JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal in a suit claiming the following reliefs :- (a) That the order dated 14th Feb., 1957 which was passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer and the entries relating to plots Nos. 139, 12 biswas, 157, 6 bigha 8 biswas 5 dhur, 200 minjumla, 2 biswas, 236, 5 biswa, 340, 1 bigha 13 dhurs, after consolidation operations, in respect of entering the names of defendants Nos. 2 to 5 and Surajdin, Bachai and Ramdin were made without the knowledge and information of the plaintiffs and are fictitious, wrong without jurisdiction and against law and facts and were all through based on fraud and deception and were not binding on the plaintiffs, may be cancelled; (b) that the defendants may be restrained by perpetual injunction from interfering with ,the plaintiffs exclusive possession; (c) costs and (d) such other and further relief, as the Court finds just. 2. The following were the issues 'on which parties went to trial, namely. Issues : 1. Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit'' 2. Whether the suit is barred u/s 49 of C. H. Act" 3. Whether the order dated 14-2-57 of the Assts. Consolidation Officer recording and holding the defendants as co-tenure holders with the plaintiff in C. H. Form No. 7 is void and liable to be cancelled as per grounds given in paras 9 to 12 of the plaint"" 4. Whether the plaintiffs are sole sirdar's of the plots in suit and are in possession over the same? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed'.' The first issue was decided by the trial Court on 15-1-1969. It held that it had jurisdiction to try the suit. The trial Court observed that the defendants objection was that the plaintiffs wanted a declaration to the effect that they are the sole sirdar's of the land in dispute, and that being the pith and substance of their case, they could have filed a suit for declaration of their rights in the revenue Court under Sec. 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act; but according to the pleadings the plaintiffs claim to be sirdar's of the plot in dispute and also to be in possession and were seeking injunction. According to the trial Court some of the factors which will determine the question of jurisdiction, were that consolidation had intervened, and the plaintiffs' contention being that the proceedings taken and orders passed by the Consolidation Authorities are void, on the ground of fraud, it would be necessary for granting any relief to the plaintiffs in respect of the land in suit, that they must first have the same cancelled; and that could be done only by a Civil Court. The trial Court further proceeded to observe that it may be that at the final stage the bar of S. 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act may become operative in case the plaintiffs are unable to prove that the proceedings taken by the Consolidation Authorities were vitiated by fraud or collusion but the suit could not be thrown out at the outset for want of jurisdiction. The question whether the suit was barred by S. 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was, therefore, expressly left open to be tried later, in due course, On issues Nos. 3 and 4, the trial Court found by its judgment dated 13-11-1969 that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the impugned order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer is void or liable to be cancelled on any ground and that being so, the plaintiffs were one of the sirdar's of the land in suit. On issue No. 2, the trial Court held that the suit in respect of title and possession of the land was barred by S. 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act: and, holding on issue No.5, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief, it dismissed the suit with costs to the contesting defendants. 3. On the plaintiffs' appeal from the dismissal of their suit by the trial Court, the following three questions were raised by the Lower Appellate Court namely : 1. Whether the , Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit? 2. Whether the suit was barred by S. 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act? and 3. Whether the non-compliance with the provisions of S. 21 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act nullifies the entire proceedings? 4. Whether the , Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit? 2. Whether the suit was barred by S. 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act? and 3. Whether the non-compliance with the provisions of S. 21 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act nullifies the entire proceedings? 4. I may here observe that the question of jurisdiction did not really arise from the defendants' appeal (sic) for the first issue which raised the question of jurisdiction had been decided by the trial Court in their favour. The point must have been canvassed by the defendant respondents in the Lower Appellate Court. 