M.C. JAIN, J.—This is the plaintiffs revision against the order dated September 27, 1982, passed by the Munsiff, Bhinmal, whereby he allowed the application of Jabbar Singh, non-petitioner No. 1 under Or. 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. 2. The plaintiff petitioner instituted a suit against the Municipal Board, Bhinmal, with the allegation that the plaintiff is the owner of plot measuring 11,429 Sq yds, situated in town of Bhinmal. The original owner thereof was one Solanki Jivaji Jorji and the plaintiff purchased that land from one Bhairushan-kar on Bhadwa Sudi 7, St 2026, for a sum of Rs. 81/-. Since then he is in possession of the suit p!ot. The plaintiff further averred that the Municipal Board, Bhinmal, invited applications for leasing out that land for industrial purposes and about nine persons have deposited earnest money along with the applications. The plaintiff sought a relief of injunction to the effect that the Municipal Board be restrained from dispossessing the plaintiff from the plot in question. The Municipal Board submitted its written statement denying the plaintiffs title and possession over the plot in question. On 7. 1. 1980 Jabbar Singh, non-petitioner No. 1, submitted an application under Or. 1, R. 10, C P.C. stating that in the past the plot in question was owned and possessed by Jagirdar Guman Singh and Ajit Singh and on Phalgun Sudi 3, St. 1993 Guman Singh had sold that land to Jabbar Singhs grand father Ranjeet Singh. His ancestors and he were and is in possession of the plot since the date of its purchase. An allegation of collusion was also made by Jabbar Singh on the ground that the parties to the suit agreed for appointment of the Receiver. 3. Jabbar Singhs application was resisted by the plaintiff and it was contended on his behalf that the suit is in between the plaintiff and the Municipal Board, Bhinmal, and relief has only been sought against the Municipal Board. In such a situation the intervener Jabbar Singh cannot be made a party. It was also stated that even if Jabbar Singh has got any piece of evidence with him with respect to title over the plot in question, still he has got no right to be impleaded as a party to the suit. In respect of the document of the sale, it was alleged that the document is a forged one. It was also stated that even if Jabbar Singh has got any piece of evidence with him with respect to title over the plot in question, still he has got no right to be impleaded as a party to the suit. In respect of the document of the sale, it was alleged that the document is a forged one. The learned Munsiff, after hearing the parties, allowed the application of Jabbar Singh. He gave reasons that the nature of suits will not change and in case Jabbar Singh is added as a party, multiplicity of the suit will be avoided and besides that a complete and effectual decree can be passed by deciding the issue involved in the suit. Dissatisfied with the order of the learned Munsiff, the present revision petition has been filed. 4. I have heard Shri A. L. Chopra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner, Shri Rajendra Mehta, learned counsel for Jabbar Singh and Shri Narpatmal Lodha, learned counsel for the Municipal Board, Bhinmal. 5. Mr. A. L. Chopra, learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently urged that the plaintiffs suit is simply a suit for injunction and the plaintiff has to establish his right only against the Municipal Board, Bhinmal. If Shri Jabbar Singh is added as a party, the simple suit for injunction will be converted into a suit for title. Even if Jabbar Singh would not be added as a party, his right would not be affected, as the decree would not be binding on him and if he has any title over the plot in question, he has got his remedy to file a regular suit. The plaintiff has been in coatinuous possession of the plot in dispute since long and previously the successors of the original title holder, were in possession. He also pointed out that in case Jabbar Singh is allowed to be impleaded as a party, then the litigation would be unnecessarily prolonged and there would be deiay in the trial of the suit and the person, who has got no title and possession over the property, would be able to get his title and possession adjudicated. Mr. Chopra referred to some case law in support of his arguments. 6. I have considered the submissions of Mr. Chopra. Jabbar Singh has moved his application under Or. Mr. Chopra referred to some case law in support of his arguments. 6. I have considered the submissions of Mr. Chopra. Jabbar Singh has moved his application under Or. 1, Rule 10, C.P.C., which empowers the court to add a party, whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. The provision contained in sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Or. 1, C.P.C., is a discretionary provision and the discretion is required to be exercised on sound judicial principles. A question arises whether the discretion, which has been exercised by the learned Munsiff in the present case, has been exercised on sound judicial principles or not. The object behind sub rule(2) of Rule 10 of Or. 1, appears to be to decide all questions involved in the suit, thereby adjudicate the controversies effectually and completely. If such a power is exercised, multiplicity of suits and proceedings would be avoided and unnecessary delay and expense In the litigation would be curtailed and curbed. In the present case the plaintiff has come with a clear averment that the title over the plot in question vestes in him and he and his predecessors were in possession of the plot in question. The Municipal Board has denied these averments. The basis of the plaintiffs claim for the relief of injunction, is based on the averments of the