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1983 DIGILAW 411 (RAJ)

Hind Tyres v. State of Rajasthan

1983-09-09

DWARKA PRASAD

body1983
DWARKA PRASAD, J.—In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Collector, Jodhpur dated December 2, 1974 confiscating tyres seized from the shop of the petitioner under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 for the alleged contravention of the provisions of the Rajasthan Essential Commodities (Prices & Stock Display) Order, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Order) and the order of the Collector, Jodhpur dated April 24, 1974 relating to tyres and tubes. 2. The petitioner was also prosecuted for the very same contravention of the provisions of the Order for an offence under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter called "the Act") in the court of Judicial Magistrate, No. 2, Jodhpur. The learned Magistrate by his order dated June 14, 1978 held that the petitioner was guilty of the contravention of the provisions of the order and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment upto the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in case of non-payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the order passed by the learned Magistrate before the Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, who by his order dated September 14, 1979 accepted the appeal and thus the petitioner was acquitted of the charge under section 3/7 of the Act, for committing a contravention of the provisions of the Order. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after the acquittal of the petitioner by the criminal court in the prosecution launched against him for the very same contravention of the provisions of the Order, in respect of which the Collector passed an order of confiscation under Section 6-A, the petitioner is entitled to the return of the Essential Commodities seized by virtue of provisions of Section 6-C (2) of the Act. It was urged by the learned counsel, that in the present case this Court by its order dated April 18, 1975 passed on the stay application authorised the petitioner to obtain the delivery of the confiscated tyres on furnishing adequate security to the satisfaction of the District Supply Officer, Jodhpur. The petitioner has admitted that he obtained the delivery of the confiscated tyres as directed by this Court, after furnishing the requisite security. The petitioner has admitted that he obtained the delivery of the confiscated tyres as directed by this Court, after furnishing the requisite security. Thus, it is urged that with the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal prosecution under section 3/7 of the Act, the petitioner was entitled to the return of the seized goods and that the order of confiscation was rendered ineffective on account of the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur in the criminal prosecution. 4. The Essential Commodities Act was enacted in the year 1955, with the dominant object of ensuring equitable distribution of Essential Commodities, defined and notified under the provisions of the Act. A contravention of the provisions of any Order made under section 3 of the Act has been made punishable under Section 7. However, it was felt that the provisions made in Section 7 of the Act for prosecution of persons committing contravention of the provisions of the Orders issued under the Act were not as effective as was necessary. In order to make the administration of the Act more effective the provisions contained in Section 6-A to 6-D were introduced by the Amending Act No. 25 of 1966. The proceedings taken under Section 6-A of the Act relating to confiscation of the Essential Commodities seized, are undertaken on the basis that a contravention of the provisions of an Order issued under Section 3 has been committed. Such proceedings are not in the nature of proceedings for prosecution for a criminal offence, but the proceedings under Section 6-A are quasi-criminal in character, as they may end in the imposition of penalty, by way of confiscation of the Essential Commodities seized, for the alleged contravention of the provisions of the Order made under Section 3 of the Act. It may be observed that the proceedings under Section 6-A do not debar a criminal prosecution. A trial, on a charge in respect of the contravention of the provisions of the Orders issued under Section 3, is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act. The real nature of the proceedings under Section 6-A is regulation of seized goods for public welfare. A trial, on a charge in respect of the contravention of the provisions of the Orders issued under Section 3, is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act. The real nature of the proceedings under Section 6-A is regulation of seized goods for public welfare. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Gujarat vs Acharya Shri Devendra Prasadji Pande, (1), while dealing with the question of mens rea, observed that mens rea means some blame-worthy mental condition whether constituted by knowledge, intention or otherwise, but the general rule of law that no crime can be committed unless there is mensrea has several exceptions. Their Lord-ships of the Supreme Court quoted with approval in the aforesaid case the following observations of Lord Evershed in Lim Chin Aik vs. The Queen (2):- "Whether the subject matter of the statute is the regulation for the public welfare of a particular activity statutes regulating the sale of food and drink are to be found among the earliest examples-it can be and frequently has been inferred that the legislature intended that such activities should be carried out under conditions of strict liability. The presumption is that the statute or statutory instrument can be effectively enforced only if those in charge of the relevant activities are made responsible for seeing that they are complied with." 5. Their Lordships also referred to the observations of Write J., in Sherras vs De Rutzen (3), where three principal classes of exceptions to the general rule that mens rea is a necessary ingredient in every offence have been pointed out. The first class includes those acts which are not criminal in any real sense, but are acts which in the public interest are prohibited under a penalty. The second class comprehends some and perhaps all public nuisances. The third class is that in which although the proceedings are criminal in form but they are really only summary modes of enforcing civil rights. Thus, when statutes regulating public welfare in the matter of equitable distribution of Essential Commodities provides for certain prohibitory or regulatory measures, which are to be taken in public interest under a penalty, they are undoubtedly quasi-criminal in nature. 6. Thus, when statutes regulating public welfare in the matter of equitable distribution of Essential Commodities provides for certain prohibitory or regulatory measures, which are to be taken in public interest under a penalty, they are undoubtedly quasi-criminal in nature. 6. Under Section 6-A of the Act, the Collector is authorised, if he thinks it expedient to do so, to direct that Essential Commodities seized for the alleged contravention be produced before him for inspection and if he is satisfied that there has been a contravention of the Orders issued under s 3, the Collector may order confiscation of the Essential Commodities so seized, together with any package, covering or receptible in which such Essential Commodities are found and any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance used for carrying those commodities. Under sub-sec. (2) of Section 6-A, the Collector is also authorised to sell the essential commodity at the controlled price, if any, fixed therefor under the Act or any other law for the time being in force and if no price is fixed, then by public auction in case the essential commodity seized is subject to speedy and natural decay or otherwise he considers it expedient in the public interest to do so. Sub-section (3) of Section 6-A reads as under;- "(3) Where any essential commodity is sold, as aforesaid, the sale proceeds thereof after deduction of the expenses of any such sale or auction or other incidental expenses relating thereto shall- (a) Where no order of confiscation is ultimately passed by the Collector, (b) where an order passed on appeal under sub-section (1) of Sec. 6-C so requires, or (c) where in a prosecution instituted for the contravention of the order in respect of which an order of confiscation has been made under this section, the person concerned is acquitted, be paid to the owner thereof or the person from whom it is seized." 7. Similar provision is contained in Section 6-C (2), which runs as under:— "(2) Where an order under Section 6-A is modified or annulled by such judicial authority, or where in a prosecution instituted for the contravention of the Order in respect of which an order of confiscation has been made under Sec. 6A, the person concerned is acquitted and in either case, it is not possible for any reason to return the essential commodity seized, such person shall, except as provided by sub-section (3) of Section 6-A, be paid the price therefor as if the essential commodity had been sold to the Government, with reasonable interest calculated from the day of the seizure of the essential commodity; and such price shall be determined ; — (i) in the case of food-grains, edible oil seeds, or edible oils, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3-B) of Section 3; (ii) in the case of sugar, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3-C) of Section 3; and (iii) in the case of any other essential commodity, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3 of Section 3." 8. Thus, if the order of confiscation passed by the Collector under Section 6-A of the Act is annulled on appeal under Section 6-C or is modified or where in a prosecution, instituted for the contravention of the Order in respect of which the confiscation of the essential commodity concerned was ordered under Section 6-A, the person concerned is acquitted then in either case the essential commodity seized would be returned to the owner of the goods or to the person from whom they were seized. If the commodity has been sold under s. 6-A (2), then the price received from such sale or auction shall be paid to the owner of such commodity or to the person from whom it was seized, after deducting the expenses of sale or auction or other incidental expenses. If the commodity has been sold under s. 6-A (2), then the price received from such sale or auction shall be paid to the owner of such commodity or to the person from whom it was seized, after deducting the expenses of sale or auction or other incidental expenses. However, if it is not possible for any reason to return the essential commodity seized, when the order passed under Section 6-A is modified or annulled or the person concerned is acquitted of the criminal charge relating to the contravention of the Order for which confiscation was made and the essential commodity has not been sold under Section 6-A (2) then also the person concerned is entitled to be paid the price of such essential commodity as if the same had been sold to the Government together with reasonable interest thereon. Thus in either case, where the order of confiscation passed by the Collector under Section 6-A is annulled or modified in appeal or where the criminal prosecution is terminated with the acquittal of the person concerned of an offence for the very same contravention of the Order issued under Sec. 3 of the Act, the person concerned is entitled to the restoration of the essential commodity or the price thereof, either under Section 6-A (3) or under Section 6-C (2) of the Act. Even in cases where the order of confiscation passed under Section 6-A is confirmed in appeal by the judicial authority under Section 6-C (1), yet at the same time the prosecution for the contravention of the Order in respect of which confiscation was made ends in an acquittal, then also the second part of sub-section (2) of Section 6-C could become operative and the person concerned would become , entitled to the return of the essential commodity concerned or the price thereof. 