Judgment A.S.Srivastava, J. 1. This application under section 482, CrPC of Vjrendra Kumar is directed against an order dated 6-3-1981 of the III Special Judicial Magistrate Budaun, granting Rs. 100/- per month as maintenance to Smt. Kailasho (opposite party no. 2) and confirmed by the order dated 17-8-1981 of the II Additional Sessions Judge, Budaun, in Criminal Revision no. 143 of 1981. 2. The marriage between Virendra Kumar and Smt. Kailasho stands dissolved by a decree dated 12-3-1979 passed by the District Judge, Pilibhit, in petition no. 10 of 1978. Though the parties were contesting this petition, the decree was passed on the basis of their mutual consent contained in a joint application moved by them before the District Judge, Pilibhit, in the said petition on the date of hearing. On 7-10-1978 Smt. Kailasho had also filed an application for maintenance under section 125, CrPC at Budaun before the III Special Judicial Magistrate which was contested by Virendra Kumar. The impugned order dated 6-3-1981 was, however, passed by the learned Magistrate granting Rs. 100/- per month as maintenance to Smt. Kailasho. A revision of Virendra Kumar against this order of the learned Magistrate was also rejected on 17-8-1981 by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Budaun. Virendra Kumar has now filed this petition challenging the aforesaid order of maintenance passed by the learned magistrate and confirmed by the II Additional Sessions Judge as illegal and without jurisdiction on the following grounds :- 1. Smt. Kailasho has no right to claim maintenance when her marriage with the applicant stands dissolved ; (2) Since Smt. Kailasho is residing separately by mutual consent, she is disentitled to claim maintenance ; (3) Smt. Kailasho made no allegation before the Magistrate that she was unable to maintain herself or the Magistrate has recorded any such finding. 3. Clause (b) to sub section (1) of section 125 CrPC provides that a " wife " Includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a dovorce, from her husband and has not remarried. Smt. Kailasho has not remarried. Therefore, under section 125 (I) (b) she continues to be a " wife " for the purposes of that section despite the decree of divorce existing between them. Therefore, Virendra Kumar cannot challenge the order of the Magistrate merely on the ground that his marriage with Smt. Kailasho stands dissolved. 4. Smt. Kailasho has not remarried. Therefore, under section 125 (I) (b) she continues to be a " wife " for the purposes of that section despite the decree of divorce existing between them. Therefore, Virendra Kumar cannot challenge the order of the Magistrate merely on the ground that his marriage with Smt. Kailasho stands dissolved. 4. Sub-section (4) of section 125, CrPC lays down the circumstances in which no wife shall be entitled to receive maintenance from her husband. They are (1) if she is living in adultery ; or (2) if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or (3) if they are living separately by mutual consent. Smt. Kailasho is not living in adultery. The decree of dissolution also furnishes sufficient reason for her to live separately. The mere fact that the decree of dissolution is passed on a compromise does not mean that after the divorce she is living separately by mutual consent. Her separate living is the necessary consequence of the decree of divorce. The parties to a marriage can live separately by mutual consent only while the marriage is subsisting. Once a marriage is dissolved even by mutual consent under section 13-B, Hindu Marriage Act, separate living of the parties cannot be said to be by '* mutual consent ". In such a case parties to the marriage are living separately not by mutual consent but by the intervention of a divorce decree. In fact " living separately by mutual consent " in sub-section (4) of Section 125 connotes an agreement between the parties which provides for their living separately by mutual consent and further that they are actually living separately in terms of that agreement. Parties living separately after a divorce decree cannot; be said to be living separately in terms of an agreement to that effect even though the basis of the decree is mutual consent. In other words, to bring a case within Section 125 (4), it must be shown that the husband and wife are living apart by a definite contract made between them. If they are living apart; in pursuance of a decree of divorce, it cannot be said that they are living apart by mutual consent. Then sub-section (4) of section 125 does not apply to a divorcee. If they are living apart; in pursuance of a decree of divorce, it cannot be said that they are living apart by mutual consent. Then sub-section (4) of section 125 does not apply to a divorcee. Such a question was raised in Prakash Chandra Verma v. Smt. Prakashwati, 1983 AWC 433 = 1983 ACrR 220 in which, on a reference made to a Division Bench, it was further held that- "The other parts of section 125 (4) of the Code, namely, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent obviously do not apply to a divorced wife as a divorced wife has sufficient reason not to live with her husband as she is no longer his wife. If the wife has been divorced it is also obvious that the husband and wife are not living separately by mutual consent as the status of husband and wife has ceased to exist." Therefore, on this ground also Smt. Kailasho cannot be held to be disentitled to maintenance. It is not correct that Smt. Kailasho had made no allegations before the Magistrate that she was unable to maintain herself nor the Magistrate has recorded such a finding. The order of the learned Magistrate itself shows that Smt. Kailasho has made such an allegation in her petition filed before him and the Magistrate has given his finding on this point. The order of the learned Magistrate cannot, therefore, be challenged on this ground also. 5. One more point was raised on behalf of the applicant Virendra Kumar during arguments. It was urged that the term "wife" includes a divorcee under Section 125 (1) (b), CrPC only in a case where she has either been divorced by her husband or she has herself obtained a divorce from her husband. Where a divorce is obtained by mutual consent, divorcee will not be a "wife" under section 125 (1), CrPC. In support of this argument, reliance has been placed on the language of Explanation (b) to section 125 (1), CrPC itself which reads as under : (b) "wife" includes woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried. In support of this argument, reliance has been placed on the language of Explanation (b) to section 125 (1), CrPC itself which reads as under : (b) "wife" includes woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried. " It is urged that this Explanation refers only to two categories of unmarried divorcees, viz., (1) a woman who has been divorced by her husband and (2) a woman who has obtained a divorce from her husband. I do not agree with this contention for the following reasons :- (a) The decree for divorce has bee a passed in a petition filed by the husband on the grounds which were contested by the wife. It is during the proceedings of that case that the parties jointly agreed to get their marriage dissolved without getting a decision of the allegations made by the husband. In such circumstances, the decree shall be deemed to have been granted to the husband. Since the decree has been obtained by the husband, he cannot be permitted to contend that Smt. Kailasho has not been divorced by him. Divorce implies that one party orders the other party out of conjugal home. In this case the husband has done so. (b) Then in such a case when the wife, while contesting the divorce petition against her, withdraws her objection and agrees to a divorce, she shall also be deemed to have "obtained a divorce from her husband. (c) The observation of the Supremo Court made while considering clause (b) of section 125 (1), CrPC in Mst.Zohata Khatoon v. Mohd. Ibrahim, AIR 1981 SC 1243 also does not help the applicant. It has observed that :- "If clause (b) was intended to embrace only cases of divorce brought about by the act of the husband, its applicability would be limited, by and large, only to Muslims, which per as appears to us to be an absurd proposition." 6. IT has been further observed in the same case as under :- " For the reasons stated, I would interpret the expression 'a woman who has obtained a divorce from her husband] as including a wife who has been granted a decree of dissolution of marrige by the court. " In this case also a decree of dissolution of marriage has been granted by the court. " In this case also a decree of dissolution of marriage has been granted by the court. So on this ground also the order of the learned Magistrate cannot be assailed. 7. For the reasons given above, the learned II Addl. Sessions Judge, Budaun, committed no error whatsoever in confirming the order of the learned Magistrate granting maintenance to Smt. Kailasho and dismissing the revision before him. This application, therefore, fails. It is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.