JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been filed by Mrs. Maria Singh against the order of the learned District judge, jodhpur dated 28 11-1981 by which her application for setting aside an ex-parte decree passed against her under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act on 6-7-1976 has been rejected as being barred by time. 2. The relevant facts giving rise to this appeal are that Shri Narendra Singh respondent No. 1 had filed an application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for a decree of divorce against his wife Mrs. Maria Singh on the ground of adultery etc. The notice of this appeal was admittedly not personally served upon the appellant and was published in a local paper 'Jangan', although at the relevant time the petitioner was not in India. The parties are residents of Udaipur. The application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed at jodhpur and, therefore, the appellant did not have knowledge of this decree till 15-10-78 when her counsel Shri Keshri Singh Hiran who was engaged by her in some criminal matter told him that it appeared that some application for divorce may have been filed against her and a decree may have been passed by a Court of Jodhpur. On that Smt. Maria Singh came to jodhpur on 2-11-78, as she was busy in the criminal cases in October; made enquiries, also inspected the file and obtained copies of the relevant documents and it was on 4-11-78 that she came to know that the above decree for divorce has been passed against her. Thereupon she filed the present application for setting aside the ex-parte decree on 7-11-78. The respondent contested the application and alleged that the appellant had knowledge of this decree from the very beginning. As a matter of facts she had left India only in order to evade service of notice of the application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act and after her return from England and USA. She had positively come to know of this decree through some common friends and relations. It was further pointed out that a criminal case under Section 454 and 427 I.P.C. had been instituted against the appellant and the copy of the challan was handed over to her on 20-9-78. She had positively come to know of this decree through some common friends and relations. It was further pointed out that a criminal case under Section 454 and 427 I.P.C. had been instituted against the appellant and the copy of the challan was handed over to her on 20-9-78. Along- with other papers filed with the challan, a copy of the decree of divorce dated 6-7-76 had also been supplied to the appellant and from that she definitely came to know of that decree of 20-9-78 but she did not take any steps to get that decree set aside within time. After taking the evidence of the parties and hearing them the learned Dist. Judge found that as a matter of fact the notice of the application under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act was never served upon the appellant and that the publication of the notice in Jangan' was also improperly obtained. He, however, found that the appeal-land had knowledge of the decree at least on 20-9-78 or immediately thereafter but she did not file the application within the prescribed time and on this ground he rejected the application hence this appeal. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. There is no dispute before me that the notice of the application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act had not been properly served upon the appellant. That being so admittedly the limitation for filing an application for setting aside ex-parte decree would start from the date of knowledge of the decree. The only question which arises for consideration in this appeal is as to on what date the appellant had got the knowledge of the decree ? If she had got the knowledge of the decree only within 30 days of the filing of the application, application would be within limitation but if the application has been filed after more 30 days from the date of know- ledge, it would admittedly be barred by time. 4. The learned District judge has mainly based his finding to the effect that the application is barred by time on the fact that copy of the challan under Section 454 and 427 I.P.C. had been supplied to the appellant on 20-9-78 and alongwith the challan a copy of the decree dated 6-7-1976 had also been supplied to her. 4. The learned District judge has mainly based his finding to the effect that the application is barred by time on the fact that copy of the challan under Section 454 and 427 I.P.C. had been supplied to the appellant on 20-9-78 and alongwith the challan a copy of the decree dated 6-7-1976 had also been supplied to her. Of course, according to the learned District Judge himself that copy which is Ex. 4 on record, was not quite legible nor was it complete but in the facts and circumstances of the case, the copy in the state in which it was, was sufficient to give the appellant the knowledge of the fact that a decree of divorce had already been passed against her on 6-7-76, I have, therefore, to examine what type of document Ex. 4 is and whether the finding arrived at by the learned District judge on its basis is correct.The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that the knowledge so far as the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree is concerned must be specific knowledge in respect of a particular decree passed by a particular court had not any vague information to the effect that some decree of some Court had been passed. He has placed reliance upon 1961 Rajasthan page 32, 1937 Patna 17, 1972 Patna page 310 and 1973 Bombay page 193 in this respect. It may at once be stated that there can not be any quarrel with the principles laid down in these authorities and the same