9. Of course, if no criminal prosecution is launched under Section 7 for the alleged contravention of the Order for which the order of confiscation was passed, then the order passed under Section 6-A (1) or the order passed by the judicial authority on appeal under Section 6-A (1), as the case may be, would become final as relating to the question of confiscation of such essential commodities. But if a criminal prosecution is launched in respect of the contravention of the Order which confiscation has been made, then the decision of the criminal court in such proceedings would govern the ultimate fate of the confiscated goods. The reason is obvious as already discussed above, that the proceedings under Sec. 6-A relating to the confiscation of the seized essential goods are quasi criminal in nature and the Collector is authorised to pass such an order of confiscation under Sec 6-A (1) in a summary manner; while the criminal prosecution for the very same contravention under Sec. 7 of the Act ensures a regular criminal trial wherein the criminal court necessarily has to follow the elaborate procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. In the present case, the petitioner having been acquitted of the criminal charge for the alleged contravention of the provisions of the Rajasthan Display of Prices and Stocks of Essential Commodities Order, 1966 by the order of the Sessions Judge, Jodhpur dated September 14, 1979, the petitioner would have been entitled to the restoration of the seized or confiscated goods if the same would have been in possession of the Collector or to the price thereof in accordance with the provisions of Section 6-A(3) if such goods would have been sold under Section 6-A (2) or even otherwise to the price thereof under Section 6-C (2). But in the present case, as mentioned above, the Essential Commodities concerned, namely, tyres were returned to the petitioner by the order passed by this Court on the stay application, on his furnishing adequate security. Therefore, now the petitioner is only entitled to an order that the order of confiscation passed under Section 6-A (1) is annulled, because such an order could not be maintained in the face of an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur in respect of the very same alleged act of contravention of the provisions of the Order issued under Section 3 of the Act. 11. I am fortified in the view which I have expressed above, by the decision of a learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Somisetti Ramanaiah vs. The District Supply Officer, Chittoor (4). 11. I am fortified in the view which I have expressed above, by the decision of a learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Somisetti Ramanaiah vs. The District Supply Officer, Chittoor (4). In that case also, in the course of certain inter-locutory proceedings in a writ petition filed by the person against whom proceedings for confiscation were taken under Section 6-A of the Act, the High Court issued a direction to the Collector to return the seized goods to the owner. In that case, the order of confiscation passed under Section 6-A (1) was confirmed on appeal by the judicial authority under Section 6-C (1). Thereafter a demand was raised against the petitioner for the value of the confiscated goods which were released to him under the direction of the High Court. The owner of the goods filed a writ petition in the High Court and contended that the prosecution for violation of the order resulted in an acquittal and as such no amount could be realised from him, even after the order passed under Sec 6-C(1) by the judicial authority, confirming the order of confiscation passed under Section 6-A (1). It was held by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the aforesaid case that inspite of the confiscation order being confirmed by the appellate authority under Section 6-C(1), as the criminal prosecution for contravention of the Order in respect of which the order of confiscation was made, resulted in an acquittal, the petitioner was entitled to the price of the goods in terms of Section 6-C (2) and the writ petition was allowed. In the present case also, in view of the subsequent development resulting in the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal prosecution under section 3/7 of the Act for the alleged contravention of the Order for which the order of confiscation was passed, the order under Section 6-A(1) dated December 2, 1974 can no longer be maintained and has to be annulled. 12. In this view of the matter, I need not go into the merits of the said order in these proceedings. It was argued by the learned Deputy Government Advocate that no appeal was preferred by the petitioner against the order of confiscation, under Section 6-C(1) of the Act. 12. In this view of the matter, I need not go into the merits of the said order in these proceedings. It was argued by the learned Deputy Government Advocate that no appeal was preferred by the petitioner against the order of confiscation, under Section 6-C(1) of the Act. However, in view of the subsequent acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal proceedings relating to the very same matter, the absence of fifing an appeal under Section 6-C (1) by the petitioner is immaterial as the petitioner became entitled to the return of the confiscated goods on the basis of the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur. 13. In this view of the matter, the writ petition is allowed and the order passed by the Collector, Jodhpur dated December 2, 1974 is annulled. No further proceedings are required to be taken in the matter since the confiscated goods have already been returned to the petitioner, on the basis of the direction passed by this Court on the stay application. The order regarding security is discharged. The parties are left to bear their own costs.