5. The lower appellate Court held: "The plaintiffs claimed two reliefs" (1) cancellation of the order dated 14-2-1957 and 12) injunction. The first relief cannot he granted by a Court other than the Civil Court. As regards the second relief it is not disputed that the plaintiffs had not been in possession over the plots and if they had been in possession which was interfered with by the defendants, they had every right to seek redress from the Civil Court by means of an injunction to safeguard that possession. The suit giving rise to the appeal was not for the bare relief of injunction because in that case the position would have been different inasmuch as the suit in respect of agricultural holdings for bare relief of injunction coupled with declaration might have been triable by the revenue Court. The relief of injunction in the suit giving rise to this appeal is actually linked with the relief of cancellation of the order. The argument of the learned counsel for the contesting respondents that the relief of declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs are the sole sirdar's of the disputed plots is pith and substance of the suit appears to be misconceived. The reason is obvious. It is not disputed that the appellants were not recorded tenure-holders or that they were not in possession. The main controversy centres round the order dated 14-2-1957 under which the names of the deceased Surajdin, Bachai and Ramdin had been recorded over the disputed plots in addition to the names of the appellants. The appellants actually were the recorded tenure-holders and their names alone existed on the land record. The relief of declaration is therefore not the pith and substance of the suit. The appellants actually were the recorded tenure-holders and their names alone existed on the land record. The relief of declaration is therefore not the pith and substance of the suit. The ruling of Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shanker, 1968 RD 470 is not applicable to the instant case because the two reliefs claimed in the suit here are cognisable by the Civil Court and there is no ancillary relief." 6. With these observations the Lower Appellate Court confirmed the finding of the trial Court on issue No. 1. that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. 7. On point No. 2. the lower appellate Court held that the suit was not barred by S. 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. On point No. 3 it held that the provisions of S. 21 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act were- not complied with and therefore, "the entire proceedings of reconciliation culminating in the Akar Patra in Form No. 7 stands nullified and the order (it. 14-2-1957 is liable to be cancelled." The lower appellate court added: "The Court will not give a finding as to whether the appellants are sole sirdar's of the disputed plots because for that the appellants shall be free to seek that relief from the revenue court after contesting their claims." 8. With these findings the lower appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit for cancellation of the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer dated 14-2-1957 and for the relief of injunction restraining the defendants Nos. 5 to 8, 2 and 9 from interfering with the appellant's possession unless the rights of the parties to the disputed plots are finally decided by a competent court." The second appeal was heard by Hon'ble C. S. P. Singh. J. and by order dated 10th May. 1971. the following issues were remitted to the lower appellate court for decision, namely; (1) "whether the plaintiffs had knowledge of the proceedings under the Act" and (2) "whether in spite of such knowledge the plaintiffs failed to file any objection under that Act.". Three months time from the date of receipt of the record was allowed to the lower appellate court to return its findings by the said order. Three months time from the date of receipt of the record was allowed to the lower appellate court to return its findings by the said order. but delays in our courts have become endemic and the lower appellate court recorded its findings on the two issues so remitted to it, by its order dated 23rd Dec., 1972. It found on the first issue that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the proceedings under the Act, and on the second issue that having had no knowledge of the proceedings, they could not have filed any objection under the Act. 9. The matter was again placed before Hon'ble C. S. P. Singh, J., and by order dated 31st Aug., 1973 he called for a fresh finding from the lower appellate court, after consideration of such fresh evidence as parties may choose to lead. It may be here noticed that on the earlier occasion the lower appellate court was required to give its finding on the said two issues. On the basis of the evidence already on the record. Hon'ble C. S. P. Singh, J. was impelled to do so in view of the fact that a perusal of the consolidation file which appears to have been summoned before him in the course of arguments, showed that there was "relevant material contained therein which will help in a correct decision of the two issues already remitted." Hon' ble C. S. P. Singh. J. was further pleased to permit the defendants to amend the written statement in view of the contention raised before him that the issue whether the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the consolidation proceedings should not have been considered by the courts below. 10. The written statements of the defendants Nos. 5 to 8 were thereafter amended and the plea was raised to the effect that the plaintiffs had full knowledge of the consolidation proceedings and they participated therein, filed objections and appeals, and their case that they had no knowledge of the consolidation proceedings or they did not participate in them was totally wrong. After recording fresh evidence, the lower appellate court has returned the finding dated 9th Dec., 1982 to the effect that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the consolidation proceedings and they did not participate in the same. 11. The matter was therefore placed before me for hearing. After recording fresh evidence, the lower appellate court has returned the finding dated 9th Dec., 1982 to the effect that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the consolidation proceedings and they did not participate in the same. 11. The matter was therefore placed before me for hearing. Learned