JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is directed against the judgment, dated June 28, 1979, of learned Sessions Judge, Ajmer, whereby he convicted the accused appellant Vijay Singh, son of Amar Singh, under section 302, I.P.C., and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of which to undergo five months' further imprisonment. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that on November 19, 1978, at about 6.00 p.m. Conductor, Bhanwarlal (since deceased), went to the Cash-room of the State Roadways at Ajmer to deposit some cash. Accused Vijay Singh followed hint upto the cash room. The deceased, suspecting him a grabber, pushed him aside. Thereafter the accused inflicted a knife blow on the chest of Bhanwarlal, causing a stab wound, oblique elliptical in shape on the right side of the chest in the second intercostal space, measuring 2.5 c.m. x 1.25 c.m. x 5 c.m. deep piercing the skin, subcutaneous tissue, muscles of the second right intercostal space. After causing the injury the accused took out the knife from the wound and ran away. Bhanwarlal vomitted blood from his mouth in the cash loom, put his hands on the chest and rushed towards the accused to nab him. Bhanwarlal, however, fell down near the stair-case. Other persons ran after the accused. The accused was caught along with the blood stained knife on the Mayo link Road and was brought back to the bus stand. At that stage Shri Asha Ram, Sub-Inspector of Police, also happened to come over there. The accused was made over to him. Shyam Prakash, PW 20, gave to the Police verbal first information report of the occurrence. It was reduced into writing and the same has been marked as Ex. P/15. A case under Section 302, I.P.C., and Section 25 of the Arms Act was registered against the accused. The blood stained knife was taken into possession by the police. It was seized and sealed; vide memo Ex. P/8. The blood stained knife was sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur and thereafter to the Serologist. The report of the Director, State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur is marked as Ex. P/30 and that of the Serologist bears the mark Ex. P/31. The arrest memo Ex. It was seized and sealed; vide memo Ex. P/8. The blood stained knife was sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur and thereafter to the Serologist. The report of the Director, State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur is marked as Ex. P/30 and that of the Serologist bears the mark Ex. P/31. The arrest memo Ex. P/7 was prepared on the spot and the blood stained Baniyan and Sweater were recovered from the person of the accused. They were seized and sealed; vide memo Ex. P/6. Baniyan and Sweater were also sent to the State Forensic Laboratory and the Serologist. The Baniyan recovered from the person of the accused was found stained with human blood. Due to disintegration the blood group on the knife and Baniyan could not be detected. The police, after usual investigation, submitted a challan against the accused to the Court of Magistrate concerned. He committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Alwar. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges. The prosecution examined 25 witnesses in support of its case, out of whom PW 2 Laxman Singh, PW 6 Ramesh Chand, PW 20 Shyam Prakash and PW 21 Rajendra Singh were examined as eye-witnesses. Out of the above noted witnesses except the two witnesses PW 6 Ramesh Chand and PW 20 Shyam Prakash, relied from their previous statements. They were, therefore, declared hostile. The learned Sessions Judge, placing reliance on the statement of PW 20 Shyam Prakash, supported by PW 6 Ramesh Chand and other corroborative evidence, including the post-mortem report, held the accused guilty of the commission of murder. He convicted and sentenced him as already mentioned above. 3. Learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the accused appellant, has vehemently urged that PW 6 Ramesh Chand ought not to have been relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge, because in fact he was not an eye-witness of the occurrence, nor was he examined as an eye-witness by the police. He was produced in the Court for the first time as an eye - witness. He is said to be a worker of the Union and he was out and out to oblige the deceased and his relatives. He further submits that PW 20 Shyam Prakash is a chance witness. He was produced in the Court for the first time as an eye - witness. He is said to be a worker of the Union and he was out and out to oblige the deceased and his relatives. He further submits that PW 20 Shyam Prakash is a chance witness. He is an employee of the workshop and he had no reason to come to the booking office or the cash room at the relevant time. Learned counsel further submits that these are glaring contradictions in the statements of both these witnesses and no reliance could be placed upon them. He also submits that there is no evidence of motive against the accused. He was an unknown person and it was the duty of the investigating officer to get him identification parade and without doing so the identity of the accused on the scane of the occurrence cannot be said to have been established beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, he urged that even if the prosecution story is held to be true, it is a case of one single blow, which was inflicted by the accused on provocation as he was pushed aside and the conviction of the accused under Section 302, I.P.C. could not be sustained. At the most he could be convicted under Section 304, Part II. I.P.C. 4. It is unfortunate that the State Government does not find it convenient to get itself represented by a Government counsel even in a murder case and no assistance has been provided to this Court during the course of the arguments, of this case. The learned Public Prosecutor did appear in this Court for a few minutes. He requested the Court to wait for some time as his appearance was needed in the Court of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Thereafter he did not turn up before this Court. 