JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendant's Second Appeal in a suit for possession and mesne profits, which was dismissed by the trial Court, but has been decreed by the lower appellate Court. 2. The accommodation was a small space in a verandah opening on the Chakarata Road at Dehradun, which forms part of a residential house. A part of the space is the verandah and a part of it is open. According to the plaintiff's case, its dimensions are 8'x18'. The house of which the verandah and the land formed was alleged to have been given by the first plaintiff who is the Mahant Sajjada Nashin, Darbar Guru Ram Rai Sahib Jhanda, to the second plaintiff's husband. Murari Dal Saklani, who was an employee of the said Darbar, to live in as a licensee. On the death of Murari Lal, his wife, plaintiff No. 2, and children were allowed to continue living in the house. Murari Lal, it was said, had allowed the defendant to occupy the space in the verandah, and, in front thereof up to the Chakrarata Road, for opening a betel shop, and that the relations between Murari Lal and the defendant being very cordial, the defendant was allowed to do so without any charge. His position was that of a licensee without any payment. It has been alleged that the defendant covered the open space abutting the portion of the verandah given to him with tin sheets over a length of about 4 towards Chakrata Road. After the death of Murari Lal, the defendant started quarrelling with the second plaintiff and made it difficult for her to live in the house. Consequently, a notice, dated the 28th January, 1972, was served on the defendant requiring him to vacate the accommodation and removing the structures of his shop within seven days, instead of comply with the notice, the defendant sent a letter, dated the 5th July, 1972 claiming that he was a tenant under Murari Lal on payment of Rs. 3 per month as rent. A complaint was thereafter filed by the second plaintiff against the defendant, which ended in the latter's conviction on the 2nd July, 1974. The sum of Rs. 720 was claimed as damages at the rate of Rs. 20 per month for three years before the institution of the suit. 3 per month as rent. A complaint was thereafter filed by the second plaintiff against the defendant, which ended in the latter's conviction on the 2nd July, 1974. The sum of Rs. 720 was claimed as damages at the rate of Rs. 20 per month for three years before the institution of the suit. Pendente lite and future damages were also claimed at the same rate. 3. The defence was that the house belonged to Murari Lal, and that the defendant was his tenant of the accommodation on payment of Rs. 3 per month as rent. In support a receipt (Paper No. 20 Ka) dated the 16th June, 1969, was produced, which purports to be signed by Murari Lal on a ten Paise revenue stamp. It acknowledges the receipt of the sum of Rs. 400 by Murari Lal from the defendant as advance towards rent at the rate of Rs. 3 per month for the accommodation, which is described as 7' wide and 12' long. part of the outer verandah of the house, and recites that the said accommodation had been let out to the defendant at the rate of Rs. 3 per month an that the monthly rent will be adjusted from the amount of Rs. 400 paid in advance and that after that amount was exhausted the rent will be payable at the rate of Rs. 15 per month, and if that was not paid, the defendant will vacate the accommodation. 4. The following are the issues, on which the parties went to trial :- "1. Whether disputed property was given as gift to late Murari Lal ?" "2. Whether Murari Lal gave on tenancy the suit property to defendant ? If so, its effect ?" "3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to mesne profits ? If so at what rate ? 4. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled ?" 5. The trial Court held on the first issue that the house had been given as a gift to Murari Lal, on Issue No. 2 that the defendant is a tenant of the accommodation and is not liable to pay rent until the sum of Rs. 400 already paid by him is adjusted; and on issue No. 3 that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any mesne profits. 400 already paid by him is adjusted; and on issue No. 3 that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any mesne profits. In view of the said findings, the trial Court held on issue No. 4 that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief and dismissed the suit. 6. On first appeal by the plaintiffs, the lower appellate Court held the receipt for Rs. 400 was not admissible in evidence it was not produced in the criminal proceedings and was a suspicious document. Indeed, the lower appellate Court was of the view that it had been fabricated later on. The lower appellate Court also negatived the theory of gift of the house to Murari Lal on the ground that there could be no gift without a registered instrument, and inasmuch as no registered instrument was produced, the house could not be said to have been gifted by the first plaintiff to Murari Lal. The lower appellate Court then took up for consideration the point raised before it that Murari Lal himself being a licensee, had no transferable interest in the property : and although it found that the contention was not without substance, it was of the opinion that in view of its finding on the question about gift and lease, it was "unnecessary to dwell deep on this point". On the question of the quantum of mesne profits, the lower appellate Court held, on the basis of oral statement of the second plaintiff that the accommodation could be let out at the rate of Rs. 20 per month and decreed the suit for possession and mesne profits, as claimed, with costs throughout and also decreed pendente lite and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 20 per month. 