JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal, J. - These four writ petitions arise in the following circumstances. 2. The City Montessori Schools is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. It has been running a chain of schools in the city of Lucknow. Some of the schools are High Schools and some others are Junior High Schools. The Society has been making appointments of teachers to these schools without following the procedure laid down in the Intermediate Education Act or in the Rules made under the Basic Education Act, as the case may be. The society has been making appointments under special contract under which the services of even a confirmed teacher are terminable on three months pay in lieu of notice. Purporting to exercise the powers under this contract the Society has terminated the services of some of its teachers. So far as teachers of High Schools are concerned the District Inspector of Schools and so far as teachers of Junior High Schools are concerned the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari has passed orders holding the termination order invalid and ineffective and further directing the management to re-instate the teachers. Aggrieved by these orders the Society has filed writ petition No. 1 of 1983 which relates to the teachers of High Schools and writ petition No. 784 of 1983 relating to teachers of Junior High Schools. Apart from these petitions the Society had earlier filed writ petition No. 289 of 1983 against the show cause notice issued to it by the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari. That writ petition has undisputedly become infructuous inasmuch as the show cause notice has since been followed by the aforesaid orders of the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari which are the subject matter of writ petition No. 784 of 1983. Writ petition No. 1427 of 1983 has been filed by some private parties praying for a writ in the nature of quo-warranto against those very teachers in whose favour orders have been passed by the District Inspector of Schools and Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari respectively. In this writ petition it has been contended that their appointments were invalid in view of the fact that they had been made in contravention of statutory provisions contained in the Intermediate Education Act and in the rules made under the Basic Education Act respectively and as such the said teachers have no right to hold the office of teachers. 3. 3. All the three writ petitions have been contested by the State authorities as well as by the teachers concerned. The U.P. Madhyamic Shikshak Sangh which claims itself to be representative body of teachers of the Secondary Schools of the State has also been allowed to intervene in order to make its submissions against the maintainability of the Petitioners. Likewise a large number of other teachers who are still serving the institution have been allowed to intervene and on another application a large number of guardians of the students studying in these institutions have been allowed to intervene, both these bodies of teachers and guardians supporting the position of them anagement. 4. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at some length. 5. The first submission made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that the appointments of the teachers concerned having been undisputedly made otherwise than in accordance with law, namely, the provisions of the Section 16E of the Intermediate Education Act and Rules 7, 9, 10 and 11 of the U.P. Recognised Basic Schools (Junior High Schools) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules 1978, the appointees though allowed to work as teachers never acquired the status of teachers' within the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions. The statutory provisions contained in 16G(3)(a) of the Intermediate Education Act and Rule 15 of the Basic Education Rules referred to above were not attracted in the case of teachers who were appointed otherwise than in accordance with the aforesaid statutory provisions. It was further contended that the institutions are being run as special institutions and the management does not want them to continue to be recognised under the Intermediate Education Act, in so far as the High Schools are concerned. In so far as the Junior High Schools are concerned it has been contended that they were never actually recognised either under the Basic Education Act or earlier to its enactment. Admittedly the institutions are not receiving any grant-in-aid from the Government. In so far as the Junior High Schools are concerned it has been contended that they were never actually recognised either under the Basic Education Act or earlier to its enactment. Admittedly the institutions are not receiving any grant-in-aid from the Government. The High Schools are no doubt recognised institutions but in their reply to the show cause notice issued by the education departmental authorities to the management it was pointed out by the latter that the management were not at all interested in continuing to enjoy any benefit of recognition and that if the regulatory provisions were sought to be enforced against the management the management would rather go without recognition. The plea of the management having not been accepted by the authorities and the impugned orders having been passed it has now been contended on behalf of the management that this Court itself could direct the authorities to discontinue the recognition granted to the High Schools run by the Society. No specific relief has however been claimed in the writ petition No. 1 of 1983 in this regard though in oral submissions on behalf of the Petitioners this prayer was made and it was contended that it was open to this Court to grant any suitable relief under the general prayer contained in the petition. 