A. P. Sareen v. State of Uttar Pradesh — 1983 DIGILAW 406 (ALL)

JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - A. P. Saran and eleven others, who are stated to be closely related to each other, have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution assailing the validity of acquisition of their land under the provisions of the U. P. Land Acquisition Act through two notifications dated Aug. 25 and Aug 26, 1981 issued under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Act in respect of their land situate in two adjoining village Habibpur and Surajpur in Tahsil Dadri of district Ghaziabad in this State. By the first of these notifications, namely, No. 9874-Bha-U/XVIII- 11-104-Bha-81 dated Aug. 25, 1981 the Governor of Uttar Pradesh had, apart from notifying under S. 4 (1) that the land mentioned in the Schedule appended to the notification was needed "for a public purpose, namely, for the planned industrial development of district Ghaziabad through the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Corporation Ltd. Kanpur". also directed under sub-sec. (4) of 5.17 that the provisions of S. 5 A of the Act shall not apply being of opinion that in view of the pressing urgency "it is as well necessary to eliminate the delay likely to be caused by an a enquiry under S. 5-A of the said Act." By the second notification the Governor declared under S. 6 of the Act that he was satisfied that the land mentioned in the Schedule was needed for a public purpose, namely, for the planned industrial development of district Ghaziabad through the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd, Kanpur and was pleased also to direct the Collector of Ghaziabad under S. 7 of the Act to take order for the acquisition of the land. Further that the amount of compensation awarded for the acquisition of the land shall be paid partly out of the public revenue of the State. The notification also mentions that as the Governor was satisfied that the case was of urgency, the Collector of Ghaziabad may, on the expiry of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in sub- sec. (1) of S. 9 of the Act take possession of the land for the said public purpose. 2. The notification also mentions that as the Governor was satisfied that the case was of urgency, the Collector of Ghaziabad may, on the expiry of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in sub- sec. (1) of S. 9 of the Act take possession of the land for the said public purpose. 2. The reason for the issuance of these two notifications have been disclosed in the counter-affidavit sworn by Sri P. B. Lal, an Upper Division Assistant in the Industries Section II, U. P. Shasan as well as two supplementary counter-affidavits sworn by Sri Naveen Chandra Bajapei, special Secretary to Govt. of Uttar Pradesh in the Industries Department. It is said that the year 1981 had been declared to be the "year of industries" for the State of Uttar Pradesh, which is thickly populated and industrially backward State, by the Chief Minister and with a view to accelerate the pace of industrial development, a high power committee under the Chairmanship of the Chief Minister was constituted at the State level This Committee was the supreme problem solving and co-ordinating mechanism which met, as far as possible, every month to ensure that the inter-departmental consultations and decision making were achieved without loss of time. Special attention was being paid in the matter of making suitable land available for setting up industries in the State. In the second meeting of this committee held on Mar. 11, 1981, - the Committee decided that the organisations concerned with the planned industrial development in the State would set outer time limits, in the light of the direction given by the Chief Minister and that the Secretary, Revenue should work out details about banjar and arable land in various districts which should be made available to entrepreneurs. It was resolved that a final list containing details about the land available for industries should be made available to the Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation and other developmental agencies so that the entrepreneurs could be properly guided. 3. On April 8, 1981 in a meeting of the Committee the U. P. State Industrial Development Corporation (briefly "UPSIDC') put forward a statement of a large number of applications from entrepreneurs which had been submitted to it for setting up industries in various districts in the State, in particular, the district of Mathura, Agra, Kanpur and Ghaziabad. The number of such applications was over 450. The number of such applications was over 450. The Committee decided that the UPSIDC should examine the suitability and availability of land for industries in new areas becoming popular with entrepreneurs. On April. 27, 1981 the Managing Director of UPSIDC put up a note before its Board of Directors wherein proposals were made for setting up industries in several new areas including village Surajpur in Dadri tahsil of district Ghaziabad, which is situate on Dadri Noida road at a distance of about 20 Kms from Ghaziabad and about 35 Kms from Delhi via Noida. It was pointed out by the Managing Director that the corporation could easily get land near Surajpur because there was a large chunk of forest and barren land Management Committee land available there. The site was about 3 Kms from the main Delhi Howrah broad guage railway line and a 33/ 1 l KV power station was already available in village Surajpur. It was further said that M/s. Delhi Cloth Mills had proposed to establish their unit at this site for which they may be needing about 200 acres and its ancillaries would be needing about 100 acres of land. It was suggested that the corporation may, for the time being, acquire about 1500 acres of land there. The Delhi Cloth Mills, according to these affidavits, were agreeable to set up light commercial vehicles project near Surajpur in collaboration with TOYOTA of Japan. Also, that B. C. Bhardwaj and Associates had also intimated to the UPSIDC that they were prepared to change the location of their project of manufacture of P. V. C. rigid pipes and fittings from Haryana in case no objection certificate for the shifting was issued and land at Surajpur was made available to them. M/s Duncon Agro Industries were also seeking allotment of land in Surajpur Industrial Scheme for their proposed auto ancillary unit at Surajpur. The land in question was selected for acquisition also because there was no other big chunk of land which had got so much Gram Sabha land contiguous to it. And, minimum number of land holders were being affected. 4. The land in question was selected for acquisition also because there was no other big chunk of land which had got so much Gram Sabha land contiguous to it. And, minimum number of land holders were being affected. 