JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C.J. - The question is whether the period of limitation for filing a revision u/s 25 Small Cause Courts Act by an aggrieved party before the High Court is 30 or 90 days. On this question, there is difference of opinion in this Court. 2. A learned Single Judge has referred this revision to have an authoritative view of the Division Bench on 'this point of difference' without framing a specific question. We shall, in this reference, confine ourselves to the 'point of difference' namely, the question mentioned above. 3. Originally Section 25 SCC Act confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court in relation to any case decided by a Court of Small Causes. The Provincial Small Cause Courts (Uttar Pradesh Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam (No. 17 of 1966) repealed and re-enacted Section 25. It conferred the power of revision on the District Judge. It could be exercised by the District Judge on the application of an aggrieved party made within 30 days. 4. By U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act (No. 37 of 1972) the following proviso was added to Section 25: Provided that in relation to any case decided by a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising the jurisdiction of Judge of Small Causes the power of revision under this section shall vest in the High Court. 5. Interpreting this proviso, a learned Single Judge in Punjab National Bank v. Sugan Chandr 1983 ARC 331 observed: Although the proviso provided an additional forum for revision u/s 25, it did not prescribe any limitation for the revision before this additional forum. Interpreting the proviso in the light of the Scheme of the Limitation Act I am led to conclude that limitation of 30 days prescribed in Section 25 has to be confined to a revision preferred before the District Judge. The said limitation cannot be extended to a revision for which forum has been prescribed by the proviso to Section 25. The consequence of the above discussion is that there is no period of limitation prescribed for a revision u/s 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act when the same is preferred to this Court. In view of the earlier practice the present revision could be filed within 90 days from the date of the decree of the trial court. 6. The consequence of the above discussion is that there is no period of limitation prescribed for a revision u/s 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act when the same is preferred to this Court. In view of the earlier practice the present revision could be filed within 90 days from the date of the decree of the trial court. 6. The same view was taken by another Single Judge in Smt, Padma Negi v. ShriGirilal Jain 1983 ARC 244. The learned Judge observed: The aforesaid proviso only lays down that the High Court also will have the power of revision in respect of matters mentioned therein. This does not lay down anywhere that the period of limitation for filing the revision would be 30 days. It is not correct to say that the main provision of Section 25 of the Act prescribing the period of limitation as 30 days should be read as a part of the proviso. The proviso has a limited function to discharge. The period prescribed is only for filing a revision before the District Judge. 7. The learned Judge held that since no specific period of limitation was prescribed, the general practice of filing a revision within 90 days can be accepted. 8. On the other hand, in Udai Bhan Gupta v. Hari Shanker Bansal 1983 AWC 227 another learned Judge held that a clear period of limitation of 30 days has been prescribed for filing a revision before the High Court. The proviso has to be read along with the principal section. 9. A revision is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of High Court- Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar Vs. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat, AIR 1970 SC 1 . It is well settled that a right of appeal does not inhere in any litigant. It must be conferred by a statute or equivalent authority-Minakshi Naidu v. Subramanya Sastri ILR XI Mad. 26 PC. 10. An appeal/revision is a creature of statute. For its maintainability it must have a clear authority of law- Smt. Ganga Bai Vs. Vijay Kumar and Others, AIR 1974 SC 1126 . It is equally settled that an appeal/revision is a substantive right. It is not a matter of procedure- Garikapatti Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhury, AIR 1957 SC 540 . Mukund Deo (Dead) represented by his legal representatives Kasibai and Others Vs. Vijay Kumar and Others, AIR 1974 SC 1126 . It is equally settled that an appeal/revision is a substantive right. It is not a matter of procedure- Garikapatti Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhury, AIR 1957 SC 540 . Mukund Deo (Dead) represented by his legal representatives Kasibai and Others Vs. Mahadu and Others, AIR 1965 SC 703 and Beharilal v. Keshri Nandan 1969 AWR 324 . 11. It seems beyond controversy that since an appeal/revision is a statutory creation, its dimensions, limitations and incidents will depend upon the relevant constating provisions. 