This application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against an order passed by the learned Munsiff, Tinsukia setting aside the exparte decree passed in Title Suit No. 115/73. The judgment is not only replete with findings based on surmises and conjectures which has resulted in an irre­gular exercise of jurisdiction by the court but also manifests a total misconception by the court of its powers under Order 9 Rule 13. At one stage I was inclined to accept the prayer of Mr. G. K. Talukdar, learned counsel appearing for the defendant-opposites party to remand the case for proper finding having due regard to the relevant provisions of law, but I find that the suit has been pending disposal for nearly ten years and for the ends of justice it will not be proper to remand it unless I am satisfied that it will serve any useful purpose. In the instant case a remand would not be of any help as the evidence of the defendant, on whom Mr. Talukdar relies, but which the learned Munsiff has not discussed, would not improve the case of the defendant. 2. The case of the defendant-opposite party is that he had got an injury on his leg in the later part of Nov/76 and was hospitalized for about a month. He has further stated in his petition under Order 9 Rule 13 that he came to know about the exparte decree on 28.2.77. The suit was fixed for hearing on 18.1.77 and in the absence of the defendant-opposite party it was decreed exparte. The defendant-opposite party filed the application on 8.3.77 for setting aside the exparte decree. No separate application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed and the delay in filing the application on 8.3.77 under Order 9 Rule 13 has not been explained otherwise in any manner although under Article 123 of the Limitation Act the defendant-opposite party was required to lie the application on 17.2.77. 3. The jurisdiction to set aside an exparte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 is circumscribed by the provisions thereof and the court has no power to override the provisions. A plain reading of the provision suggests that it demands strict compliance by the party invoking the jurisdiction of the court there under. The reason is very simple as can be gathered from the scheme of the Code. A plain reading of the provision suggests that it demands strict compliance by the party invoking the jurisdiction of the court there under. The reason is very simple as can be gathered from the scheme of the Code. Procedures for the progress of litigation are so prescribed that no party shall have an unfair advantage over the other and the machinery of justice once set in motion shall continue, its course as charted by the provisions of the Code. Those who submit to the jurisdiction of the court must assist the court to dispense justice according to law. Any unfair ad­vantage extracted from perverting the provisions will obviously result in the course of justice being obstructed. The Code enjoins a duty upon the court to ensure that no brake is applied un­fairly to slow down the motion of justice which must keep its pace and deal parties evenly. The defendant who invokes the provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 is to "satisfy" the court that he was prevented by "sufficient cause" from appearing when the suit was called for hearing because he is applying a brake to the progress of the litigation as a result of which the plaintiff is put at a disadvantage. In exercising jurisdiction under Order 9 Rule 13 and deciding whe­ther a case for the satisfaction of the court was duly made out by the defendant, the court will consider the conduct of the defendant to see if he was diligently and honestly pursuing the remedy and that he was not using it as a cover for any design by him to unduly linger the proceeding and thereby putting the other party at a disadvantage and obstructing the course of justice. The onus is very heavy upon him which is indicated by the expressions "satisfy" and "sufficient cause" used in Order 9 Rule 13. The court is bound to see that the defendant dis­charges the onus to its complete satisfaction. Delaying justice is denying' justice and it is the duty of the court to see that this principle is observed by the parties at all stages of all proceedings under the Code. Provisions of the Code have to be interpreted to meet the contemporary societal need as spelled out by the current legislative policies. Delaying justice is denying' justice and it is the duty of the court to see that this principle is observed by the parties at all stages of all proceedings under the Code. Provisions of the Code have to be interpreted to meet the contemporary societal need as spelled out by the current legislative policies. In this connection, there­fore, reference may be made to the amendment made in 1976 when a proviso and an explanation were added, the plain object of which was to ensure that the jurisdiction under Order 9, Rule 13 was exercised with great care, caution and circumspec­tion, not in a casual and cavalier manner. 4. In this case it appears that the defendant-opposite party has not made out a case for the "satisfaction" of the court to invoke its jurisdiction under Order 9 Rule 13. In the appli­cation under Order 9 Rule 13 the defendant-opposite party has made a general statement to explain why and how he was pre­vented from filing the application only until 28.2.77 and no cause, moreover, has been shown as respects the specific date, namely, 18.1.77. Even in his evidence to which my attention was drawn by Mr. Talukdar, learned counsel for the defendant-oppo­site party. I find that he has explained the period of his inaction generally only until 28.2.77 and no care is taken to explain why the application was filed on 8.3.77. Although no applica­tion under section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed in this case this Court would have considered if reasonable and satisfactory explanation was given for the entire period, i. e. from the date of passing of the decree, namely, 18.1.77 to the date of filing of the of the application for setting aside the exparte decree, namely, 8.3.77. 