counsel for the defendant appellants urged that it is impossible to say that the plaintiffs who are claiming to be the residents of the village and recorded tenure-holders of the' land in suit would have had no knowledge of the start of consolidation of holding operations in the village. The start of consolidation operations in a village is a notorious fact and everyone who has anything to do with any land in the village becomes aware of the same. Learned counsel further contended that it was not the case of the plaintiffs that they had no knowledge of the fact that the village had come under consolidation operations at the time when the proceedings in questions were taken in the year 1957. Their case was that the particular proceedings by which the names of defendants Nos. 2 to 5 and Surajdin, Bachai and Ramdin were recorded under the Assistant Consolidation Officer's order dated 14-2-1957 as co-tenure-holders with them were fraudulently suppressed from them, and no notice or summons was issued. The learned counsel further urged that the enquiry whether the plaintiffs had knowledge of the consolidation proceedings was thus wholly irrelevant and that this court ought not to have remitted an issue for a finding on that question. The question raised at the trial was whether the suit is barred by S. 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and also whether the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit. Under S. 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of the land, or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings, in regard to which proceedings could or ought to have been taken under the Act, has to be done in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and all civil and revenue courts are prohibited from entertaining any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act. 12. 12. The plaintiffs case was that their names were originally recorded as sirdars of the land in suit but by some fraud the names of defendants nos. 2 to 5 and Surajdin, Bachai and Ramdin came to be recorded as co-tenure-holders under an order dated 14th Feb., 1957 of the Assistant Consolidation Officer and that they came to know of this fact by inspection of CH Form No. 7. CH Form No. 7 is referable to R. 27-A of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules. A statement in that form is required to be prepared by the Consolidation Lekhpal under the directions of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation in view of the orders passed under S. 9A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. S. 9-A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act deals with disposal of cases relating to claims to land and partition of joint holdings, but that was not the shape of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act or Rules framed thereunder, in the year 1957, when the impugned order dated 14-2-1957 was passed. Before the amendments made to the Act in 1958, CH Form No. 7 was referable to R. 19 (e) (iii) and R. 20. It was a list of mistakes detected in the Khatauni. CH Form No. 6 detailed the mistakes in the Khasra; and CH. Form No.S the list of mistakes in the map. R. 19 (e), required that the Assistant Consolidation Officer, shall, in taking action under S. 7. direct the consolidator to make a field to field partal of the Village in association with the consolidation committee and submit a report to him showing. "(e) a list of mistakes detected by him in (1) the map; (ii) the khasra in respect of area, possession and irrigation; and (iii) the khatauni as a result or checking and test thereof in accordance with the provisions contained in the Land Records Manual". Rule required the Assistant Consolidation Officer to test the same by random sampling and then forward the lists of mistakes with his report for orders of the Settlement Officers (Consolidation) through the Consolidation Officer. Under Rule 21 the Assistant Consolidation Officer was required, pending receipt of the orders of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), to collect as many tenure-holders of the village as possible and try to bring about reconciliation between them. Under Rule 21 the Assistant Consolidation Officer was required, pending receipt of the orders of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), to collect as many tenure-holders of the village as possible and try to bring about reconciliation between them. Sub-rule (2) R. 21 runs thus : "(a) Where any of the parties concerned is not present or where a reconciliation has not been arrived at, the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall make a summary enquiry, maintain a brief memorandum of the evidence recorded by him and tentatively decide as to what the proper entry would be: (b) He shall then issue notices to all persons concerned with the entry, informing them of the existing and the proposed entries and calling upon them to furnish their evidence for or against the proposal on a date to be fixed by him." The certified copy of the Form No. 7, Ext. 1, shows that in addition to the names of Baijnath and Munna plaintiffs, the names of Surajdin, Ram Niwaj, Bahraich, Bachai and Mahrajdin were also sought to be added and the Assistat Consolidation Officer appears to have approved of the correction. As official acts are presumed to be regularly performed, one must proceed on the assumption unless the contrary is proved that the Assistant Consolidation Officer must have issued notices to all persons concerned with the entry, which included the plaintiffs, informing them of the existing and the proposed entries. Under sub-sec. (4) of S. 8 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it then stood any person aggrieved by such an order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer could, within 21 days of the orders, appeal to the Consolidation Officer, whose decision was, except as otherwise provided by or under the Act as it then stood, made final. 