JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendants' Second Appeal from a decree declaring that the plaintiff was a permanent Assistant Teacher of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2, namely, (1) Mahatma Gandhi Shiksha Parishad, Bridgemangaj and (2) Mahatma Gandhi Inter College, Bridgemanganj, on 12-7-1972, and that his services had not been dispensed with legally in this case and that he is entitled to all the benefits of pay etc. accruing from the status of being a permanent employee with cost's. 2. The relief claimed in the plaint as it stands, even after the addition of the District Inspector of Schools, Gorakhpur, as the third defendant is that by means of a decree for permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, the defendants and their Officers be restrained from terminating the services of the plaintiff except in accordance with law and from preventing the plaintiff in discharge of his duties as an Assistant Teacher. The two reliefs claimed, which follow the above are for costs and the usual claim of any other relief which the plaintiff may be deemed entitled. 3. The last sentence of the operative portion of the lower appellate courts judgment after granting the declaration quoted above says that "the rest of the reliefs are rejected." Thus, all the reliefs claimed in the plaint were rejected and instead a relief not claimed in the plaint was granted by the lower appellate court. 4. The plaintiffs case, as set out in the plaint, is that the defendant 1 is a registered Society which runs defendant 2 which is a recognised and aided Institution governed by the U. P. Intermediate Education Act and the Regulations framed thereunder; that the plaintiff is a B. A. B. Ed. and was appointed an Assistant Teacher in the L.T. Scale of- pay on 16-8-1971 on probation for year after due selection and approval of the District Inspector of Schools. Gorakhpur, and is serving the defendants as such; that although the plaintiffs appointment was against a substantive vacancy the Manager of the Institution who is prejudiced against him moved the defendant, District Inspector of Schools only for temporary approval of the plaintiffs appointment, but the request was turned down and the defendant, Inspector, vide letter dated 9-12- 1971 approved the appointment of the plaintiff on probation: that thereafter the Manager got an order from the defendant. Inspector, dated the 20th May, 1972, changing the earlier approval of the plaintiffs appointment into one "by way of temporary measure": that the plaintiff on coming to know of the subsequent order of the defendant, Inspector, approached him and he' after fully considering the matter, vide his letter dated 7-6-1972, recalled his order dated 20-5-1972 and restored his earlier approval of the plaintiffs appointment on probation that thereafter under some pressure and misconception the defendant, Inspector, vide letter dated 29-6- 1972, again ordered the approval of the plaintiffs appointment by way of temporary measure up to 30-6-1972. It was conveyed to the plaintiff on 8-7-1972. According to the plaintiff, the said order is illegal void and ineffective for the reasons: (1) that the defendant, Inspector, having approved the plaintiffs appointment on probation, vide order dated 9-12-1971 he had no jurisdiction to change it (2) that the plaintiff possesses the prescribed qualification for the post and having been duly selected there could be no occasion for approval as temporary measure and on this ground also the order is without jurisdiction; (3).that the grounds mentioned in support of the order are not valid and correct; 14) that the impugned order was passed behind the plaintiffs back and without affording him any opportunity of being heard; and (5) that the order cannot affect the probationary character of the plaintiffs appointment. It is then pleaded that the plaintiff as well as the President of the defendants and majoiry of the members of the Committee of Management of the defendant college have approached the District Inspector of Schools for recalling the order in question, "and the matter is still under his consideration." It was then pleaded that the plaintiff has joined the Institution on 8-7-1972 when it reopened and was attending to his duties. No orders terminating his services were passed and without the prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools, the services of the plaintiff could not be terminated, but the Manager of the Institution threatened on the 11th July, 1972 to prevent the plaintiff from attending the Institution, hence the suit. 5. An application for temporary injunction was made simultaneously with the institution of the suit on the 12th July, 1972: but the application was rejected by the trial court's order dated 9-10-1972. That order was confirmed on appeal, while the suit was pending before the trial court. 6. 5. An application for temporary injunction was made simultaneously with the institution of the suit on the 12th July, 1972: but the application was rejected by the trial court's order dated 9-10-1972. That order was confirmed on appeal, while the suit was pending before the trial court. 