JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - This first appeal is directed against the award of the District Judge in a reference under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act which has been dismissed as not maintainable by the court below. 2. By G. O. No. 2183/V-1228/1945 dated 26th April, 1946 the Government of U. P. authorised the Collector, Agra to occupy the land in question for temporary use by the Government for making bricks for use in the construction of a new building for Medical College, Agra According to the award of the Land Acquisition Officer, the Compensation for use of the land by way of rent during the period of occupation by the Government had already been paid to the claimants. The land was returned to the claimants partly on 7-8-53 and the rest on 28- 9-53 by the Tahsildar, Agra. During the period of its possession the Government admittedly removed earth from the fields for the purpose of making bricks. Since the Government was required to pay compensation for the earth so removed and, or damages caused to the land the compensation was determined on the basis of the report of the Public Works Department itself, and was offered to the various claimants by the order of the Land Acquisition Officer dated 18-2-1955. 3. The appellants being dissatisfied with the amount offered made an application to the Collector, Agra praying for making a reference to the court. According to them, the appellants came to know about these proceedings for the first time on 30th March, 1955 when the award was made known to them. In the reference application the plea was taken that the land remained in occupation of the Government for well over 8 years during which period the earth was removed from the various plots. The compensation for this was assessed only at the rate of Rs. 100. - per Bigha which was too law and inadequate. It was further stated that due to the operations carried out for making the bricks, the entire land had been rendered uneven and at places pits as deep as 8 feet had been dug. Accordingly the total compensation of Rs. 12000/- was claimed for removing the earth. 100. - per Bigha which was too law and inadequate. It was further stated that due to the operations carried out for making the bricks, the entire land had been rendered uneven and at places pits as deep as 8 feet had been dug. Accordingly the total compensation of Rs. 12000/- was claimed for removing the earth. Objection was also taken that no notice had been served on the claimants by the Land Acquisition Officer before determining the amount of compensation payable and thus they had no opportunity to place their case. The court for the reasons recorded in its judgment came to the conclusion that the reference itself was not maintainable under the provisions of Ss. 35 to 37 of the Land Acquisition Act, as in its view, none of the provisions of S. 35, 36 or 37 of the Act applied to the facts of the present case. In the result, the reference was dismissed. Aggrieved the appellants have come up before this Court. 4. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it would be better to examine the scheme of the Act regarding temporary occupation of the land by the Government. Chapter VI of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 deals with the temporary occupation of the land and this Chapter consists of only three sections. In fact, the whole scheme contained in these three sections gives the step by step procedure before land belonging to any person could be occupied by the Government as a temporary measure. These sections read as under : "35 (1). Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that the temporary occupation and use of any waste or arable land are needed for any public purpose, or for a Company, the appropriate Government may direct the Collector to procure the occupation and use of the same' for such term as it shall think fit not exceeding three years from the commencement of such occupation. (2) The Collector shall thereupon give notice in writing to the persons interested in such land of the purpose for which the same is needed and shall, for the occupation and use thereof for such term as- aforesaid and for the materials (if any) to be taken therefrom, pay to them such compensation, either in a gross sum of money, or b} a monthly, or other periodical payments as shall be agreed upon in writing between him and such persons respectively. (3) In case the Collector and the persons interested differ as to the sufficiency of the compensation or apportionment thereof. the Collector shall refer such difference to the decision of the Court. 36. (1) On payment of such compensation, or on execution of such agreement, or on making a reference under Section 35, the Collector may enter upon and take possession of the land, and use or permit the use thereof in accordance with the terms of the said notice. (2) On the expiration of the term, the Collector shall make or tender to the persons interested compensation for the damage if any) done to the land and not provided for by the agreement, and shall restore the land to the persons interested therein : Provided that, if the land has become permanently unfit to be used for the purpose for which it was used immediately before the commencement of such term, and if the persons interested shall so require the appropriate Government shall proceed under this Act to acquire the land as if it was needed permanently for a public' purpose or for a Company. 