5. A perusal of the F.I.R. Ex. P/16 read with the statement of PW 20 Shyam Prakash, shows that Bhanwarlal, Conductor went to the cash room. The accused followed him and when the accused stretched his hand towards the currency notes, held by Bhanwarlal, the latter pushed him aside. At that stage the accused took out a knife and inflicted a blow on chest of Bhanwarlal. P/16 read with the statement of PW 20 Shyam Prakash, shows that Bhanwarlal, Conductor went to the cash room. The accused followed him and when the accused stretched his hand towards the currency notes, held by Bhanwarlal, the latter pushed him aside. At that stage the accused took out a knife and inflicted a blow on chest of Bhanwarlal. Thus, the motive, showing the cause of crime as disclosed in the F.I.R., is that the accused followed the deceased with the intention to grab the cash in possession of the Conductor Bhanwarlal. No doubt PW 20 Shyam Prakash has not stated this fact of making an attempt by the accused to snatch away the currency notes in his statement, recorded before the Court and as such it cannot be said with certainty that the motive behind the incident was money-grabbing. The proof of motive satisfies the judicial mind about the likelihood of the author, but its absence only demands deep search and cannot undo the effect of evidence, otherwise sufficient. The motive of a man is often subjective and is difficult to prove it. It is known only to the perpetrator of the crime. Hidayatullah, C.J., as he then was, observed in M.N. Naik v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 1956 that:- "We need not consider the question of motive in this case if we are satisfied that the evidence that Narayan Nathu Naik was the assailant of Ratan, is acceptable." Reference may also be made to State of Haryana v. Sher Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1021 . Keeping the above principle in view, we now proceed to evaluate other evidence on the record. 6. We have get the statement of PW 20 Shyam Prakash. He states that on the date of the occurrence he was working in the Roadways Work,shop and was on duty from 4.00 p.m. to 12.00 mid-night. At about 6.00 p.m. he came towards the Roadways bus-stand to purchase match box and biri. While going back he came towards the room of the A.D.M. and when he was crossing the stair-case, he saw the accused going behind Bhanwarlal Conductor. Bhanwarlal pushed him aside. The accused then took out his knife and inflicted an injury on the chest of Bhanwarlal. After inflicting the injury accused Vijay Singh took to his heels. Bhanwarlal, keeping his hand on the chest, rushed behind. Bhanwarlal pushed him aside. The accused then took out his knife and inflicted an injury on the chest of Bhanwarlal. After inflicting the injury accused Vijay Singh took to his heels. Bhanwarlal, keeping his hand on the chest, rushed behind. He, however, fell down on the staircase. Some other persons ran behind the accused. The accused was nabbed on the link road. Several persons surrounded him and he was brought at the bus-stand. The witness further states that he saw a blood stained knife in the hand of the accused and that he gave to the police verbal F.I.R. (Ex. P/15). Arrest memo (Ex. P/7). was prepared in his presence and blood stained knife was also recovered: vide (Ex. P/8). The witness identified the knife in the Court as Article 1. In the course of cross-examination he stated that the accused was wearing a Jersey, which was found stained with blood. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the witness was a chance witness, as he had no occasion to be on the scene of the occurrence. He could not have come out of the Roadways workshop without a duty pass. This argument has no force. The of the occurrence was lodged by this witness soon after the incident. This goes a long way in strengthening the veracity of the testimony of Shyam Prakash. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Rana Pratap v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 680 , it has been observed that evidence of chance witnesses cannot be viewed with suspicion. If a murder is committed in a street or thoroughfare, passers by will be natural witnesses. Hostile witness PW 1 Hanaraj, who was out and out to help the accused, also admitted that when he came out of the room after hearing the cry, he saw Ghanshyam and Poonam Chand near the scene of the occurrence. He is an employee of the Roadways and he cannot be termed to be a chance witness. The witness has been cross-examined at length. Nothing has appeared in his statement on the basis of which it can be said that this part of statement is false. 