plaintiffs tide over the plot in question. In order to succeed, the plaintiff would be required to prove that the title of the plot in question vests in him and he is in possession of the same. This he is required to establish against the Municipal Board. Now Jabbar Singh also comes with a case that the title of the plot in question vests in him, as it was purchased by his ancestors and he is in possession of the same. Jabbar Singh alleges direct proprietary interest in the subject matter of the suit. It is true that if he is not impleaded as a party to the suit, and if any decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff that would not be binding on him and that decree will have no effect against him. He would be driven to a separate suit. It is true that if he is not impleaded as a party to the suit, and if any decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff that would not be binding on him and that decree will have no effect against him. He would be driven to a separate suit. As considered above, the object of Order 1, Rule 10(2) is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to pass effective decree adjudicating the questions completely. Taking into consideration the object of this salutary provision of Or. 1, Rule 10 (2),C.P.C, in my opinion it cannot; be said that the discretion, which has been exercised by the learned Munsiff, is not exercised judicially. In this connection I may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Razia Begum vs Sahebzadi Anwar Begum(1). In the majority judgment in para 13 certain principles have been summarised for invoking the provision of Or. 1, Rule 10, C. P. C. The second principle propounded is that in a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest, in the subject matter of the litigation. Looking to the allegations made by Jabbar Singh in his application, it can be said that Jabbar Singh is asserting a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation, that is, in the plot in question. My attention has been invited by Shri Chopra to some decisions of this Court. 7. In Ramesh Chandra vs. Mukhtyar Singh (2) a declaratory suit was instituted that the sale-deed executed by defendants No. 1 and 2 in favour of defendant No. 3 be declared null and void against the plaintiff as the suit property belonged to him . The plaintiff also claimed relief of possession. One Mohan Lai filed an application under Or. 1, R. 10, C.P.C., on the ground that the suit property belonged to him and was in his possession and that the plaintiff was neither the owner of the suit property, nor was in possession. An allegation of collusion was also made in the application. The parties to the original suit contested the application. The trial court however, allowed the application. The defendant came in revision. An allegation of collusion was also made in the application. The parties to the original suit contested the application. The trial court however, allowed the application. The defendant came in revision. The revision petition was allowed and the order of the trial court was set aside on the ground that in case the intervener is impleaded as a party, the result would be that the defendant petitioner will have to contest the suit against the two plaintiffs and will have to show that both of them are not owners and in possession of the suit property. It was further observed in that case that the controversy, which has been raised by the intervener, would be totally foreign to the controversy in the suit between the plaintiff Himmat Singh and the defendant. It was also observed that the controversy, which is required to be determined in the suit, is the controversy between the original parties to the suit only. 8. Preference has also been made by Mr. Chopra to a decision in Mazhar Hussain vs. Shafi Mohammed (3). A similar controversy arose in that case. It was considered in that case that intervention can be insisted in the three classes of cases. The (B) category was of the cases where the proprietory rights of the intervener are directly affected by the proceedings. In that case one Mohammed Farooq filed an application for being impleaded as a defendant under Or 1, Rule 10(2), C.P.C., alleging himself to be the owner and in possession of the disputed portion of the suit property, as against the claim of the plaintiff, who alleged himself to be the owner and in possession of the property in question. It may be stated that these authorities have not taken into consideration, the law, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case referred to above. On the contrary reference may be made to a decision of this Court in Murlidhar v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Alwar (4). That was also a case relating to a suit for permanent injunction and the plaintiff prayed for injunction on the basis of the title as well as on possession. The intervener set up a counter claim in respect of title and interest of the plaintiff. That was also a case relating to a suit for permanent injunction and the plaintiff prayed for injunction on the basis of the title as well as on possession. The intervener set up a counter claim in respect of title and interest of the plaintiff. It was observed that the allegation in the plaint require investigation into the title of the plaintiff, so, the intervener had been rightly added as a party. It was further observed in that case if the intervener had not been added as a party it might have led to multiplicity of proceedings. Under Or. 1. Rule 10, C P. C, even those persons can be impleaded as party who set up a counter-claim to the interest and title of the plaintiff. In that case the intervener claimed to be the owner of one of the shops, which are comprised in the suit property. 9. 