have not been challenged before me by the learned Counsel for the respondent also.It has been held in 1957 Supreme Court Page 1384; "When the summons was not duly served, limitation under Article 164 does not start running against the defendant because he has received some vague information that some decree has been passed against him. It is a question of fact in each case whether the information conveyed to the defendant is sufficient to impute to him knowledge of the decree within the meaning of Article 164. The test of the sufficiency is not what the information would mean to a stranger, but what it meant to the defendant in the light of his previous dealing with the plaintiff and the facts and circumstances known to him. The test of the sufficiency is not what the information would mean to a stranger, but what it meant to the defendant in the light of his previous dealing with the plaintiff and the facts and circumstances known to him. If from the information conveyed to him the defendant has knowledge of the decree sought to be set aside, time begins to run against him under Article 164. It is not necessary that a copy of the decree should be served on the defendant. It is sufficient that the defendant has knowledge of the material facts concerning the decree, so that he has a clear perception of the injury suffered by him and can take effective steps to set aside the decree." 5. Therefore, as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case as to whether a particular information is sufficient to impute knowledge of the decree to the defendant or not ? Now in the light of this we have to consider the facts and circumstances of the present case. It may at once be, stated here that admittedly the relations between the appellant Mrs. Maria Singh and her husband Shri Narendra Singh were by no means cordial. Disputes had been going on and they had been living separate since long. Narendra Singh had been residing in India and Smt. Maria Singh had been away to England and U.S.A. for a pretty long time since 1975. On her return a complaint for offence under Section 454 and 427 I.P.C. had been lodged against her. It was in respect of the house belonging to her husband Narender Singh. When a complaint for trespass and mis-chief in that house was lodged against her, it could have naturally put her on guard that the property of her husband was not being treated as a property belonging to her also and that is why charges under Section 454 and 427 I.P.C. were being made against her. In connection with the investigation of this charge the S.H O. had admittedly issued some interrogatories to Smt. Maria Singh vide Ex. 3, querry No. 4 was to the effect that according to the information received it appeared that Shri Narendra Singh had divorced her and the matter has been decided by the High Court. The querry vide Ex. In connection with the investigation of this charge the S.H O. had admittedly issued some interrogatories to Smt. Maria Singh vide Ex. 3, querry No. 4 was to the effect that according to the information received it appeared that Shri Narendra Singh had divorced her and the matter has been decided by the High Court. The querry vide Ex. A/3 was admittedly received by Smt. Maria Singh on 8-9-78 but she did not give any reply to it. This fact should further put her to guard and she must have come to know that atleast there were rumours of her having been divorced by her husband. It is in this sequence that the challan under Sections 454 and 427 I.P.C. was produced before the Court on 20-9-78 and the copy of the challan was admittedly supplied to her. There is no denial of the fact that alongwith the challan the document Ex. 4 was also supplied to her. She has admitted in her statement before the Court that it was she who had received the documents and then she handed it over to her counsel Sri Keshri Singh Hiran. She has further admitted that after 2 or 3 days of this she had again met Shri Hiran in connection with some other criminal matters. The case of the respondent further was that a clear typed copy of the documents Ex. 4 had also been supplied to the appellant by the S.H.O. soon after 20.9-78. The learned District judge has referred to this aspect of the matter although he has not completely relied upon it. It was in these circumstances that according to the learned District judge it appeared that Smt. Maria Singh had the know- ledge of the decree passed against her atleast on 20-9-78 when the document Ex. 4 had been supplied to her alongwith the Challan and, therefore, she should have filed the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree dated 6-7-76 atleast within a month from 20-9-78. 6. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the document Ex. 4 was not legible and the appellant could not have come to know of the contents of this document when it was supplied to her. He also urged that Ex. 6. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the document Ex. 4 was not legible and the appellant could not have come to know of the contents of this document when it was supplied to her. He also urged that Ex. 4 is not a complete copy of the decree but is only a very small part of it, and therefore, even if it was read with some effort on the part of the appellant, this document was not sufficient to impute knowledge of the decree to the appellant according to him document could at best show that some application under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act had been filed against the appellant and some decisions may have been given in that matter, but what that decision was and whether the application was accepted or rejected could not be inferred from this document. He also laid much emphasis on the fact that the respondent had been trying to over reach the appellant and to obtain a decree of divorce against her on