M. RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, who is an Asst. Controller of Weights and Measures, has presented this writ petition, praying for the issue of a writ of prohibition to the respondents directing them not to proceed with the departmental inquiry which has been instituted against him. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in brief, are as follows : The Controller of Weights and measures who is the Head of the Department framed certain charges, vide Annexure C and communicated them to tht petitioner. After the petitioner filed his written statement vide Annexure-D, denying the charges, the Controller considered that the charges should be inquired into and, therefore, he decided to appoint an inquiring authority to inquire into the charges framed against the petitioner under sub-rule (2) read with sub-rule (5) of R. 11 of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 ('rules' for short ). He chose to appoint the Dy. Commr. of Inquiries, State Vigilance Commission, Banglore, as the inquiring authority by order dt. 22-12-1982, copy of which is produced as Annexure-E. It reads :"proceedings of the Controller of weights and Measures, Bangalore sub : Departmental Enquiry against sri M. B. Sajjan, Asst. Controller of Weights and Measures, hubli. Ofder No. WMD/est/cr-73/82. Read : (1) This office letter of even no. dt. 23-3-82 framing the charges against Sri M. B. Sajjan, asst. Controller of Weights and measures, Hubli. (2) Letter No. SVC/adm/82- 83/vol. I/206 dt. 30-6-82 from the Secretary, State Vigilance commission, Bangalore. Order in exercise of the powers conferred under provisions of KCS (CC and A) rules, 1957, I appoint the Dy. Commr. of Enquires (1), State Vigilance Commission, Bangalore, as Enquiry Authority to conduct a detailed enquiry as per the provisions of the KCS (CC and A) rules, 1957, into the charges levelled against Sri M. B. Sajjan, Asst. Controller of Weights and Measures, Hubli. The presenting officer attached to the dy. Commr. of enquiries (1), State Vigilance commission, Bangalore, is appointed as presenting officer in the above case. Sd/-Ranganath Kelvadi, controller of Weights and Measures. After the appointment of the inquiring authority, he issued notice dt. 19-1-1983 (Annexure-F) to the petitioner, to appear before him. It is at this stage the petitioner has presented the petition. Commr. of enquiries (1), State Vigilance commission, Bangalore, is appointed as presenting officer in the above case. Sd/-Ranganath Kelvadi, controller of Weights and Measures. After the appointment of the inquiring authority, he issued notice dt. 19-1-1983 (Annexure-F) to the petitioner, to appear before him. It is at this stage the petitioner has presented the petition. ( 3 ) SRI N. B. Bhat, learned counsel for the petitioner urged the following three contentions : (I) The Head of the Department who is empowered to impose only the penalties specified under Cls. (ii), (iii) and (iii-a) of R. 8 of the Rules, has no authority to institute the disciplinary proceedings. (ii) The Head of the Department had no authority to appoint an Officer of the vigilance Commission as the inquiry authority. (iii) The charge is vague and defective and, therefore violative of R. 11 (3) of the Rules and principles of natural justice. ( 4 ) ELABORATING the first contention, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted as follows : under R. 9 (2) (bb) the Head of the department is empowered to impose on a member of the State Civil Service, Class ii, any of the penalties specified in Cls. (ii), (iii) and (iii a) of R. 8 of the Rules. The punishments are censure, with-holding of increments and with holding of promotion, respectively. Under R. 10a (2) of the Rules, a disciplinary authority competent under the rules to impose any of the penalties specified in Cls. (i) to (iv-A) of R. g is empowered to institute disciplinary proceedings against any government servant for the imposition of any of the penalties specified in Cls. (v) to (viii) of R. 8 of the Rules, notwithstanding that such disciplinary authority is not competent under these rules to impose any of the latter penalties. The expression 'any of the penalties' used in R. 10a (2) means, every one of the penalties. As the head of the Department has no power to impose penalties specified under Cls. (iv) and (iv-a)of R. 8 of the Rules against a class II Officer, he has no power to institute disciplinary proceeding for the imposition of any major penalty under R. 11 of the Rules. The only power available to a head of the Department as disciplinary authority is, to initiate action under R. 12 of the Rules. Therefore the proceeding instituted is without authority of law. The only power available to a head of the Department as disciplinary authority is, to initiate action under R. 12 of the Rules. Therefore the proceeding instituted is without authority of law. ( 5 ) THE contention in my opinion is fallacious. Under R. 9 (2) (bb) of the rules, the Head of the Department is empowered to impose any one among the three penalties