Judgment S.Saghir Ahmad, J. 1. This is a tenant's writ petition. 2. The premises in question is owned by opposite party no. 3. A portion of this house is in occupation of the petitioner as a tenant. THE opposite party no. 3 moved an application under section 21 (3) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) for the eviction of the petitioner from the said premises and for its release in her favour. It is stated in the application that the petitioner who was posted as a Bank employee at Faizabad has since been transferred to Lucknow. THE opposite party no. 3 further stated that her husband, who was also bank employee, was posted in the Orissa region where there were no facilities for the eduction of children and, therefore, in 1978 the opposite party no. 3 with her children (a son and a daughter) came to Faizabad and got her children admitted in local schools. She first stayed with her father and brother but later shifted to a rented house for which she was paying Rs. 200/- per month as rent although she herself was getting Rs. 150/- every month as rent from the petitioner in respect of the house in dispute. The application was contested by the petitioner who stated that his transfer to Lucknow was only a short term arrangement. The opposite party no. 3 with her family could live with her husband who was now posted at Lucknow but she was deliberately staying at Faizabad in order to seek eviction of the petitioner. In any case, opposite party no. 3 alongwith her children could live with her father, who was also residing at Faizabad in his own house. 3. The Prescribed Authority by his judgment and order dated 17-9-81 allowed the application. THE petitioner was directed to vacate the premises on the expiry of thirty days from the date of the order. THE petitioner thereafter filed an appeal which was disposed of by the 1st Additional District Judge, Faizabad by his judgment and order dated 26-3-1982. THE appeal was dismissed. THE petitioner has now come to this Court. 4. THE petitioner was directed to vacate the premises on the expiry of thirty days from the date of the order. THE petitioner thereafter filed an appeal which was disposed of by the 1st Additional District Judge, Faizabad by his judgment and order dated 26-3-1982. THE appeal was dismissed. THE petitioner has now come to this Court. 4. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Prescribed Authority while allowing the application did not at all compare the respective hardships of the parties, as was mandatorily required to be done in view of the fourth proviso to section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. This basic mistake was repeated by the appellate court and the provisions contained in Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act were totally ignored by the Prescribed Authority as also by the appellate authority. The findings recorded by these authorities on the question of genuine need of the opposite party no. 3 were also assailed. This is countenanced by the learned counsel for the opposite party by submitting that the appellate authority being conscious of the true legal position, has compared the respective hardships of the parties in the light of the guidelines contained in Rule 16 and as such the impugned judgments were liable to be sustained particularly when both the authorities below have recorded a concurrent finding of fact, which is legally unassailable in a writ petition, that the need of the opposite party for the accommodation in question was genuine and bonafide. Let me proceed to examine the merits of the respective contentions. 5. The scheme of the Act indicates that on an application of the landlord for the eviction of a tenant and for the release of the accommodation in his favour, the Prescribed Authority shall first consider the need of the landlord for the accommodation in question and if the need was found to be genuine and bonafide, the Prescribed Authority would then compare the hardships of the landlord and tenant. THE guidelines for such comparision have been laid down in Rule 16. THEre is obviously a difference between the words "needs" and ''Hardship" and it is in different context that the two words have been used in section 21. 6. THE guidelines for such comparision have been laid down in Rule 16. THEre is obviously a difference between the words "needs" and ''Hardship" and it is in different context that the two words have been used in section 21. 6. 4th Proviso to section 21 (1) (a) lays down, and these provisions are mandatory, that the Prescribed Authority shall take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. The question then is what is the meaning of the word "HARDSHIP" as used in the above proviso. 7. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edition, Volume II page 1210 lays down with reference to a number of English decisions on Rent Control Legislation that "hardship" connotes something harsher and more severe than trifling inconvenience and negligible loss of profit or temporary loss of a commercial opportunity. It is also laid down with reference to an Australian case that "hardship" includes any matter of appreciable detriment whether financial, personal or otherwise. 8. There appears to be a provision similar to that of 4th Proviso to section 21 (1) (a) of the Act which is contained in Regulation 63 of the National Security (Landlord and Tenant) Regulations (Australian Act) which provides that on the hearing of an application, the Court shall take into consideration in addition to all other relevant matters-(a) any hardship, which would be caused to the lessee or any other person by the making of the order (b) any hardship which would be caused to the lessor or any other person by the refusal of the court to make an order. In the case of Returned Soldiers etc. League of Australia Incpted v. Abbot, 1946 SASR 270 it has been laid down that "hardship" in the sense used in the aforesaid Regulation' may be regarded as the subjective effect of a detrimental nature upon the person concerned, directly consequent upon the deprivation of a benefit subsisting or potential. The word is capable of being descripative of adverse repercussions of every kind ; on the one hand, mere transient discomfort or inconvenience something evanscent and causing little disadvantage, although a source of some annoyance, such as the denial of some luxury ; and on the other hand, some permanent and unalterable evil or misfortune, together with all the grades of tribulation between those extremes. It may be physical or mental, and, indeed, will include in some degree both kinds of malaise. The consequence of a loss, or failure to obtain, possession of premises are likely to have included therein hardships concerning proprietary and financial interests, and may comprehend deprivation of rights or privileges of commercial value and bringing in revenue. Alternatively, such consequences may be personal, giving rise to physical discomfort, anxiety of mind, and other social, or even civic evils. It is not possible to classify the manifold form that hardship may take, as the aspects of detriment are as diverse and varied as the exigencies of human affairs. Regulations 63 (a) and (b) are intended to prevent one person securing a privilege, however, well he may be entitled thereto, if its exercise means little to him, and, at the same time, its bestowal will cause harm of some magnitude to another. Where the evils that one person or the other may suffer cannot readily be measured in contrast, and where the same approach equality, no precise unit of comparision is possible. The privation or injury on either side may be of different kinds, and, it may be, the adverse effects will depend at times very greatly on the suseptibility or the age-see Arthur v. Marsh, 1945 SAR 31 of the person who has to suffer. I suppose the problem may be put this way, if there is to be some aspect of unfairness whether an order be made or withheld, the question is, which of these alternatives will cause the least suffering ?" The meaning placed on the word "Hardship" by this court in its various decisions is not different. Moreover, Rule 16 itself provides ample guidelines in the light of which the authorities under the Act have to compare the hardship. 9. In the instant case, the Prescribed Authority did not at all compare the hardships of the parties. As a matter of fact, it did not advert its mind to that aspect of the matter. The Ist Additional District Judge who disposed of the appeal took into consideration the following factors for coming to the conclusion that the need of the landlady was genuine and bonafide ; (i) The landlady was paying Rs. 200/- rent for the accommodation in which she was living as against Rs. The Ist Additional District Judge who disposed of the appeal took into consideration the following factors for coming to the conclusion that the need of the landlady was genuine and bonafide ; (i) The landlady was paying Rs. 200/- rent for the accommodation in which she was living as against Rs. 150/- per month which she was getting from the petitioner as rent for the disputed permises. This was termed by him as the "financial aspect" and was held to be a relevant consideration for assessing the genuine need of the landlady. (ii) The standard of living of the landlady was, (I repeat the phrase used by the learned Additional District Judge), "not less than that of the tenant." The standard of living was a relevant consideration for deciding the need of the landlady. (iii) "If the hardship of the landlord and tenant stand on the same footing then in that case hardship of the landlord will be given a preferential chanc" (I have quoted this portion from para-7 of the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge). 10. The learned Additional District Judge in his judgment has throughout considered only the question of "bonafide need." He suddenly observed, on the basis of a decision of this court, without previous comparison, that if the hardship of the landlord and tenant stand on the same footing, "the hardship of the landlord will be given a preferential chance." He relied upon a decision of this court completely ignoring the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bishan Chand v. Additional District Judge, 1982 ARC 440 in which it was laid down that if the hardship of both landlord and tenant stand on the same footing, then in the absence of any additional circumstance indicating that preference can be shown to the landlord, the ejectment order in favour, of the landlord cannot be made. So far as the question of payment of higher rent by opposite party no. 3 is concerned, it may be stated that the learned Additional District Judge has relied upon the case of Smt. Rameshwari Devi v. Ist Addl. District Judge, 1981 UPRCC 414 wherein it has been laid down that the fact that the landlord was paying higher rent as a tenant than what he was getting from his tenant would be a relevant consideration for deciding release application. District Judge, 1981 UPRCC 414 wherein it has been laid down that the fact that the landlord was paying higher rent as a tenant than what he was getting from his tenant would be a relevant consideration for deciding release application. As against this there is an earlier decision of this Court in the case of Ramji Lal v. Addl. District Judge, 1978 (2) All Indian Rent Control Journal 64 in which it was held that the landlord was paying higher rent for the accommodation in his possession would not by itself be a relevant consideration. However, since in the instant case the petitioner has offered to make up the deficiency in rent and was still prepared to pay additional rent to make up the difference (see para-4 of the petitioner's affidavit dated 29-7-82), the Prescribed Authority as also the Additional District Judge should have taken into consideration this offer. 11. The learned counsel for the opposite party no. 3 next contended that since the petitioner had been transferred to Lucknow, the accommodation in dispute shall be deemed to be vacant under section 12 of the Act and, therefore, it was not required of the Prescribed Authority as also the Additional District Judge to compare the hardships. 12. The relevant provision in this regard is contained in section 12 (3-A) of the Act which provides that "if a tenant of a residential building holding a transferable post under any Government or Local Authority...............has been transferred to some other city........................then such tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy such building....................." It may be stated that transfer contemplated in this section is a regular transfer. Subsection (4) of section 12 provides that a building or part which a landlord or tenant has ceased to occupy within the meaning of sub-section (1), sub-section (3), sub-section (3-A) or sub-sec. (3-B) shall, for the purposes of this Chapter,be deemed to be vacant. It would be thus clear that the vacancy under Sec. 12 would be relevant only for the purpose of Chapter III in which section 12 occurs and not for the purposes of Chapter IV which contains section 21. (3-B) shall, for the purposes of this Chapter,be deemed to be vacant. It would be thus clear that the vacancy under Sec. 12 would be relevant only for the purpose of Chapter III in which section 12 occurs and not for the purposes of Chapter IV which contains section 21. I am fortified in this view by a series of decisions of this court in the case of Brijendra Nath v. IIlrd Additional District Judge, 1979 AWC 107, Smt. Prem Kumari Jain v. District Judge, 1979 UPRCC 68 and Param Hans Singh v. District Judge Ballia, 1980 ARC 550. I may, however, mention that in the instant case the petitioner has stated that he has been transferred to Lucknow as a local arrangement and that his was not a regular transfer. He also pleaded that his family members were still staying in the accommodation in dispute. These facts have also not been taken into consideration by the authorities below. 13. In view of what has been stated above, I allow the writ petition and quash the judgment and order dated 17-9-81 passed by the Prescribed Authority as also the judgment and order dated 26-3-82 passed by Ist Addl. District Judge, Faizabad and remand the case to the Prescribed Authority to dispose it of afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. I, however, make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.