ORDER S.K. Dhaon, J. - The petitioner was in the employment of the Rampur Zila Sahkari Bank Limited, Rampur (hereinafter referred to as the employer) as an Assistant Cashier. He was a workman for the purposes of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). A reference of an industrial dispute between a number of District Co-operative Banks including the employer was made under S. 4-K of the Act. The dispute related to the service conditions of the employees of the Banks. The employer, during the pendency of the dispute before the Tribunal in disciplinary proceedings unconnected with the dispute, passed an order dismissing the petitioner from service. This was done without paying wages for one month and without making an application to the Tribunal for obtaining its approval of the action taken by the employer against the petitioner as required by the provisions of the proviso to S. 6-E(2)(b) of the Act. The petitioner made a complaint purporting to be under S. 6-F of the Act to the Tribunal. On Feb. 23, 1979, the Tribunal took the view that the inquiry held against the petitioner was not in accordance with the principles of natural justice. It directed the employer to justify before it the punishment awarded to the petitioner. On July 28, 1980, the Tribunal dismissed the application made by the petitioner under S. 6-F of the Act. In this petition the two orders passed by the Tribunal are being impugned. 2. The provisions contained in S. 6-E of the Act are in the pari materia with those of S. 33 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In S. 6-E of the Act the general right of an employer to take action against the employee has been restricted. In fact a ban has been imposed upon the right of the employer. However, the ban is not an absolute one and it may be lifted. In cases covered by the provisions of S. 6-E (1) of the Act no action as enumerated in Cls. (a) and (b) can be taken by the employer unless an express permission in writing has been obtained by it from the authorities mentioned in sub-s. (1) of that provision. In cases covered by the provisions of S. 6-E (1) of the Act no action as enumerated in Cls. (a) and (b) can be taken by the employer unless an express permission in writing has been obtained by it from the authorities mentioned in sub-s. (1) of that provision. In cases covered by sub-clause (a) of S. 6-E (2) of the Act the employer can straightway take action against the employee, the only limitation 'being that the action of the employer should be in accordance with the Standing Orders applicable to a particular employee. For cases covered by cl (b) of sub-s. (2) of S. 6-E there are three requirements : (1) The action should be in accordance with the Standing Orders applicable to a particular employee ; (2) No employee shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and (3) An application is made by the employer to the authority mentioned in sub-s. (1) of S. 6E, and, before which an industrial dispute is pending, for the approval of the action taken by the employer. 3. It will thus be seen that the limitation on the power of the employer is not so vigorous in S. 6-E (2) as it is in S. 6-E,(l) of the Act. 4. Section 6-E of the Act has twin objects. First, to provide protection to the workman concerned against victimisation by the employer on account of his having raised an industrial dispute and then continuing the proceedings. Secondly, the pending proceeding in connection with the industrial dispute should be determined in a peaceful manner and the employer should not take any action, of the type mentioned in this section, which may create fresh disputes "likely to further exacerbate the already strained relation between the employer and the workman". 5. The purpose of enacting S. 6-F is to provide a speedy remedy to the workman, in a situation, where an order adverse to him has been passed in contravention of the provisions of S. 6-E of the Act. The normal remedy provided to a workman under S. 4K of the Act. namely, a reference of an industrial dispute by the State Government for adjudication, will entail delay. Further, it is in the discretion of the State Government to make or not to make a reference. The State Government is not bound to make a reference in every case. The normal remedy provided to a workman under S. 4K of the Act. namely, a reference of an industrial dispute by the State Government for adjudication, will entail delay. Further, it is in the discretion of the State Government to make or not to make a reference. The State Government is not bound to make a reference in every case. On the contrary. S. 6-F of the Act gives an unfettered right to a workman to make a complaint to the tribunal concerned and, if he succeeds in establishing that the provisions of S. 6-E have been violated, the tribunal has to treat the complaint as a dispute referred to or pending before it in accordance with the provisions of S. 4-K of the Act. The violation of the provisions of S. 6-E in itself will not result in an award reinstating the workman. The order of discharge or dismissal passed in contravention of S. 6-E will not be invalidated. If contravention of S. 6-E is not established the complaint is liable to be dismissed. However, if such a contravention is established the next question will be as to whether the order passed against the workman is justified on merits. Section 6-F enables a workman to get the conduct of an employer examined in the same manner as is done in the case of adjudication of an industrial dispute under S. 4-K. of the Act. It also gives a chance to the employer to justify the order of punishment passed by it, against a workman, as if it is a party to a dispute pending before a Tribunal in a reference under S. 4-K of the Act. 6. Sri S. P. Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced two contentions before me to assail the orders of the Tribunal. They are : (i) the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to suo motu direct the employer to justify the order of punishment passed by it; (ii) the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to record a finding that on merits the order of dismissal passed against the workman stood justified unless it had recorded a finding that the provisions of the proviso to S. 6-E (2)(b) of the Act had been observed in their breach. In my opinion, there is no force in either of the two contentions. In my opinion, there is no force in either of the two contentions. Before the Tribunal there was no dispute that the employer had passed the order without complying with the requirements of this statute. In para 23 of the written statement filed by and on behalf of the employer before the Tribunal it was mentioned : That the O. P. was advised that approval under S. 6-E is not necessary. If the Hon'ble Tribunal concludes that S. 6-E of the U. P. 1. D. Act is applicable to the O. P. the facts of the case may kindly be gone into by the Hon'ble Tribunal." Thus the employer had requested the Tribunal to examine the merits of the order passed by it (the employer). 7. There is neither any express or any implied prohibition in the Act debarring the Tribunal from asking an employer to justify the order of punishment passed by it (the employer). It is well-settled that a court or Tribunal, in the absence of any express or implied prohibition, may adopt any procedure to advance the cause of justice and fair play. Procedure is a mere handmaid of justice. The Tribunal committed neither any illegality nor any impropriety in directing the employer to justify its action. The Tribunal gave a chance to the petitioner of "making the employer's conduct the subject-matter of an industrial dispute." It also gave an opportunity to the employer to get his conduct examined as if it was the subject matter of an industrial dispute. The Tribunal, therefore, acted in the interest of the petitioner and not to his detriment when it passed an order ", therefore, call upon the employers to justify the order of punishment before this Tribunal......." 8. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on a decision of the Supreme Court in Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd., ( AIR 1979 SC 1652 ) : 1979 Lab IC 1192. In that case the argument before the Supreme Court was that in proceedings under S. 33.(2) (b), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Tribunal was under legal obligation to suo motu issue a direction to the employer to justify the order of punishment passed by it against a workman. The Court repelled this contention and held that no such duty was cast on any Tribunal. The Court speaking through Hon'ble Mr. The Court repelled this contention and held that no such duty was cast on any Tribunal. The Court speaking through Hon'ble Mr. Justice Desai in para 12 observed: "It must be specifically noticed that the first respondent company in its application seeking approval of its action has set out in its application the charges preferred by it and the domestic inquiry held in respect of the charges. A prayer was made in the application that its action terminating service of the appellant be approved. Nowhere in this application either in express terms or by implication it was averred that in the event the Tribunal comes lo the conclusion that enquiry was defective, the employer first respondent company proposes to offer evidence for substantiating the charges. Neither such an averment was made in the application made to the Industrial Tribunal but till the Industrial Tribunal concluded its proceedings by saying that the matter is set down for making the award any oral or written application was made on behalf of the company that over and above the record of enquiry it proposed to lead evidence in its possession in respect of the charges to substantiate the same to the satisfaction of the tribunal. Not only no such request was made at any lime before the award was made by the Industrial Tribunal.............." The Court in para 34 concluded its opinion: "Having given our most anxious consideration to the question raised before us. and minutely examining the decision in Cooper Engineering Ltd., case 1975 Lab IC 1441 : (AIR 1975 SC 19001 to ascertain the ratio as well as the question raised both on precedent and on principle, it is undeniable that there is no duty cast on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court while adjudicating upon a penal termination of service of a workman either under S. 10 or under S. 33 to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charge of misconduct by giving some specific opportunity after decision on the preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry was at all held, or if held, was defective, in favour of the workman. Cooper Engineering Ltd. case merely specifies the stage at which such opportunity is to be given, if sought. It is both the right and obligation the employer, if it so chooses, to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charges of misconduct. Cooper Engineering Ltd. case merely specifies the stage at which such opportunity is to be given, if sought. It is both the right and obligation the employer, if it so chooses, to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charges of misconduct. It is for the employer to avail of such opportunity by a specific pleading or by specific request. If such an opportunity is sought in the course of the proceeding the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, should grant the opportunity to lead additional evidence to substantiate the charges. But if no such opportunity is sought nor there is any pleading to the effect no duty is cast on the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal suo motu to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charges." 9. No other decision was cited before me. The first contention of the learned counsel is not (enable either on facts or on principle or on authority. 10. As regards the second contention, as indicated above, it was not in dispute that the petitioner had been dismissed from service in contravention of the statute. In such a situation a finding by the Tribunal that the statute had been contravened would have been meaningless. The occasion for recording such a finding could arise only when the party before the Tribunal were at variance on the question as to whether the requirements of the. statute had been complied with. Moreover, when the Tribunal in its order dated 23-2-1979 recorded a finding that the inquiry against the petitioner had not been conducted in a fair manner and the Tribunal had called upon the employer to justify its action before it, it was implicit in its order that it had come to the conclusion that the order of punishment had been passed against the petitioner in violation of statute. On or before 23-2-1979, there were only two possible situations before the Tribunal. Either the disciplinary action had been taken by the employer after complying with the conditions or the order had been passed in breach of the conditions mentioned in the statute. If the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the employer had complied with the terms of the statute that was the end of the matter so far the complaint made by the petitioner was concerned. If the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the employer had complied with the terms of the statute that was the end of the matter so far the complaint made by the petitioner was concerned. The complaint had to be dismissed and nothing further was required to be done by the Tribunal. Here, the Tribunal proceeded to examine the preliminary question as to whether the employer had conducted the enquiry against the petitioner in accordance with the principles of natural justice. This shows that the Tribunal was clear in its mind that the employer had not complied with the requirements of the statute. In other words, the Tribunal was satisfied that the provisions of S. 6-E of the Act had been contravened by the employer. When the Tribunal proceeded to adjudicate upon the preliminary question, as to whether the enquiry against the petitioner had been conducted in a fair manner, it was clear in its mind that the condition precedent for the exercise of its jurisdiction under S. 6-F of the Act. namely, the contravention of S. 6-E was in existence. In my opinion, the petitioner cannot make any grievance of the fact that, in the absence of an express finding by the Tribunal that the provisions of S. 6-E of the Act had been violated, it (the Tribunal) had no jurisdiction to examine the merits of the order passed against the petitioner. 11. Let us now consider some authorities to examine the correctness of the second contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner. The provisions of Sections 6E and 6-F of the Act correspond to provisions of Sections 33 and 33-A Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. 12. In Equitable Coal Co. Ltd. v. Algu Singh, AIR 1958 SC 761 the Supreme Court examined the provisions of Sections 22 and 23. Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. which were analogous to the provisions of Sections 6-E and 6-F of the Act. It may be stated here that in the Act Sections 6-E and 6-F were inserted by U. P. Act No. 1 of 1957. Speaking through Hon'ble Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, in para 4 the Court observed. Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. which were analogous to the provisions of Sections 6-E and 6-F of the Act. It may be stated here that in the Act Sections 6-E and 6-F were inserted by U. P. Act No. 1 of 1957. Speaking through Hon'ble Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, in para 4 the Court observed. "If the employer contravenes the provision of S. 22, the employee is entitled 10 make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to the Appellate Tribunal and, on receiving such complaint, the Appellate Tribunal has to decide the complaint as if it is an appeal pending before it. The breach of the provisions of S. 22 by the employer is in a sense a condition precedent for the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on the Labour Appellate Tribunal by S. 23. As soon as this condition precedent is satisfied the employee is given an additional right of making the employer's conduct the subject-matter of an industrial dispute without having to follow the normal procedure laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act. In an enquiry held under S. 23, two questions fall to be considered: Is the fact of contravention by the employer of the provisions of S. 22 proved? If yes, is the order passed by the employer against the employee justified on merits? If both these questions are answered in favour of the employee, the Appellate Tribunal would no doubt be entitled to pass an appropriate order in favour of the employee. If the first point is answered in favour of the employee, but on the second point the finding is that, on merits, the order passed by the employer against the employee is justified, then the breach of S. 22 proved against the employer may ordinarily be regarded as a technical breach and it may not, unless there are compelling facts in favour of the employee, justify any substantial order of compensation in favour of the employee. It is unnecessary to add that, if the first issue is answered against the employee, nothing further can be done under S. 23." It will be seen that the Supreme Court emphasised, firstly, that the satisfaction of the condition precedent namely the breach of the provision of S. 22 by the employer, conferred upon the employee the right of getting the validity of the order of punishment passed against him tested, as if an industrial dispute had come into existence without, of course, following the normal procedure laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act, secondly, that the non-observance of the provisions of S. 22 did not render the order of punishment void. Such a breach was a technical one. Thus, the Tribunal, in the case before me, acted in the interest of the petitioner workman when it proceeded to examine the preliminary question as to whether the enquiry against the workman had been conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and thereafter directed the employer to justify the order of punishment passed against the workman. 13. In Punjab National Bank v. All India Punjab Bank Employees Federation, AIR 1960 SC 160 , the Supreme Court examined the provisions of S. 33A, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Court speaking through Hon'ble Gajendragadkar, J. as he then was, observed in para 31 : "This contention is, however, untenable in view of the decision of this Court where the provisions of S. 33A have been construed and considered, and so we must now turn to S. 33A. This section was inserted in the Act in 1950. Before it was enacted the only remedy available to the employees against the breach of S. 33 was to raise an industrial dispute in that behalf and to move the appropriate Government for its reference to the adjudication of a tribunal under S.'10 of the Act. The Trade Union Movement in the country complained that the remedy of asking for a reference under S. 10 involved delay and left the redress of the grievance of the employees entirely in the discretion of the appropriate Government; because even in cases of contravention of S. 33 the appropriate 1 Government was bound to refer the dispute under S. 10. That is why S. 33A was enacted for making a special provision for adjudication as to whether S. 33 has been contravened. That is why S. 33A was enacted for making a special provision for adjudication as to whether S. 33 has been contravened. This section enables an employee aggrieved by such contravention to make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to the tribunal and it adds that on receipt of such complaint the tribunal shall adjudicate upon it as if it is a dispute referred to it in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It also requires the tribunal to submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of the Act shall then apply to the said award. It would thus be noticed that by this section an employee aggrieved by a wrongful order of dismissal passed against him in contravention of S. 33 is given a right to move the tribunal in redress of his grievance without having to take recourse to S. 10 of the Act." 14. Again in para 33 the Court observed : "......Thus there can be no doubt that in an enquiry under S. 33A the employee would not succeed in obtaining an order of reinstatement merely by proving contravention of S. 33 by the employer. After such contravention is proved it would still be open to the employer to justify the impugned dismissal on the merits. That is apart of the dispute which the tribunal has to consider because the complaint made by the employee is treated as an industrial dispute and all the relevant aspects of the said dispute fall to be considered under S. 33A. Therefore, we cannot accede to the argument that the enquiry under S. 33A is confined only to the determination of the question as to whether the alleged contravention by the employer of the provisions of S. 33 has been proved or not." In Hindustan General Electrical Corporation Ltd. v. Bishwanath Prasad, AIR 1971 SC 2417 : 1971 Lab IC 1396 the Court in para 9 observed : ".......S. 33A enables a workman who has been punished by dismissal or discharge etc. to make a complaint in writing to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal when an employer contravenes the provisions of S. 33 during the pendency of proceedings before Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal etc. If such a complaint is made, the Labour Court, Tribunal etc. to make a complaint in writing to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal when an employer contravenes the provisions of S. 33 during the pendency of proceedings before Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal etc. If such a complaint is made, the Labour Court, Tribunal etc. is to adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it and in accordance with the provisions of the Act submit its award to the appropriate Government. In other words, then the conditions laid down in S. 33A apply a workman who is punished as mentioned therein does not have to wait for a reference of an industrial dispute by an appropriate authority under S. 10 of the Act for adjudication of the dispute but can himself prefer his complaint which is to be treated in the same way as a dispute under S. 10. These sections do not lend themselves to the construction that as soon as the Labour Court, Tribunal etc. finds that there has been a violation of S. 33 it should award reinstatement. It must go through the proceedings which would have to be taken under S. 10 and it would be the duty of the Labour Court etc. to examine the merits of the case in the light of the principles formulated in the Indian Iron and Steel Co.'s case 1958 SCR 667 : AIR 1958 SC 130 ." In para 12 the Court observed : "The Tribunal in our view rightly refused to go into the question of the pendency of any conciliation proceeding; but even if there was any such proceeding, it would make no difference to the result in this case. The Tribunal would still have to consider whether the employer's action was justified in the light of the decision in the Indian Iron and Steel Co.'s case, 1958 SCR 667 : AIR 1958 SC 130 . In other words, the Tribunal would have to be satisfied that the allegations, if any, about want of good faith or victimisation or unfair labour practice were baseless. In other words, the Tribunal would have to be satisfied that the allegations, if any, about want of good faith or victimisation or unfair labour practice were baseless. The Tribunal would also have to be satisfied whether any complaint was made on the score that the enquiry was vitiated by basic error or violation of any principle of natural justice and its finding on which the order of dismissal was passed was therefore perverse or without any foundation." In Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh v. Suresh Chand, AIR 1978 SC 995 : 1978 Lab IC 693 the contents of paras 11, 12 and 13 of the judgment are relevant. They have been aptly summarised in the headnote on page 996. It reads : "It will be seen that mere contravention of S. 33 by the employer will not entitle the workman to an order of reinstatement, because inquiry under S. 33A is not confined only to the determination of the question as to whether the employer has contravened S. 33, but even if such contravention is proved, the Tribunal has to go further and deal also with the merits of the order of discharge or dismissal. The very fact that even after the contravention of S. 33 is proved, the Tribunal is required to go into the further question whether the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer is justified on the merits, clearly indicates that the order of discharge is not rendered void and inoperative by such contravention. It is also significant to note that if the contravention of S. 33 were construed as having an invalidating effect on the order of- discharge or dismissal, S. 33A would be rendered meaningless and futile. Such a highly anomalous result would never have been intended by the Legislature, AIR 1958 SC 761 and AIR 1960 SC 160 , Followed." To sum up, factually the employer had made a request to the Tribunal to permit it to justify its order of punishment. The Tribunal committed neither any illegality nor irregularity nor impropriety in calling upon the employer to justify the order of punishment. The condition precedent for the examination of the order of dismissal, passed against the petitioner, on merits by the Tribunal existed. The Tribunal was satisfied that the provisions of S. 6-E of the Act had been violated. The Tribunal committed neither any illegality nor irregularity nor impropriety in calling upon the employer to justify the order of punishment. The condition precedent for the examination of the order of dismissal, passed against the petitioner, on merits by the Tribunal existed. The Tribunal was satisfied that the provisions of S. 6-E of the Act had been violated. The petitioner cannot make any grievance of the conduct of the Tribunal, as it acted in his interest and not to his detriment, in examining the order of punishment passed against him (the petitioner) on merits. 