JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - This writ petition was dismissed as not pressed vide order dated 27th July, 1982 passed on an application moved on behalf of the Petitioners by the under noted order: Learned Counsel for the Petitioner Sri. R.S. Misra states that the writ petition may be dismissed as not pressed. The learned Counsel for the opposite parties has no objection to it. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. The interim order dated 12th October, 1981, is hereby vacated. A certified copy of this order may be issued to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner on payment of necessary charges today, if possible. Sd. K.N. Misra, J. 27-7-1982." 2. The said application was accompanied by an affidavit of Sri. Ram alias Shri Ram Singh, Petitioner No. 2, as pairokar of all the other Petitioners in the above mentioned writ petition. Sri. R.S. Misra, who had presented the said application and on whose statement the writ petition was dismissed as not pressed, was Counsel for the Petitioners, and a Vakalatnama duly signed by Petitioners Nos. 1 to 10 is on record. 3. Srimati Lilawati wife of Sheo Narain Singh, who claims to be daughter and legatee on the basis of a registered will dated 11th May, 1982 said to have been executed by Srimati Raghubanshi, Petitioner No. 10, moved an application dated 22nd September, 1982 for recalling the order dated 27th July, 1982 by which the writ petition was dismissed as not pressed. The applicant in her application has averred that Petitioner No. 3 Nageshar died on 28th June, 1982 leaving behind his widow Srimati Munia as his heir and successor and that Petitioner No. 10 Srimati Raghubanshi had also died on 30th June, 1982 and the applicant Smt. Lilawati is the daughter and legatee on the basis of aforesaid will of the deceased Petitioner No. 10, Srimati Raghubanshi. It has further been averred that the applicant's husband, on inspection of the record of the writ petition made on 21st September, 1982, came to know that the writ petition was surreptitiously got dismissed as not pressed and that since Petitioners No. 3 and 10 had already died, Sri. R.S. Misra, Advocate, had no lawful authority to get the above writ petition dismissed as not pressed. R.S. Misra, Advocate, had no lawful authority to get the above writ petition dismissed as not pressed. Since the aforesaid legal heirs and representatives of deceased Petitioners No. 3 and 10 were not brought on record and Sri. R.S. Misra, Advocate, was not their counsel and as such the writ petition could not be dismissed as not pressed on the statement of learned Counsel for the Petitioners. The applicant, thus, prayed that the said order dated 27th July, 1982, be recalled and the writ petition be restored and be heard on merits. An application for substitution has also been moved. 4. I have heard learned Counsel for the applicant, Sri. Sankatha Rai and also Sri. R.S. Misra as well as Sri. S.N. Singh, Advocate who represents the opposite parties. Arguments were heard at some length on the said application as well as on the merits of the writ petition. 5. Learned Counsel for the applicant Sri. Sankatha Rai vehemently argued that since Petitioner Nos. 3 and 10 had already died prior to moving of the said application for dismissal of the writ petition as not pressed, and as such the said application could not be treated to be an application filed on behalf of all the Petitioners nor the writ petition could be dismissed as not pressed on the statement of Sri. R.S. Misra, Advocate, who ceased to be counsel for Petitioner Nos. 3 and 10 on their death. Learned Counsel further argued that neither applicant Lilawati, who is a legal heir and representative of deceased Petitioner No. 10 nor Smt. Munia, widow of deceased Petitioner No. 3, would be bound by the said order dated 27th July, 1982, dismissing the writ petition and since they are materially prejudiced by the said order and as such her application for recalling the said order deserves to be allowed. In reply, learned Counsel for the opposite parties contended that Sri. R.S. Misra, Advocate, represented the Petitioners in the writ petition and so it could be dismissed on his statement as not pressed. The order dismissing the writ petition does not suffer from any error of law and jurisdiction and so it should not be recalled on the said ground urged by learned Counsel for the applicant. 6. R.S. Misra, Advocate, represented the Petitioners in the writ petition and so it could be dismissed on his statement as not pressed. The order dismissing the writ petition does not suffer from any error of law and jurisdiction and so it should not be recalled on the said ground urged by learned Counsel for the applicant. 6. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and giving my anxious consideration to the matter, I find substance in the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the applicant. Since Petitioner Nos. 3 and 10 had already died and their legal heirs and representatives were not brought on record nor Sri. R.S. Misra, Advocate, represented them in the writ petition and as such the writ petition could not be dismissed as not pressed on his statement. 7. It is well settled that a suit can be withdrawn as a matter of right where the Court's permission to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action is not needed. (See AIR 1968 Supreme Court 111). On the parity of reasoning, same would hold good even in cases where writ petition is sought to be withdrawn by the Petitioners and they seek its dismissal as not pressed without further praying for filing writ petition on the same cause of action or against the same impugned order. The Court would in such matter, have no discretion but to accede to the request and dismiss the writ petition as withdrawn or as not pressed, as prayed. This shall, however, not hold good where there are more than one writ Petitioners and all of them do not join in making such request. It is well settled that one of the Plaintiffs cannot withdraw a suit (See AIR 1956 Madras 15). In my opinion, the same would, on parity of reasoning, equally hold good where only one or more than one out of many writ Petitioners apply for withdrawal of the writ petition or seek its dismissal as not pressed. In such a case, where some of the Plaintiffs or the writ Petitioners have applied to withdraw the suit or the writ petition and seek its dismissal as not pressed, the proper course would be to transpose them in the array of opposite parties, leaving the remaining Plaintiffs or the writ Petitioners to continue and prosecute the suit or the writ petition. Unless all the Plaintiffs or the writ Petitioners join in the prayer for getting the suit or the writ petition dismissed as not pressed, the same could not be dismissed as it would be highly prejudicial to the interest of those Plaintiffs or Petitioners who have not joined with others in getting the suit or the writ Petitioners dismissed as not pressed. It goes without saying that in judicial proceedings no order can be passed against a party without hearing him or behind his back. Applicant Lilawati, who is heir and legal representative of deceased Petitioner No. 10 Smt. Raghubanshi, was not impleaded prior to moving of said application by Sri. R.S. Misra, Advocate nor the learned Counsel was instructed by her to make the said statement on her behalf. Similarly Petitioner No. 3, Nageshar had died on 28th June, 1982 and his widow Smt. Munia was not brought on record nor learned Counsel represented her. In these circumstances, Sri. R.S. Misra, Advocate, had no lawful authority to make statement on their behalf for the dismissal of the writ petition as not pressed. As Petitioner Nos. 3 and 10 had already died prior to moving said application and as such the statement made by learned Counsel for getting the writ petition dismissed as not pressed cannot be lawfully attributed to have been made on behalf of deceased Petitioners or their legal heirs and representatives. In this view of the matter I find it just and proper to recall the order dated 27th July, 1982. 