6n behalf of the contesting respondent reference has further been made to the authorities, Harbans Singh v. H.R. Srinivasan (5), Dr. A. K. Roy v. J.C. Roy Choudhary (6), A. Gyaneshwar Rao vs. Mahmood Shareef (7), Singh-eshwar Rai vs. Babu Lal Rai (8) and Sanwarmal vs. Budh Mal (9). 10. I need not discuss and deal with the above authorities, as I have relied upon the Supreme Court decision referred to above and I have found that the intervener has a direct interest in the property in question. 11. The question may be examined from another aspect as well and that aspect is that after amendment of Sec. 115, C. P. C, the scope of revision under Sec. 115, C. P. C, has been very much curtailed. A revision petition, after amendment of Sec. 115, is not only maintainable on the grounds (a), (b) and (c) given in sub-section (1) of Section 115, but the order sought to be revised, is further required to be such, which may be covered by clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso added to sub-section (1) of Sec. 115. The proviso is couched in the negative language. It is not permissible for the High Court to vary or reverse any order unless the order satisfies the condition of clause (a) or clause (b) appended to the proviso. The proviso is couched in the negative language. It is not permissible for the High Court to vary or reverse any order unless the order satisfies the condition of clause (a) or clause (b) appended to the proviso. Under clause (b) of the proviso an order can be reversed or set aside only when the order would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. Thus, it would appear that the impugned order should be of such a nature, which if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or would cause irreparable injury to the plaintiff. I have not been able to comprehend as to how the impugned order would occasion a failure of justice or would cause irreparable injury to the plaintiff. It may be stated that the scope of the suit is not in any way enlarged, for the plaintiff would be required to establish his own title and possession and he can establish that title and possession not only against the Municipal Board, but against the intervener Jabbar Singh, as well. Of course Jabbar Singh would get a right to defend and to attack the plaintiffs assertion of ownership and possession. By addition of any party, the time, which the trial may take, may be little prolonged. To my mind, little delay in the trial of the case cannot be considered to be causing any irreparable injury to the plaintiff. Rather the interest of justice demands that the controversy with regard to ownership and possession of the plot in question, may be effectually and completely determined between the contesting parties. Instead of causing any failure of justice, the cause of justice would thereby be advanced. The provision of Or. 1, R. 10, C.P.C., has been considered in the light of the amended provision of Sec. 115, C.P.C. in the decision of the Punjab High Court in Sarup Chand v. Nagar Palika, Sangrur (10). In that case an argument was advanced with regard to the maintainability of the revision petition. The provision of Or. 1, R. 10, C.P.C., has been considered in the light of the amended provision of Sec. 115, C.P.C. in the decision of the Punjab High Court in Sarup Chand v. Nagar Palika, Sangrur (10). In that case an argument was advanced with regard to the maintainability of the revision petition. It was contended that in view of the provisions of Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (after its amendment) the revision petitioner is further required to show that if the impugned order is allowed to stand, it would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made and only then the High Court will interfere under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not otherwise. In that case the trial court allowed the application under Or. 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. The plaintiff had instituted a suit for permanent injunction against the defendant restraining him from demolishing and breaking the wall. The intervener Talia Ram made an application that he be impleaded as a party in the suit on the ground that if any relief is granted to the plaintiff in his absence, that will likely to affect him adversely. His case was that there was a wall in front of the lane ABC, which was demolished in the year 1978 The learned Judge, while considering the amended provision of Sec. 115, C.P.C, observed that the learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out that how the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to him. Even if the order is wrong, the same cannot be interferred with in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It may be mentioned that in the present case, as well, I do not find that the impugned order in any way would occasion a failure of justice or would cause irreparable injury to the plaintiff. It may be mentioned that in the present case, as well, I do not find that the impugned order in any way would occasion a failure of justice or would cause irreparable injury to the plaintiff. So the impugned order cannot be said to be such which may fulfil conditions mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Sec. 115, C.P.C, Apart from examining the question in the light of the amended provision of Sec. 115, 1 have considered the matter on merits, as well and even on merits I have found that the intervener Jabbar Singh has a direct interest in the plot in question and, as such, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and proceedings, the learned Munsiff was right and justified in adding him as a party to the suit. 12. In the result, this revision petition has no force, so it is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.