JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - The Petitioner is the tenant of an accommodation in house No. 13/207, Halka Madan Nai Ki Mandi, Agra. The Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are owners and landlords of the same. An application u/s 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) hereinafter referred to as the Act, was filed by the landlords against the Petitioner on the ground that they required the accommodation in dispute for their own residence, as the one already occupied by them was not sufficient for their needs. The Petitioner contested the application on the ground that the need of the landlords was not bona fide and in the event of ejectment he would suffer greater hardship than would be caused to the landlords in case the application was rejected. At a later stage, it appears that the landlord-Respondents secured an amendment of the petition on the ground that they had retired from their official positions and had vacated the public premises which were in their possession at the time of their employment and hence they were entitled to the benefit of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 21 of the Act. The averment made in the amendment application is significant and reads: 15-A. That the provisions of Section 21(1-A) of the Act are applicable to the case and the bona fide need of the applicant and hardship of the opposite party is not to be considered under law, even the opposite party would not suffer any hardship and the comparative hardship of applicant would be greater If the application is rejected. 2. The substantive relief claimed even in the amendment application was that an order for release of the premises in. dispute be passed against the tenant. Thereafter evidence was led by the parties in the shape of affidavits and the Prescribed Authority, after appraisal of the entire material on record, came to the conclusion that Sub-section (1-A) of Section 21 of the Act did not apply to the case, as the application moved by the landlords was not bonafide. Inasmuch as some tenants had vacated the tenements occupied by them in the same building during the pendency of the case and the landlords were already in occupation of those portions. Consequently, the application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority by its order dated 5-11-1981. 3. Inasmuch as some tenants had vacated the tenements occupied by them in the same building during the pendency of the case and the landlords were already in occupation of those portions. Consequently, the application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority by its order dated 5-11-1981. 3. The landlords preferred an appeal which was allowed by the appellate authority by its order dated 22-4-1983 and the landlords' release application was allowed. Aggrieved by this order of the appellate authority the Petitioner has filed this writ petition. 4. The contention raised before me on behalf of the Petitioner was that the appellate order was wholly without jurisdiction, the appeal Itself was not competent and the learned Judge committed apparent error of law by deciding the appeal as if it arose out of an application under Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 21 of the Act. This contention is untenable. I am unable to accept the argument pressed before me that after the amendment being allowed the original application presented under Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 21 of the Act ceased to exist in law and that it was completely replaced by a totally different application to be labelled as one under Sub-section (1-A) of Section 21 of the Act. I have already adverted to the substantive relief claimed in the amendment application which does not bear out any such argument. There was no prayer for converting the original application made under Sub-section (1)(a) into one under Sub-section (1-A) of Section 21. The averment expressly made in the application, to which I have already adverted, was that on the facts now brought on record by means of amendment the bonafide need of the applicant and hardship of the opposite party is not to be considered under law. Thus, in substance the prayer contained in the amendment application was that it was not open, on the facts of the case, to the opposite party-tenant to show that he would suffer greater hardship in the event of the release application being allowed and further that the Prescribed Authority was not required under the law to examine whether the landlords application was bona fide. The contention that the original application was completely replaced by a new application and was no longer available for adjudication by the authorities concerned is not substantiated even by the manner in which the authorities proceeded to dispose of the matter. The contention that the original application was completely replaced by a new application and was no longer available for adjudication by the authorities concerned is not substantiated even by the manner in which the authorities proceeded to dispose of the matter. It is important to note that the Prescribed Authority after dealing with the landlords case embarked upon the enquiry relating to the comparative needs and hardship of the parties and after weighing the claims of both parties ultimately decided that the Petitioner-tenant would suffer greater hardship. It is well settled that even in a case In which Sub-section (1-A) of Section 21 of the Act Is attracted the landlord applicant is not absolved of the onus of establishing that his application is bona fide. Sub-section (1-A) is an integral part of Section 21 and, therefore, the preliminary requirement for passing any order of release in the landlords' favour is that his application must be bona fide. It is not difficult to visualise instances where inspite of the full operation of the provisions of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 21 of the Act the landlord may be actuated by ulterior motive in applying for release and thereby securing ejectment of a sitting tenant. Hence, the condition precedent to the passing of a release order u/s 21 of the Act, whether it is under Sub-section (1)(a) or Sub-section (1-A), is a finding that the application is bona fide. 5. In the instant case if the landlords application were construed as one made under Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 21, then a finding about bona fide need would be Imperative. Further, a finding on the comparative needs and hardship of the parties would also be essential. Both these findings have been recorded by the Prescribed Authority. Hence, it appears that neither the parties nor the authorities were meticulous with regard to the form in which the application was made. Substantially all the relevant evidence which could be adduced to make out a case under Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 21 was led by the parties and over and above that the landlords also tried to place some material on record which may attract the provisions of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 21 of the Act. In these circumstances it would not be correct to limit the amplitude of the order of the Prescribed Authority within the straight-jacket of Sub-section (1-A). In these circumstances it would not be correct to limit the amplitude of the order of the Prescribed Authority within the straight-jacket of Sub-section (1-A). It is a comprehensive order partaking of the characteristics of both types of applications and has considered all the relevant aspects of the case and also recorded findings which would be consistent with both categories. 6. Looking at the order passed by the appellate authority there remains absolutely no room for doubt that the case of the landlords, as originally presented in the form of an application under Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 21 of the Act, was examined at length and all the findings which would be relevant for adjudication of such application were recorded after full appreciation of the evidence of the parties. The appellate authority reversed the finding of the Prescribed Authority and categorically held that the landlords' application was bona fide and their need for the accommodation applied for was genuine. He repelled the objection raised on behalf of the tenant that the landlords in fact did not seriously intent to settle down at Agra where the accommodation in dispute was situated but would migrate to Ajmer where also they had a house. After recording this finding the appellate authority addressed itself to the question of the likely hardship likely to be caused to the parties by the grant or dismissal of the application. On this point also the finding was recorded in favour of the landlord-Respondents and it was held that they would suffer greater hardship if the application for release was rejected. In these circumstances the appeal was allowed and the order for ejectment of the Petitioner was passed. 7. There is also nothing to Indicate that the Petitioner ever objected at any stage to the case being treated as one arising out of a composite application. There is no averment in the writ petition that the Petitioner was not aware of this fact that the case originally put forward in the application under Sub-section (1)(a) was also being examined on merits by the authorities. There is certainly no material to suggest that he objected to such procedure. The Petitioner strongly relied on a Division Bench case Kalyan Rai Saxena Vs. There is certainly no material to suggest that he objected to such procedure. The Petitioner strongly relied on a Division Bench case Kalyan Rai Saxena Vs. II Additional District Judge and Others, (1982) AWC 100 in which it was held that where it was not established that Sub-section (1-A) applied to the facts of the case, the landlords' application for release u/s 21 of the Act must be dismissed. The facts of that ruling are clearly distinguishable. That was a case in which from the very inception an application under Sub-section (1-A) alone was made and naturally the judgments were also rendered only in accordance with Section 21(1-A). There was neither any pleading nor any evidence nor any finding of the nature required for establishing the needs of the landlord and tenant and their comparative hardships etc. under Sub-section (1)(a). In those circumstances certainly the application for release could not be allowed after recording the finding that Sub-section (1-A) was not attracted. In a case where the Prescribed Authority delivers a judgment only in accordance with Sub-section (1-A) and does not fulfil the requirements of an order which can be passed under Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 21 of the Act, it is not possible to hold that it was an omnibus order and that appeal would still lie u/s 22. On the other hand, as I have already pointed out, in the instant case the whole tenor of the proceedings makes it abundantly clear that the original case set up under Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 21 was never abandoned. The landlord at a subsequent stage simply invoked Sub-section (1-A) as a second string to his bow. If the first string snapped, the second was still intact. There was, therefore, nothing to preclude the authorities from proceeding in a manner which would be consistent with the procedure under Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 21. Keeping in view the fact that the parties completely submitted to the procedure adopted by the authorities, the absence of any allegation in the writ petition that such procedure was demurred to at any stage and the nature of the findings actually recorded by the two authorities, I am inclined to hold that the order passed by the appellate authority did not suffer from any lack of jurisdiction. Since the application under Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 21 still survived for adjudication, an appeal u/s 22 was also competent Therefore the appellate order was neither without jurisdiction nor erroneous in law. The learned Judge after scrutinising the entire material on record reversed the twin findings arrived at by the Prescribed Authority. He was fully competent to set aside those findings and arrive at an independent conclusion. There is no inhibition in law for making a composite application under Sub-section (1)(a) and (1-A) of Section 21. They are not incompatible with each other. Such application can be made and an omnibus order can be passed. The only distinction between the two provisions is that while under Clause (1)(a) the landlord has to establish both ingredients, viz. (a) that his application is bonafide, and (b) that he would suffer greater hardship if release is refused, for the purposes of (1-A) he is absolved of the onus of proving greater hardship to him. In the case of such a comprehensive application it would be quite consistent with law that it may be rejected on one count i.e. failure to substantiate the requirements of Clause (1-A) but it may still be allowed under Clause (1)(a) if both conditions prescribed therein are fulfilled. In such event an appeal can be preferred u/s 22 of the Act. 8. There is no other legal error which has been pointed out in the impugned order passed by the Respondent No. 1. I, therefore, find no force in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed 'in limine'.