4. The Board of Directors of UPSIDC approved the note of the Managing Director of May, 1, 1981 and in the 4th meeting of the High Power Committee held on May 8, 1981 the various actions taken on the direction given at the previous meetings of the Committee were considered and the Chief Minister re-emphasised strict adherence to the time limits specified for various activities. The position in respect of applications pending with UPSIDC for allotment of land was considered and the Chief Minister desired that effort should be made by the UPSIDC to allot as many plots as possible in order to achieve better utilisation of public money. Thereafter, on May 27, 1981, the UPSIDC addressed a communication to the Board of Revenue for issuing direction to the various district Magistrates, including that of Ghaziabad, to finalise the matter of acquisition of land within a period of three months. The UPSIDC also intimated to the Government of Uttar Pradesh that many entrepreneurs had tied up with financial institutions and any delay would cause increase in the cost of project. This was followed by a letter dated June 19, 1981 by the State Government to various District Magistrates, including that of Ghaziabad, that proposals for acquisition of land for planned industrial development should be sent on priority basis. On June 22, 1981 proposals for acquisition of land were sent by the UPSIDC to the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad and a request was made for dispensing with the inquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. On June 22, 1981 another letter was sent by the UPSIDC to the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad for acquisition of land and for making it available to the various entrepreneurs within a period of three moths. 5. It appears that the reasons mentioned by the Managing Director of UPSIDC in his letter of June 22, 1981 to the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad for dispensing with the inquiry under S. 5-A were not found sufficient by the State Government to whom a copy of that letter had been endorsed. 5. It appears that the reasons mentioned by the Managing Director of UPSIDC in his letter of June 22, 1981 to the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad for dispensing with the inquiry under S. 5-A were not found sufficient by the State Government to whom a copy of that letter had been endorsed. In the endorsement to the General Manager, UPSIDC contained in the radiogram of June 20, 1981 from the Deputy Secretary of the U. P. Government in the Industries Department (Annex. 13 to the second supplementary affidavit of Bajpei) it was mentioned so. Another radiogram of July 13, 1981 to the Collector, Ghaziabad from the Deputy Secretary asking him to furnish his recommendation and reasons for application of S. 17 of the Act contains a similar endorsement. The same day, namely, on July 13, 1981 the General Manager wrote to the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad about it and endorsed a copy of his letter to the Deputy Secretary. On July 17, 1981 the Deputy Secretary sent another radiogram to the Collector Ghaziabad drawing his attention to the earlier message of June 30 and July 13 and asking for immediate submission of proposal for acquisition of land in villages Habibpur, Surajpur etc. Yet another telegram asking the Collector to submit his recommendation immediately was sent by the Secretary, Industries on Aug. 4, 1981 where after a proposal was received in the Industries Department of the Government from the Collector Ghaziabad for acquisition of land on Aug. 13, 1981 which was submitted for consideration before the appropriate authorities on Aug. 17, 1981. In a note of Aug. 24, 1981, put up before these authorities, it was mentioned that in case land was not immediately made available to M/s Delhi Cloth Mills, they may go to another State and as such it was a fit case for dispensing with the provision of S. 5-A of the Act. On consideration of the matter, the appropriate authorities felt convinced that it was a fit case where there was urgency for dispensing with the enquiry under S. 5 A of the Act. Then came the notification of Aug. 25 and Aug. 26, 1981 under Ss. 4 and 6 respectively followed, according to the respondents, with possession having been taken on Sept. 29, 1981 by them after expiry of the period mentioned in the notice under S. 9 (1). It is said that on Aug. Then came the notification of Aug. 25 and Aug. 26, 1981 under Ss. 4 and 6 respectively followed, according to the respondents, with possession having been taken on Sept. 29, 1981 by them after expiry of the period mentioned in the notice under S. 9 (1). It is said that on Aug. 20, 1982 possession was given to M/s Delhi Cloth Mills. The petitioners have disputed these assertions in regard to possession. 6. The writ petition was instituted on Sept.30, 1981. 7. Sri S. P. Gupta, who has argued the case on behalf of the petitioners, urged, firstly, that the entire acquisition proceedings were bad because inquiry under S. 5-A had been erroneously dispensed with and the provisions of S. 17 (i), (1-A) and (4) were illegally invoked secondly, that the acquisition being for a company compliance with Part (VII) of the Act was necessary and, inasmuch as, such compliance was admittedly not made, the proceedings for acquisition were vitiated and thirdly, that acquisition having actually been made for the Delhi Cloth Mills, the issuance of notification purporting, to acquire it for the UPSIDC was a colourable exercise of powers by the Government which allegedly acquired the land for the public purpose. We shall deal with these submissions one by one, but before doing so we may read the relevant provisions of the Act (in so far as they are material) as applicable in this State : "4(1). Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the official Gazette and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. (2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally or specially authorised by such Government in this behalf, and for his servants and workmen - to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality: to dig or bore into the sub-soil; to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is' adapted for such purpose. to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line of the work (if any) proposed to be made thereon, to make such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches; and where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any standing crop, fence or jungle. 5. ..... 5-A. Hearing of objections:- (1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under S. 4, sub-sec. (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company may, within twenty-one days after the issue of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be. (2) Every objection under sub-sec. (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under section 4, sub-sec. (1) or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land to the appropriate Government containing his recommendation on the objection together with the record of the proceedings held by him for the decision of that Government. The decision of the (appropriate Government) on the objections shall be final (3) For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation if the land were acquired under this Act. 6. (1) Subject to the provisions of part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under S. 5-A, sub- sec. (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under S. 4. sub-sec. sub-sec. (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required under S. 5-A, sub- sec. (2) ). Provided that Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. (2) .......... ............ ............. (3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the case may be, and, after making such declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appearing. 9. (1) The Collector shall then cause public notice to be given at convenient places on or near the land to be taken, stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land, and that claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be made to him. (2) ............ ............. .............. (3) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on the occupier (if any) of such land and on all such persons known known or believed to be interested therein or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, as reside or have agents authorised to receive service on their behalf, within the revenue district in which the land is situate. (4) ............... .............. ............. 17. (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the (appropriate Government) so directs, the Collector though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in S. 9, sub-sec. (1) take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a company. Such land shall thereupon (vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances). (1-A) The power to take possession under sub-sec. (1) may also be exercised in the case of other than waste or arable land, where the land is acquired for or in connection with sanitary improvements of any kind or planned development. Note :1-A introduced by U. P. Land Acquisition (U. P. Amendment) Act (U. P. Act No. XXII of 1954) date of enforcement 19-11-1954. 17. (2). (1) may also be exercised in the case of other than waste or arable land, where the land is acquired for or in connection with sanitary improvements of any kind or planned development. Note :1-A introduced by U. P. Land Acquisition (U. P. Amendment) Act (U. P. Act No. XXII of 1954) date of enforcement 19-11-1954. 17. (2). Whenever, owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway Administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river- side or ghat station, or of providing convenient connection with or access to any such station, the Collector may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-sec. (1) and with the previous sanction of the (appropriate Government) enter upon and take possession of such land which shall thereupon (vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances); (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government the provisions of sub-sec. (1), sub-sec. (1-A) or sub-sec. (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of S. 5-A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under S. 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under S. 4 sub-sec. (1). Note :Sub-sec. (1-A) or sub-sec. (2) of S. 17 (1) amended by Land Acquisition (U.P. Amendment and Validation) (U. P. Act VIII) of 1974". 8. A reading of these provisions would show that normally, after the preliminary publication under S. 4 (1) any person interested in any land so notified would be entitled to file an objection before the Collector who would, after giving an opportunity to the objector of being heard and after making such further inquiry as he thinks necessary, make a report to the appropriate Government containing his recommendations on the objection, together with the record of the proceedings before him, and Government would, after consideration thereof, make a declaration of the nature envisaged by S. 6 (1) if it is satisfied that any particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a company. Thereafter, the Collector shall proceed to make acquisition of the land in accordance with the provisions following. Thereafter, the Collector shall proceed to make acquisition of the land in accordance with the provisions following. The objection would normally.not be successful in regard to the question whether the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company because of the conclusiveness in that respect attached to the declaration made by the Government by S. 6 (3) and also on, account of the myriad form that public purpose may assume in a welfare State like ours. It can, however, be visualised that an objector may be able to place before the Collector cogent material to satisfy him, and eventually the appropriate Government that it may not be necessary to displace him, for achievement of the purpose for which acquisition is being made, from his parcel of land, either wholly or in part and that equally suitable or better land, which would subserve the purpose well, was available nearby. He may succeed in convincing them that in the circumstances of the case it was not really necessary to uproot him. The conclusiveness attached to a declaration made under S. 6 (1) does not detract from the salutary nature of the protection envisaged for a person whose property was being acquired particularly, when it is ultimately for the appropriate Government to decide whether a specific parcel of land is or is not needed for a particular public purpose or company. The inquiry under S. 5-A is summary in nature and can be easily completed within reasonable time. 9. Section 17 contains a departure from the normal procedure of taking possession of the acquired land after making of the award for compensation. It contemplates the taking of possession without awaiting the making of the award in cases of urgency. It also envisages that where taking of possession before the making of the award is necessary, the provisions of S. 5A may be made inapplicable by the appropriate Government, thus obviating the necessity of an inquiry under that provision. This is contemplated by sub-sec. (4) of S. 17 of which the preceding sub-sections, including sub-sec. (1-A) which has been added to the Act in its application to this State contemplate such taking of possession of land whether waste or arable or not, in case there is urgency to do so. 10. This is contemplated by sub-sec. (4) of S. 17 of which the preceding sub-sections, including sub-sec. (1-A) which has been added to the Act in its application to this State contemplate such taking of possession of land whether waste or arable or not, in case there is urgency to do so. 10. Urgency, it would appear, is to be the guiding factor both in the matter of taking possession and of excluding the inquiry under S. 5A. This is rational too for else the provisions may suffer from invalidity on the touchstone of the Constitution. For then, it would confer an arbitrary power upon the appropriate Government. 