6. Defendants I and 2 contested the suit by a written statement filed on their behalf by the Secretary-cum-Manager, Om Prakash Jaiswal. Defendant 3, namely, the District Inspector of Schools did not file any written statement. It was admitted that the plaintiff is a B. A. B. Ed. and was employed in the defendant College and that the Management sent some papers for approval of the temporary appointment of the plaintiff. This is followed by the assertion that the District Inspector of Schools approved of the plaintiffs appointment as a temporary teacher by order dated the 20th May, 1972. and the orders dated the 7th June, 1972. 29th June, 1972 and the 9th December, 1971 were also mentioned. This is followed by the assertion that the District Inspector of Schools approved of the plaintiffs appointment as a temporary teacher by order dated the 20th May, 1972. and the orders dated the 7th June, 1972. 29th June, 1972 and the 9th December, 1971 were also mentioned. The first additional plea raised was that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the answering defendants; that in the Session 1971-72, the defendant College had to appoint a teacher "who may teach Hindi and English to High School classes and for that purpose an advertisement was made"; that the plaintiff applied, but it was found that he did not possess the requisite qualification as he was not B. A. in English, nor had he taken Sanskrit in Intermediate"; that thus he was neither qualified to teach English nor was he competent to ' teach Hindi in High School classes in view of the prescribed necessary qualifications: that the plaintiff could not therefore, be appointed permanently on the said post: that the Managing Committee sent papers for approval of the D. I. O. S. who "made enquiries about his appointment as a permanent teacher because in his opinion he was found to be a trained graduate; that the Principal was in league with the plaintiff and without the knowledge of the Managing Committee or the Manager gave incorrect information to the District Inspector of Schools who approved the plaintiffs appointment on probation on that information, but when the Management came to know of it, the Manager represented the correct facts to the District Inspector of Schools who on the 20th May, 1972 set aside his previous approval and approved of the plaintiffs appointment as a temporary teacher; that again the plaintiff represented his case to the D.I. O. S. behind the back of the Management and the Inspector on 7th June, 1972, recalled his order dated the 20th May, 1972 and again approved the appointment of the plaintiff as a probationer whereupon the Management again represented to the Inspector, who on the 29th June, 1972 set aside the orders dated the 7th June, 1972 and 9th December, 1971 and finally approved the appointment of the plaintiff as a temporary teacher and that the services of the plaintiff thus stood terminated on the 30th June, 1972 as his appointment was for one academic session only that is up to the 30th June, 1972. It was also pleaded that the Inspector had full power to set aside his previous orders, obtained by fraud or misrepresentation: that it was wrong to say that the plaintiff possessed the prescribed qualifications for appointment as English and Hindi teacher for High School classes and it was well known to the plaintiff that he did not possess the requisite qualifications for being appointed to the post permanently. It was then pleaded that it is the Managing Committee of the College who appoints a teacher and the Managing Committee of the defendant college having appointed the plaintiff as a temporary teacher he could by no stretch of imagination, be termed a teacher appointed on probation on a permanent basis. It was admitted that the President of the College was "illegally siding the plaintiff' due to friction within the Managing Committee and under pressure from the President and in collusion with the plaintiff the Principal was practising fraud and illegality and was disobeying the order of the Management and had made the report in favour of the plaintiff without any right or authority. Lastly, it was pleaded that the plaintiff is not a teacher of the defendant college and is not entitled to any salary or any relief claimed by him and that the suit was liable to be dismissed with costs. The parties went to trial on the following issues :- "(1) Whether the approval of the plaintiffs appointment vide letter dated 29- 6-72 is illegal, void and ineffective for the reasons given in para 6 of the plaint? If so its effect?" "(2) Whether the plaintiff still continues in service of the defendant?" "(3) Whether the plaintiff does not possess the requisite qualification for permanent appointment and as an assistant teacher to teach Hindi and English in High School classes as alleged by the defendant?" "(4) Whether the plaintiff was appointed as temporary teacher of the defendant for the session 1971-72?" (5) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?" 