6. On behalf of the teachers and Madhyamic Shikshak Sangh it has been contended that the appointments were not void ab initio merely because the procedure laid in Section 16-E was not followed. The teachers were admittedly qualified teachers and they had performed their duties to the full satisfaction even of the Petitioners. If there was any irregularity in the appointment it was curable. Sub-section (10) of Section 16E of the Intermediate Education Act empowers the Director of Education to cancel any appointment made in contravention of the provisions of the Act, and inasmuch as the Director has not exercised this power it was not open to the management, of their own, to treat the appointments as invalid. It was for the management to approach the Director to cancel the appointments under Sub-section (10) of Section 16-E. It has however been contended that the Petitioners had an alternative remedy of appeal u/s 16G(3)(c) of the Intermediate Education Act, if they were aggrieved by the orders of the District Inspector of Schools. It was for the management to approach the Director to cancel the appointments under Sub-section (10) of Section 16-E. It has however been contended that the Petitioners had an alternative remedy of appeal u/s 16G(3)(c) of the Intermediate Education Act, if they were aggrieved by the orders of the District Inspector of Schools. This alternative remedy having not been availed of it is not open to the Petitioners to approach this Court direct. It has further been contended that the management cannot base their case on their own wrong. If the appointments were not made in accordance with the provisions of the Statute and if thereafter the terminations were also sought to be effected in contravention of the statutory provisions the management were not entitled to seek the assistance of this Court in support of their own wrong acts. It was further argued that the Society had no locus standi in the matter and it was Committee of Management constituted under the statutory scheme of administration to raise any question if it so wished. 7. So far as the first contention, namely, the one in regard to the alleged invalidity of the initial appointments is concerned, learned Counsel for the Petitioners Sri. Shanti Bhushan has relied upon Arya Kanya Pathshala v. Manorama Devi 1971 ALJ 983. In this Division Bench decision Hon'ble Dwivedi, J. as he then was, speaking for the Bench held that where the initial appointment has been made without previous approval of the District Inspector of Schools, as was then required under the Intermediate Education Act, the appointment was void and that in respect of a person so appointed the previous approval of the Inspector was not required for termination of his service. This case has been followed in a number of other decisions-see e.g., Adrasha College v. Director 1981 Lab. I.C. 998 and Prabhu Narain Singh v. D.D.E. 1977 AWC 358 with the modification that even though the approval of the Inspector for the appointment may have been obtained subsequently and previous approval may not have been obtained the appointment would become valid with effect from the date the approval was accorded. In the Arya Kanya Pathshala case the approval of the appointment had not been accorded at any stage, whether before or after the appointment. In the Arya Kanya Pathshala case the approval of the appointment had not been accorded at any stage, whether before or after the appointment. On behalf of the opposite parties and Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh it has been contended that the decision in Arya Kanya Pathshala case was of no avail to the Petitioners for several reasons. In the first place, the writ petition in that case, filed by the teacher, was not maintainable at all because the teacher had come to the court under Article 226 of the Constitution direct against the order of the management without intervention of any order of any statutory authority. Such a writ petition was not maintainable because only an order of a statutory authority or any other body in respect of discharge of public functions could be challenged in a writ petition and not the order merely of the management terminating the services of an employee. In this view of the matter the teacher's writ petition (which had been wrongly allowed by the Single Judge) deserved to be thrown out at the very threshold and it was not necessary to dismiss the writ petition of the teacher on the ground stated by the Division Bench in the special appeal of the management. It has further been contended that Intermediate Education Act had been amended subsequently to this decision. Under the amended provisions the approval of the District Inspector of Schools is no longer required for making an appointment and as such the ratio of the decision is no longer valid. The amended provision also incorporates the aforesaid Sub-section (10) of Section 16E under which the Director has been given the power to cancel an appointment made in contravention of the provisions of the statute. No such provision existed at the time when the Arya Kanya Pathshala case was decided. As against this, it has been contended on behalf of the Petitioners that the amendments made in the Act do not in any way affect the ratio of the decision and further that the authority of the Division Bench is no less binding merely because the case could have been decided on another basis which was not discussed in the judgment. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has contended that the new provisions of the Intermediate Act in regard to the procedure of selection are even more stingent than the earlier provision in as much as while under the earlier provision only the approval of the District Inspector of Schools was required at the final stage, what the new provisions require is that the entire selection process shall be virtually taken over by the District Inspector of Schools and it is for the reason that the approval of the District Inspector of Schools for an appointment has become redundant and has not been required. The decision in Arya Kanya Pathshala case laid down that the provision requiring approval of the District Inspector of Schools was mandatory. This decision applied with greater force in a case where not merely the approval of the District Inspector of Schools was required but instead the selection itself is being required to be made by or under the control of the District Inspector of Schools. On behalf of the Sangh and the aggrieved teachers, reliance has also been placed by Sri. S.D. Misra and