11. There must be some compelling reasons to exclude even the summary inquiry under S. 5A in a given case and thereby depriving the person concerned of getting his land excluded from acquisition proceedings. We may recall the words of M. H. Beg, J. (as he then was) in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1977 SC 183 ) where he said that : "....considering the nature of the objections which are capable of being successfully taken under S. 5-A it is difficult to see why the summary enquiry should not be concluded quite expeditiously." and that "...the purpose of S. 17 (4) of the Act is obviously, not merely to confine action under it to waste and arable land but also to situations in which an inquiry under S. 5A will serve no useful purpose, or, for some overriding reason, it should be dispensed with. The mind of the Officer or authority concerned has to be applied to the question whether there is an urgency of such a nature that even the summary proceedings under S. 5A of the Act should be eliminated. It is not just the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an inquiry under S. 5A which has to be considered." and those of Krishna Iyer, J. in the State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh ( AIR 1980 SC 319 ) where he said (in para 16) that. "..... Without referring to supportive case law, it is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man's property is a serious matter and the smaller the man the more serious the matter. "..... Without referring to supportive case law, it is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man's property is a serious matter and the smaller the man the more serious the matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and preemptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons. Save in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Articles 14 (and 19) burke an enquiry under S. 17 of the Act." 12. What happened in this case has been noticed earlier. Can, on the facts stated by the respondents, it be said that the question of exclusion of an inquiry under S. 5-A was gone into by the appropriate authorities and if yes, did they determine it with reference to material relevant for the purpose and can the decision to exclude inquiry be said to be arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would, on these facts have come to the conclusion that even a summary inquiry under S. 5-A should have been dispensed with. Let us examine these facts one by one. 13. The high power committee decided in March 1981 in its second meeting that details of banjar and arable land in various districts which could be made available to entrepreneurs be worked out and be made available to the departmental agencies like the Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation etc. to enable them to properly guide the entrepreneurs. Early in April a statement was put forward by UPSIDC before the committee about a large number of applications from the entrepreneurs interested in setting up industries in the various districts of the State including Ghaziabad, and on April 27 a note was put up before the Board of Directors of the UPSIDC by its Managing Director containing proposal for setting up industries in new areas including village Surajpur. It was said that in Surajpur, there was a large chunk of forest and barren land management committee land available. The Delhi Cloth Mills were agreeable to set up a light commercial vehicle project near Surajpur in collaboration with Toyota of Japan. They might need about 200 acres of land and the ancillaries might be needing another about 100 acres. It was said that in Surajpur, there was a large chunk of forest and barren land management committee land available. The Delhi Cloth Mills were agreeable to set up a light commercial vehicle project near Surajpur in collaboration with Toyota of Japan. They might need about 200 acres of land and the ancillaries might be needing another about 100 acres. The proposal to acquire about 1500 acres of land was made because other entrepreneurs had also shown interest in getting up industries there. The note was approved by the Board of Directors in its meeting of May 1, 1981. And, on May 8, 1981 the matter was looked into by the high power committee in which the Chief Minister desired that an effort should be made by the UPSIDC to allot as many plots as possible to achieve better utilisation of public money. It is thereafter that on May 27, 1981 a communication was addressed by the UPSIDC to the Board of Revenue to get the land acquired within three months. On June 22, 1981 proposals for acquisition of land were sent by the UPSIDC to the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad containing a request that inquiry under S. 5A of the Act be dispensed with. Seven days later, on June 29, another letter was sent by it to the District Magistrate Ghaziabad for acquiring the land and making it available to various entrepreneurs within a period of three months. 14. There was exchange of communication between the UPSIDC and the State Govt. and communications were repeatedly addressed to the Collector, Ghaziabad to expedite the submission of proposal for acquisition of land in villages Surajpur, Habibpur, etc. and it was only on Aug. 13, 1981 that a proposal was received in the Industries Department of the State Government from the Collector, Ghaziabad for acquisition of the land. The proposal was examined at appropriate level and in a note of Aug. 24, 1981 there was a mention that in case the land was not made available to M/s. Delhi Cloth Mills they may go to another State so that it was a fit case for dispensing with the provision of S. 5-A of the Act. The Government, on consideration of the matter, took a decision that there was urgency in the matter necessitating dispensing with an inquiry under S. 5A. Then followed the two notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 on Aug. The Government, on consideration of the matter, took a decision that there was urgency in the matter necessitating dispensing with an inquiry under S. 5A. Then followed the two notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 on Aug. 25, and Aug. 26, 1981. We may also mention here that initially in the letter of June 22, 1981, the Managing Director of the UPSIDC had suggested to the Collector that the experience in the matter of acquisition of land was that generally disposal of objections under S. 5A and taking of possession thereafter took a long time so t~at proposal for acquisition of land in village Surajpur and Habibpur should be made on priority basis invoking the provision of S. 17 (1) and (4) of the Act. A copy of this letter had been endorsed to the State Government as well These reasons were, however, not found to be convincing by the State Government for the applicability of S. 17 of the Act as was intimated by it to the General Manager of the UPSIDC through its endorsement of a copy of the radiogram sent by the Government to the Collector. It was then that in a subsequent communication of July 13, 1981 the General Manager of the UPSIDC put forward the fact that the land in villages Surajpur and Habibpur had been chosen by M/s Delhi Cloth Mills for the proposed light commercial vehicles project in collaboration with Japan and that the Japanese technicians were expected in that month itself to a have a look at the land. Further in case about 400 acres of land was not immediately made available to M/s Delhi Cloth Mills, who had to establish the Project very soon, they could select a site at some other place or in some other State which would result in deprivation of the State of the advantage of heavy investment and setting up of that heavy industry. Further, setting up of the Project and its ancillaries would provide employment and business to people of adjacent area. Then followed the steps which have been noticed earlier. 15. The total area of the land of the petitioners is about 18 acres out of 275 acres covered by the impugned notification. Adjacent to the petitioners' land is a chunk of barren land belonging to the Gram Samaj, running into a few thousand acres. Then followed the steps which have been noticed earlier. 