37. In cases the Collector and persons interested differ as to the condition of the land at the expiration of the term, or as to any matter connected with the said agreement, the Collector shall refer such difference to the decision of the Court. 5. An examination of S. 35 will show that whenever any waste or arable land is needed for temporary occupation and use by the Government, it can authorise the Collector to procure the occupation and use of the same for not more than three years. The Government gives this permission to go ahead with the occupation to the Collector who is, on the strength of such permission, required to give notice in writing to the interested persons intimating to them the purpose for which the land was needed. The Government gives this permission to go ahead with the occupation to the Collector who is, on the strength of such permission, required to give notice in writing to the interested persons intimating to them the purpose for which the land was needed. He is also required to pay such compensation either in a gross sum of money or by monthly or other periodical payments for occupying and using the land, for the term, for which the Government needs it, and for taking material, if any, from such land The terms which may be agreed between the Collector and the owner of the land in respect of the amount and mode of payment of compensation and about the material which is to be taken out from the owner's land, in this regard are required to be reduced into writing in the form of an agreement. However, should the owner of the land not agree to the terms offered by the Collector or about the apportionment thereof amongst the various claimants, the Collector is bound to make a reference of such difference for decision to the Court. 6. However, until the procedure contained in S. 35 has been duly followed, the Collector has no right to either enter upon or to occupy the land or to use the same even for the purpose for which the Government had given him permission. It is only after due compliance of the requirements of S. 35 that the Collector has the right to occupy the land for the permitted use or purpose only and then the Collector can proceed further as laid down in S. 36. After the land has been used for the purpose of temporary acquisition, and not beyond the term as agreed or three years, whichever is less, the Collector is liable to tender an amount as compensation to the land owners, for any damage done to the land not covered under the agreement, and to restore possession over the land to the owners thereof. It is further provided that where, by user of the land to which it was put by the Government it became unusable for the purposes for which it was being used prior to its occupation, the land may be acquired permanently for the public purpose provided the owner of the land so demands. 7. It is further provided that where, by user of the land to which it was put by the Government it became unusable for the purposes for which it was being used prior to its occupation, the land may be acquired permanently for the public purpose provided the owner of the land so demands. 7. S. 37 provides for a situation where the land owner and the Collector differ about the condition of the land at the.time of its redelivery or if there be disagreement about the terms of the agreement referred to in sub-clause (2) of S. 35 then in such an event, the differences shall be referred for decision to the court. 8. According to the appellants, no notice was ever served on them as contemplated in sub-section (1) of S.35. The Collector, through Public Works Department occupied the land and-started making bricks without ever serving a notice on the owners. No compensation was either paid to them and they came to know about the proceedings only after the award had been given by the Land Acquisition Officer in respect of the compensation payable to them after redelivery of possession of the land. It is pleaded that no occasion could arise to execute an agreement contemplated under sub-clause (2) of S. 35 and no such agreement was in fact entered into between the parties. There is no denial of these allegations in the written statement by the State, apart from making a sweeping reply that compensation by way of rent had already been paid to the appellants, for the period during which the Government remained in possession over the disputed land. Though the land was occupied in 1946, its possession was not restored even after three years, which is the maximum period for which such land could remain in occupation of the Government. Admittedly, the land was released in two stages on 7-8- 1953 and 28-9-1953 i.e.more than seven years after its occupation. In this case, the Collector admittedly failed to enter into an agreement with the owners before proceeding to occupy the claimants' land. From a bare reading of S. 35, it is obvious that the order issued by the Government merely accords permission to the Collector to go ahead to procure the occupation and use of the land sought to be temporarily acquired. But this too cannot be done for a period of more than 3 years. From a bare reading of S. 35, it is obvious that the order issued by the Government merely accords permission to the Collector to go ahead to procure the occupation and use of the land sought to be temporarily acquired. But this too cannot be done for a period of more than 3 years. Under the powers to procure the occupation and use of the land however, the Collector cannot straightway proceed to occupy the land and start using it even for permitted purposes, though temporarily. On the basis of the authority so given, what the Collector can do is only to take steps as are contemplated in sub-clause (2) of S. 35 in order to procure the occupation of the land. For this purpose, he is required first to serve notice in writing to the persons interested in such land informing them the purpose and the period for which the said land is needed. In response to such notice, the interested parties may negotiate the amount of compensation payable for occupation of the land or for material to be taken out from the land in question and then an agreement may be entered into between the parties. When no such agreement can be arrived at, the flatter must be referred to the court for determining the compensation. Only after such reference has been made by the Collector can he proceed to occupy the land and use the same for specified purpose. 