specified in Cls. (ii), (iii) and (iii a) of R. 8 of the Rules on a member of the State Civil Service, Class II depending on the nature of the charge proved. All the three are minor penalties. Under the rules, a penalty, whether minor or major, can be imposed against a member of the State Civil Service, only in a disciplinary proceedings. If the interpretation placed on R. 10a by the learned counsel for the petitioner were to be accepted, it would mean, that though the Head of the department is empowered to impose any one of the three penalties aforesaid on a class II Civil servant, he would have no power to institute disciplinary proceedings and as without instituting disciplinary proceedings no penalty, minor or major, could be imposed, the Head of the Department would possess a power which is in. capable of being exercised. When this fallacy in his argument was pointed out, the learned counsel for the petitioner replied that he would not and did not dispute that the Head of the Department had no power to impose a minor penalty, but he could do so under R. 12 of the Rules, without instituting disciplinary proceedings under R. 11 of the Rules. This submission is also equally fallacious. Relevant portion of R. 12 of the Rules reads :"12. Procedure for imposing minor penalties:- (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3) of R. 11 A, no order imposing on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in Cls. This submission is also equally fallacious. Relevant portion of R. 12 of the Rules reads :"12. Procedure for imposing minor penalties:- (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3) of R. 11 A, no order imposing on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in Cls. (i) to (iv-a) of R. 8 shall be made except after,- (a) informing the Government servant in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour on which it is proposed to be taken, and giving him a reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal ; (b) holding an inquiry in the manner laid down in sub rules (3) to (23) of r. 11, in every case in which the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that such inquiry is necessary ; (c) taking the representation, if any, submitted by the Government servant under Cl. (a) and the record of inquiry if any, held under Cl. (b) into consideration ; (d) recording a finding on each imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour ; and. . . . " ( 6 ) THE wording of the clauses of R. 12 extracted above indicate that two courses are open to a disciplinary authority having the power to impose a minor penalty against a civil servant :- (i) As provided in Cl. (a), to inform the Government servant in writing of the proposal to take action against him to give him an opportunity to make representation and to consider the representation, if any, made by him and to pass final order imposing a minor penalty, if the case warrants the imposition of such penalty. (ii) As provided in Cl. (b), to bold an inquiry in accordance with R. 11 (3) to (23) of the Rules. ( 7 ) THEREFORE, under the scheme of the rules, an authority, which has got power to impose a minor penalty against a civil servant can institute disciplinary proceedings either under R. 12 (1) (a) only or under R. 12 (b) read with R. 11 of the rules. Which course should be adopted depends upon the nature of the charge. If the nature of the charge is such as could be decided after giving the civil servant an opportunity to make represen. Which course should be adopted depends upon the nature of the charge. If the nature of the charge is such as could be decided after giving the civil servant an opportunity to make represen. tation, the disciplinary authority could follow the procedure prescribed under R. 12 (a) of the Rules. But if the nature of charge is such, as would call for an oral inquiry, production of documents or examination of witnesses, the authority could hold an inquiry in accordance with R. 12 (1) (b) read with R. 11 of the Rules, in that the article of charge in terms of sub-rules (3) and (4) of R. 11 of the Rules has to be prepared and given to the delinquent official and he should be called upon to submit his reply. After the receipt of the reply if inquiry is considered necessary, the authority could itself bold the inquiry or could appoint an inquiring authority as provided in R. 11 (5) of the Rules. The contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner proceeds on the misconception that the procedure prescribed under R. 11 should be followed only for imposing major penalty and not in cases where minor penalty is proposed. Even in cases where a minor penalty alone is considered as sufficient, inquiry under r. 11 may become inevitable. Whether an inquiry under R. 11 read with R. 12 (b) should be held or the procedure prescribed under R. 12 (a) would be appropriate, depends upon the nature of the charge. But in both cases, i. e. , whether the action is taken under R. 12 (a) or 12 (b) and R. 11, if the finding on the charge is against the civil servant, the