15. The total area of the land of the petitioners is about 18 acres out of 275 acres covered by the impugned notification. Adjacent to the petitioners' land is a chunk of barren land belonging to the Gram Samaj, running into a few thousand acres. From the material placed before us in the form of affidavits and their annexures and even from the original file wherein the matter was considered by the State Government placed before us by the learned Chief Standing Counsel it does not appear that the specific plots of the petitioners were chosen for the site of the Projects by M/s Delhi Cloth Mills or that but for these plots, they would not be able to establish their project in the area. In fact, there is no particularisation of the land which was to be acquired for the proposed project of M/s Delhi Cloth Mills. The entire correspondence which has been exchanged between the UPSIDC, the State Government and the Collector, as has been disclosed by the respondents to us, only shows that the DCM needed about 300 acres of land in village Surajpur/Habibpur at a very early date. In this situation, in particular, it may have been possible for the petitioners to convince the Collector and the State Government that land could be made available to the DCM for their project even excluding their plots. This they could only do if they had an opportunity of filing an objection under S. 5A. The State Government could still have acquired the land if it had come to the conclusion that the plots of the petitioners should be included in the land which was to be made available to the DCM for the project. They could deal with the petitioners' objection expeditiously for the inquiry under S. 5A is of summary nature. 16. There appears to be substance in the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that inquiry under S. 5A could not be reasonably dispensed with in the instant case for the pace at which the entire exercise resulting in the issuance of the two notifications dated Aug. 25 and 26, 1981, proceeded was not indicative of any extreme urgency in the matter of handing over possession to the allottee's of the land. 25 and 26, 1981, proceeded was not indicative of any extreme urgency in the matter of handing over possession to the allottee's of the land. From the letter of June 29, 1981 of the Managing Director of the UPSIDC (Annex. XII to the supplementary counter- affidavit of Sri Navin Chandra Bajpai, sworn on Mar. 14, 1983) it appears that the decision to make land in village Surajpur available to the entrepreneurs within three months had been taken in the meeting of the High power committee dated April 8, 1981. The Collector was asked to make a proposal in that respect only in the month of June, 1981. The Collector made the proposal, after repeated reminders, in the month of Aug., 1981. The request for dispensing with an inquiry under S. 5A was made by the UPSIDC for the first time in its letter of June 22, 1981. The possession over the land in dispute, even according to the respondents, was taken on Sept. 20, 1981. It is apparent that the pace at which the respondents were taking steps to acquire the land was not consistent with the concept of urgency as reasonably understood. There was no difficulty in notifying the land under S. 4 and thereafter affording 21 days period for filing of objection to the proposed acquisition before proceeding to acquire it. 17. There is another way of looking at the matter and it is this. Urgency is an inference from some facts and circumstances which exist in a given case. One cannot assume urgency on the basis of non-existent or irrelevant circumstances. The entire basis on which the need for an immediate possession over the land was inferred in this case was the fear that unless the land was immediately made available to them, the DCM may walk out of the State with the Project. There is a mention of this circumstance in the letter of July 13, 1981 from the Managing Director, UPSIDC to the Collector, Ghaziabad, of which a copy was endorsed to the State Government. And, this is the circumstance, which, according to the respondents, weighed with the State Government in deciding to dispense with the provisions of S. 5A. There is a mention of this circumstance in the letter of July 13, 1981 from the Managing Director, UPSIDC to the Collector, Ghaziabad, of which a copy was endorsed to the State Government. And, this is the circumstance, which, according to the respondents, weighed with the State Government in deciding to dispense with the provisions of S. 5A. It has not been shown to our satis`action by the learned Chief Standing Counsel, appearing for the State Government, as well as the UPSIDC that in fact, there was any material before these respondents to justify an interference to that effect. At least no such material has been placed before us in the present proceedings. Besides, as alleged by the counsel for the petitioners, it was not open to the DCM to withdraw their project from the State of Uttar Pradesh to another State by themselves at their sweet will. The provisions of S. 11 of the Industries t Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 read with R. 7 (iA) and 15 of the Registration and Licensing of Industrial Undertaking Rules, 1952 preclude such a unilateral change of location. The State Government assumed the existence of a reason for considering the case to be one of urgency which was, in reality, non-existent when reasonably visualised. The inference of urgency, in the circumstances of this case, was clearly based upon consideration of a non-existent reason. In law, therefore, the present is a case of non-application of mind to the problem of urgency by the appropriate authorities. A decision arrived at by such non-application of mind is clearly arbitrary and cannot he sustained. 18. Two decisions were relied upon by the respondents in which according to them, the true scope of the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayan's case was explained by saying that the Supreme Court had given some instances where S. 5A could be dispensed with and did not lay down an extensive list of cases where alone S. 5A could be eliminated. There is no difficulty in accepting this but what is important is that, ultimately, it is a question of fact in each case whether the conclusion to dispense with the inquiry under S. 5A was justified or not. There is no difficulty in accepting this but what is important is that, ultimately, it is a question of fact in each case whether the conclusion to dispense with the inquiry under S. 5A was justified or not. For example, in Raj Bali v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1983 All 78 ) a Division Bench, speaking through K.C. Agarwal, J. found that there was evidence to show that the State Government had not only applied its mind to the urgency of the matter for which the land was intended to be acquired but also to the question whether the urgency was of such nature that even summary proceedings contemplated by S. 5A were required to be dispensed with. It found that it had been mentioned in the counter affidavit that entrepreneurs who were agreeable to start industries on the site in question were keen for obtaining possession of the land immediately so that their finances were not held up. This, according to