JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - Heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner and also learned Counsel for opposite party No. 3. Opposite Party No. 3 has filed counter affidavit in opposition of the writ petition. Since Petitioner's Counsel stated that he does not want to file a rejoinder affidavit the writ petition was heard on merits. 2. I have perused the impugned orders passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) as well as by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Briefly stated the facts of the case are as follows: It appears that against the allotment of chak the Petitioner had filed an objection before the Consolidation Officer. This objection was rejected by the Consolidation Officer vide order dated 8th July 1981. Aggrieved by this order the Petitioner filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) on 13th July 1981. It has come in the counter-affidavit that on the date the appeal was filed 20th July 1981 was fixed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Counsel for the Petitioner was informed about that date but since no one appeared on behalf of the Petitioner, who was the Appellant before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), the appeal was disposed of on merits by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) vide order dt. 20th July 1981. The Petitioner filed an application for restoration the next day, i.e. on 21st July 1981 and prayed that the order dated 20th July 1981 be recalled and the appeal be heard and disposed of on merits as the order passed on 20th July 1981 was an ex-parte order. This application was rejected by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) vide order dated 3rd November 1981. Aggrieved by this order the Petitioner filed a revision which was rejected by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 20th October, 1982. These three orders passed by opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 have been challenged in this writ petition. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that on 20th July, 1981 when no one appeared on behalf of the Appellant the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) should have dismissed the appeal in default instead of proceeding to decide it on merits and as such when on 21st July 1981 an application was moved by the Petitioner then the order should have been recalled and the appeal should have been heard on merits. Referring to order dated 3rd November 1981 by which his application was rejected learned Counsel pointed out that the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) has rejected the application on the ground that apart from showing sufficient cause of absence the Appellant should have also shown that some injustice was caused and he was prejudiced by the order which was passed in appeal on merits and since in his opinion the order dated 20th July 1981 was just and proper and as such he rejected the application. Learned Counsel urged that on similar grounds the Deputy Director of Consolidation has also rejected the revision. He thus urged that the Petitioner's restoration application has been rejected on insufficient and erroneous ground and the orders thus deserve to be quashed. 4. In reply learned Counsel for the opposite party urged that the Petitioner's Counsel was informed of the date of hearing in the appeal but inspite of knowledge he failed to appear and as such the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) rightly disposed of the appeal on merits. 5. I have considered the aforesaid arguments and have perused the impugned orders very carefully. In my opinion the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the Petitioner carry much weight. It is not disputed that the Petitioner had filed restoration application the very next day, i.e. on 21st July 1981. When none had turned up on behalf of the Appellant on 20th July 1981, the date on which the appeal was fixed for hearing the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) instead of proceeding to decide the appeal on merits should have dismissed the appeal for default. There appears to be no reason why he proceeded to dispose of the appeal on merits when none appeared on behalf of the Appellant to press the appeal on merits. Since no one had appeared on behalf of the Appellant and as such it cannot be said that the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had gone into the merits of the matter on the points raised by the Appellant in the appeal. Under Order 41 Rule 17 of the CPC it is provided that where on the day fixed, or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the Appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for heating, the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed. Under Order 41 Rule 17 of the CPC it is provided that where on the day fixed, or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the Appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for heating, the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed. An Explanation has been appended by Amending Act No. 104 of 1976 to this rule which provides that nothing in this sub-rule shall be construed as empowering the Court to dismiss the appeal on the merits. Thus in view of this provision if the Appellant does not appear at the time when the appeal is called for hearing the appellate Court has no option but to dismiss the appeal in default. Although this provision does not apply to consolidation proceedings but the principle enunciated therein should generally be adopted. Thus the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), in my opinion, legally erred in proceeding to decide the appeal on merits. He further committed a manifest error when he rejected the application for restoration which was filed the very next day on an erroneous view that since the order passed by him on merit was just and proper and no prejudice according to him was caused to the Appellant and as such he refused to restore the appeal. In my opinion this observation is clearly violative of the principles of natural justice. The claim set out by the objector, Appellant for the revisionist in the objection, appeal or revision could not be disposed of on merits without hearing the objector, Appellant or the revisionist, as the case may be. The proper course in such a case should be that the case be dismissed for default instead of being decided on merits, because it would be violative of the principles of natural justice if decided ex parte on merits instead of dismissing in default. The Deputy Director of Consolidation also fell in the same error and as such in my opinion the impugned order 'passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dt. 20th October 1982 as well as the orders dated 20th July 1981 and 3rd November 1981 passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) deserve to be quashed. 6. The Deputy Director of Consolidation also fell in the same error and as such in my opinion the impugned order 'passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dt. 20th October 1982 as well as the orders dated 20th July 1981 and 3rd November 1981 passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) deserve to be quashed. 6. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 20th October 1982 and the orders dated 20th July 1981 and 3rd November 1981 passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) are quashed and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) is directed to restore the appeal to the original number and decide it on merits after giving full opportunity to both the parties. In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs.