JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. - This writ petition is directed against an order passed by the Vth Additional District Judge, Agra, dated 22nd December, 1981. The learned District Judge dismissed the revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act against an order striking off the defence of the Defendant under Order 15, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The case raises an interesting question of law. 2. The landlords filed a suit for eviction of the tenant and reserved their right to bring a suit for arrears of rent later. The rate of rent was of course mentioned as Rs. 50/- per month. It was also stated that four months' rent had not been paid and there was a default u/s 20(2)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. There was an allegation that inspite of termination of tenancy and even after the filing of the suit rent was not deposited month by month as required under Order 15, Rule 5 of the Code. The trial Court applied the provision of Order 15, Rule 5 of the Code and struck off the defence. A revision was preferred and it was dismissed, and now the Defendant tenant has come up to this Court in writ petition. 3. On behalf of the Defendant it was argued by Shri M.C. Agarwal that the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code was not applicable at all because the suit was not for the reliefs as contemplated in the said provisions. In other words, it was contended that where a landlord brought a suit for mere eviction without claiming any arrears of rent the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code would not be attracted. He further urged that since the provisions of Order XV Rule 5 of the Code was penal in nature the provisions had to be strictly construed. On behalf of the Respondent landlord Shri Ram Niwas Singh urged that after the deletion of the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act and the amendment of Rule 5 of Order XV of the Code it was immaterial whether the relief for recovery of arrears of rent was sought for or not in the suit. On behalf of the Respondent landlord Shri Ram Niwas Singh urged that after the deletion of the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act and the amendment of Rule 5 of Order XV of the Code it was immaterial whether the relief for recovery of arrears of rent was sought for or not in the suit. He urged that it was open to the landlord to claim only the relief of eviction and reserve his right for claiming the arrears of rent in a subsequent suit. 4. The Court below took the view that the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code would be applicable in the instant suit and struck off the defence. The question before this Court is whether the defence could be struck off under the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code where the landlord had not asked for the relief for arrears of rent as well. It would, therefore, be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Rule 5 as applicable in this State. Rule 5-Striking off defence on failure to deposit admitted rent, etc. (1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the Defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of 9 per centum per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (2), strike off his defence. 5. Explanations 1, 2 and 3 and Sub-rules (2) and (3) are omitted, as these provisions are not relevant here. The suit contemplated under Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code is one which is filed by the lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of the lease and for the recovery from him the rent or compensation for use and occupation. The suit contemplated under Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code is one which is filed by the lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of the lease and for the recovery from him the rent or compensation for use and occupation. It will be obvious at once that the suit has to be for the eviction of the lessee and for the recovery of rent or compensation for use and occupation. The two different reliefs as contemplated under this Rule is joined by the word 'and'. The question is what is the intendment in using the word 'and'. In other words, in what sense is the word 'and' used here? It undoubtedly has been used as a conjunction between the two Clauses viz. between the two different reliefs in the suit. Has the word 'and' to be read as 'or' in this Rule? It is, however, well settled that the conjunction 'and' is not to be read as 'or ' and vice versa unless it is imperative to do so. It is also well settled that the conjunction 'and' has generally a cumulative sense requiring the fulfillment of all the conditions that it joins together. It is antithesis of the word 'or'. It is also well settled that substitution of conjunctions ought not to be made without there being good reasons for the same. The rules of interpretation lay down that unless a change is required by any rule of grammar or by the sense of the particular passage or by the general scheme of the enactment and if the adherence of strict literal interpretation is destructive of the object of the enactment, it would not be so read. Reading the provisions of Rule 5 it is obvious that the intendment was that the provisions were to be applicable in a suit in which both the reliefs for eviction of the lessee and for the recovery of arrears of rent or compensation for use and occupation was sought. There is nothing in Rule 5 which persuades me to take the view that the rules of grammar require the reading of the word 'and' and 'or'. Nor do I find any intendment in the phraseology of Rule 5 that the word 'and' is to be read as 'or'. There is nothing in Rule 5 which persuades me to take the view that the rules of grammar require the reading of the word 'and' and 'or'. Nor do I find any intendment in the phraseology of Rule 5 that the word 'and' is to be read as 'or'. Reading the provisions as it exists it is clear that the provisions have been made applicable to a suit where both the reliefs are asked for. 6. It is well settled that the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code are penal in nature. The law requires a compliance with the requirement of Rule 5 in regard to the deposit of rent due, interest thereon and costs of the suit as well as the deposit of rent as and when it falls due. The penal provisions of Rule 5 are to be applied if these conditions are not fulfilled. Penal provisions are to be construed strictly. The result of a breach of these requirements is that the defence is to be struck off. This provision is salutary in nature and was enacted, it seems, to prevent the tenant from delaying the disposal of a suit for eviction and arrears of rent. The provisions of Rule 5 has made it obligatory for the tenant to deposit the rent which is admitted to the tenant as due together with interest thereon at 9 per cent per annum and costs of suit lest his defence would be struck off. In this way the object of the Act would be satisfied. The Intendment, it seems, was not that it would apply merely to a suit for eviction or merely to a suit for recovery of arrears of rent or compensation for use and occupation in respect of a building. 7. It will be relevant to look into the legislative history of this provision. Prior to 1972 there was no such provision in Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code when the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 came into effect on the 15th July, 1972 a provision was made for the filing of a suit for eviction of a tenant who was in default of arrears of rent for more than four months. Section 20(2)(a) of the Act provided that a suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the termination of the tenancy may be instituted where the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than four months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 which now stands deleted, read as follows: (3) In any suit under Sub-section (2), the tenant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount of rent or damages for use and occupation admitted by him to be due and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit, deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent or damages for use and occupation due at the rate of rent admitted by him, and in any event of any default in this regard, the Court may, unless after considering any representation made by him due in that behalf it allows him further time on security being furnished for that amount, refuse to entertain any defence or, as the case may be, strike off his defence. 8. Sub-section (3), therefore, applied to all the suits of the nature mentioned in Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 20(2) of the Act. It was not applicable merely to a suit for eviction of a tenant based on the ground of default as contemplated in Clause (a) of Section 20(2) of the Act. Sub-section (3) was deleted by U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972 with effect from 20th September, 1972. Instead, the amendment was introduced in Rule 5 of Order XV of the Code. It provided more or less in the similar lines as in the present Rule 5 for striking off the defence in case of his failure to comply with the provisions of the said Rule. But what is significant is that instead of making this Rule applicable to all those suits contemplated under Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 20(2) of the Act, the wording of Rule 5 as it now stands, makes it clear that it is applicable to a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease or for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation. The amplitude of the Rule is now restricted to a suit for eviction of a tenant and for recovery of ai rears of rent. It would also be applicable to a suit brought for the eviction of the tenant, recovery of arrears of rent etc. in respect of a tenant of a building which is not governed by the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. It is apparent from the above that the penal provisions of striking off the defence is now restricted only to a suit for eviction of a tenant and for recovery of arrears of rent or compensation for use and occupation. This strengthens the view that the intendment of the legislature was that it would apply only to a suit where both the reliefs have been claimed. For the reasons mentioned above I am of the view that the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code would be applicable only to a suit where the lessor has sought both the reliefs of eviction and recovery of arrears of rent or compensation for use and occupation. 9. In this case it was urged that there was arrears of rent for more than four months, there was a default to bring the suit within the ambit of Section 20(2)(a) of the Act but the lessor reserved the right to recover the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation in a subsequent suit. I am not able to appreciate the stand of the lessor in reserving his right for recovery of arrears of rent or compensation for use and occupation to a future suit if he was entitled to sue for both the reliefs in the present suit. It is indeed unintelligible that the lessor would not be asking for the recovery of arrears of rent or damages for use and occupation in the suit and still expect the lessee to make the deposit of arrears of rent, pay interest thereon and also go on making deposit of rent month by month. I, therefore, do not find any merits in this contention also. 10. Learned Counsel had also addressed on the merits. It was stated that the entire amount had been deposited and no amount was due although there was some delay in the making of the deposit which was liable to be condoned. I, therefore, do not find any merits in this contention also. 10. Learned Counsel had also addressed on the merits. It was stated that the entire amount had been deposited and no amount was due although there was some delay in the making of the deposit which was liable to be condoned. Learned Counsel for the Respondent, however, stated that the question whether there was a default in the making of the deposit was a question of fact and could not be gone into in the writ petition. It is not necessary to go into this question, for in my view the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code have no application to a suit which is filed only for the eviction of the tenant. Consequently, the view taken by the Court below is manifestly erroneous and cannot be sustained. 11. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Respondent No. 1 dated 22-12-1981 and the order passed by Respondent No. 2 dated 25th March, 1980 are set aside. The Petitioner will be entitled to his costs.