13. S. 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act as it then stood provided that no person shall institute any suit or other proceeding in any civil or revenue court with respect to any matter arising out of consolidation proceedings or with respect to any other matter in regard to which a suit or application could be filed under the provisions of the Act. These provisions show that unless the plaintiffs establish, as a fact, that the Assistant Consolidation Officer did not serve any notice of the proceedings taken by him for the correction of records that was made under his order, the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer was final and binding on them, and they could not institute any suit in a civil or a revenue court to avoid the effect of, or to get round the same. 14. The issue whether the plaintiffs had knowledge of the consolidation proceedings could be said to be relevant in that context but the real issue was not whether the plaintiffs were aware of the fact that the consolidation operations were going on, but whether the Assistant Consolidation Officer revised the revenue records to their prejudice by entering the names of the defendants as co- tenure-holders with them without serving on them the notice required to be served by R. 21 (2) (b) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules, and thus deprived them of the opportunity which they had under the law of being heard before the said correction of the revenue records. 15. It is impossible to say in the face of Extr,. A 1 to A 5 that the appellants had no knowledge of the proceedings of consolidation of holdings which were going on in the village in the year 1957. It is highly improbable that the appellants were not aware of the entry of the names of the defendants Nos. 2 to 5 and Surajdin, Bachai and Ramdin, as co-tenure-holders with them in the year 1957, until 20 or 25 days before filing of the suit which they did on 16th July. 1968. Be that as it may, the primary question which was raised in this suit and which looms large on the facts of the case is the question whether the civil court was competent to entertain the suit. However, a question of jurisdiction could be raised now only if the conditions of sub-sec. (1-A) of S. 331 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Performs Act are satisfied. However, a question of jurisdiction could be raised now only if the conditions of sub-sec. (1-A) of S. 331 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Performs Act are satisfied. These conditions are, firstly that the objection to the jurisdiction must have been taken in the court of first instance and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement: and secondly that the consequence of entertaining the suit by the Civil Court has been a failure of justice. It is indisputable that the objection to the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit was taken at the earliest possible opportunity in the court of first instance. Indeed it was tried as a preliminary issue. The question which has, therefore, to be answered is whether the finding arrived at by the trial court and confirmed by the lower appellate court that the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit is correct and if not whether there has been a consequent failure of justice. 16. The question whether the court has jurisdiction has to be determined primarily on the allegations in the plaint. The plaint allegations in the present case are that the plaintiffs have been the tenants for agricultural purposes and sirdars in possession of the land detailed at the foot of the plaint and have been using the same as such; that the defendants never had an connection with the land in suit, nor wet they ever in possession of the same; on the contrary since the death of their father, the plaintiffs have continuously been in possession of the land up to the date of suit, that the defendants are in league, and inimical to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are peaceful and illiterate persons and are engaged in agriculture but occasionally the first plaintiff used to be away to Pratapgarh in connection with management of some cultivation which he has got from his wife's side; that the defendant No. 9 was ex- Sabhapati of the village and was very influential and very clever and very litigious, and inimical towards the plaintiffs; that some 20 to 25 days ago when the plaintiffs were manuring the land in suit, the defendants came and prevented the plaintiffs from doing so, claiming the land to be the property of defendants Nos. 1 to 6; that the plaintiffs were very surprised at this and got the revenue record inspected on which they came to know that the names of Surajdin the father of the defendant No. 1 and Bachai son of Kalidin, and Ramdin son of Dharja along with defendants Nos. 2 to 5, had been entered along with the plaintiffs' name, and the defendants Nos. 6 to 9 were their friends, and further that the names of Surajdin, Bachai and Ramdin along with defendants Nos. 2 to 5 had been entered as co- tenure-holders with the plaintiffs under an order dated 14-2-1957 of the Assistant Consolidation Officer of the area; that Surajdin was dead and Bachai and Ramdin were also dead. The defendant No. I was the son of Surajdin. Mahrajdin, own brother of Bachai was a defendant and Ramdin died issueless but defendant No. 6 who was the widow of Gujrat alias Gajoo claimed herself to be the widow of Ramdin and was, therefore, impleaded