 on the one hand and Smt. Madhu Soni, daughter-in-law of the tenant, who was admittedly not the tenant of the accommodation in question when the agreement aforesaid was arrived at. Further, it is admitted to Counsel for the Petitioner that the agreement dated 7-11-1978 was not in regard to the entire accommodation which was in the tenancy of H.L. Soni and was the subject matter of the permission granted by the Commissioner but was in regard to only a portion of it. 11. The question as to whether on account of the subsequent events the need of the landlord has ceased to exist or not is a question of fact or at best a mixed question of law and fact. As such even if the subsequent events could be taken into consideration in proceedings u/s 43(2)(rr) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 this question of fact not having been pressed by the Petitioner either before the Prescribed Authority or before the Additional District Judge in appeal he would, even otherwise, not be entitled to raise such a question for the first time in a writ petition. 12. It was then urged by Counsel for the Petitioner that since the application made for substituting the legal representatives of H.L. Soni in the first application filed by Respondent No. 1 on 4-10-1978 u/s 43(2)(rr) read with Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 had been dismissed on 10-11-1979 by the Prescribed Authority it was not open to Respondent No. 1 to file the second application on 11-12-1979 on which the impugned orders were passed. It was urged by Counsel for the Petitioner that since one application on the basis of the permission granted by the Commissioner was filed by Respondent No. 1 and could not fructify inasmuch as the legal representatives of M.L. Soni were not substituted after his death and the application made in this behalf was rejected, the permission granted by the Commissioner exhausted itself and on the basis of that permission the second application could not be filed. At this place it may be pointed out that it is not the argument of Counsel for the Petitioner, and in my opinion rightly, that the first application filed by Respondent No. 1 on 4-10-1978 had abated and that the consequence flowing from abatement of proceedings as provided in Order XXII, Rule 9 CPC were attracted. Neither the provisions of Order XXII, Rule 9 CPC have been applied to the proceedings under the Act nor any provision either in the Act or in the Rules has been brought to my notice on the basis of which it could be urged that the first application made by Respondent No. 1 had abated. 13. The ground on which it has been urged that the second application was not maintainable, namely, that since the first application did not fructify, the permission granted by the Commissioner exhausted itself has in my opinion no substance. In Chhotey Lal's case (Supra) the facts were that after obtaining the permission for filing a suit for ejectment of the tenant the landlord gave a notice to the tenant terminating his tenancy and thereafter filed a suit for his ejectment on the basis of the permission so obtained. The Plaintiff, however, after he had given the notice of termination of tenancy as aforesaid, accepted rent from the tenant and on the view that this acceptance of rent may be a bar to his success in the suit he made an application for withdraw! of the suit with permission to file a fresh suit which was granted and the suit was withdrawn. Thereafter the landlord gave a fresh notice of termination of tenancy to the tenant and filed another suit on the basis of the same permission. It was urged that the second suit was not maintainable because the earlier suit filed on the basis of the same permission had not fructified, having been withdrawn. This plea was repelled and it was held that the mere fact that a second notice to quit was given when the first notice was found defective did not affect the permission which had been granted by the District Magistrate unless the permission was conditional and the condition was broken. This plea was repelled and it was held that the mere fact that a second notice to quit was given when the first notice was found defective did not affect the permission which had been granted by the District Magistrate unless the permission was conditional and the condition was broken. On the finding that the permission in that case was unconditional, as is the permission in the instant case, it was held that the permission notwithstanding the fact that the earlier suit had not fructified having been withdrawn was in full force and had not exhausted itself. 14. Lastly, it was urged by Counsel for the Petitioner that in view of Rule 18 of the Rules the second application was not maintainable. For dealing with this submission it would be useful to quote Rule 18 at this place which reads as hereunder: 18. Avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings: (1) Where an application of a landlord against any tenant for permission to file a suit for eviction u/s 3 of the old Act, on any ground mentioned in Section 21(1) has been finally allowed or rejected on merits either before or after the commencement of the Act, whether by the District Magistrate or on revision by the Commissioner or the State Government or under Clause (i) or (m) of Section 43(2) by the District Judge, and the landlord instead of filing a suit for eviction makes an application u/s 21 on the same grounds within a period of six months from such decision or from the commencement of the Act, whichever is later, the prescribed authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive; Provided that the period during which the operation of any permission as aforesaid is stayed by order of any Court or authority shall be excluded in computing the said period of six months. (2) Where an application of a landlord against a tenant u/s 21 for the release of any building or any specified part thereof or any surplus land appurtenant to such building is rejected on merits and a fresh application on the same ground is made within a period of one year from that decision, the prescribed authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive. It was pointed out that since the second application had not been made within six months of 31-8-1978 on which date the special appeal filed by Respondent No. 1 was allowed as aforesaid, the Prescribed Authority could not accept the findings in the proceedings for grant of permission u/s 3 of U.P. Act 3 of 1947 as conclusive. I find it difficult to agree with this submission either. Section 43(2)(rr) was inserted in U.P. Act 13 of 1972 by U.P. Act 37 of 1972 published in the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 16-9-1972. This Section 43(2)(rr) came into force with effect from September 20, 1972, and was thus not on the statute book prior to 16-9-1972. On the other hand Rule 18 of the Rules was framed in exercise of the powers conferred by U.P. Act 13 of 1972 as it stood before the insertion of Section 43(2)(rr). These rules were published in the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 1-7-1972 and by virtue of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of the Rules came into force from 15-7-1972. It is, therefore, not possible to construe that what was contained in Rule 18 of the Rules was intended to limit or circumscribe the extent and scope of Section 43(2)(rr) of the Act which was inserted in the Act after the enforcement of Rule 18. This seems to have been in the mind of the legislature while enacting Section 43(2)(rr). The two provisos to Section 43(2)(rr) make it clear that an application u/s 43(2)(rr) could be filed at any time within three years of the permission becoming final as contemplated by the said two provisos. Section 43(2)(rr) further provides that in an application made by the landlord on the basis of a permission granted u/s 3 of U.P. Act 3 of 1947 on any ground specified in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 and which permission had become final "it shall not be necessary for the prescribed authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid, and such order, shall be final and shall not be open to appeal u/s 22." It is thus apparent that the scheme of Section 43(2)(rr) was different from that of Rule 18 of the Rules. Whereas Rule 18 of the Rules contemplated that the Prescribed Authority shall accept the findings in the proceedings u/s 3 of U.P. Act 3 of 1947 as conclusive if an application was made u/s 21(1) within six months of the date on which permission was granted or from the commencement of the Act, Section 43(2)(rr) contemplates that even if the application is not made within six months from the aforesaid dates but is made within three years therefrom it would not be necessary for the Prescribed Authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground under Sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 21 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. Firstly, in view of what has been pointed out above there is no inconsistency between Rule 18 of the Rules on the one hand and Section 43(2)(rr) on the other. Secondly, even if there was any such inconsistency it is settled law that the provisions in the Act will prevail over those of the Rules. As such even though the second application filed by Respondent No. 1 u/s 43(2)(rr) read with Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 on 11-12-1979 was not within six months of 31-8-1978 when the special appeal filed by Respondent No. 1 was allowed as aforesaid it was not open to the Prescribed Authority in view of the specific provisions contained in this behalf in Section 43(2)(rr) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 to satisfy itself afresh as to whether the bonafide need of Respondent No. 1 for the accommodation in question was still in existence or not. 15. No other point has been pressed. 16. In the result I find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. The Petitioner is granted one months time to vacate the accommodation in question.