S.S. BYAS, J.—This revision by twenty persons is directed against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Balotra dated June 16, 1983 passed in Criminal Case No. 56 of 1981, whereby cognizance for offence under Sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 325, 326, and 307 read with Sec. 149, I.P.C. was taken and process was issued to them to stand trial. 2. It would be proper to briefly resume the facts and circumstances giving rise to this revision. 3. At about 9 a.m. on 6-8-1981, a mob of nearly twenty four persons went to the field to Kamal and started ploughing it. Kamal, his brothers Sattar and Bilal went to forbid them. The mob became violent and made an assault on the complainant-party. The aforesaid three persons along with one Gafoor were belaboured. A report of the occurrence was lodged at police station, Ramsar on the same day. The police registered a case and proceeded with investigation. On the completion of investigation, the police submitted a challan against seven persons in the court of Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Barmer. Since, the offence under section 307, IPC was exclusively triable by a court of Sessions, the case was committed for trial. The learned Sessions Judge framed charges under sections 307, 147, 148, 326, 325, 324 and 323 read with section 149, IPC, against the seven accused persons. On 16.6.83, P.W. 1 Sattar was examined by the prosecution. When he was under cross examination, the Public Prosecutor submitted an application under Sec. 319, Cr. P.C. before the learned Sessions Judge, praying therein that the twenty persons (who are the petitioners in this Court) be summoned to face trial. The cross-examination of the witness was deferred at the request of the defence counsel The learned Sessions Judge by his order dated June 16,1983 allowed the said application, took cognizance against the petitioners and issued bailable warrants to secure their presence. Aggrieved against the said order, the petitioners have preferred this revision petition. 4. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and the Public Prosecutor. I have also carefully gone through the record of the case. 5. Aggrieved against the said order, the petitioners have preferred this revision petition. 4. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and the Public Prosecutor. I have also carefully gone through the record of the case. 5. The scope and ambit of Section 319, Cr.P.C. and the powers of a Court thereunder have been elaborately and exhaustively dealt with by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jogindra Singh vs. State of Punjab (1) and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Ram Kishan Rohtagi (2). The law laid down in these authorities was followed by this Court in Sheoram Singh etc. vs. State of Rajasthan (3). As a result of the pronouncements made in the above cases, it is now a well settled position in law that under Section 319 (I), Cr.P.C. a court(which includes all courts whether of a Magistrate or a Sessions) is competent and has powers to add any person and to summon him to stand trial, if the evidence recorded during enquiry or trial discloses his involvement in the commission of crime. The evidence of a single witness has been held to be sufficient to enable the court to issue process under Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. 6. Keeping in view this settled position of law, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners challenged the impugned order on two grounds viz;— (1) During trial, the prosecution examined only one witness Sattar (P.W.I). But his statement is incomplete because cross-examination was deferred. As such. the statement being incomplete, cognizance could not be taken on its basis against the petitioners. (2) The impugned order is not a speaking order. The learned Sessions Judge has merely mentioned therein that the application filed by the Public Prosecutor was accepted. This is not the proper compliance of the provisions of Sec. 319, Cr.P.C. 7. In reply, the learn d Public Prosecutor supported the impugned order and submitted that it was perfectly legal. I have taken the respective contentions into consideration. 8. Taking the first contention first, a perusal of the record shows that the prosecution examined only one witness Sattar (P.W.I). The examination-in-chief was over and cross-examination was taken up by the defence counsel. The cross-examination, however, remained incomplete and was deferred on the request of the learned defence counsel. 9. It is true that the statement of a witness in order to become evidence has to pass through three stages viz. The examination-in-chief was over and cross-examination was taken up by the defence counsel. The cross-examination, however, remained incomplete and was deferred on the request of the learned defence counsel. 9. It is true that the statement of a witness in order to become evidence has to pass through three stages viz. (i) examination-in-chief (ii) cross-examination and (iii) re-examination. Section 138 of the Evidence Act lays down the Procedure as to how a witness is to be examined. It envisages the aforesaid three stages. It speaks that the witness shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined and lastly (if the party calling him so desires) re examined. It is apparent from a bare reading of this section that the right of cross-examination is there, but it is there only when the adverse party desires to exercise it. If the adverse party desires to cross-examine the witness that privilege has to be granted to it. But when the adverse party does not desire to cross-examine the witness, it can not be said that the right of cross-examination has been denied to it or that the statement is not complete for want of cross-examination. 10. In the instant case, the exaraination-in-chief of P.W. 1 Sattar was complete and the learned defence counsel took up the cross-examination. After putting some questions in the cross-examination to the witness, the learned defence counsel made a request to defer the cross-examination in view of the application of the prosecution under section 319(1), Cr.P.C. In the context of these circumstances, it cannot be maintained that the right of cross-examination was denied. If the adverse party chooses not to cross-examine the witness despite an opportunity being granted to it, it can not be said that the statement is not complete for the purpose of applying Sec. 319(1), Cr.P.C. The adverse party can not be compelled to cross-examine a witness. All that the law requires under sec. 138 of the Evidence Act is to afford an opportunity for cross-examination. That opportunity was granted and cross-examination did take place to some extent. It could not be completed and was deferred for a later stage on the request of the learned defence counsel. The prosecution or the trial court cannot be saddled with responsibility for the cross-examination remaining incomplete. 138 of the Evidence Act is to afford an opportunity for cross-examination. That opportunity was granted and cross-examination did take place to some extent. It could not be completed and was deferred for a later stage on the request of the learned defence counsel. The prosecution or the trial court cannot be saddled with responsibility for the cross-examination remaining incomplete. The contention that since the statement of P.W. 1 Sattar was not complete, if can not be used to take cognizance against the petitioners is thus devoid of force and holds no ground. 11. Coming to the second contention, it was argued that the impugned order is not in speaking terms. The learned Sessions Judge should have recorded reasons as to how and why he was taking cognizance of the offences against the petitioners and issuing process to make them to stand trial. The contention is not without force. 12. 11. Coming to the second contention, it was argued that the impugned order is not in speaking terms. The learned Sessions Judge should have recorded reasons as to how and why he was taking cognizance of the offences against the petitioners and issuing process to make them to stand trial. The contention is not without force. 12. The impugned order dated June 16, 1983 reads as under: — ^^eqyfte nksyq] xqyke bZuke] vCnqyk] mej] gkde ,oa vehj cj tekur e; muds odhy Jh cakh?kj ,M- mifLFkrA ih- ih- Jh }kjdknkl tkskh mkfLFkrA vkt vfHk;ku i{k dh rjQ ls lk{kh lRrkj ih- MCyq- 1 ds c;ku dyec} dju vkjEHk fd;s x;sA phQ iw.kZ gksus ds ipkr yksd vfHk;kstd Jh }kjdknkl tkskh us ,d vkosnu i= izLrqr dj fuosnu fd;k fd lk{kh lRrkj ds gq, c;kuks es ks"k 20 eqyfteku }kjk Hkh vijk?k djuk ,oa muds f[kykQ Hkh izlaKku fy;s tkus gsrq fuosnu fd;kA lk{kh lRrkj ds c;ku dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA leLr ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks ns[krs gq, fo}ku ih- ih- }kjk izLrqr izkFkZuk&iz= Lohdkj fd;k tkdj nj[okLr es ntZ ks"k eqyfteku ¼1½ rksxk iq= vkye] ¼2½ vej iq= rksxk ¼3½ lyq iq= bLekbZy ¼4½ deky iq= lyq ¼5½ xqeku iq= vkye ¼6½ bnjhl iq= ,glku ¼7½ lyhe iq= ,glku ¼8½ vjck iq= ulhj ¼9½ tkuw iq= ulhj ¼10½ eqghe iq= ulhj ¼11½ oyh iq= ulhj ¼12½ gkth vehu iq= jetku ¼13½ xqykc iq= gkth vehj ¼14½ uoyk iq= vCnqyk ¼15½ lsQy i = jenku ¼16½ gkth iq= lkdj ¼17½ vjck iq= gkth ¼18½ ljhQ iq= flok ¼19½ flYyk iq= lkdj ,oa vnk; iq= fldk ds f[kykQ Hkh izlaKku fy;k tkrk gSA vr% mijksDr 20 eqyfteku dks tfj;s okjUV tekurh 20]000@& ds ryc fd;s tkosA lk{kh lRrkj ds c;ku egQqy j[ks x;sA ftUgs vkbZUnk iskh ds fy, ikcUn fd;k x;kA xokg jktwflag vkt gkftj gS tks vkbZUnk rych ij gkftj vkosA vr% izdj.k okLrs rych ks"k rkjh[k 14-7-83 dks isk gksA^^ 13. A bare perusal of the impugned order makes it abundantly clear that the learned Sessions Judge recorded no reasons, which induced him to take cognizance and issue process against the petitioners. A bare perusal of the impugned order makes it abundantly clear that the learned Sessions Judge recorded no reasons, which induced him to take cognizance and issue process against the petitioners. All that he wrote is— ^^lk{kh lRrkj ds c;ku dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA leLr ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks ns[krs gqos fo}ku ih- ih- }kjk izLrqr izkFkZuk i= Lohdkj fd;k tkdj nj[kkLr esa ntZ ks"k eqyfteku——ds f[kykQ Hkh izlKaku fy;k tkrk gSA^^ This certainly is not a faithful compliance of the provisions of Section 319 (1) Cr.P.C. 14. Section 319(1), Cr.P.C. uses the words "it appears from the evidence". The use of word "appears" is deliberate and meaningful. It connotes that the court must state reasons as to how it appears from the evidence that the persons not in the array of the accused, are to be summoned to take trial. Again, the words-"for the offence, which he appears to have committed" in Sec. 319(1), Cr.P.C. cast a duty on the court to record as to what offence appears to have been committed by that person against whom the cognizance is to be taken and process is to be issued. The learned Judge has not recorded any reasons as to how it appeared from the evidence of PW 1 Sattar that the twenty petitioners have committed the offences for which they were summoned to take trial. The learned Sessions Judge has also failed to state the offences for which cognizance was taken and process issued to the petitioners to take trial. The words "for the offence, which he appears to have committed" in Section 319(1) do require the Court to state the offence which appears to have been committed by that person who is not before the court and is to be added as an accused. 15. In my opinion section 319(1), Cr.P.C. casts a mandate on the court to pass a speaking order before it proceeds against those persons, who are not before it and to whom it wants to add in the array of the accused. 16. 15. In my opinion section 319(1), Cr.P.C. casts a mandate on the court to pass a speaking order before it proceeds against those persons, who are not before it and to whom it wants to add in the array of the accused. 16. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Supra), their Lord-ships of the Supreme Court gave a caution to a court proceeding under section 319(1) Cr.P.C. in the following words:— "But, we would hasten to add that this is really an extra ordinary power which is conferred on the court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken." 17. The impugned order when examined in the light of the above observations does not stand good and is not in consonance with the requirements of section 319(1), Cr.P.C. 18. In the result, the revision is allowed and the impugned order so far it relates to the petitioners is set aside. The case is sent back to the learned Sessions Judge, Balotra. In case, he feels, he should take cognizance against the petitioners and to summon them for trial, he will pass a fresh speaking order in the light of the observations made above. This judgment will not stand in his way to prevent him from exercising his discretion under section 319(1), Cr.P.C.