as a defendant. The plaintiffs further pleaded that Inspection of CH Form No. 7 revealed the following facts : (a) That the order directing the entry of the names of Surajdin, Bachai and Ramdin and defendants Nos. 2 to 5 as co-tenure- holders was wholly without jurisdiction against law, in collusion with the defendants, without knowledge or information to the plaintiffs, wrong, fictitious and against facts and was a forgery. (b) That no notice or summons was ever issued nor was any proceeding taken about the said order. (c) That the said order was passed on the basis of the statement of defendant No. 9. It was wholly without jurisdiction, against law and collusive and was passed to harm the plaintiffs. (d) That while passing the said order, statements of the members of the Consolidation Committee were not recorded nor was it verified by them. (e) That the said order did not contain any signatures of the Assistant Consolidation Officer. 17. It was then repeated that the said order was procured by collusion of the defendants and was based on fraud, deception and wrong statements, and the plaintiffs never had any knowledge of the CH Form No. 7 before the aforesaid inspection. It was again repeated that the aforesaid order was based on fraud and deception. 17. It was then repeated that the said order was procured by collusion of the defendants and was based on fraud, deception and wrong statements, and the plaintiffs never had any knowledge of the CH Form No. 7 before the aforesaid inspection. It was again repeated that the aforesaid order was based on fraud and deception. Certain allegations were then made against the defendant No. 9 and it was said that the plaintiffs were prevented by fraud of the defendant No. 9 from coming to know the said proceedings and order in the consolidation operations. 18. The relief claimed has already been recited herein-above. The long and short of the plaint allegation is that the plaintiffs wanted to avoid the orders passed and the entries made in the consolidation proceedings on the ground that they were fraudulent and collusive and were without jurisdiction inasmuch as they were passed without any notice to them. The effective relief which the plaintiffs wanted was a declaration that entry of the names of Surajdin, Bachai and Ramdin along with the defendants Nos. 2 to 5 as co-tenure-holders with them, were wrong. The declaration that the Assistant Consolidation Officer's order dated 14-2-1957 was based on fraud and was passed without the knowledge or information of the plaintiffs and was fictitious, wrong, without jurisdiction, illegal and against the facts was sought only as a stepping stone for the real relief of declaration that the entries made in the revenue records with respect to the land in suit were wrong and not binding on the plaintiffs. 19. The lower appellate court has observed that the relief so claimed was for cancellation of the order dated 14-2-1957 and cannot be granted by a court other than the civil court and the main controversy centered round that order. The trial court also observed that the plaintiffs cannot succeed in getting any relief with respect to the land in suit unless they succeed in getting the order dated 14-2-1957 cancelled and that this could be done only by a civil court. 20. The provision for cancellation of instruments by suit, as contained in S. 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, It is in the following terms : "31. 20. The provision for cancellation of instruments by suit, as contained in S. 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, It is in the following terms : "31. (1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable, and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. (2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered: and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation." Under this provision a person may sue to have an instrument adjudged void or voidable and the court, may in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. The basic relief to be had under this provision is the adjudication to the effect that the instrument in question is void or voidable, and in some cases, where the court so adjudges it, it can ask the party in whose possession the instrument is, to deliver it up and to cancel it. In case of a decree or order of a court or authority not subordinate to the civil court, where a suit under S. 31 of the Specific Relief Act is brought all that the court can do, on being satisfied of the correctness of the plaintiffs' case, is to adjudge that the decree or order is void and declare it to be so. The court or authority passing the impugned order not being subordinate to the civil court, cannot be asked to deliver up that order to the civil court for being cancelled by it. Such a declaration is in most cases adequate and whenever that order or decree is sought to be used against the plaintiff, he can set up the judgment and decree of the civil court by which it is declared void. There is no question of cancellation of a decree or order, although a decree adjuging a decree or order to be void is sometimes loosely described as a decree cancelling the order or decree which has been adjudged void. There is no question of cancellation of a decree or order, although a decree adjuging a decree or order to be void is sometimes loosely described as a decree cancelling the order or decree which has been adjudged void. There can be no dispute that the jurisdiction to pass a decree under S. 31 of the Specific Relief Act is possessed only by the civil court. Yet the basis, and the only basis on which the decree or order of another court can be adjudged void by a civil court is to be found in the provisions of S. 44 of the Evidence Act, which provides that; "Any party to a suit or other proceeding may show that any judgment, order or decree which is relevant under S. 40, 41 or 42 and which has been proved by the adverse party, was delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it, or was obtained by fraud or collusion. "The effect of the provisions of Ss. 