Sri. S.S. Bhatnagar on the decision in Ram Sarup Vs. State of Haryana and Others, AIR 1978 SC 1536 . In that case the rules laid down that before a person could be appointed to a particular post five years experience in the administration of labour laws was required. The person appointed did not possess the requisite experience at the time of his appointment. He acquired the experience after his appointment. Thereafter he was sought to be reverted, and their lordships held that the irregularity committed in making the appointment of a person with a lesser experience stood cured as soon as the requisite length of experience was attained by the appointee. Relying on this decision it has been contended on behalf of the aggrieved teachers and the Sangh that when even the requirement of minimum qualification could be treated as directory mere procedural requirement could not be treated as mandatory. Relying on this decision it has been contended on behalf of the aggrieved teachers and the Sangh that when even the requirement of minimum qualification could be treated as directory mere procedural requirement could not be treated as mandatory. This has been sought to be countered by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners by contending that the procedural requirements go to the root of the matter inasmuch as they are designed to ensure that not only duly qulified persons are appointed as teachers but that only the best available persons are appointed and further that equality of opportunity is made available to all the intending applicants. The Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh itself had assailed an Ordinance passed by the State Governor whereby provision had been made for appointing teachers without following the normal procedure laid down in the Intermediate Education Act and their writ petition assailing that Ordinance had been allowed in Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh v. State of U.P. 1979 ALJ 178. When even the legislature could not condone any departure from the statutory provisions relating to procedure for selection, it could not be open to the departmental authorities to do so indirectly by merely their omission to take action u/s 16E(10). It has further been contended on behalf of the Petitioners that Section 16E(10) could not be construed to mean that every appointment, howsoever violative of the provisions of the Act, should be deemed to be valid until it is cancelled u/s 16E(10). 8. Having noticed the various contentions raised on behalf of the parties in regard to the question of validity or otherwise of the initial appointments of the teachers concerned we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to express any final opinion on this question in the instant cases because they could be disposed of on another ground which in our opinion is decisive. 9. 9. Even assuming the appointments to be merely irregular and not void ab initio, and further assuming that the provisions of Section 16G(3)(a) and of Rule 15 respectively were applicable to the termination of the service of the teachers, what we find is that the District Inspector of Schools and the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari respectively have not been conferred any power under the statutory provisions noticed earlier either to make a declaration of invalidity of termination or to direct re-instatement of the teachers whose services have been purported to be terminated. The provisions of Section 16G(3)(a) are to the effect that no teacher may be served with a notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. Thereafter Sub-Clause (b) says that the Inspector may approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the management. Likewise, Rule 15 of the Basic Education Rules lays down that no teacher of a recognised school may be served with a notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the District Basic Education Officer. The power vested under these provisions is thus expected to be exercised when the management seeks the approval of a proposed notice of termination to be issued to the teacher. In the instant case, the management never sought the approval of the Inspector or of the District Basic Education Officer before issue of termination notice. The 'proposal' for termination was never submitted to the Inspector or the Basic Education Officer, as the case may be. The termination of service was sought to be effected without securing such approval. Such a termination may be good or bad, but the jurisdiction of the Inspector or of the Basic Officer was never invoked by the management. Neither the Inspector nor the Basic Education Officer has been given power to intervene after an invalid termination. Statutory authorities do not have any general jurisdiction either to give any declaratory relief or to grant specific relief such as an order of re-instatement (videSamiullah Beg v. District Magistrate 1980 AWC 430 , Paras 5 and 6, a Division Bench case to which one of us was a party). Statutory authorities do not have any general jurisdiction either to give any declaratory relief or to grant specific relief such as an order of re-instatement (videSamiullah Beg v. District Magistrate 1980 AWC 430 , Paras 5 and 6, a Division Bench case to which one of us was a party). Such general jurisdiction vests only in Civil Court and indeed it is open to question, in respect of which it is not necessary to express any final opinion in the instant case, as to whether even the civil court could grant any relief by way of re-instatement or declaration in a case of this kind. It has no doubt been argued on behalf of the Petitioners on the authority of Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmt Narain AIR 1976 SC 888 , that even a civil suit would not lie. We are however not concerned in these writ petitions with the question of maintainability of a civil suit. We are concerned only with the powers of the District Inspector of School and of the District Basic Education Officer respectively under the two statutory provisions noticed earlier. 10. The Intermediate Education Act lays down that if the management acts in contravention of the provisions of the Act the Director can direct the management to remove any defect or deficiency found on inspection or otherwise, vide Section 16D(2). Sub-section (3) lays down that if the management fails to comply with any such direction the Director may refer the case to the Board for withdrawal of recognition or recommend to the State Government to proceed against the institution under Sub-section (4). Sub-section (4) empowers the State Government to appoint an authorised controller over the institution. Likewise Section 12 of the Basic Education Act lays down that the Director may direct the management of Basic School to remove any defect or deficiency found on inspection or otherwise, and on the failure of the management so to do, the Director may refer the case to the Board for withdrawal of recognition of such school and on receipt of recommendation under Sub-section (3) the Board may withdraw recognition of that school. No power has been given in either case even to the Director to grant any declaration to a teacher whose services have been sought to be terminated in contravention of the provisions of statute or to declare that the teacher continues in service. No power has been given in either case even to the Director to grant any declaration to a teacher whose services have been sought to be terminated in contravention of the provisions of statute or to declare that the teacher continues in service. Any direction by the Director concerned, to the management to re-instate a teacher if disobeyed could only result ultimately in derecognition of the school or in the appointment of an authorised Controller over its management. The direction could not have the effect of treating a teacher as having continued in service on his post. By way of contrast, reference may be made to Section 36(4)(iii) of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 which does give to the tribunal a power to direct re-instatement of a teacher. 11. It has however been forcefully contended on behalf of the Sangh and the aggrieved teachers that the writ jurisdiction being discretionary no relief should be granted to the management because the management itself was at fault, first, in not following the procedure prescribed for selection of teachers and thereafter in contravening the provisions of statute in regard to termination of their service. The contention of the management in this regard is that the management has not been doing anything in this regard stealthily but openly and in the full knowledge of the authorities. The authorities themselves have recognised the institutions as special schools even though no provision existed in the statute for recognition as special institutions. It has further been contended that the institutions are being run as institutions of excellence and have been turning out highly meritorious students who have secured top positions in the merit lists in public examinations and also obtained a large number of scholarships issued by the Government and its agencies. They have also given comparative details whereby they have tried to show that these institutions have produced outstanding results while other institutions which have allowed themselves to be governed by the regulatory provisions are plagued by indiscipline and other evils and as such they have not been able to produce such results. In support of this contention the management also relies on the intervention petitions made by the guardians and by their other teachers who are continuing to serve the institutions faithfully. It has further been contended that the law itself permits unrecognised, and unaided institutions to be run by private organisations. In support of this contention the management also relies on the intervention petitions made by the guardians and by their other teachers who are continuing to serve the institutions faithfully. It has further been contended that the law itself permits unrecognised, and unaided institutions to be run by private organisations. There is no bar to anyone sending up private candidates at public examinations even from an unrecognised school. Whatever contravention of the Intermediate Education Act and of the Rules under the Basic Education Act has been committed by the management has been done openly and after due notice to the authorities and the very fact that the authorities themselves have not chosen to de-recognise the institutions or to take them over through appointment of authorised controller shows that the authorities recognised that the institutions are doing excellent work. It is on account of their special management scheme that, according to Petitioner, they are being able to produce good results. They are prepared to run the institutions as un-recognised schools. Recognition is normally needed either for securing grant-in-aid or for securing confidence of the students and their guardians. In the instant case, the Petitioners are not seeking any grant-in-aid and they already enjoyed the confidence of the students and of the guardians and as such they do not stand in need of recognition or further recognition. On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the Sangh and the aggrieved teachers that the institutions cannot be permitted to flout the law laid down by the legislature in regard to the security of tenure of service and that the leissez faire notion of " hire and fire " at the will of the employer is out-moded. 12. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the various contentions noticed above. Suffice it to say that the legislature itself in its wisdom has not conferred any powers on the District Inspector of Schools and District Basic Eduction Officer to direct re-instatement of teachers. The legislature has provided sanction for the statutory regulations by laying down that any institution committing breach of those regulatory provisions would be liable to be visited with the penalty of de-recognition or of being taken over. It is not for us to substitute a different relief for the teachers or a different penalty to be visited on the management. The legislature has provided sanction for the statutory regulations by laying down that any institution committing breach of those regulatory provisions would be liable to be visited with the penalty of de-recognition or of being taken over. It is not for us to substitute a different relief for the teachers or a different penalty to be visited on the management. So far as the exercise of discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution is concerned two things stand out. First is that no authority could be permitted to usurp a power or jurisdiction which it does not possess. The second is that these institutions which enjoy the substantial support of the management and of the bulk of their other teachers who are still on their rolls. It was argued on behalf of the Respondents that other teachers are supporting the management only out of fear of vindictive action. On behalf of the management it has been pointed out that autcally the pay scales in the institutions concerned are much better than the pay scales admissible under the Intermediate Eduction Act as prescribed by the State Government. Not only this, the number of teachers employed by the institutions is far in excess of the number required by the department. The teachers-students ratio in these institutions is much higher than in the aided recognised schools. These facts have not been controverted, and the teachers support cannot therefore be ignored merely on the suspicion that the same has been secured under threat or coercion. Another circumstance pointed out on behalf of the management is that although the schools are co-educational with a preponderance of boys the majority of teachers and all the heads of the institutions are ladies. According to the managements way of thinking the induction of a greater number of ladies help in the maintenance of discipline and of standards. Whatever one may think of this theory the fact remains that the lady teachers would themselves feel insecure if they were subjected to regulatory provisions. The services of many of them may have to be dispensed with on account of redundancy. The support of the guardians moreover cannot be explained away merely on the basis of fear. Whatever one may think of this theory the fact remains that the lady teachers would themselves feel insecure if they were subjected to regulatory provisions. The services of many of them may have to be dispensed with on account of redundancy. The support of the guardians moreover cannot be explained away merely on the basis of fear. Considering the entirety of circumstances we are of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for refusing to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the Petitioners on the grounds urged on behalf of the Respondents and the Sangh. 13. The preliminary point about the existence of alternative remedy need hardly datain us. Once we have held that the order of the Inspector did not fall u/s 16G(3)(b) it could not be appealed against under sub Clause (c) of that Sub-section. As such the question of alternative remedy dose not arise. We do not see how it was necessary for the management to invoke 16E(10) as that is a provision not meant to be invoked by the management but a power conferred on the authorities to over-ride the management which seeks to make a bad appointment. It would be farfetched to contend that the management itself can invoke that power. 14. The other preliminary point urged was that the writ petitions could be filed not by the Society but only by the Committee of Management. It is true that the Society had earlier submitted a scheme of administration which was duly approved and the Committee of Management was also formally constituted in accordance therewith. The scheme of administration was never actually acted upon by the management. They did originally apply for recognition and for that purpose they did submit the scheme but apparently on second thoughts they shelved the scheme, and the authorities also during all this long period prior to the passing of the impugned orders never thought of enforcing the same. The management openly contends that it is not interested in following the scheme and will not comply with the regulatory provisions and it is prepared to face the consequences, namely, de-recognition or the appointment of authorised controller. In these circumstances the question of the Committee of Management (which is a defunct body and exists only on paper) as such filing writ petitions could not arise. In these circumstances the question of the Committee of Management (which is a defunct body and exists only on paper) as such filing writ petitions could not arise. The impugned orders impose financial liability on the Society and it is the Society that will thus suffer if the impugned orders are allowed to stand. It cannot therefore be said that the society has no locus standi to maintain the petitions. 15. We do not consider it necessary or proper to grant any relief by way of ordering de-recognition of the High Schools and it is also not necessary to go into the controversy as to whether the Junior High Schools in question were duly recognised or demeed to be recognised under the Basic Education Act. 16. In the result the writ petition No. 1 of 1983 is allowed and the order Annexure 14 dated 31-12-82 passed by the District Inspector of Schools is hereby quashed. Writ Petition No. 784 of 1983 is allowed and the order dated 7-2-83 passed by the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari Annexure 29 is hereby quashed. The writ petition No. 289 of 1983 is dismissed as infructuous. Writ Petition No. 1427 of 1983 has also become infructuous inasmuch as the Management has already terminated the services of the persons concerned and it is unnecessary to go into the merits of the maintainability or otherwise of the petition. The teachers are not holding the office de-facto. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. 17. In all the writ petitions the parties shall bear their own costs. 18. Immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment an oral prayer was made by the learned Standing Counsel and counsel for the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari for a certificate under Article 133 read with 134A of the Constitution. We are not satisfied that the cases involve any substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court ; as such the certificate prayed for is refused.