the Bench, was a relevant fact which could be taken into account by the State Government for coming to the conclusion about exclusion of the inquiry under S. 5A. Likewise, in Sardar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1983 All LJ 220) another Division Bench, speaking through B. D. Agarwal, J., found that the purpose of acquisition was construction of pucca road to afford greater facility to the sugarcane growers in the area for removing their produce to the factory and the scheme was not such as may generally entail delay in execution. Further, that on expert's opinion it had been found that alignment of the road could not be shifted from the land of the petitioner to some other land as in that event sharp curves would have to be made thereby adding to the cost of construction. The petitioners had made representations to the State Government and the first petitioner was also associated with the inspection made at the site. The Bench felt that in the circumstances it could not be said that the power to dispense with the enquiry under S. 5A was exercised in an arbitrary or perverse fashion without regard to the actual or undenied plea or that there was no application of mind to the issue on the part of the authorities concerned. The Bench felt that in the circumstances it could not be said that the power to dispense with the enquiry under S. 5A was exercised in an arbitrary or perverse fashion without regard to the actual or undenied plea or that there was no application of mind to the issue on the part of the authorities concerned. The Bench also observed (in para 7) that, "the time which may be consumed generally in the disposal of objections preferred under S. 5A of the Act is also undoubtedly a relevant circumstance of consideration." With this observation too there can hardly be any difference in approach. But then, as mentioned by the same Bench in the immediately preceding sentence, noticing the observation made in an earlier case of Dr. Nanak Chandra Chaturvedi v. State of U.P. (1979 All CJ 105), that, "each case had necessarily to depend upon its facts and circumstances." 19. In fact, we share the view of B. N. Sapru, J. and S. D. Agarwal. J. in Ajadul Bux v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1982 All 435 ) that unless an irreparable injury is likely to be caused to the fulfilment of the object for which the land is being acquired if an opportunity under S. SA is afforded to the persons whose land is sought to be acquired, inquiry under S. 5A should, generally, not be dispensed with. We find no merit in the submission that, inasmuch as the notification under S. 4 contains a recital that, "in view of the pressing urgency it is as well necessary to eliminate the delay likely to be caused in an inquiry under S. 5A...... the matter brooked no further inquiry as the satisfaction of the Governor was conclusive in that respect. The existence of urgency is to be inferred from facts in existence and those relevant to the inquiry. If based upon such facts, the opinion of the Governor may be said to be immune from scrutiny about the sufficiency of material leading to it. But judicial scrutiny is not excluded in the sense that it is not open to a court, where challenge is made, to look into the existence or otherwise of facts upon which the opinion is said to have been formed or the relevance thereof. But judicial scrutiny is not excluded in the sense that it is not open to a court, where challenge is made, to look into the existence or otherwise of facts upon which the opinion is said to have been formed or the relevance thereof. In addition, conclusiveness cannot be claimed in respect of an opinion about existence of urgency, either for taking possession or for excluding the summary inquiry under S. 5A. where the inference drawn is such to which no reasonable person shall arrive on the proved facts. We have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of the respondents in this regard. Even in (Smt.) Kailash Wati v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1978 All 181 ) where a Bench of this Court observed that the question of existence and extent of urgency is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and that it is not open to the court of examine the propriety or correctness of the satisfaction by scrutinising the same as court sitting in appeal over it, the Bench noticed the decision of the Supreme Court in Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P. AIR 1967 SC 1081 ) that the courts had power of interference on grounds of non-existence of facts or non-application of mind or on the ground of malafide which was reiterated in Narayan's case. On facts, in Kailashwati's case, the Bench found that in the opinion of the State Government the necessity of providing the godown was so acute that the construction of the same could not he delayed so that its decision to dispense with an inquiry under S. 5A. in the proceedings for acquisition of land for construction of market yard by Krishi Utapadan Mandi Samiti, was justified. The Bench itself examined the evidence on the record before it in that respect. 20. In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1033 ) it was observed by the Supreme Court that, "the conclusion of the Government in a given case that there was urgency is entitled to weight, if not conclusive." In that case the notification under S. 4 was issued on 14, 17-3-1969. The acquisition was by the government, at public expenses, for a public purpose, namely for the setting up of a factory for the manufacture of china-ware and Porcelain-ware including wall glazed tiles etc. The acquisition was by the government, at public expenses, for a public purpose, namely for the setting up of a factory for the manufacture of china-ware and Porcelain-ware including wall glazed tiles etc. The notification directed that action under S. 17 (2) (c) (as amended in its application to Punjab) shall be taken on the ground of urgency and the provision of S. SA shall not apply. The notification under S. 6 was issued on Mar. 18, 1969. The notice under S. 9 was served upon the petitioner- appellant on Mar. 28, 1969. The Supreme Court noticed the circumstances (in para 5 of the report) for holding the action of the Government in having recourse to S. 17 of the Act and the relevant circumstances were that at the instance of the State of Haryana, Government of India had issued a letter of intent to a company for setting up the factory. It was to be started with the collaboration of a foreign company called Pilkington Tiles Ltd. The scheme had been financed and approved by concerned authorities and on Nov. 26, 1968 the Government wrote to one of the promoters of the Project asking him to complete the "arrangements for the import of capital equipment and acquisition of land in Haryana State for setting up of the proposed factory. It was further stated in the communication that the Government was pleased to extend the time to complete the project upto April. 