disciplinary authority having the power to impose only a minor penalty, could impose only a minor penal, ty. But In a case in which the second alternative is followed, namely, the inquiry is held under R. 11 of the Rules and the authority considers that having regard to the gravity of the charge, imposition of a major penalty is called for, the procedure prescribed under Cl. (21) of R. 11 of the Rules has to be followed. It reads : 21 (a) Where a Disciplinary Authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in Cls. (21) of R. 11 of the Rules has to be followed. It reads : 21 (a) Where a Disciplinary Authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in Cls. (i) to (iv-a) of r. 8 but not competent to impose any of the penalties specified in Cls. (vi) to (viii) of R. 8. has itself inquired into or caused to be inquired into the articles of any charge and that authority having regard to its own findings or having regard to its decision on any of the findings of any Inquiring Authority appointed by it, is of the opinion that the penalties specified in Cls. (v) to (viii) of R. 8 should be imposed on the government servant, that authority shall forward the records of the inquiry to such Disciplinary Authority as is competent to impose the last mentioned penalties. (b) The Disciplinary Authority to which the records are so forwarded may act on the evidence on the record or may, if it is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses is necessary in the interest of justice, recall the witness and examine, cross-examine and re examine the witness and may impose on the Government servant such penalty as it may deem fit in accordance with these rules. The procedure prescribed by the above rule, in such a case is, the records of the inquiry has to be submitted to the authority competent to impose major penalties on the civil servant concerned for taking further action. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner, however, strenuously contended that the expression 'any of the penalties' used in r. 10a (2) means every one of the penalties and, therefore, unless the Head of the department was empowered to impose all the penalties, namely (i) to (iv-a) of R. 8, he had no power to institute the Disciplinary proceedings under R. 11. ( 9 ) IN support of his interpretation that 'any of the penalties' means 'every one of the penalties' the learned counsel relied on para 34 of the judgment of the Supreme court in Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam chand Thapa (1 ). It reads :"34. ( 9 ) IN support of his interpretation that 'any of the penalties' means 'every one of the penalties' the learned counsel relied on para 34 of the judgment of the Supreme court in Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam chand Thapa (1 ). It reads :"34. After giving the matter full and anxious consideration, we have come to the conclusion that the words 'any one of the directors' is ambiguous ; in some context, it means 'only one of the directors, does not matter which one', but in other context, it is capable of meaning 'every one of the directors'. Which of these two meanings was intended by the legislature in any particular statutory phrase has to be decided by the Courts on a consideration of the context in which the words appear, and in particular, the scheme and object of the legislature". ( 10 ) FROM the aforesaid paragraph itself it is clear that the words 'any one' in some context means only one and in some other context means every one. Therefore, which of the two meanings should be adopted depends upon the context in which the expression is used. That meaning which fits aptly to the scheme of the statutory provision should be given. Having due regard to the scheme of the rules the expression 'any of the penalties' used in R. 10a (2) of the Rules means any one of the penalties and not every one of the penalties. The intention of the rule is to confer on a disciplinary authority which is given the power to impose any one of the minor penalties viz. , those specified in cls. (i) to (iv-a) of R. 8, the power to institute disciplinary proceedings either under R. 12 (a) or under R. 12 (b) read with R. 11. The only difference between the two is if the first procedure is followed, it could end only in a minor penalty, but if the second procedure is followed, it could end either in a minor penalty or a major penalty, but in the latter case, as the disciplinary authority which instituted the disciplinary proceedings has the power only to impose a minor penalty, if it is of the opinion that the gravity of the charge calls for imposition of a major penalty, then the procedure specially prescribed to govern such cases under R. 11 (21) has to be followed. Hence, I find no substance in the first contention. (See also Division bench judgment in R. B. Tallur Math v. State of Mysore (2) ). ( 11 ) (I ). The second contention of the petitioner is that an officer of the Vigilance Commission could not have been appointed as the inquiring authority, in view of the Vigilance Commission Rules