9. In the application to the Collector for making the reference in this case, the claimants had clearly asserted that no notice under S. 35(2) of the Act was ever served on them. They also asserted that they had no knowledge about the award which had been given behind their back. From the facts on the record, it appears that at the time of making this application, the land had already been restored to the claimants after its use by the Government. The reference was sought at this second stage when under S. 36(2), the Collector is required to tender the amount of compensation for damages caused to the land. 10. From the facts on the record, it appears that at the time of making this application, the land had already been restored to the claimants after its use by the Government. The reference was sought at this second stage when under S. 36(2), the Collector is required to tender the amount of compensation for damages caused to the land. 10. The argument raised for the State of U. P. and accepted by the court below was that if the parties had failed to enter into an agreement under S. 35(2), the remedy lay only in seeking a reference under sub- section (3) but once that stage is over no further reference can be made for payment of compensation for the user of the land or for taking out material from it. If the Collector had illegally occupied the land without first entering into an agreement with the claimants, it is urged, the claimant ought to have taken appropriate proceedings in the Civil Courts for restraining the Collector from doing so. The same argument has been repeated before me. It is a strange argument and I am surprised .that the Government which vows to uplift the downtrodden and professes to be their saviour is involved in taking undue advantage of their ignorance and inability to fight against the might of the State by illegally using their land without paying any compensation whatsoever of it. Laws are made to be followed by the officers of the Government both in letter and spirit and not to be flouted mercilessly. If the officers whose duty it is to work within the framework of the law themselves feel free to act in such an indiscriminate manner, who else is going to follow the law. I fear, I utterly fail to agree with the contention raised on behalf of the State. 11. It is obvious and almost admitted that in pursuance of the proceedings to acquire the land temporarily under S. 35, no notices were sent to the claimants, at least there is no material on the record to prove otherwise. The defendant did not controvert the statement made in the reference application and this fact, therefore, ought to be deemed to having been admitted by the State. Also, no agreement was entered into between the Collector and the appellants. The defendant did not controvert the statement made in the reference application and this fact, therefore, ought to be deemed to having been admitted by the State. Also, no agreement was entered into between the Collector and the appellants. That being-so the claimants could not have asked for reference being made to the court under sub-clause (3) of S. 35. The action of the Collector in occupying the land before any agreement had been reduced to writing as required in sub-clauses (2) and (3) of the section was itself illegal and cannot be taken advantage of by the State. A party which is itself guilty of violating the provisions of law and in failing to discharge its statutory functions in accordance with law, cannot be permitted to use the said lapse as a defence. To permit this would amount to giving premium for the illegalities in procedure committed by the Collector in this case. The Collector by his own conduct is estopped from raising such a plea in defence. 12. It is urged that after redelivery of possession of the land, such a reference was not maintainable in view of the language employed in S. 36(2). As noted above, in the normal circumstances, the Collector could not take possession over the land before he had finalised the terms by mutual agreement on which the same was to be occupied by the Government. S. 36(2), therefore, cannot bar this reference. 13. The next point urged by the learned State counsel was that the reference has been made under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and such a reference is not contemplated in proceedings under Chapter VI, which deals with temporary occupation of land. It is now well settled that mere wrong mention of the provision cannot disentitle -a person from availing the relief justly due to it. If legally the claimants were entitled to have a reference made to the court a mere quoting of wrong section of the Act would not deprive them of their right. 