30, 1969. The Supreme Court felt that under those circumstances it had become necessary for the State of Haryana to take immediate steps to acquire the required land and that in those circumstances the Government was constrained to have recourse to S. 17. The decision clearly recognises the principle that the court can look into the circumstances of a given case to arrive at a conclusion whether the exclusion of inquiry under S. 5A should be upheld even though the opinion of the State Government in that regard was entitled to great weight. The circumstances in Jage Ram were such in which the conclusion of the State Government could not be characterised as unreasonable or arbitrary. The circumstances in Jage Ram were such in which the conclusion of the State Government could not be characterised as unreasonable or arbitrary. The observation that "the fact that the State Government or the party concerned was lethargic at an earlier stage is not very relevant for deciding the question whether on the date on which the notification was issued, there was urgency or not, contained in para 10 of the report, has to be read in the context of the fact of the case. Besides, as seen in the earlier part of this judgment, the evidence on the record of the present writ petition, reasonably construed, cannot lead to the conclusion that on the date on which the impugned notification under S. 4 excluding inquiry under S. 5A was issued, there was any material before the State Government to come to a conclusion that unless possession was taken over the land in dispute soon, without holding even a summary inquiry under S. 5A, the project of light commercial vehicle would not be established in the State and the DCM which was to set up the project, would walk out of it. 21. It was urged on behalf of the respondents both by Sri V. N. Khare, Chief Standing Counsel and Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, senior counsel for the DCM, that after the exclusion of right to property as one of the fundamental rights from part III of the Constitution, the petitioners were not entitled to seek relief in this Court because they would be entitled to compensation for their land which was being acquired. It was further urged that in this view of the matter, even if there was some procedural error in not affording an opportunity to them to object to the proposed acquisition of their land, they were not entitled to seek a verdict about the invalidity of the acquisition proceedings. It was further urged that in this view of the matter, even if there was some procedural error in not affording an opportunity to them to object to the proposed acquisition of their land, they were not entitled to seek a verdict about the invalidity of the acquisition proceedings. The argument over-looks the fact that the right to object to acquisition of their property, except in accordance with law, would still inhere in the petitioners as a constitutional right, though not as a right to enforce a fundamental right, on account of Article 300-A of the Constitution, which) provides that "no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." Besides, irrespective of the right to receive compensation the petitioners can legitimately insist that acquisition of their property should be in accordance with law and not otherwise. If, as we hold, they could only be deprived of an opportunity to object to the acquisition of their plots under the provisions of the Act itself, and their right to object could be taken away, only upon valid exercise of power under S. 17 and not otherwise, they cannot be denied relief merely because there is a provisions for compensation for the acquired property. 22. An attempt was made on behalf of the respondents to show that in respect of some of the plots, the petitioners had obtained sale-deeds very recently, presumably after they learnt that the land was likely to be acquired. They drew our attention to some of the sale-deeds of which copies have been brought on the record. The counsel for the petitioners, on the contrary, stressed that even though the sale deeds were recent but they were executed in pursuance of earlier settlement of the transactions and the petitioners were in actual possession over the plots. The fact that the sale-deeds were of recent origin could not, proceed the submission, adversely affect the petitioners' case because they were persons interested in the property and as such, entitled to challenge the acquisition. We are of opinion that on the evidence before us, it is not possible to come to a conclusion that the petitioners have no interest in the land to which the petition relates or that they are not entitled to challenge the acquisition. We are of opinion that on the evidence before us, it is not possible to come to a conclusion that the petitioners have no interest in the land to which the petition relates or that they are not entitled to challenge the acquisition. In the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the State of U. P., it has been pointed out that by the impugned notification no land of the petitioners in village Surajpur was acquired and 'only 28 bighas of land in village Habibpur belonging to the petitioners has been acquired. This has been stated by Sri P. B. Lal in para 7 of his counter affidavit. In para 15 of the same counter affidavit, the further statement made is that plots Nos. 389, 401, 403, 405 and 406 of village Habibpur were recorded in the names of the petitioners. About other plots, namely, 390, 391, 392 and 400, the stand taken is that they are not recorded in the name of any of the petitioners. The petitioners have reiterated their claim of ownership even in respect of these plots in their rejoinder affidavit and have filed copies of some of the sale-deeds in support of their claim. Their case also is that even though they were put in possession of the whole of the plots, they obtained sale deeds in different names for portions of each plot. They have asserted their possession over all the plots. In the aforesaid counter affidavit, it has been acknowledged that there existed boring's on plot Nos. 390 and 391 belonging to the petitioners and that there is a room on each one of these plots. These averments are to be found in paras 9 and 16 of the counter affidavit. In this state of pleadings it is difficult to conclude that the petitioners have no sufficient interest to assail the acquisition of the plots in dispute. 23. An effort was made by the counsel for the petitioners to persuade us to take the view that acquisition was not for a public purpose and that, in reality, it was for a company so that compliance with part VII of the Act was necessary. It is difficult to accept this submission. 