JUDGMENT T. S. Misra, J. - Mohammad Ahmad, oppositeparty no. 3, filed a suit against the present petitioner seeking his eviction from the accommodation in question. He alleged in the suit that he had purchased the house consisting of six shops and two Dalancumrooms by a sale deed dated 1771974 from Smt. Kishwari Begum. The defendant was a tenant of one of the said shops. According to the plaintiff, the rent payable by the defendant was at the rate of Rs. 25/ p.m. He stated that he had given a notice dated 441975 to the defendant which was served on him on 741975 determining his tenancy and claiming arrears of rent. Since the notice was not complied with he filed the suit. The defendant contested the suit alleging that the plaintiff was not owner of the said house and that Mohammad Rafiq is his landlord. He also said that the suit was not maintainable and that it was bad for want of notice. He denied to be a defaulter in making payment of rent. The suit was dismissed on 2771976 holding that relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties had not been proved and that notice was illegal and the petitioner was not a defaulter. The oppositeparty no. 3 then filed a revision No. 270 of 1974 before the District Judge, Lucknow which was allowed with the observation that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. The case was sent back to the trial court for rehearing and decision according to law. After remand of the case parties adduced evidence in the Court of Additional Judge, Small Causes. The suit was ultimately dismissed on 2881979. The oppositeparty no. 3 then filed a revision under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act which was heard and decided by the Vth Additional District Judge. The revision was allowed and the suit was decreed. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the judgment and decree passed by the Vth Additional District Judge, Lucknow, copies of which are Annexure 2 and 3 respectively to the writ petition. The petition has been opposed and a counteraffidavit has been filed. A supplementaryaffidavit has also been filed enclosing thereto true copies of the depositions made by the witnesses before the trial court. 2. The petition has been opposed and a counteraffidavit has been filed. A supplementaryaffidavit has also been filed enclosing thereto true copies of the depositions made by the witnesses before the trial court. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. For the petitioner it was submitted that the learned V Additional District Judge fell in error in holding that the notice purporting to have been sent by the plaintiffoppositeparty to the petitionerdefendant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on the petitioner by refusal. I have perused the notice. The plaintiff had sent that notice to the defendant at his correct address under registered A. D. post. A copy of that notice is Ext. 2. The postal receipt evidencing that the said notice was sent under registered A. D. post is Ext. 3 The original notice is Ext. 1. There is an endorsement dated 741975 on the original notice "Lene se inkar". The said notice was, therefore, returned by the post office to the counsel for the plaintiff who had sent that notice. The trial court held that the notice was not served on the petitioner. The learned V Additional District Judge, however, reversed that finding and held that the refusal of the notice by the defendantpetitioner was proved. In this connection the learned V Additional District Judge made the following observations : "It is settled view that it will be presumed under law that the notice was tendered to the defendant and it was refused by him. Address on the notice has not been disputed by the defendant It is further settled view that mere denial on the part of the defendant that he did not receive and refuse the notice is not sufficient. There should be sufficient explanation or evidence in rebuttal that either the address on the notice was incorrect or on the alleged date of refusal of the notice, the defendant was not present at his own address. Such being the case, the presumption raised under law has not been rebutted. There should be sufficient explanation or evidence in rebuttal that either the address on the notice was incorrect or on the alleged date of refusal of the notice, the defendant was not present at his own address. Such being the case, the presumption raised under law has not been rebutted. Therefore, the refusal of the notice has been proved in the case and the learned court below has wrongly held that the notice or refusal of notice was not proved in accordance with law." The provisions of Section 3(c) read with Section 14(a) of the Post Office Act indicate that in normal course a letter delivered to accepting or receiving post office is expected to be delivered to the addressee and in view of the provisions of Section 114(e) and (f) a presumption about due service of that notice may be made if the notice has been duly despatched through post office by registered post to correct address. An endorsement on notice "refused'' would strengthen that presumption. Presumption of law under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act of service of notice may also be made. A notice terminating lease under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act sent to a tenant in a registered envelope containing his correct address and returned back to the landlord with an endorsement of refusal may be deemed to have been served on the tenant but the presumption of service of notice under section 27 of the General Clauses Act and section 114 of the Evidence Act is rebuttable. In the absence of proof to the contrary, it may, therefore, be presumed that the refusal had been made by the tenant to whom the registered letter was correctly addressed at the time when the letter could be expected to reach him in the ordinary course. 3. In the case in hand the notice was sent to the petitioner by the oppositeparty no. 3 through his counsel under registered A.D. post. It was returned back with the endorsement of refusal. A presumption of its service under section 114 of the Evidence Act and section 27 of the General Clauses Act could, therefore, be raised. The question which arises for consideration is whether that presumption was rebutted by the petitioner. 3 through his counsel under registered A.D. post. It was returned back with the endorsement of refusal. A presumption of its service under section 114 of the Evidence Act and section 27 of the General Clauses Act could, therefore, be raised. The question which arises for consideration is whether that presumption was rebutted by the petitioner. The petitioner had examined himself as a witness in the case before the trial court and had deposed that he had not received the notice from the plaintiff. He also deposed that it was wrong that he had refused to accept the notice. In his crossexamination he had stated that he had no enmity with the postman of his beat. He had also admitted that the address mentioned on the notice in question was his correct address. The learned V Additional District Judge held that the denial on the part of the defendant that he did not receive the notice is not sufficient and that there should be sufficient explanation or evidence in rebuttal that the address on the notice was incorrect or on the alleged date of refusal the defendant was not present. In my view, the reasoning given by the learned V Additional District Judge is not wellfounded. There may be a case where a notice is sent under registered post to an addressee, the address noted on the letter may also be correct and the addressee may also be at his house but even then the notice may not be tendered to him at all. If the notice is not actually tendered, the addressee will have to say that the notice was not tendered though admitting that he was present throughout on the day in question at his house. The defendant had no doubt categorically stated that the address noted on the notice in question was correct address but he had also stated on oath that he never refused to accept service of notice. What more evidence could be expected to be led in order to rebut the presumption. The defendant could not be asked to lead negative evidence. The statement on oath that the notice was never delivered to him and that he had never declined to receive the notice was not controverted or refuted by the plaintiff in his statement. What more evidence could be expected to be led in order to rebut the presumption. The defendant could not be asked to lead negative evidence. The statement on oath that the notice was never delivered to him and that he had never declined to receive the notice was not controverted or refuted by the plaintiff in his statement. There is, no doubt, the solitary statement of the defendant to the effect that he never refused to take the notice. The trial court believed this statement but the learned V Additional District Judge did not record any finding disbelieving the defendant on the point. On the other hand, he tried to raise the presumption on the ground that the address on the notice was correct and that the defendant had not stated that he was not present at his house when the notice is said to have been delivered to him. In my view this was not a correct approach. The presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act or under Section 27 of the General Clause Act may be rebutted by the solitary statement of the defendant. The Supreme Court in P. V. Rao v. C. V. Ramana ( AIR 1976 SC 869 ) had held that where a notice sent by a registered post is returned with endorsement as refused it is not always necessary to produce the postman who tried to effect service. The presumption can be rebutted by the testimony of the defendant provided it is convincing. The statement of the defendant petitioner to the effect that he had never refused to accept the notice was sufficient, in the circumstances, to rebut the presumption and to shift the onus on the plaintiff to establish by evidence that the service of the notice had been duly effected. In fact, nothing was elicited in crossexamination to indicate that he was not telling the truth. He could not examine the postman because the postman would not depose against his own endorsement. The defendant could not also produce any other witness as that would have been stamped as cooked up evidence. As a party to the suit having knowledge of the fact, he was bound to examine himself which he did. His testimony that he did not refuse to accept the service of notice remained unshattered in crossexamination. The defendant could not also produce any other witness as that would have been stamped as cooked up evidence. As a party to the suit having knowledge of the fact, he was bound to examine himself which he did. His testimony that he did not refuse to accept the service of notice remained unshattered in crossexamination. The presumption of service of the said notice was thus amply rebutted by the statement of the defendant. The learned V Additional District Judge was, therefore, wrong in holding that the presumption had not been rebutted by sufficient evidence. He also fell in error in holding that the notice was served on the defendant. In my opinion the trial court was correct in holding that the notice was not served and the suit was bad for want of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 4. Both the courts have held that the defendant had committed default in making payment of rent but the question of default would arise only when a notice of demand had been served on the defendant. The said notice in the case in hand was not served on the defendant. In these circumstances a decree for eviction of the defendant from the premises in question could not be granted. 5. In the result, the petition is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree passed by the appellate court below are quashed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court are restored. (Petition allowed).