WAHAJUDDIN, J. ( 1 ) THE applicants figure as accused persons in Case Crime No. 256 of 1982, under sections 302 and 307, Indian Penal Code of District Mainpuri. They, however chose to surrender before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etah, instead of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mainpuri, on 5th November, 1962. They were remanded to Jail custody and on application for bail was moved before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etah, who did not entertain it. The bail application then moved in the Sessions Court, Etah, was transferred to II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Etah, namely, Sri M. P. Singh. The II Additional District and. Sessions Judge, Etah, vide its order dated 17-11-1982 granted bail to the applicants. It would appear that an application was also moved before the Additional Munsif Magistrate, Mainpuri, for bail. He rejected that application observing that neither the applicants have put in appearance before him, nor are they in the Custody of the court, hence the application is rejected. Subsequently the complainant of the case moved an application before the Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, for cancellation of the bail granted by Etah court, which had application issued notice to the present applicants and sent for reports from the police. It also directed that all the relevant papers may be obtained from the Etah Court. The applicants maintained that the entire proceedings on the aforesaid application, namely, Criminal Misc. Application No. 1028 of 1982, pending before the court of Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, is without jurisdiction and has prayed that the proceedings may be quashed This prayer has been opposed by the opposite party by putting appearance. ( 2 ) IT has been maintained in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 that the Additional Munsif Magistrate, Manipuri rightly rejected the application of the applicants, as he had no papers regarding the case. It was, further main rained that the case relates to District Mainpuri, consequently, Etah court had no jurisdiction to entertain any bail application. It was further, maintained that this was also brought to the notice of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Etah, that he has no jurisdiction in the matter, but he still granted bail. It was, further main rained that the case relates to District Mainpuri, consequently, Etah court had no jurisdiction to entertain any bail application. It was further, maintained that this was also brought to the notice of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Etah, that he has no jurisdiction in the matter, but he still granted bail. It was, further, maintained that the notices of the application for cancellation of bail were served upon the applicants and they appeared before the court of Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, where the application was heard and was pending orders and the accused persons have purposely avoided the courts at Mainpuri. ( 3 ) THE case was for admission, but, as the points involved have a far reaching bearing of greatest importance and the opposite side has also put in apprehended, and points involved are purely legal after hearing some arguments, declared to hear the matter at length, so that a proper adjudication may be made when the points involved are only law points. ( 4 ) IT is not disputed that the offences in which the applicants are involved were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Mainpuri and not Etah District. The applicants have urged that the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Etah, was still competent to grant bail, when a surrender was made in District Etah and that in any case, only a court superior to the court of Sessions Judge could cancel it and the Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, cannot cancel it. The contention of the other side is that Etah, court had no jurisdiction to grant bail and the order of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Etah, is a nullity and that being the position the Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, where the offence was committed is fully competent to consider whether the applicants should be allowed to remain enlarge or should be sent to jail pending investigation, enquiry and trial. These are two short points which need adjudication. ( 5 ) I proceed to consider whether the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Etah, had the jurisdiction to grant bail to the applicants. The learned Counsel for the applicants has referred certain sections of the Criminal Procedure Code in that connection. These are two short points which need adjudication. ( 5 ) I proceed to consider whether the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Etah, had the jurisdiction to grant bail to the applicants. The learned Counsel for the applicants has referred certain sections of the Criminal Procedure Code in that connection. Section 2 (j), Criminal Procedure Code, (hereinafter referred to as the Code) defines local jurisdiction in relation to a Court or Magistrate, means the local area within which the court or Magistrate may exercise all or any of its or his powers under the Code. Section 6 lays down the classes of criminal courts, as Court of Sessions. Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, Judicial Magistrate of Second Class and Executive Magistrates. Section 7 provides that every State shall be a sessions division or shall consists of sessions divisions and every sessions division shall, for the purposes of this Code, be a district or consist of districts. In Uttar Pradesh we have sessions divisions and in every district there is a sessions division. In particular- Etah and Mainpuri are distinct and separate sessions divisions created by the State Government under Section 7 (3) of the Code. Section 8 Criminal Procedure Code relates to Metropolitan areas, with which we are not concerned. Section 9 (1) lays down that the State Government shall establish a Court of Sessions for every sessions divisions. Sub clause (6) of section 9 lays down that the Court of Session shall hold its sitting at such place or places as the High Court may by notification, specify. Section 14 provides for local jurisdiction of Judicial Magistrates. The aforesaid provisions, thus, deal with the constitution of different classes of courts and sessions divisions. Sections 80 and 81 of the Code deal with the procedure of arrest of person against whom warrant is issued and procedure to be followed by the Magistrate before whom such person arrested is brought. Both these sections deal with the cases of arrested persons and execution of warrant of arrest and arrest in consequence thereof. The case where voluntary surrender is made differs from the case where arrest is made in execution of a warrant. Section 80 deals with the warrant of arrest executed outside the district in which it was issued. Both these sections deal with the cases of arrested persons and execution of warrant of arrest and arrest in consequence thereof. The case where voluntary surrender is made differs from the case where arrest is made in execution of a warrant. Section 80 deals with the warrant of arrest executed outside the district in which it was issued. It provides that unless the court issuing warrant is within third kilometers of the place of arrest or is nearer than the Executive Magistrate of District Superintendent of Police or Commissioner of Police, within whose local limits and jurisdiction the arrest was made, the arrested person will be taken before such Magistrate or District Superintendent or Commissioner. Section 81 (1) provides that the Executive Magistrate Or District Superintendent of Police or Commissioner of Police shall, if the person arrested appears to be the person intended by the Court which issued the warrant, direct his removal in custody to such Court. The first proviso provides for bail in bailable cases. The second proviso provides that if offence is not bailable, it shall be lawful for the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Session Judge of the district in which the arrest is made subject to the provisions of Section 437, Criminal Procedure Code, to grant bail. The reason why such provisions have been made is obvious. In case where arrest is made in execution of a warrant, the arrested person has to be enable to seek bail from the district where he is arrested and lodged. Hence such provisions have been made. But this made not mean that a person is at liberty to choose the court and district as to surrender there on his own volition and seek bail from there instead of from the court within whose jurisdiction the offence was committed. ( 6 ) SECTION 167 of the Code is the other relevant section laying down the procedure when investigation cannot be completed within twenty-four hours. It again deals with the case where a person is arrested and detained and provides that the Police Officer concerned, not below the rank of Sub-Inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary and forward the accused to such Magistrate. It again deals with the case where a person is arrested and detained and provides that the Police Officer concerned, not below the rank of Sub-Inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary and forward the accused to such Magistrate. Sub section (2) provides further steps laying down that the Magistrate concerned may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case from time to time, authorize the detention of the accused in such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit, but for a term not exceeding fifteen days; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction. This section again is not attracted in the present case. Section (7) Criminal Procedure Code provides for enquiry or trial of offences by court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. ( 7 ) SECTIONS 437 and 439, Criminal Procedure Code, are only other relevant sections. In Section 437, Criminal Procedure Code, the words a Court has been used and in Section 439 Criminal Procedure Code the words or Court of Session has been used. These two sections deal not only with the cases where a person is arrested or detained in execution of a warrant to but also with the cases where he appears. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the applicant that the expression a Court would mean any court of Session and the expression a Court or the expression Court of Session would not and cannot mean only the court of session or the court within whose local limits the offence is said to have been committed. The other side urged that it would necessarily mean a court of competent jurisdiction and the court of competent jurisdiction is only that court within whose local territorial limits the offence has been committed. The other side urged that it would necessarily mean a court of competent jurisdiction and the court of competent jurisdiction is only that court within whose local territorial limits the offence has been committed. I have laid down the Scheme regarding the creation of courts, class of courts and local and territorial jurisdiction; and the words Court of Session used in Section 439 Criminal Procedure Code and words a Court used in Section 437 Criminal Procedure Code, is to be interpreted in that context and background and not divested from the same, otherwise the results would be an anarchy and chaos in the matter of surrender and exercise of powers of bail and a person would be free to surrender anywhere in India and seek hail from any Court or any Session Court. That cannot be the purpose and intent of the Legislature. In fact, this type of practice would lead to abuse of power and confer a liberty upon the person to surrender and appear before any court or any Session Court anywhere and seek bail from such Court of his choice. Obviously, it is implied that the Court or (Court of Sessions and should be the competent Court, having territorial jurisdiction concerning the offence. A similar view has been taken in 1975 Cr. L. J. 1249 (Devision Bench Calcutta)1, 1972 W. L. N. 441 Rajasthan2, 1961 Rajasthan L. W. 487, Gulam Mohammad v. State4, 1959 Cr. L. J 6oo. State v. Sojjan Singh6, and 1953 Cr. L. J. 1525. All these cases are cited in AIR. Manual