5. In this case the defendant-opposite party did not examine the Doctor who had treated him for his alleged leg injury which was his specific case in his application. He examined one Dr. Chakraborty who treated him for peptic ulcer syndrome and other diseases on different dates but not on the material date, namely, 18.1.77. Dr. Ckakraborty has proved the signature of Dr. Sarma on the certificate Ext. 2. Apparently, he could not legally prove the contents of the certificate. Surprisingly, however, the learned Munsiff has observed : "But when a colleague doctor deposes on the certificate Ext. Dr. Ckakraborty has proved the signature of Dr. Sarma on the certificate Ext. 2. Apparently, he could not legally prove the contents of the certificate. Surprisingly, however, the learned Munsiff has observed : "But when a colleague doctor deposes on the certificate Ext. 2 it can at least be taken as genuine and must be accepted to lend assurance as to the truth of the petiti­oner's case". 6. The learned court below has also considered the evidence of P. W. 3, Sabhanand Gupta and has held that the admission of the defendant-opposite party into hospital was proved by the witness but there is no finding by him about the period during which the defendant remained in the hospital without which he could not hold that the defendant had attempted to dis­charge the onus that lay upon him by proving his case as made out in the application and he was honestly perusing the remedy. On the evidence of these two witnesses only the learned Munsiff has arrived only at a general finding that "the petitioner was indisposed due to injury on his leg and he was prevented from, attending the court when the suit was called for hearing". It is interesting to note that he has based his finding on certain other extraneous considerations and surmises. The learned Munsiff has observed : "It would appear that on 6.9.76 and 27.11.76 (the defendant ) was absent. There is no earthly reason on his part to remain absent when on the previous date he was verily present". 7. Further, although the onus was upon the defendant- opposite party to prove that he was prevented by "sufficient cause" from appearing on the date of hearing, the learned Munsiff has observed that "the opposite party's" witness did not say that the petitioner had been indisposed and bed ridden'-' and thereby purporting to shift the onus to the plaintiff, the opposite party before him. 8. Another important aspect of the matter has also to be taken into consideration. Nowhere in the judgment we find any discussion of evidence about the "sufficient cause" which pre­vented the defendant-opposite party from appearing, particularly on the date on which the suit was called for hearing and about the explanation of the delay in filing the application for restoration of the suit which were the main points at issue in the proceedings under Order 9 Rule 13. His findings are vague and general and not categorical. Apparently, he is not conscious of the limitation of his jurisdiction in the matter of restoring a suit decreed exparte. He has not applied his mind to the provisions, either of Order 9 Rule 13 or of Article 123 of the Limitation Act or of section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was incumbent upon him to make a categorical finding on the point of limitation because that is related to the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Order 9 Rule 13. There is no such findings in this case. As to the real "satisfaction" of the court in setting aside the ex-parte decree he overlooked that the court is performing a judicial act when arriving at his "satis­faction" for which valid and cogent reasons have to be given. He has overlooked that he cannot exercise jurisdiction under Order 9 Rule 13 expedite justified. In this case we find that he had done precisely which he was prohibited by law to do. He has observed that "for the sake of natural justice the delay is required to be condoned and I do it accordingly". He has, therefore, clearly misdirected himself as to the scope of his juris­diction in setting aside the ex-parte decree. His bald finding to the effect "the delay has been explained are (sic) not barred by limitation" is clearly a perverse finding as it purports to reflect the position that the defendant was honestly and diligently perusing the remedy although that was not the case as discussed above. Indeed, the court did not at all approach the matter from that view of law. This Court must exercise its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to keep the courts below within the bounds of their jurisdiction and accordingly an interference by the Court is called for in the facts and circum­stances of the case. 9. My attention has been drawn by Mr. .6. N. Medhi, the learned counsel for the petitioners, to a decision of this court reported in AIR 1977 Gauhati 51 (Mangaldoi Tea Co. Ltd. vs. Md. Abdul Latif Munshi). It was held in this case by my learned brother learned counsel for the petitioners, to a decision of this court reported in AIR 1977 Gauthati 51 (Mangaldoi Tea Co. Ltd. Vs. Md. Abdul Latif munshi). Ltd. vs. Md. Abdul Latif Munshi). It was held in this case by my learned brother learned counsel for the petitioners, to a decision of this court reported in AIR 1977 Gauthati 51 (Mangaldoi Tea Co. Ltd. Vs. Md. Abdul Latif munshi). It was held in this case by my learned brother Lahiri, J. That: "The power of the court to restore a suit is circum­scribed and limited by the express provision contained in order 9 Rule 13 of the Code. On no other ground other than those enumerated in Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code a court can set a side an ex-parte decree." I express my respectful agreement with the above observation. 10. This suit was filed in 1973 and it is pending disposal for nearly ten years. The suit was decreed ex-parte on 18.1.77. and that application for restoration was filed on 8.3.77, The appli­cation was clearly barred by Article 123 of the Limitation Act and the defendant opposite party could not make out any case either in the application for restoration or in the evidence, which have been placed before me, to satisfy the court either on the point of "sufficient case" or on the point of limitation about the delay in filling the application. To allow the proceeding to continue further in the above circumstance would clearly occasion a failure of justice and it will, therefore, be meet and proper if the impugned order is set aside, which I hereby accordingly do. The court below has acted illegally as well as with material irregularly in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as discussed above. 11. In the result the petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute. However, Mr. G. K. Talukdar, learned counsel for the defendant-opposite party submits that his client is a petty vegetable seller and as such he prays that the defendant opposite party may not be saddled with any costs. In these circumstances no cost is awarded to the successful petitioner in this case.