the serious ground of adultery without the appellant getting any notice or an opportunity of hearing the Court which passed that decree and that is why he had got the summons published in local paper of jodhpur which has no circulation at Udaipur where the parties had been residing earlier and specially in the circumstances when the respondent knew that the appellant had. left India and was staying at England or U.S.A. during these days. 7. So far as the last mentioned submission of the learned Counsel goes, I do not think it has any bearing on the question of knowledge of the appellant in respect of the decree. There is no dispute that the summons of the application under Section IS of the Hindu Marriage Act was not served upon the appellant and the publication thereof in the local paper of jodhpur was not proper. But merely on that account it can not be assumed that as a matter of fact alleged by her. The question of knowledge of this decree till the date alleged by her. The question of knowledge will have to be decided from other evidence which has been led by the learned District judge viz. the receipt of the document Ex. 4. 8. Now it may at once be stated the Ex. The question of knowledge of this decree till the date alleged by her. The question of knowledge will have to be decided from other evidence which has been led by the learned District judge viz. the receipt of the document Ex. 4. 8. Now it may at once be stated the Ex. 4 is certainly not quite legible, but at the same time it is abundantly clear that it can be read with some effort and the meaning of the document can be made out. The heading of the document is in English and there is no denial of the fact that the appellant knows English. If she had made a little effort she could have clearly made out that this was a document relating to a judgment of the Court of the learned District judge in a matter under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act relating to the parties in this matter. Then as already stated above she herself had received this document and handed it over to her counsel. This document was a part of the Challan filed against her for offence under Section 454 & 427 Indian Penal Code in respect of her own husband's premises and further as stated above a querry had already been made from her by the S.H.O. concerned during the course of investigation regarding passing of the decree and, there- fore, these circumstances there was absolutely no reason to think that the appellant would not have know through Ex. 4 that a decree for divorce had been passed against her by the learned District Judge, Jodhpur on 6-7-76. Not only this it is natural that when a criminal case is instituted against a person and a challan is filed and copies are delivered to that person he or she would at one look into the documents and try to find out what the case was and what were the documents or evidence in support of that case. Naturally, therefore, as soon as these copies were delivered to Smt. Maria Singh, the heading of Ex. 4 is in English and from this heading itself in the circumstances pointed above, she must have or could,have know that a decree of divorce had been passed against her on 6-7-76. 9. The matter does not rest here. Naturally, therefore, as soon as these copies were delivered to Smt. Maria Singh, the heading of Ex. 4 is in English and from this heading itself in the circumstances pointed above, she must have or could,have know that a decree of divorce had been passed against her on 6-7-76. 9. The matter does not rest here. On 20-9-78 when she handed over the papers to her learned Counsel Shri Keshri Singh Hiran, he must also have looked into these documents and admittedly the appellant Smt. Maria Singh had again met Shri Hiran after 2 or 3 days. It is natural to expect that Shri Hiran must have told her about these documents on that meeting. Even if for the sake of arguments it is assumed that the appellant not knowing Hindi was not able to go through the papers and challan completely, her counsel who was well versed in the legal affairs would certainly have gone through these documents and informed her about the contents when she says that it was only on 15-10-78 that Shri Hiran had told her that it appeared that some matter regarding divorce had been filed or may have been filed against her at jodhpur and that she should made enquiries about them. Neither the affidavit of Mr. Hiran has not been filed nor he has been examined by the appellant although she had led evidence in this matter. In these circumstances a very strong presumption arises against her and has rightly been drawn by the learned District Judge. I am, therefore, perfectly in agreement with the finding arrived at by the learned District judge. 10. It was also strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that a decree of divorce on the ground of adultery has been obtained ex-parte against the appellant which would not only effect her own future but also the legitimacy and future of her on Rajender Singh and in these circumstances the exparte decree should be set aside and she must be afforded an opportunity to defend herself. I am constrained to observe that even if that is so the court can not give a go-bye to the provisions of Limitation. I am constrained to observe that even if that is so the court can not give a go-bye to the provisions of Limitation. If the appellant having had knowledge of the decree did not take steps to get it set aside within the prescribed time the Court would not be justified in setting it aside on sensational grounds or in view of the alleged far-reaching consequences of the decree. 11. For the reasons stated above I do not find any force in this appeal and hereby dismissed it. However, looking to the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.Appeal dismissed. *******