7. The trial court took up issue 4 first and held that the plaintiff was selected and appointed as temporary teacher up to the end of the academic session. The trial court took up issue 4 first and held that the plaintiff was selected and appointed as temporary teacher up to the end of the academic session. On issue 1 the trial court took the view that the Inspector was required to give his approval within two weeks and that not having been done the appointment made by the Management must be deemed to have been approved under S. 16-F (2), Intermediate Education Act and all the orders passed by the Inspector were illegal, void and ineffective. On issue 3, the trial court observed that "what was argued was stranger to the issue" and as the issue was raised by the defendants" I hold that the,plaintiff does possess the requisite qualification for the permanent appointment" and answered the issue in the negative and against the defendants. The trial court added that since "the plaintiff sought no relief that he was wrongly appointed temporarily, hence it will not affect the status of the plaintiff as temporary hand". On issue 5, the trial court held that, in view of its finding on issue 4, the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief and dismissed the suit accordingly. 8. On appeal by the plaintiff, the lower appellate court did not formulate the questions which arose for its consideration in the appeal. Under the heading, "Findings' the lower appellate court first referred to the Resolution No. 2, of the Selection Committee held on the 25th July, 1971 and recited its contents, the effect of which was to show that the plaintiff was selected for teaching Hindi and English in the trained Graduate's Grade of pay for one year on a temporary basis. The lower appellate court then referred to the letter of the Inspector dated the 29th June, 1972 and its contents. The lower appellate court then referred to the letter of the Inspector dated the 29th June, 1972 and its contents. The lower appellate court then observed that the parties were agreed that there was a permanent vacancy, and Chapter III, Regulation 7 requires that a person selected for substantive appointment against a clear vacancy shall be placed on probation from the date of joining duty; that the plaintiff was appointed as a teacher against a clear vacancy; that the Resolution did not show that he lacked any qualification and, therefore, his appointment was being made on a temporary basis; and that point was raised for the first time by the Manager on the 14th December, 1971, while the Principal, who had forwarded the papers for approval of the Inspector, had on the 3rd December, 1971, replied that the plaintiff had been appointed on probation. The papers before the Inspector showed a breach of Regulation No. 7 and "in order to meet this objection the Principal represented that the plaintiff had been appointed on probation. That was the end of the matter and the approval was accorded on 9-12-71. Developments took place subsequently with which the plaintiff was not concerned at all. The learned counsel for the respondent has raised the question that the plaintiff was not qualified to be appointed as a Hindi or English teacher for teaching classes 9 and 10. According to him, he should be a trained Graduate in Hindi as well as an Intermediate in Sanskrit, according to the regulations in force since 6th December, 1969. There is a note in this regulation that in those institutions in which in Hindi classes some Sanskrit is to be taught if there is any qualified Sanskrit teacher then it would not be necessary for a Hindi teacher to be an Intermediate in Sanskrit. The Head clerk of the institution has appeared as D. W. 1 in this case and he has admitted that in 1971-72 there were as many as 3 Sanskrit teachers in the respondent is not at all correct that the plaintiff was not a qualified teacher. Moreover, whatever the qualifications the plaintiff had, this matter was not referred to by the Selection Committee at all in the resolution that was passed. There were subsequent developments of 14th December, 1971 which cannot be taken into consideration at all. Moreover, whatever the qualifications the plaintiff had, this matter was not referred to by the Selection Committee at all in the resolution that was passed. There were subsequent developments of 14th December, 1971 which cannot be taken into consideration at all. So, the result is that, if the plaintiff, as held above, was qualified to be appointed as an Assistant Teacher, then, under Regn. 7, his appointment had got to be on probation notwithstanding the resolution of the Selection Committee being for a temporary appointment. The Selection Committee could not appoint a qualified teacher in a permanent vacancy on a temporary basis according to Regulation 7......... A question has been raised that the sanction of the D. I.O. S. was not given within