7. He is an employee of the Roadways and he cannot be termed to be a chance witness. The witness has been cross-examined at length. Nothing has appeared in his statement on the basis of which it can be said that this part of statement is false. 7. Learned council has appointed out some contradictions in the statements of PW 20 Shyam Prakash and PW 6 Ramesh Chand and on the basis of such contradictions he wants us to reject the evidence of the witness Syam Prakash. It will be worth-while to note that the learned counsel in the same breath has also urged that Ramesh Chand is not reliable witness. If his latter contention is accepted, then the statement of this witness cannot be utilised to throw away the statement of the other witness. If there are two contradictory statements, they must have been made by the same person. Statement made by one witness cannot be contradicted by that of another witness. Section 145, Evidence Act, 1872, cannot be attracted; vide Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC 839 . Moreover, the contradiction on the point as to where the other witness was standing appearing in the statement of Ramesh Chand need not be given undue importance. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recollect accurately the sequence of events which takes place in quick succession or in a short span of time. Sometimes a witness gets confused. A witness though wholly truthful is liable to be overawed by the Court's atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination. The discrepancies, which do not go to the root of the matter and shake the basic features of the case. cannot be given undue importance. In our considered opinion, the statement of this witness cannot be discarded on the ground tint he is a worker of the Union. To be a public worker is no disqualification. It will be expedient to note here that most of the employees of the Roadways, examined as eye - witnesses, have changed their versions in favour of the accused. Had this witness subject to pressure, he too could have obliged the accused. But that is not the case here. To be a public worker is no disqualification. It will be expedient to note here that most of the employees of the Roadways, examined as eye - witnesses, have changed their versions in favour of the accused. Had this witness subject to pressure, he too could have obliged the accused. But that is not the case here. Regarding minor discrepancies and contradictions, reference may be made with advantage, to Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753 , wherein it has been held that "over much importance cannot be given to minor discrepancies". There is a ring of truth in the statement of this witness and we find no reason to discard it. His statement gets corroboration from the fact that the accused was chased by other persons and he was caught red handed near the the scene of the occurrence with his blood stained knife. The accused in his statement, recorded under Section 313, Cr. PC, has admitted in answer to question No. 28 that he had been arrested near the scene of the occurrence. He also submitted in answer to question No. 32 that when he came near the workshop, he saw three or four persons, followed by a big crowd, rushing towards him. The crowed caught hold of him and then it administered beating to him. 8. PW 22 Asha Ram stated that he seized the knife and sealed the same on the spot and put it into the Malkhana. The seal was kept intact and the knife was given to PW 9 Devi Singh. PW 9 Devi Singh stated that he took the knife to the State Forensic Laboratory. The report the Serologist and Chemical Examiner is that the parcel was found packed in a sealed cover with the impression of the seal intact. It further shows that the knife Article 1 was stained with human blood. The recovery of the blood stained knife from the possession of accused soon after the occurrence lands substantial support to the prosecution story, disclosed by PW 20 Shyam Prakash. The blood stained Baniyam was also recovered from the possession of the accused. It was also kept in a sealed condition and according to the report of the Director, Forensic Laboratory, the same was found stained with human blood. The accused in his statement, recorded under Section 313, Cr. The blood stained Baniyam was also recovered from the possession of the accused. It was also kept in a sealed condition and according to the report of the Director, Forensic Laboratory, the same was found stained with human blood. The accused in his statement, recorded under Section 313, Cr. PC, has failed to explain how a knife containing stains of human blood was recovered from his possession. Instead of explaining the presence of blood on the knife, he denied the recovery of the knife from his possession. The statement 'of this witness also finds corroboration from the statement of PW 7 Dr. A.N. Mathur. The injury found on the person of the deceased was found to have been caused with a knife and on the same part of the body regarding which the witness stated to have seen the accused inflicting the injury on the person of the victim. PW 22 Police Officer Asha Ram stated that just after the occurrence the accused was produced before him with the blood stained knife, Shyam Prakash gave verbal FIR (Ex. P/15) to him and the same was reduced into writing by him. He sent Ganpat Singh to the Police Station to record the