under which an officer of the Vigilance commission can hold an inquiry when the inquiry is entrusted to the Commission. (ii) R. 11 (2) of the Rules empowers a disciplinary authority to appoint an inquiring authority. It reads :"whenever the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for enquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviours against a Government servant, it may itself inquire into, or appoint under this rule an authority to inquire into the truth thereof". The wording of the rule indicates that the disciplinary authority can appoint any person as inquiring authority. The rule does not provide that an officer of the department to which the delinquent civil servant belongs should alone be appointed or that an officer of the Vigilance Commission cannot be appointed, as the inquiring authority. In the present case, the head of the Department, who is the disciplinary authority, has chosen to appoint an officer of the Vigilance Commission as the inquiring authority. (iii) Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that as the Vigilance Commission is constituted under special rules framed by the Governor under proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution, it is not open for the disciplinary authority to appoint as inquiring authority an officer, who is func tioning under such special rules. Sri S. V. Narasimhan, learned High Court Government pleader, on the other hand submitted that in view of R 11 (2) a disciplinary authority could appoint an officer of his own department or of any other department as inquiring authority. He also stated that in fact the Government had issued instructions to the effect that if in a gives case, a disciplinary authority intended to entrust the inquiry to an officer of the Vigilance Commission, the inquiry could be so entrusted, after taking the consent of the officer of the Vigilance commission. He also stated that in fact the Government had issued instructions to the effect that if in a gives case, a disciplinary authority intended to entrust the inquiry to an officer of the Vigilance Commission, the inquiry could be so entrusted, after taking the consent of the officer of the Vigilance commission. ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contends that the circular contravened the vigilance Commission Rules and therefore an officer of the Vigilance could not have been appointed as the inquiring authority acting on the basis of the circular. ( 13 ) AS pointed out earlier, under R. 11 (2 ). a disciplinary authority can appoint any person whom it considers to be a fit person to hold the inquiry as inquiring authority. Therefore, it is open to a disciplinary authority to appoint an officer of its own department or an officer of any other department of the State Government if he agrees to be the inquiring authority. The Vigilance Commission is also a department of the State Government like any other department of the State Government. The fact that separate set of rules are framed for the department makes no difference. In fact for every department of Government there are special rules made under Art. 309 of the Constitution rules in addition to the general rules. ( 14 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner did not point out to any rule of the Vigilance commission Rules, which prohibits the appointment of an officer of the Vigilance commission as inquiring authority. The circular issued by the Government does not create any situation inconsistent with the statutory rules. Even without that circular, it was open to the disciplinary authority to appoint an officer of the vigilance Commission as an inquiring authority provided that the officer was willing to undertake the inquiry. Therefore there is no substance in the second contention also. ( 15 ) AS far as the third contention is concerned, it does not constitute the basis for the issue of a writ of prohibition at all. Writ of prohibition will issue only when there is lack of jurisdiction in the authority, who initiated the quasi-judicial inquiry and not otherwise. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that he had also prayed for quashing the charge memo by the issue of writ of certiorari. Writ of prohibition will issue only when there is lack of jurisdiction in the authority, who initiated the quasi-judicial inquiry and not otherwise. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that he had also prayed for quashing the charge memo by the issue of writ of certiorari. The charge memo issued is no order at all and therefore no writ of certiorari can be issued. Even that prayer is really in the nature of writ ot prohibition prohibiting the authority from inquiring into the charge, which cannot be granted as the inquiry has been instituted by the competent authority. It is, however open to the petitioner to raise this objection before the authorities. ( 16 ) IN the result, the petition is rejected. Sri S. V. Narasimhan, High Court government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance in two weeks. --- *** --- .