8. The writ petition is accordingly restored and substitution allowed. 9. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties at some length on the merit of the writ petition as well. Sri. Sankatha Rai, learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation, by the impugned order dated 14-6-1979 acted illegally in setting aside the order dated 23-10-1974 which was lawfully passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer in the reconciliation proceedings on the basis of compromise filed between the parties. According to him, the Assistant Consolidation Officer had recorded the compromise in presence of two members of Consolidation Committee and the same bears signatures of all the parties to the compromise. According to him, the Assistant Consolidation Officer had recorded the compromise in presence of two members of Consolidation Committee and the same bears signatures of all the parties to the compromise. Learned Counsel further argued that the Deputy Director of Consolidation wrongly observed in his order that Parma Singh and Mahendra Singh are not present at the time of recording of compromise and it does not bear their signatures. Learned Counsel urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has based his finding on the interpolation subsequently made in the compromise at the revisional stage by adding word 'Vaste' under the signatures of Parma Singh and Bal Chand. Referring to the orders passed by the subordinate consolidation authorities learned Counsel for the Petitioners urged that this had not been the case of the opposite parties that in the compromise it was written as 'Parma Singh Vaste Mahendra Singh and Bal Chand Vaste Parma Singh'. The opposite parties made said interpolation in the record in order to make the compromise doubtful. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, there, should not have based his order on such interpolation made subsequently in the record. Learned Counsel, thus, urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation committed manifest error in setting-aside the order passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer by wrongly holding that the compromise entered into between the parties was suspicious and thereby remanding it to the Court of the Consolidation Officer for decision on merits. I am unable to agree with this contention. 10. A perusal of Annexures 4 and 5 indicates that Parma Singh is said to have signed for Mahendra Singh and Bal Chand is said to have signed for Parma Singh. This certainly creates a doubt upon the genuineness of the compromise and I do not find any infirmity in the finding recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation to that effect. The question whether interpolation was subsequently made in the compromise to make it suspicious was raised by the opposite parties in the review petition filed by them before the Deputy Director of Consolidation against his order dated 14-2-1979 and the Deputy Director of Consolidation rejected the said contention by detailed order dated 27-11-1979, a certified copy of which has been annexed to the writ petition. In view of this I find it difficult to accept that any interpolation was made in the compromise subsequently. 11. In view of this I find it difficult to accept that any interpolation was made in the compromise subsequently. 11. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners next contended that the Deputy Director of Consolidation, prior to recording the said finding that the compromise was not free from suspicion on the aforesaid ground should have obtained expert opinion regarding signatures of Parma Singh, Mahendra Singh and Bal Chand for ascertaining whether the compromise bore their signatures or not. Referring to Annexure-6 learned Counsel contended that the Appellants Bal Chand and Mahendra had asserted that the compromise does not bear their signatures and they had also applied for getting their signatures verified by an expert. Since their request was rejected by the appellate Court, it became more necessary for the Deputy Director of Consolidation to have got the signatures verified by obtaining expert opinion on the matter and without doing so, he illegally proceeded to record the aforesaid finding and thus, committed a manifest error in setting aside the order passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer by wrongly expressing suspicion regarding genuineness of the compromise. I am unable to agree with this contention as well. 12. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has, as already mentioned above, rejected the contention of the Petitioners that an interpolation was subsequently made in the compromise and so in view of this categorical finding I do not find any error has been committed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in recording the finding that the compromise was not free from suspicion when in the compromise it was mentioned as 'Prama Vaste Mahendra and Bal Chand Vaste Parma Singh'. The compromise could not be said to be free from suspicion and s0 if expert opinion was not obtained about the genuineness of the signatures of the aforesaid persons, the finding recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in the impugned order cannot be said to suffer from any manifest error of law or jurisdiction so as to call for interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Deputy Director of Consolidation remanded the case to the Consolidation Officer for decision on merits. The parties will now have an opportunity to get their claim determined on merits and so no case of causing irreparable injury to any party arises by the impugned order and substantial justice appears to have been done. 13. The Deputy Director of Consolidation remanded the case to the Consolidation Officer for decision on merits. The parties will now have an opportunity to get their claim determined on merits and so no case of causing irreparable injury to any party arises by the impugned order and substantial justice appears to have been done. 13. The writ petition thus, fails and is hereby dismissed. I however, direct the parties to bear their own costs.