formal PIR Ex. P/16. He also stated that the blood stained knife and Baniyan were recovered from the possession of the accused. Thus, the statement of PW 20 Shyam Prakash gets further corroboration in material particulars from the statement of PW 22 Asha Ram. In our opinion he is a witness of truth. His statement, when considered in the light of other reliable circumstantial evidence, is by itself sufficient to hold that the accused Vijay Singh inflicted a knife blow on the chest of Bhanwar Lal on November 19, 1978 at 6.00 p.m. as a result whereof Bhanwarlal succumbed. The statement of this witness also finds corroboration from the deposition of PW 6 Ramesh Chand. As regard this witness it has been strenuously urged that he was not cited as an eye-witness and his name does not appear in the FIR No doubt, the hostile witnesses have also stated his presence on the scene of the occurrence at the time of causing the injury by the accused on the victim Bhanwarlal. As regard this witness it has been strenuously urged that he was not cited as an eye-witness and his name does not appear in the FIR No doubt, the hostile witnesses have also stated his presence on the scene of the occurrence at the time of causing the injury by the accused on the victim Bhanwarlal. For arguments' sake even if discard his statement, the statement of PW 20 Shyam Prakash, corroborated by other circumstantial evidence as discussed above, by itself is sufficient to bring home the guilt to the accused. The giving of an FIR within a short time of the occurrence does indicate that there is a ring of truth in the prosecution version. The FIR is a detailed document. There was no time gap in between the occurrence and the lodging of the FIR. This important event further supports the prosecution case. It is not the number of witnesses examined, nor the quantity of evidence adduced by the prosecution that counts. It is the quality that counts: vide Maqsoodan v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC 126 . Here in our considered opinion, the testimony of PW 20, Shyam Prakash, duly supported by other evidence in material particulars, as discussed above, is of sterling worth to bring home the guilt to the accused. 9. This brings us to the question of the nature of offence viz., whether the accused should be convicted under Section 304 Part II, IPC., as con,tended by the learned counsel for the accused appellant, or whether he has been rightly convicted under Section 302, IPC. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant has urged that the accused was pushed aside by the deceased, which must have caused grave and sudden provocation and in the heat of moment the accused gave only a single knife blow to the deceased without intending to cause his death or any injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 10. The cases of single blow have come up before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a number of cases. 10. The cases of single blow have come up before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a number of cases. In Visa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed:- "To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under s. 300 "thirdly", First, it must establish, quite objectively that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict the particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution, throughout), the offence is murder under S. 300 "thirdly". It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention to even cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rost of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional." 11. In the same case while reversing the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan, AIR 1916 Bombay 191 , their Lordships observed as under:- "With due respect to the learned Judge he has linked up the intent required with the seriousness of the injury, and that, as we have shown, is not what the section requires. The two matters are quite separate and distinct, though the evidence about them may sometimes overlap. The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he know of its seriousness or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there." 12. The above noted case was read with approval in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and another, AIR 1977 SC 45 . In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court discussed in detail distinction between Section 299 and Section 300, IPC. In that case none of the injuries was found to have been caused on any vital part of the body of the victim. All the injuries were on the hands and legs. Their Lordships, after discussing the entire evidence, observed:- "There is no reason why Dr. Sarojini's evidence with regard to the second element of Clause (3) of Section 300 be not accepted. Dr. Sarojini's evidence satisfactorily establishes the presence of the second element of this clause. All the injuries were on the hands and legs. Their Lordships, after discussing the entire evidence, observed:- "There is no reason why Dr. Sarojini's evidence with regard to the second element of Clause (3) of Section 300 be not accepted. Dr. Sarojini's evidence satisfactorily establishes the presence of the second element of this clause. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion, that the offence committed by the accused was 'murder', notwithstanding the fact that the intention of the accused to cause death has not been shown beyond doubt." In the above noted case their Lordships reversed the judgment of the High Court, whereby it convicted the accused under Section 304, Part II. IPC., instead of under Section 302 and 302/34, IPC and restored the judgment of the trial Court, convicting the accused under Section 302 and 302/34, IPC. 13. In Aditya Mohapatra and another v. State of Orissa, AIR 1980 SC 2110 the argument advanced before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was similar as has been advanced before us. The injury sustained by the deceased in that case was a panetrating wound in the chest to the depth of 1 and 3/4 inch. The left lung had been pierced. The fourth rib was cut, through and through, indicating that considerable force of violent nature had been used. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the injury inflicted by the accused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and as such the offence clearly fall within the ambit of the third limb of Section 300, IPC, in the facts and circumstances of the case. 14. As regards Shanker v. State of M.P., AIR 1979 SC 1532 relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant, suffice it to say that the decision in that case was based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. The accused and the deceased in that case were taking their meals together and just after finishing their meals the accused inflicted a dagger blow on the neck of the deceased. Their Lordships have not considered the effect of clause 'thirdly' of Section 300, IPC in that case, because that point might not have been raised or argued by the prosecution. In the case on hand the position is Kaloidoscopic. The accused followed Bhanwarlal Conductor and went upto the each room. Their Lordships have not considered the effect of clause 'thirdly' of Section 300, IPC in that case, because that point might not have been raised or argued by the prosecution. In the case on hand the position is Kaloidoscopic. The accused followed Bhanwarlal Conductor and went upto the each room. There was no ostansible reason for the accused to pursue Bhanwarlal, who was having money with him. In such circumstances, if the deceased pushed him aside, it was a self sought provocation and he cannot take advantage thereof, specially when there is evidence on record that the Conductor was having cash amount in his hand and had gone to the cash room for depositing the same. The possibility of the accused going upto the cash room to take away the money from the possession of the deceased, under the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be ruled out. Learned counsel raised a point that no identification parade was conducted in the course of investigation and, therefore, the accused should be given benefit of doubt. In this connection suffice it to say that in the absence of request from the accused. State is not bound to hold identification parade when he is arrested on the spot: vide State of U.P. v. Raju, AIR 1971 SC 708 . 15. Looking to the nature of the injury, caused to the victim, there is no manner of doubt that the accused intended to cause bodily injury to the deceased on a vital and vulnerable part of the body viz. the chest. The medical evidence, as mentioned above, is that the injury was a stab-wound, oblique, eliptical in shape on the right side of the chest in the second intercostal space measuring 2.5 c.m. x 1.25 c.m. x 5 c.m. deep piercing the skin, subcutaneous tissue, muscles of the second right intercostal space. The Doctor opined that the cause of death was shock and haemorrhage due to the stab-wound injury on the vital organ (right lung), which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Looking to the nature and depth of the injury it can safely be said that the injury was caused with full force. The accused indubitably intended to cause the bodily injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Looking to the nature and depth of the injury it can safely be said that the injury was caused with full force. The accused indubitably intended to cause the bodily injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. There is nothing on record to hold that the injury was accidental or unintentional or that the accused intended to inflict some other kind of injury than the one which had been actually inflicted. In this view of the matter, the case clearly attracts the provisions of Section 300 thirdly'. We are also unable to accede to the submission of the learned counsel for the accused that the act was done by the accused while being deprived of the power of self-control or under grave and sudden provocation on account of being pushed by the deceased. The accused has hardly any justification to follow the deceased upto the cash-room. One cannot seek shelter behind self-sought provocation. There was no reason for the accused to inflict a fatal blow with a formidable sharp weapon, like knife, and inflict an injury measuring 2.5 c.m. x 1.25 c.m. x 5 c.m. deep. The blow was thrust right into the chest near the heart. In this view of the matter, the accused-appellant has rightly been convicted under Section 302 IPC. 16. The net result of the above discussion is that we uphold the conviction and sentence awarded to the accused appellant by the Court below and dismiss the appeal.Appeal dismissed. *******