7. The notice of the appeal was issued on question Nos. 1, 3 and 4, as specified in the Memorandum of appeal, after hearing under Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 20 per month. 7. The notice of the appeal was issued on question Nos. 1, 3 and 4, as specified in the Memorandum of appeal, after hearing under Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These questions raised the points; firstly, that the Paper No. A-20 was admissible, and the lower appellate Court was not justified in law in refusing to read it in evidence; secondly that the view of the lower appellate Court that the trial Court should not have assumed the role of an expert in the matter of handwriting and signatures was erroneous; and thirdly that the view of the lower appellate Court, on the questions of gift and competence of Murari Lal to transfer the property, were both wrong and at any rate as Murari Lal was allowed to occupy the property as a licensee and he was said to have let out the property to the defendant in that capacity, the suit was not maintainable in law. 8. I have heard Mr. G.C. Dwivedi for the defendant-appellant Mr. Ram Shanker for the plaintiff-respondent in this Second Appeal. 9. Having heard Mr. Dwivedi, I agree that the lower appellate Court was in error is not reading the receipt (Paper No. A-20) and was also in error in overruling the view of the trial Court that the receipt was genuine. I say so because Paper no. 20-Ka does not purport to be a lease. It merely purports to be a receipt for payment of advance rent. Such a document could not be said to require registration and was duly stamped with ten Paise revenue stamp. Since the document did not purport to be a lease or to create a lease, it cannot be said that it was inadmissible in evidence. It was just a receipt and could be read in evidence for whatever it was worth. As to the genuineness of the signatures of Murari Lal on that receipt, I do not agree with the observation of the lower appellate Court that they did not tally with those on Paper No. 23-A. I have also looked into the signatures of Murari Lal on Paper No. 21-A, and would say that the signatures on the receipt were genuine. The receipt was duly proved by the oral evidence led by the defendant and there was no reason to doubt its genuineness. The receipt was duly proved by the oral evidence led by the defendant and there was no reason to doubt its genuineness. The lower appellate Court was in error in suspecting its genuineness on the basis of conjectures alone. 10. Nevertheless, the question, which has to be answered is, whether the status of the defendant was that of a tenant or of a licensee. It is not the law that a licence cannot be granted for consideration. It may be that the plaintiff's case that a Murari Lal gave the accommodation free to the defendant was wrong, but the receipt for payment Rs. 400 having been proved, one has to proceed on the assumption that Murari Lal permitted the defendant to occupy the accommodation in suit on or before the 16th June, 1969, and took Rs. 400 as advance to be adjusted at the rate of Rs. 3 per month. That covered the period of eleven years one month and left Re. 1 in balance. Therefore, it follows that Murari Lal permitted the defendant to occupy the accommodation for more than eleven years. A lease for a term exceeding one year could not have been created except by a registered instrument executed by the lessor and the lessee both, in view of the provisions of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. The result was that a lease did not come into existence by the acceptance of Rs. 400 by Murari Lal from the defendant on the 16th June, 1969, vide Paper No. 20-Ka. What came into existence was a permission or a licence, where under the defendant could continue to remain in occupation of the accommodation for eleven years one month without any further payment, and thereafter, on payment of Rs. 15 per month, and he was liable to be evicted thereafter if he did not pay the amount of Rs. 15. That period had not expired when the suit was filed. It could be said to have expired in or after July, 1980 during the pendency of the Second Appeal in this Court. The plaintiffs were thus not entitled to evict the defendant or to recover any amount as mesne profits from him on the cause of action pleaded by them in the suit giving rise to this Second Appeal. 11. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The plaintiffs were thus not entitled to evict the defendant or to recover any amount as mesne profits from him on the cause of action pleaded by them in the suit giving rise to this Second Appeal. 11. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court dismissing the suit with costs is restored. However, I make no order as to costs.