23. An effort was made by the counsel for the petitioners to persuade us to take the view that acquisition was not for a public purpose and that, in reality, it was for a company so that compliance with part VII of the Act was necessary. It is difficult to accept this submission. The notifications expressly mentioned that the land was being acquired for planned industrial development of the area through the U. P. S. I. D. C. and that the amount of compensation to be awarded for the acquisition was to be paid partly out of public revenue of the State. This recital has not been established to be factually incorrect though an allegation was made on behalf of the petitioners in a supplementary rejoinder affidavit that according to the information gathered by the petitioners the entire compensation was to be paid by the UPSIDC and thereafter by DCM. Further, that no part of compensation was to be borne by the State of Uttar Pradesh. This averment has been sworn to be true on perusal of records, by the deponent of the rejoinder affidavit. No copy, however, of any document which could lend credence to this allegation was appended. There is no reason to suspect the claim that part of the compensation would be contributed by the government, planned industrial development of the area is undoubtedly a public purpose. A declaration that the land is needed for public purpose is conclusive under S. h 13). In these circumstances, it cannot be successfully urged that compliance with part VII of the Act was necessary for validly acquiring the land. If authority is needed, there is ample and we may refer only to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jage Ram ( AIR 1971 SC 1033 ) (supra) which is a complete answer to the submission of the petitioners' counsel on this aspect of the case. We may also refer to its decision in Aflatoon v. Lt. If authority is needed, there is ample and we may refer only to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jage Ram ( AIR 1971 SC 1033 ) (supra) which is a complete answer to the submission of the petitioners' counsel on this aspect of the case. We may also refer to its decision in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi ( AIR 1974 SC 2077 ) where it observed (in para 24) that, "the mere fact that after the acquisition the Government proposed to hand over, or, in fact, handed over, a portion of the property acquired for development to the co- operative housing societies would not make the acquisition one for `company' " .......and that, "merely because the Government allotted a part of the property to co- operative societies for development, it would not follow that the acquisition was for co-operative societies and therefore, part VII of the Act was attracted." Nor is there any worth it the plea that, in reality land was being acquired for the D. L. M. by the State Government in colourable exercise of its powers under the Act. There is ample evidence on the record of the writ petition, and we have made some reference to it by alluding to the averments contained in the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the State, to uphold the claim of the State that acquisition proceeding had been taken by it to subserve a public purpose, namely, the planned development of some districts of the State including Ghaziabad bona fide. The mere fact that eventually the planned development was to be effected through the assistance of private entrepreneurs does not make the acquisition any the less for a public purpose. More than this need not be said about this plea. 24. We are, however, not impressed by the submission that, inasmuch as the DCM, as allottee's of the land, had acquired an interest in the land and having been put in possession thereof any procedural flaw in the acquisition proceedings could not invalidate the acquisition so as to adversely affect their interest, or that the petitioners could, if they choose, claim damages from the State Government for being deprived of their land illegally. The petition was filed in this court on Sept. 30, 1981. The petition was filed in this court on Sept. 30, 1981. Annexure ' l' to the counter affidavit of Sri I.D. Parasher, Law Officer of the DCM includes a photocopy of the agreement between the UPSIDC and the DCM enabling the DCM to take possession of the land and set up its project as well as of the possession memo. Both are dated Aug. 20. 1982. Besides, when this Court was dealing with the petitioners' prayer for ad interim protection of their possession over the land, during the pendency of the writ petition, an undertaking was given on behalf of the DCM as well that they would abide by the undertaking given by the Advocate General of Uttar Pradesh as well as the Chief Standing Counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh to the court earlier that in case the writ petition is allowed, they would pull down permanent construction, if any, made on the land during the pendency of the writ petition. This Court had, on Oct. 16, 1981. ordered that status quo over the land in dispute shall be maintained by the parties and no trees or tubewell standing would be cut away or demolished. On Aug. 23, 1982, the order was vacated after recording an undertaking by the Advocate General and the Chief Standing Counsel that if any permanent construction is raised on the land during the pendency of the writ petition, it shall be removed by the respondents if the writ petition succeeds, at their own costs. The DCM was impleaded as a party to the petition on an application subsequently made by the petitioners and in the counter affidavit of Sri Parasher it was said that possession had been handed over to it by the UPSIDC on Aug. 20, 1982. On an application made on Sept. 20, 1982 in which it was alleged that after taking possession, the DCM were threatening to demolish the petitioner's structures standing on the land and that they be restrained from doing so this Court directed that until Oct. 11, 1982 the parties are restrained from giving effect to the threat as mentioned in para 15 of the affidavit filed in support of that application). The matter of impleadment of the DCM as a respondent came up for orders finally on Nov. 25, 1982 on which date the Court directed DC,M to be impleaded as respondent No. 4. 11, 1982 the parties are restrained from giving effect to the threat as mentioned in para 15 of the affidavit filed in support of that application). The matter of impleadment of the DCM as a respondent came up for orders finally on Nov. 25, 1982 on which date the Court directed DC,M to be impleaded as respondent No. 4. The same day an another application (No. 14601 of 1982) was filed by the petitioners on Sept 20. 1982 with the prayer that the DCM be restrained from making construction on the land in dispute pending disposal of the writ petition, the Court discharged the ad interim orders which had been passed from time to time till that date. This was after the Advocate General as well as the Chief Standing Counsel reiterated the undertaking given earlier that constructions made will be removed by the respondents at their own costs in the event of success of the writ petition and Sri V. N. Khare, who was appearing for the DCM too, which had been added as respondent to the writ petition, had also undertaken on its behalf that in case the petition succeeds it would feel itself bound by the undertaking given by the learned Advocate General. In these circumstances, the DCM cannot be heard to say that even if the acquisition proceedings were invalid, they should not suffer as they were grantees of the land from the UPSIDC. 25. The result of the discussion is that the notification issued under S. 6 of the Act without affording opportunity to the petitioners to file objections and without an inquiry under S. 5A is invalid. The decision to obviate the inquiry under that provision was wholly without authority of law. The recital to that effect in the notification under S. 4 is invalid too. The notification dated Aug. 26, 1981 is quashed. The respondents are directed to permit the petitioners to file objections and enquire into them under S. SA before making a fresh declaration, if any, under S. 6 of the Act in regard to their land. 26. The petitioners shall he entitled to their costs.