14. After possession over the land is redelivered after temporary occupation and use by the Collector, then again compensation has to be paid to the interested persons in respect of the damage, if any, done to the land as was not covered by the agreement. 14. After possession over the land is redelivered after temporary occupation and use by the Collector, then again compensation has to be paid to the interested persons in respect of the damage, if any, done to the land as was not covered by the agreement. Here again the owners of the land are entitled to be compensated for so much of the damage done to the land as was neither covered under the terms of the agreement nor was included in the amount of compensation paid under S. 35(2) read with S. 36(1). In the instant case, there was no agreement at all. Question, therefore, arises, whether the claimants could claim any compensation for the damage caused to the land, language and spirit behind S. 36 requires that the Collector should strictly abide by the terms on which the land had been temporarily occupied and also confine strictly to the user of the same within the terms agreed upon. If for any reason the Collector fails in persuading the land owners to agree to his terms or where terms of the agreement are not reduced to writing for any reason whatsoever, then, any damage done to the land must be adequately compensated for. Restoration of the land to the interested persons should follow payment or tender of compensation to the land owners. The sequence in which the various phases of the process are provided in sub-clause (2) of S. 36 must be meticulously followed. The provisions require that first the Collector shall tender the amount of compensation for the damage caused in excess of what had been contemplated by the earlier agreement and then to restore its possession back to the owners. What happened in this case appears to be that first the land was handed over to the owners in 1953 and thereafter the damage was ascertained and an award followed on 10-2-1955. It was only when the amount offered under the award was not accepted by the claimants the present reference was made under S. 37. 15. The argument of the State which has commended itself to the learned District Judge is based entirely on the language of S. 37 of the Act, divorced from the provisions contained in S. 36(2). It was only when the amount offered under the award was not accepted by the claimants the present reference was made under S. 37. 15. The argument of the State which has commended itself to the learned District Judge is based entirely on the language of S. 37 of the Act, divorced from the provisions contained in S. 36(2). After rejecting the claimant's contention that the reference could be treated to be one under S. 35(3) the court held that no reference in the facts and circumstances of the case could be made even under S. 37. According to him there were only two contingencies in which a reference under this Section could be made, (1) where there was any difference as to the condition of the land on the expiry of the term and, (2) where the difference related to a matter connected with the said agreement. Since in his opinion, the case did not fall under any of these two categories, the reference itself was not maintainable. 16. The same line of argument has been reiterated before me also and it is urged that the reference was rightly held to be not maintainable. I wish I could agree with the view of the learned District Judge. In spite of my vigorous effort to do so, I find myself unable to agree with his reasoning. He has read and interpreted the provision of S. 37 alone completely divorced from and after isolating the provisions of S. 36 and this is where the mistake appears to have been committed. 17. The language of S. 36(2) quoted earlier requires the Collector to act in the following manner : (i) When the term for which the land had been or could be occupied expires. (ii) The Collector shall make or tender compensation to the interested persons for the damage, if any, done to the land acquired for temporary occupation. (iii) Such compensation, however, shall not include any amount already covered by the terms of the agreement as contemplated by Section 35(2). (iv) If the damage caused to the land is so extensive that the same cannot be put to the same use for which it was being used before such acquisition, then the claimants have the option to require the Collector to acquire the land permanently. 18. (iv) If the damage caused to the land is so extensive that the same cannot be put to the same use for which it was being used before such acquisition, then the claimants have the option to require the Collector to acquire the land permanently. 18. From the above, it would be clear that the land owners are entitled to compensation for all the damage done to their land during occupation by Government, barring such part thereof as might be covered already under the agreement made under S. 35(2). Admittedly, there was no such agreement and it is no parties' case that such an agreement in writing had in fact been arrived at between the parties. In its absence who must suffer? Not the claimants, as the terms of the agreement alone could have curtailed their right in respect of the damage that may be caused to the land due to the use for which it was needed by the Government. At the stage of S. 35(2) itself, the parties could agree about the extent to which the earth was to be excavated for making the bricks and how much and in what manner the payment would be made. In the absence of such an agreement, no limitation on the right to claim compensation for damage caused could be pleaded by the State. Only the terms of the agreement could be restrictive of appellant's rights and, therefore, advantage, if any, of the absence of such an agreement must go in their favour. 