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act is that while a judgment, order or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction regularly obtained by one party against another, binds both, in all further dealings between them, and in case of judgments in rem, they bind everyone, unless the party interested in doing so establishes that the judgment, order or decree which he says is not binding on him was delivered by a court not competent to deliver it or was obtained by fraud or collusion. That party may have a declaration to that effect by way of a suit under S. 31 of the Specific Relief Act, or in case he has not already done so, may show in the proceeding in which it is sought to be used against him, that it was passed by a court not competent to pass it or was obtained by fraud or collusion. It is thus not necessary for a person to obtain an advance declaration of invalidity or nullity by a suit under S. 31 of the Specific Relief Act. He can avoid the judgment, decree or order whenever and wherever it is set up against him, provided he carn show that it was made by a court not competent to pass it or was obtained by fraud or collusion. 21. He can avoid the judgment, decree or order whenever and wherever it is set up against him, provided he carn show that it was made by a court not competent to pass it or was obtained by fraud or collusion. 21. It is necessary only in cases of what are called voidable instruments or transactions, that they must be avoided by a suit for their cancellation under S. 31 of the Specific Relief Act, for a voidable instrument or transaction is good until it is avoided by the person by whom. or at whose instance, it is voidable. A judgment, decree or order passed by a court not competent to pass it or obtained by fraud and collusion is void in the sense that its invalidity or nullity can be set -up by any person interested in doing so whenever and wherever it is sought to be used against him. 22. The real relief and the only effective relief which the plaintiffs desire in the present case was a declaration of their rights as the sole sirdar's of the land in suit to the exclusion of the defendants, and they wanted that relief by having the revenue records corrected by expunging the names of the defendants Nos. 1 to 6 therefrom. They could get that relief, and adequately and properly too, by a suit under S. 229B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. in case they could succeed in showing that they were sirdar's in possession and the defendants were not in possession. In case they were out of possession they could get relief by a suit for possession under S. 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. That being so, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit, was, in my opinion, barred by S. 331 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 23. The lower appellate court referred to and distinguished the Full Bench decision of this court in Ram Wazamb v. Jata Shanker, 1968 All LJ 1108 : ( AIR 1969 All 526 ). I think the lower appellate court was not right in doing so. The main relief in the present case was a declaration that the entries in the revenue records were wrong, though relief in that form could not be granted at all. I think the lower appellate court was not right in doing so. The main relief in the present case was a declaration that the entries in the revenue records were wrong, though relief in that form could not be granted at all. The real relief was, as stated above, a declaration of the plaintiffs' rights to the land in suit and the appropriate forum for the same was the revenue court. 24. This beings me to the question whether the trial of the suit by the civil court has resulted in or will result in a failure of justice. I had the occasion to examine this question in Kishori Lal v. Shambhoo Nath, 1979 RD 37 : (1978 All LJ 1273). To a suit under S. 229-B of the U. P. Z. A. & L. R. Act, the State Government and the Gaon Sabha are necessary parties. To a suit under S. 209 also the State Government is a necessary party. There can be no effective adjudication of rights in these matters in the absence of the State Government and the Gaon Sabha inasmuch as the place of the landholders is now taken by the State Government. I may add that in the present case the lower appellate court, while decreeing the suit expressly refused to give finding on the question whether the plaintiffs are the sole sirdar's of the land in suit and left them free to seek that relief from the revenue court. The relief granted by the lower appellate court to the plaintiffs is thus a relief without any substance. The declaration that the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer dated 14-2-1957 was not binding on the plaintiffs, is of no consequence unless the revenue authorities recognise the plaintiffs to be the sirdars of the land and enter their names in the revenue records. The declaration that the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer dated 14-2-1957 was not binding on the plaintiffs, is of no consequence unless the revenue authorities recognise the plaintiffs to be the sirdars of the land and enter their names in the revenue records. If the plaintiffs were to file a suit for declaration and set up the decree passed by the lower appellate court in their favour, the state Government and the Gaon Sabha, who would be necessary parties to that suit, may very well take the plea that the finding and the decree of the civil court are not binding on them as they were not parties to the present suit and the plaintiffs would, in that case, be required to prove in the presence of the State Government and the Gaon Sabha that the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer dated 14-2-1957 and the subsequent entries in the revenue records, in the consolidation proceedings and thereafter were all without jurisdiction and a nullity for being based on fraud and on collusion. It appears clear to me that even if the present suit were not dismissed at this stage by this court sitting in appeal, there would be a consequent failure of justice. 