15. The other submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner are: (1) In fact, and in substance, the case of the petitioner fell under S. 6E (1) of the Act and not under S. 6E (2) of the Act. A pleading in the writ petition that the case fell under S. 6E (2) of the Act cannot constitute any estoppel against the petitioner. It is a question of law and not of fact. (2) If the case falls under S. 6E (1) of the Act, prior permission of the Labour Court was necessary before passing the order of dismissal. In the absence of the requisite permission the order of dismissal was void ab initio. (3) Since the employer passed the order of dismissal against the petitioner in violation of the principles of natural justice, its order was ab initio void and it will be treated as non est in law. 16. It has been the consistent case of both the parties throughout that on 20th June, 1975, the State Government made a reference under S. 4K of the Act relating to all the District Co-operative Banks in the State, which were 55 in number. The dispute referred was of a general nature concerning the service conditions in all the banks. This position is admitted in para 6 of the writ petition which reads : "That the dispute referred to was in respect of fixing uniform conditions of service and pay scales in all the District Cooperative Banks in Uttar Pradesh." It was the consistent case of both the parties throughout that the disciplinary proceedings taken by the employer against the petitioner were unconnected with the dispute referred by the State Government for adjudication. Even if the clear admissions made by the petitioner in the averments in the petition that to his case the provisions of S. 6E (2) of the Act were applicable are ignored, the fact remains that to the facts and circumstances of his case the provisions of S. 6E (2) of the Act alone would be attracted. Assuming, without conceding, that the provisions of S. 6E (1) of the Act are attracted the position in law will remain the same. S. 6F of the Act talks of the contravention of the provisions of S. 6E of the Act. It, therefore, has in its ambit both the provisions of Sections 6E(1) and 6E(2) of the Act. As stated above, it was the admitted case of the employer that it had not complied with the provisions of S. 6E of the Act at all. Therefore, it contravened the provisions of S. 6E of the Act. The submissions made by the learned counsel are fully met by the decision of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank's case ( AIR 1960 SC 160 ) (supra). There, the precise argument was repelled by the Supreme Court. The arguments advanced there are to be found in paras 21 and 22 of the judgment which run thus : "It is next contended that the Bank does not dispute the fact that it had held no enquiry into the alleged misconduct of its employees before it passed the impugned orders of dismissal against them. It is well established that even where an employer is justified in terminating the services of his employees he is bound to give them a charge-sheet and hold a proper enquiry at which they would have a chance to meet the said charge-sheet. This requirement is universally treated as consistent with natural justice and fair play and since the Bank has not complied with it the impugned orders of dismissal are wholly invalid for this additional reason and the result again would be that the said orders are inoperative and void and the employees are' entitled to reinstatement as a matter of course." "22. In support of this argument reliance has been placed on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall, 75 Ind App 225 : AIR 1948 PC 121 . In support of this argument reliance has been placed on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall, 75 Ind App 225 : AIR 1948 PC 121 . This decision holds that the order of dismissal passed against a person who is a member of the Civil Service of the Crown in India without complying with the mandatory relevant provisions of '. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, is void and inoperative, and that the Civil servant against whom such an order is passed is entitled to a declaration that he remained a member of the Indian Civil Service at the date of the institution of the suit in which he challenged the validity of the impugned order. Similarly in Khem Chand v. Union of India, 1958 SCR 1080 : AIR 1958 SC 300 , this Court has held that an order of dismissal passed against a public servant specified in Article 311(a) without complying with the mandatory provisions of Article 311 (2) is void and that the public servant sought to be dismissed by such an invalid order continued to be a member of the service at the date of the institution of the suit. It is in the light of these decisions that the learned Attorney General asks us to hold that the relationship between the Bank and its employees remains wholly unaffected by the orders of dismissal passed by the Bank against them and so, as soon as the orders are held to be void nothing more remains to be done but to make a declaration of master and servant between the parties and to direct reinstatement. Thus presented the argument no doubt appears prima facie to be attractive, but is our opinion, a careful examination of the relevant sections of the Act shows that it is not valid." The answer to the afore quoted arguments is to be found in the succeeding paras and particularly in paras 31 and 33, quoted above. 17. In the result, I find no merits in this petition and it is dismissed. However, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.