19. It was submitted by the learned State Counsel that according to the award the compensation had already been paid to the interested persons before the land was occupied temporarily. This allegation was specifically refuted in the reference application but no reply to it has been given by the State. In my opinion, merely because there is a mention- of such payment in the award, that should not be accepted as correct particularly when this fact was specifically denied by the claimants. When parties were at issue on this point, the same ought to have been decided after recording necessary evidence in that behalf. The learned court below has taken the view that from the conduct of the parties, it could validly be presumed that there was an implied agreement between the parties, otherwise how else the appellants would have permitted occupation of their land by the Government. The learned court below has taken the view that from the conduct of the parties, it could validly be presumed that there was an implied agreement between the parties, otherwise how else the appellants would have permitted occupation of their land by the Government. This, however, does not appear to be wholly justified. Under S. 35(2) the relevant words "pay to them such compensation........ as shall be agreed upon in writing between him and such persons respectively" clearly rule out possibility of an implied agreement which must always be in writing. 20. There was no issue framed in the court below on the question as to whether any compensation in respect of the period for which the State remained in possession over the land in dispute had in fact been paid to the appellants. However, the court below has, relying upon the observations made in the award of the Collector, held that this compensation had been paid off even though there was no agreement in writing between the parties in that respect. As I have observed earlier, the scheme of Chapter VI of the Act lays down the various steps and the sequence in which those steps are to be taken before the State through the Collector can enjoy the land even for a temporary purpose. Firstly, the State was not at all entitled to enter upon and occupy the land without first entering into an agreement about the compensation payable for such occupation and in the event of parties disagreeing with the amount offered by the Collector, in this behalf, it was entitled to refer the matter to the courts. Secondly it appears that no agreement was entered into between the parties and there is nothing on the record to show that at any stage before occupying the land the Collector had tendered or offered any amount by way of compensation for such temporary occupation, hence the stage did not arise for the appellants to request the Collector to make reference to the court under S. 35(3) of the Act. 21. I have gone through the judgment of the court below and it does not appear therefrom that any evidence had been adduced by the parties showing that payment of compensation had been made by the State for the period of occupation of the land by it. 21. I have gone through the judgment of the court below and it does not appear therefrom that any evidence had been adduced by the parties showing that payment of compensation had been made by the State for the period of occupation of the land by it. In the paper book, there is a document dated 9-1-1969 which shows that in pursuance of G. D. dated 26th April, 1946, no notice under S. 35(2) of the Act was given to the claimants. This document is in the nature of a query made from the office and in reply to it, the office has replied that no such notice had been issued. The view of the court below that since no dispute was raised by the appellants regarding the sufficiency of compensation for the period of occupation, it must be presumed that the compensation in that regard had been paid, in view of the document referred to above, does not appear to be correct. However, I am purposely refraining from expressing any opinion on this question at present. 22. The court below has held that the present reference could not be deemed to be under S. 35(3) of the Act. If no notice as contemplated under S. 35 was given to the claimants and no negotiations, successful or abortive, took place between the parties regarding the amount of compensation, there could be no occasion for the claimants to request the Collector for making a reference. As held earlier, the provisions of S. 35 require that either parties agree in writing to the terms of occupation or, if they fail to do so, a reference has to be made to the court in that respect. However, no period of limitation for doing so has been prescribed. The court below has also held that in the circumstances of the case, it was possible to hold that an implied agreement had come into being. However, S. 35(3) completely rules out an implied agreement for, it requires that the agreement ought to be in writing. In the absence of the written agreement, one must assume that there was no agreement at all as contemplated under that section. 23. However, S. 35(3) completely rules out an implied agreement for, it requires that the agreement ought to be in writing. In the absence of the written agreement, one must assume that there was no agreement at all as contemplated under that section. 