two weeks of the receipt of the relevant papers. However this is an administrative matter, and, if the D. I. O. S. put some questions seeking further information, which must be included under the broad words 'relevant papers', then, he cannot be said to have exceeded his jurisdiction in according the sanction on 9- 12-71. After that, of course, he had no right to make orders that he passed in this case right up from May to 29-6-72. Therefore, the order dated 29-6-72 was totally illegal in the circumstances of the case." 9. The lower appellate court then held that since the plaintiff was an Assistant Teacher on probation for one year, his services could not be terminated without the sanction of the Inspector which was not done in the present case and after the lapse of one year of probation, and without valid termination of the services of the plaintiff, the plaintiff became a permanent hand of the institution after the expiry of one year, and, when he filed this suit he held that character. 10. Lastly, the lower appellate court observed that the relief for permanent injunction could not be granted to the plaintiff as "his services cannot be foisted upon the institution at all." However, the lower appellate court held that he is only entitled to a declaration that he is a permanent employee and his services cannot be terminated legally and further that he would be entitled to all the pay and benefits of his status which the defendants will have to pay till they have legally got rid of him. 11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties. 11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties. I find that the lower appellate court has wholly perverted the truth of the matter and came to an insupportable conclusion. 12. The substantial question involved in the case was whether the appointment of the plaintiff-respondent was temporary, or on an ad hoc basis, which terminated automatically on the expiry of the alleged term of appointment on the 30th June, 1972, or that the appointment having been made in a clear vacancy, it could not be terminated without the prior approval of the Inspector under S. 16-G (3), Intermediate Education Act. I may here observe that under S. 16-G (3) the discharge, removal, dismissal, or reduction in rank of a teacher, or diminution of his emoluments, or service of notice of termination of his service, all require the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. It may further be noticed that service of a notice of termination or the discharge of a teacher on abolition of the post held by him, are not cases of punishment and it was only in cases of punishment that the Inspector was required under the proviso to cl. (b) of sub-sec. (3) of S. 16-G to give an opportunity to the teacher to show cause why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted. 13. It is undisputed in the present case that for the reasons stated by the Inspector in his order dated the 29th June, 1972 he approved of the termination of the services of the plaintiff-respondent with effect from the 30th June, 1972, on the ground that his appointment was made by the Management on a temporary basis and that it should have been approved as such and could not be treated to be an appointment on a substantive basis on probation against a clear vacancy. This gives me reason to think that the only protection which the plaintiff had under the Intermediate Education Act was not given to him by the Inspector. 14. In spite of this glaring position, the entire case proceeded on a topsy-turvy basis. 15. Before I proceed further, it is, however, necessary to state certain indisputable facts. The advertisement for the post specified the requirement thus "Ek Prashikchhit Snatak, Angrezi. Hindi Ko Variyata.". which may be translated as "a trained graduate English weightage to Hindi. 14. In spite of this glaring position, the entire case proceeded on a topsy-turvy basis. 15. Before I proceed further, it is, however, necessary to state certain indisputable facts. The advertisement for the post specified the requirement thus "Ek Prashikchhit Snatak, Angrezi. Hindi Ko Variyata.". which may be translated as "a trained graduate English weightage to Hindi. This description of the requirement clearly means, in my opinion, that the institution was in need of a trained graduate in English or :or teaching English but would give preference to a person who was also a trained graduate in Hindi. The prescribed qualification for Assistant Teachers for High School classes, in the trained Graduates' Grade, according to Appendix 'A' to the Regulations framed after the 1958 amendment of the Intermediate Education Act, for teaching English is, vide-entry 9: "Trained B. A. with English Literature." and for teaching Hindi it is, vide entry 2: Trained B. A. with Hindi and Intermediate with Sanskrit". The other alternative qualifications are not material for the purposes of the present case but the note which was relied on by the lower appellate court runs thus : "Any institution where a qualified Sanskrit teacher is available to teach the Sanskrit portion of the Hindi Courses, it may not be necessary for the Hindi teachers to have taken Sanskrit as one of the subjects for the Intermediate Examination." 