25. It was not suggested to me that under these circumstances the plaint may be directed to be returned for presentation to the proper court. However, I find that even if that request were made it would be appropriate in this case to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction. The plaint would need substantial amendments and since the amount of court-fees payable on a suit for declaration and for possession in the revenue court would not be very heavy, it would meet the ends of justice if it is left open to the plaintiffs in case they are so minded to bring a fresh suit for proper relief in the court of competent jurisdiction. 26. I must, however, briefly notice the submissions made by Sri R. C. Srivastava, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents. His first objection was that the appeal was not maintainable as all the defendants had not appealed. There is no substance in the objection in view of the provision contained in O. 41 R. 4 of the Civil P. C. 27. I must, however, briefly notice the submissions made by Sri R. C. Srivastava, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents. His first objection was that the appeal was not maintainable as all the defendants had not appealed. There is no substance in the objection in view of the provision contained in O. 41 R. 4 of the Civil P. C. 27. His next objection was that the Assistant Consolidation Officer is not a court and, therefore, Section 44 of the Evidence Act does not apply. The objection is misconceived. S. 44 of the Evidence Act will have to be relied upon by the plaintiffs in the suit for declaration and/or possession to be instituted in :a revenue Court. It is not suggested that a revenue Court is not a Court within the meaning of S. 44 of the Evidence Act. Even so in view of the fact that the word 'Court' is used in S. 44 of the Evidence Act with reference to the authority whose judgment, order or decree is sought to be questioned, it would be sufficient to observe that the word "Court" as used in the Evidence Act includes, according to its definition, under S. 3 of that Act, "all Judges and Magistrates and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence." The Assistant Consolidation Officer who passed the impugned order dated 15-2-1957 was undoubtedly a person authorised to take evidence, in view of S. 38 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 28. The next objection raised by Sri Srivastava was that where fraud was committed by the court, the decree is said to be a nullity, but if the fraud is committed by a party, the decree is only voidable at the instance of other side. No such question arises in the present case. If the order dated 14-2-57 was passed by the Asstt. Consolidation Officer in excess of his jurisdiction or was obtained by fraud or collusion, the plaintiffs can show that in the revenue court under S. 44 of the Evidence Act when that order is relied upon by the defendants in the revenue court. 29. Sri Srivastava then said that the main relief sought by the plaintiffs was of an injunction and the relief for avoidance of the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer was merely ancillary. 29. Sri Srivastava then said that the main relief sought by the plaintiffs was of an injunction and the relief for avoidance of the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer was merely ancillary. I have already demonstrated that the main relief was of a declaration of the incorrectness of the entries made in the revenue records, consequent upon the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer. The relief of injunction was merely consequential. 30. The last submission made by Sri R. C. Srivastava was that in view of the order passed by Hon'ble C. S. P. Singh, J. the only surviving question is whether the suit is barred by S, 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Hon'ble C. S. P. Singh, J. did not decide any issue, when he remitted the two issues framed by him for a finding to the lower appellate court. The whole case was at large and when a question of jurisdiction is raised, it is appropriate to deal with it and to decide it first. 31. In view of the conclusion arrived at by me above, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that the suit ought to be dismissed on that finding. It would not be proper for me to enter upon the merits of the case or to decide the other issues. 32. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree under appeal are set aside. It is held that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the suit is on that finding dismissed with costs throughout, leaving it open to the plaintiff respondents if they are so minded, to seek their remedy, if any in a court of competent jurisdiction. The record summoned from the Consolidation authorities under this court's order dated 20th July, 1973 and which is now tagged on to the record of the lower appellate court, shall be sent back to the proper authority as soon as possible.