23. Even if the claimants had failed to make a reference before the Collector occupied the land, yet there is nothing in the Act to bar a common reference being made under S. 35(3) as also under S. 37 of Chapter VI of the Act, more so in the peculiar circumstances of the present case. Where the State has authority to enforce its will on its unwilling subjects under the provisions of any statute, such provisions, by their very nature, must be construed favouring the subject and not the State. The court below has relied upon a single Judge decision of this court in Samlia Ram v. P. W. D., Agra, 1957 All WR (HC) 96. That case, however, is clearly distinguishable. In that case, it was assumed that notices under S. 35(2) had been issued to the owners and in those circumstances, it was held that to attract application of S. 35(3), it was necessary that the persons to whom notices are sent should raise the dispute at the proper time (emphasis mine). The said case, therefore, cannot be deemed to be an authority for the point raised herein. The other case to which reference has been made was Secy. of State in Council v. Abdul Salam Khan, ILR 37 All 347 : ( AIR 1915 All 477 ) where under Ss. 35 and 36(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, compensation had been awarded by the court for "Kankar" removed from the land. On an appeal to the High Court by the Secretary of State, it was herd that the very basis of the claim awarded by the court was wrong because "Kankar" was Government property and all minerals, as a general rule belonged to the Government. In these circumstances, the appeal was allowed and the claim of the Zamindars in respect of "Kankar" taken out from the land was rejected. That position also does not arise in the present case. 24. The court below was of the opinion that under S. 36, dispute as to sufficiency of compensation cannot be referred to the court. This is not so. Ss. That position also does not arise in the present case. 24. The court below was of the opinion that under S. 36, dispute as to sufficiency of compensation cannot be referred to the court. This is not so. Ss. 35, 36 and 37 are intimately interlinked and must be read as part of a single scheme and one section cannot be read in isolation from others. ' 25. The words "differ as to the condition of the land on the expiration of the term" cannot, by any stretch, be linked with the proviso to' S. 36(2). This term is of a very wide import and encompasses within its scope all questions relating to damage caused to the land as can be ascertained at the time of redelivering its possession to the land owners. 26. To illustrate my point, take for instance that some land was acquired for temporary use near the site of the factory where the land was needed only for the purposes of raising temporary structure to store material However, when the land is vacated by the company and was redelivered to the owner, the temporary structure raised on the land were left as they were. The owner of the land had no use of such structures and he needs the land plain for carrying on his cultivation as before. Can the claimants not ask for damages for expenses incurred by them in removing the structures so as to restore the land to its original conditions? If the argument of the State counsel is to be accepted, such a claimant would not be entitled to claim any damages in this respect and he must proceed in the civil Court to seek their removal To my mind, the language of S. 37 cannot validly be put to such a restricted meaning. The endeavour of this legislation has been to provide complete forum to cover all likely disputes that may arise between the owner of the land and the State. By the very nature of these provisions, it must be understood that every sort of dispute which could conceivably arise during such proceedings under Chapter VI were intended to be decided on reference to the court for determination, whenever parties fail to settle them by mutual consent at one or the other stage of the proceedings. 27. By the very nature of these provisions, it must be understood that every sort of dispute which could conceivably arise during such proceedings under Chapter VI were intended to be decided on reference to the court for determination, whenever parties fail to settle them by mutual consent at one or the other stage of the proceedings. 27. What is provided in the proviso to sub-clause (2) of S. 36 is a special right which is given to the owner and is not at all referable to the claim for compensation arising out of any damage caused to the land while under temporary occupation of the Government. If the land was rendered so useless as to become' unusable by them for which it was being used earlier, the owner has the right to compel the Government to acquire the land , compulsorily. That, however, cannot mean that whenever the condition of the land was rendered so bad as to make it completely unfit for the purpose for which it was being used before, the owner was bound to request the State to acquire the land compulsorily as laid down in the proviso and was debarred from claiming any compensation for such damage as had been caused to his land. Where, in carrying out certain work, the Government digs up the land so occupied and leaves it un-levelled and though the land can still be used for agricultural purposes, will the owner be not entitled to compensation as would be necessary for levelling the land? In my opinion the owner alone has the right to decide whether he would prefer to have compensation for the damage done to the land or to compel the Government to acquire it compulsorily. On a true interpretation