IVth Edition Volume 14 at page 527. ( 8 ) THE following observations in the case of State v. Sojjan Singh (supra) are important: For the decision of the second point urged by Mr. Har Parshad we have to find out whether the word Court appearing in section 497 means any Court or the Court which has jurisdiction to try the accused for the offence alleged to have been committed by him. Mr. Mehra admitted that in the case of a person who is arrested or detained by the Police without warrant an application for bail under section 497 can only be made to the Court who can take cognizance of the offence for which the accused is arrested or detained, but he maintains that when he appears of his own accord he can apply to any Court. He has not been able to cite any authority to support his contention and I do not think the contention can be correct, because it would mean that when a case for a cognizable or a non-bailable offence is registered against a person in one District it is open to him to go to any Magistrate in any other District in India and apply to him for bail whether or not he can take cognizance of the offence or he has jurisdiction to try the case that may result therefrom. ( 9 ) IN the case of Gulam Mohammad v. State (supra), which is under old Criminal Procedure Code, while interpreting Section 167, as it then was, the following observations were made: He has clearly no power under section 167 to admit the arrested person to bail. If a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try the case, he has no power even under section 497 to grant bail, to the person arrested. That section is limited to the jurisdiction of the Courts of trial in the matter of granting or refusing bail. This is obvious from subsections (1) and (2) of section 497. ( 10 ) IT was urged that the II additional District and Sessions Judge, Etah, will have jurisdiction in every sessions division, as he is Sessions Judge of sessions division. I am unable to appreciate that argument. He has been appointed as Additional Sessions Judge, Etah, to exercise powers of Sessions Judge there and in that sessions divisions and not for all remaining sessions divisions of the State Mainpuri is it separate sessions division and for that sessions division Sessions Judge and Additional Sessions Judges are appointed and posted at Mainpuri to exercise powers in that very sessions division. I, therefore, find that the order of II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Etah, granting bail to the applicants is bad in law and without jurisdiction. ( 11 ) IT was urged that even if it be so, the Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, cannot take the applicants into custody, nor can be ignore the bail granted by the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Etah, as he is not a court of superior jurisdiction and only High Court can do that. I have considered that matter. ( 11 ) IT was urged that even if it be so, the Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, cannot take the applicants into custody, nor can be ignore the bail granted by the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Etah, as he is not a court of superior jurisdiction and only High Court can do that. I have considered that matter. It is the Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, who is concerned with the case and who bas the requisite jurisdiction in the matter and he is the competent court. He is not bound by the order of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Etah, who bad no jurisdiction and has rather amazingly abused his office by granting bail inspite of lack of jurisdiction, even though it was opposed before him. Heaven would not have fallen if he had adopted the right course as to direct the applicants to move the proper court of jurisdiction at Mainpuri. It is also striking that he has been so over zealous that notwithstanding that an application for bail had been moved at Mainpuri also, he chose to decide the bail matter himself instead of leaving the matter to the court of competent jurisdiction. It is further, strange that he proceeded to grant an absolute bail instead of simply taking bail for ultimate appearance before the Mainpuri court by specified time and obtaining bail from there. The crux of the matter is whether an order, which is nullity in the eyes of law on account of total lack of jurisdiction, can be taken to subsist as to stand a bar in the way of Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, for deciding the matter of bail himself. I feel that the order which is a nullity cannot subsist in the eyes of law and the Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, has complete jurisdiction over the matter. In the case of Kiran Singh and another v. Chaman Paswan8, it was held that a decree passed by the civil court without jurisdiction is a nullity and the same principle, when the matter is of jurisdiction, would apply to the criminal case also. ( 12 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the case of Gurcharan Singh v. State9, but the case is distinguishable on facts. ( 12 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the case of Gurcharan Singh v. State9, but the case is distinguishable on facts. Obviously, when the bail has been granted by a competent court of jurisdiction different considerations would arise and there are numerable imitations in canceling the bail and it should not be ordinarily cancelled. But in this case the position is different, because the very jurisdiction is Jacking and an order without territorial jurisdiction cannot subsist. ( 13 ) APART from that, this is a proceeding under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code and this court will not exercise its inherent power in favour of the applicants to perpetuate an integrality committed by the II Additional District and Sessions Judge Etah. ( 14 ) I may in the end, however, observe that I have made no observations concerning the merits of the case and naturally that matter has to be considered by the Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, if any bail application is preferred before his court. ( 15 ) THE application is rejected. Application rejected. .