16. Section 16-F (1) as it stood at the relevant tip-e of the Act requires that "Subject to the provisions hereinafter specified, no person shall be appointed as a.......... teacher in a recognised institution unless he - (a) possesses the prescribed qualifications or has been exempted under sub-s. (1) of S. 16-E; (b) has been recommended by selection committee constituted under sub-sec. (2) or (3), as the case may be of the said section and approved, in the case of Principal or Headmaster by the Regional Deputy Director. Education, and in the case of a teacher by the Inspector : Provided that if the Inspector is satisfied that for any institution no candidate, who possesses all the prescribed qualifications, is available for appointment he may permit the institution to employ as a temporary measure any suitable person for a period not exceeding one year. Such period may be extended with the prior approval of the Inspector". 17. The next proviso is not material for our present purpose. 18. Such period may be extended with the prior approval of the Inspector". 17. The next proviso is not material for our present purpose. 18. Sub-section (2) lays down the following rule : "The name of the selected candidate shall be forwarded for approval, in the case of a teacher, by the Principal or Headmaster to the Inspector, and, in the case of Principal or Headmaster, by the Chairman of the selection committee to the Regional Deputy Director, Education. A statement showing the names, qualifications and other particulars, as may be prescribed of all candidates who may have applied for selection shall also be sent along with the name of the selected candidate. The Inspector or Regional Deputy Director, Education, as the case may be, shall give his decision within two weeks of the receipt of the relevant papers, failing which approval shall be deemed to have been accorded." 19. Sub-section (3), which provides for appeal, is in the following words : "Where the Regional Deputy Director, Education or the Inspector, as the case may be, disapproves for reasons to be recorded in writing of any name proposed under sub- s. (1) the management may within three weeks of the receipt of the disapproval make a representation against it to the Director in the case of a Principal, or Headmaster and to the Regional Deputy Director, Education, in the case of a teacher, and the decision of the Director or the Regional Deputy Director, Education, as the case may be, in the matter shah be final." 20. In case of disapproval of the recommendation of the selection committee, sub-s. (4) provides the following procedure for making the appointment : "Where the recommendation made under sub-s. (2) has been disapproved and the representation of the management if any under sub-s. (41 has been rejected, the Selection Committee shall proceed to select and recommend another name for approval as provided under Ss. 16-E and 16-F. If the selection so made is again disapproved and the representation, if any, against the disapproval has not been accepted, the Regional Deputy Director, Education, in case of a teacher and the Director in case of a Principal or Headmaster, may appoint any qualified person out of the list of the candidates applying for the vacancies and such appointment shall be final." 21. I may here add that the provisions quoted here are as they existed in the year 1971 when the appointment in question in this case was made. 22. A selection committee was appointed in the present case also. There were a number of other appointments to be made and the selection committee appears to have considered those cases also. In the chart prepared by the Selection Committee, which is Paper No. 21-Ga/11 and appears to be signed by the members of the selection committee, the plaintiffs name is the first. That shows that the plaintiff's subjects in B. A. were Hindi, Geography and Political Science, and the column 14, which describes the nature of appointment recommended, shows it to be temporary and in the remarks column, it is stated that he, that is the candidate, was not fit or qualified and, therefore, he was appointed temporarily. The resolution No. 2 dated the 25th July, 1971, which has been referred to in some detail and relied upon by the lower appellate Court and was obviously passed after the said meeting of the selection committee, at which that chart was prepared gives the reasons for recommending the appointment of the plaintiff on a temporary basis, although, as the chart shows, he was not fit for the post. I should have said not qualified for the post, for the Hindi word used in the chart 21-Ga/11 is "Upyukt Nahin Paye Gaye", which could also mean that he was not found qualified or did not fit in with the particular post for which his appointment was being considered. The resolution shows that