therefore none of the two sections can restrict the claimant's right to a reference being made to the court for determining the extent of damage caused to the land. 28. On a true interpretation therefore none of the two sections can restrict the claimant's right to a reference being made to the court for determining the extent of damage caused to the land. 28. Thus, a plain reading of these sections can lead us only to one conclusion that under the first part of S. 37 all questions relating to damage caused to the land from the date of its initial possession up to the time- of redelivery of its possession must be ascertained and tendered to the land owner, subject, , however, to such deductions therefrom as may be necessary under the terms of the written agreement, if any, between the parties as contemplated- under S. 35(2). The help of the terms of the agreement can be taken by the State only to the extent that any part thereof which was covered under the agreement may not be paid over twice to the claimant. The absence of the written agreement, however, cannot be used as a shield to thwart the claim of the land owner for compensation. 29. Since in this case there was - no agreement, at least none has been filed, the entire damage done to the appellant's land was liable to be ascertained and compensation for it was liable to be paid to them. The view of the learned lower Court that reference itself was not maintainable does not commend itself to me at all. To interpret the provisions of S. 37 in this manner will certainly amount to doing violence with its plain language. On a logical and harmonious construction of the various provisions in Chapter VI of the Act, I am of the view that the reference was maintainable and could not have been rejected. 30. I have already considered the scope of S. 37 and even at the cost of repetition, it may be stated that a reference under section 37 could be legally made in this case for determining the damage caused to the land on account of taking out material for making bricks and the court was bound to determine the same. 31. I have already considered the scope of S. 37 and even at the cost of repetition, it may be stated that a reference under section 37 could be legally made in this case for determining the damage caused to the land on account of taking out material for making bricks and the court was bound to determine the same. 31. In view of the above findings, I am inclined to allow the appeal and to set aside the award of the learned lower Court but since the case has been decided on a preliminary point, it may be necessary to remand the case for decision on the points which are involved in these proceedings. 32. However, before parting with this case, I would like to emphasis that the scheme of Chapter IV contains Ss. 35 to 37 encompasses the whole procedure regarding temporary occupation of land by the Government. The scheme of the Act as set out in these sections required meticulous adherence to the same by the authorities that be. They must take care not to deprive a private individual of his land, even though for a temporary period, without first agreeing to the terms on which the land is sought to be occupied and if that may not be possible to permit the parties aggrieved to approach the court. Before this is done, the Collector or the State has no business to enter upon or occupy the land belonging to a subject. If this preliminary care had been taken, the appellants would not have been put to so much deprivation of their land and avoidable litigation pending since 1964 (sic). It also does not behove any democratic socialist Government to occupy the land for as long as 7 or 8 years when the law ordains that the maximum period for temporary occupation should not exceed three years. I entertain a firm hope that the State will now wake up and try to make amend for the loss done to these poor and illiterate land owners who were kept out of possession for so long by it. 33. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed and the award of the court below is set aside. I entertain a firm hope that the State will now wake up and try to make amend for the loss done to these poor and illiterate land owners who were kept out of possession for so long by it. 33. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed and the award of the court below is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Court below with a direction that it shall frame necessary issues on the questions whether any agreement in writing had been arrived at between the parties before the land of the appellants was occupied by the State and also whether any compensation had been paid to the appellants for occupation of their land and for which period? If no compensation had been paid for the period beyond three years from the date of occupation, the Court will also consider whether it can award any compensation to the appellants in respect of the said period which was in excess of that period of three years. The Court shall also decide the question of compensation in respect of damage caused to the land on account of taking out the earth from the land in question for the purposes of making bricks. The Court shall give necessary opportunity to the parties concerned to lead evidence on these questions and thereafter determine the compensation that may be payable to the appellants afresh. With the above observation and directions, the appeal is allowed with costs. It is needless to emphasise that the Court will act with necessary dispatch to decide the matter as expeditiously as may be possible.