12. A revisional power may be confined to jurisdictional matters alone, as by Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure. A revision may lie on a question of law, e.g. Section 25 SCC Act; or it may be available for satisfying as to the regularity of proceedings, or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order-see Section 48 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Sometimes the power of revision is conferred on an authority to be exercised suo motu only, for instance, Section 48 mentioned above. In Abdul Junaid v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1972 AWR 292 while dealing with this provision it was observed that Section 48 does not confer any right on a party to file an application in revision. It confers a power on the specified authority for the sake of keeping the inferior authorities within bounds. Dealing with this very provision, a Full Bench of our Court in Ramakant Singh Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P. and Others, AIR 1975 All 126 observed that where the Director of Consolidation exercises the jurisdiction suo motu no party has a right to make submissions before him at the first instance. But after calling for the record, if he wishes to interfere, an opportunity has to be given to the parties to the case. 13. Section 25 after its amendment by U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972 reads as follows: 25. But after calling for the record, if he wishes to interfere, an opportunity has to be given to the parties to the case. 13. Section 25 after its amendment by U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972 reads as follows: 25. Revision of decree and orders of Courts of Small Causes: The District Judge, for the purpose of satisfying himself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to law, may of his own motion, or on the application of an aggrieved party made within thirty days from the date of such decree or order, call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as he thinks fit. Provided that in relation to any case decided by a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising the jurisdiction of Judge of Small Causes the power of revision under this 'section shall vest in the High Court. 14. Section 25 SCC Act confers revisional power on the District Judge to be exercised suo moto as well as on the application of an aggrieved party. Unlike Section 48 Consolidation of Holdings Act this provision confers a right on an aggrieved party to invoke the revisional jurisdiction. This right is exercisable by an application filed within 30 days. If it is made beyond it, the application will be liable to be dismissed in view of Section 3 Limitation Act, unless the delay is condoned u/s 5 Limitation Act. The limitation on this power of provision exercised suo motu or at the instance of a party, is that it lies on a question of law, i.e. the court can call for the record of the case to satisfy itself that the impugned order is according to law. The court cannot reappraise evidence on a question of fact or upset pure findings of fact. 15. The proviso does not denote or delineate the extent or incidents of the power of revision. It does not state whether the power of revision lies on a question of jurisdiction or on a question of law or fact or all of them. Of course, it does not prescribe any period of limitation. It does not confer power of revision on the High Court exercisable on its own motion. All these things have, however, been provided in Section 25 itself. 16. Of course, it does not prescribe any period of limitation. It does not confer power of revision on the High Court exercisable on its own motion. All these things have, however, been provided in Section 25 itself. 16. In our opinion, the words "under this Section" occurring in the clause "the power of revision under this Section shall vest in the High Court" provide the clue. They mean that the nature and character of the power of revision vested in the High Court is as is prescribed in this section, i.e. Section 25. The proviso does not confer a different or a fresh power but the same power of revision as is given to the District Judge. To avoid duplication, the proviso defines the power by saying "under this section". One has to look to the section and apply it to the High Court. 17. In other words, the High Court can exercise the power of revision suo motu. It can also exercise it on the application of an aggrieved party made within 30 days. It is exercisable for the purpose of satisfying itself that the decree or order was according to law. The further limitation being that the High Court can exercise the power of revision only in relation to a case decided by a District Judge or an Additional District Judge. 18. To summarise, the position is that Section 25 read with its proviso confers a power of revision on the District Judge as well as the High Court depending upon the status of the court which exercised the original jurisdiction. In other respects, the incidents of the power of revision are the same in either case. 19. In our opinion, an aggrieved party can file a revision before the High Court by an application made within 30 days of the date of the order. If, it is filed beyond this period, an application for condonation of delay u/s 5 Limitation Act will lie irrespective of the stage at which the fact of delay comes to light. If the delay is in a particular case, not condoned, the application in revision will have to be dismissed even where the record has been summoned at the instance of such party The Full Bench decision in Rama Kant Singh (supra) is distinguishable. There Section 48 Consolidation of Holdings Act did not confer any right on a party. If the delay is in a particular case, not condoned, the application in revision will have to be dismissed even where the record has been summoned at the instance of such party The Full Bench decision in Rama Kant Singh (supra) is distinguishable. There Section 48 Consolidation of Holdings Act did not confer any right on a party. It provided power of revision to the Director. Section 25 SCC Act confers a right of revision on a party. Of course, this does not affect the suo motu power of the Court. But for its invocation, a party has no right to be heard. 20. Let the papers of this case be laid before the learned Single Judge with this opinion.