he was selected for teaching Hindi and English. It is indisputable that he did not possess the necessary minimum qualification for teaching English in High School Classes and he could not have been appointed on a substantive basis on the post of an Assistant Teacher in English. So far as the post of teacher in Hindi is concerned, he did have Hindi in B.A. but did not have Sanskrit in Intermediate. The result was that, on the face of it, he was not qualified even for teaching Hindi to High School Classes. But the lower appellate Court has found, relying on the evidence of the clerk of the defendant college, that there were three other teachers who could teach Sanskrit. The result was that, on the face of it, he was not qualified even for teaching Hindi to High School Classes. But the lower appellate Court has found, relying on the evidence of the clerk of the defendant college, that there were three other teachers who could teach Sanskrit. It is not known whether they could teach Sanskrit in High School Classes, but assuming that they could teach Sanskrit and assuming that the plaintiff could have been appointed as an Assistant Teacher in Hindi on a substantive basis, the fact remains that the vacant post of the Assistant Teacher in the trained graduates grade, which was advertised by the defendant institution, was of a teacher in English. It is a different matter that the requirements for teaching English being what they are these days the management wanted to combine the post of the English teacher with that of a Hindi teacher and, therefore, they put in the clause in the advertisement for the post that preference or weightage will be given to Hindi. 23. Nevertheless, the selection committee does not appear to have found any fit and qualified teacher among the candidates before it for teaching English. They chose to appoint the plaintiff as he was otherwise found to be the best choice. Therefore, keeping in view the proviso to S. 16-F (1) the selection committee thought that the plaintiff could be appointed to the post as a temporary measure and that is why they said that he was being appointed as an English and Hindi teacher as a temporary measure. 24. The recommendations of the selection committee were required to be forwarded for the Inspector's approval in the case of a teacher, by the Principal of the institution and in this case the Principal seems to have played the trick and appears to have told the Inspector at some stage that the plaintiffs appointment was made, or could be made on probation. It was, in these circumstances, that the Inspector was persuaded to approve of the plaintiff's appointment, not as a temporary measure as recommended by the selection committee but on probation, that is to say on a substantive basis against a clear vacancy. The advertisement showed that the vacancy was of an English Teacher. Sub-sec. It was, in these circumstances, that the Inspector was persuaded to approve of the plaintiff's appointment, not as a temporary measure as recommended by the selection committee but on probation, that is to say on a substantive basis against a clear vacancy. The advertisement showed that the vacancy was of an English Teacher. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 16-F shows that the Inspector could not have approved of the appointment of the plaintiff on a substantive basis on probation as an English teacher. There is the further fact that S. 16-F does not contemplate the making of a modified appointment by the Inspector. The appointment has to be made by the committee of management on the recommendation of the selection committee after the approval of the Inspector. The Inspector can approve or disapprove. He cannot modify. It is only the last stage where the selection is finally disapproved, that the Regional Deputy Director of Education could in the case of a teacher appoint a qualified person out of the list of candidates applying for the vacancy in the situation contemplated by sub-s. (4) of S. 16-F. The order of the Inspector approving of the appointment of the plaintiff on a substantive basis on probation was thus ultra vires the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act. 25. It needs no showing that any appointment made without approval was not protected by S. 16-E (3) of the Act where the appointment was invalid. The appointee did not acquire the status of a teacher and the invalid appointment so made could obviously be terminated by the person who made it. 26. This simple position of the case has been completely muddled by the lower appellate Court. I must add that the lower appellate Court was not sitting on appeal from the orders of the committee of management. or of the Inspector. It was seized of a civil suit seeking in effect a declaration of the status of the plaintiff. The Civil Court could interfere only if the defendants had acted .-against some mandatory provisions of taw or had acted without jurisdiction. I may here point out that the importance attached to Regulation 7 of Chapter 3 of the Regulations framed after the amendment of the Intermediate Education Act, 1958, is wholly misplaced. The Civil Court could interfere only if the defendants had acted .-against some mandatory provisions of taw or had acted without jurisdiction. I may here point out that the importance attached to Regulation 7 of Chapter 3 of the Regulations framed after the amendment of the Intermediate Education Act, 1958, is wholly misplaced. The Regulation said that "a person selected for substantive appointment against a clear vacancy shall be placed on probation from the date of joining duty." The plaintiff was never selected for substantive appointment. He was selected and recommended for a temporary appointment by the Selection Committee. It was open to the plaintiff not to have accepted the appointment if he was aggrieved by it, but he could not have acquired the status of a teacher appointed substantively, unless he was appointed as such by the committee of management which alone had the authority to do so. The committee of management never did so. It was, under the circumstances, impossible to say that the plaintiff held the post of a permanent teacher in the defendant institution on the 12th July, 1972, which was the date on which he was last allowed to sign the attendance register. 27. Mr. R.K. Kackar, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, urged that the first order of the Inspector, approving of the appointment of the plaintiff as a probationer, could not be modified by the Inspector by the subsequent orders which he purported to pass. I have held above that the Inspector's first order of December, 1971, was illegal inasmuch as the Inspector could not approve of some thing which had not been proposed by the management. He could only approve or disapprove of the proposal made by the management. He could not pass a new order of his own. The principle of implied powers relied upon by Mr. R. K. Kackar in this context on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in Asstt. Collector, C.E. v. N. T. Co, of India Ltd. : AIR 1972 SC 2563 at page 2573, in paragraph 30, and of a Division Bench of this Court in Dharamvir Singh Tyagi v. Dy. Director of Education : 1981 UPLBEC 511 : (1981 Lab IC NOC 174), cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. Collector, C.E. v. N. T. Co, of India Ltd. : AIR 1972 SC 2563 at page 2573, in paragraph 30, and of a Division Bench of this Court in Dharamvir Singh Tyagi v. Dy. Director of Education : 1981 UPLBEC 511 : (1981 Lab IC NOC 174), cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. The power to modify the proposal of the managing committee could not be implied in the power to approve or to disapprove of it. The provisions of S. 16-F, quoted above particularly those of sub-s. (4) of the Act make it clear that the Inspector had no such implied power of modifying a proposal made by the Committee of Management, as to appoint a person substantively where the proposal is to appoint him on a temporary basis. Indeed, it was the duty of the Inspector, in the light of the first proviso, to see whether the plaintiff was possessed of minimum essential qualifications for the post on which he was appointed, and in case the Inspector found that he did not possess those qualifications, to have permitted the making of a temporary appointment. 28. Before parting with the case, I have a further observation to make. The plaintiff claimed an injunction obviously because he wanted a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from terminating his services. The temporary injunction was refused. The lower appellate court has found that the relief of permanent injunction could not be granted. Yet the lower appellate court granted to the plaintiff a relief of declaration in such wide terms as to entitle the plaintiff not only to the status of a permanent assistant teacher in the defendant institution, but also to all the salary and employments of that post. I understand that, under an interim order passed by this Court the management has paid the entire salary of the plaintiff which the plaintiff was permitted to withdraw on furnishing security. It is a common ground that the plaintiff has not worked for a single day since the 12th July 1972, and the termination of his service has been found by this court to be valid and proper. But he has got the entire salary for this long period. It is a common ground that the plaintiff has not worked for a single day since the 12th July 1972, and the termination of his service has been found by this court to be valid and proper. But he has got the entire salary for this long period. It is unfortunate that even cases of this kind remain pending in our Courts for such long times and with such unfortunate results, I have, however, no means available with me of remedying the situation. The law must prevail and must be given effect to. 29. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside and the suit is dismissed but in the circumstances, I leave the parties to hear their own costs throughout.