JUDGMENT M.D. Bhatt, J. 1. This is the defendants appeal against the trial Court's judgment and decree for specific performance, whereby, the defendants No. 1 and 2 had been directed to execute the registered sole-deed in the plaintiff's favour, on receipt of sale-consideration of Rs. 12,000/- . 2. The defendants Jainendra Kumar, Rajendra Kumar, Vijay Kumar, Ashok Kumar and Rishabh Kumar (defendants No. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 respectively) are the sons of the defendant No. 3 Tekchand. It is no longer in dispute that the defendants No. 1 and 2, vide agreement Ex. P-1 dated 6-12-73, had contracted to sell 7.55 acres of land out of Kh. No. 562 (old Kh. No. 664 village-Mokalpur) for sale-consideration of Rs. 19,000/- after having already received the earnest money of Rs. 7,000/- at the time of execution of the agreement. 3. It is also not in dispute that the defendant No. 3 Tekchand and his uncle Bhaiyalal had jointly executed the registered sale-deed Ex. P-3 dated 25-5-56 in favour of Tekchand's two minor sons Jainendra and Rajendra (defendants No. 1 and 2) through their maternal uncle Rajaram with respect to old Kh. No. 664 (present Kh. No. 562) area 8.55 acres and old Kh. No. 558 area 0.30 acres, total area being, thus, 8.85 acres. 4. The plaintiff in his suit, filed initially only against the defendants No. 1 and 2 Jainendra Kumar and Rajendra Kumar had claimed specific performance of the contract, alleging that the defendants No. 1 and 2 had failed to execute the registered sale-deed in his favour as per the terms of the written agreement Ex. P-1, despite his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. During the course of the trial, these defendants' other brothers and father (defendants No. 3, 4, 5 and 6) were also impleaded as the defendants in this suit, on their application for being so joined. Their defence was, however, common. It was contended that the suit-land in question being the ancestral and joint family property of all the defendants, the defendants No. 1 and 2 had no right to alienate the undivided shares of other co-parceners as well. It was, next, urged that the registered sale-deed dated 25-5-56 executed by the defendant Tekchand and his uncle Bhaiyalal, in favour of the defendants No. 1 and 2 was a sham transaction. It was, next, urged that the registered sale-deed dated 25-5-56 executed by the defendant Tekchand and his uncle Bhaiyalal, in favour of the defendants No. 1 and 2 was a sham transaction. As for the agreement in question, on which the plaintiff had based his claim, it was vehemently pressed that the document was not an agreement of sale but had been executed only by way of security for the prepayment of loan of Rs. 7,000/- , received by the defendants No. 1 and 2 under document. In this context it was pleaded that the market value of the suit-land being not less than Rs. 30,000/- , it could not have been sold for a meagre consideration of Rs. 19,000/- only. As the last resort, it was urged that Ratan Chand and Rajaram, who were not parties to the present suit having already been granted bhumiswami rights in the suit-land under section 190 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, the claim of the plaintiff was untenable and more so, was incompetent in the absence of these two persons being necessary parties to the suit. 5. The trial Court, in the light of the evidence and the attending circumstances, has held that the sale-deed Ex. P-3 dated 25-5-1956 was neither Sham nor of benami nature; and as such, the defendants No. 1 and 2 were the absolute owners of the suit-land by virtue of this sale-deed in their favour. As regards the nature of transaction Ex. P-1 dated 6-12-1973, it is held that it was an agreement of sale and not a document by way of security for any loan. Market price of the suit-land at the relevant time as being Rs. 30,000/- was held not proved; and further more, it is held that inadequacy of price was not a valid ground to deny the claim for specific performance. As regards, Rajaram and Ratan Chand, who were not joined in the suit, it was held that they were neither necessary nor proper parties for the suit. It was, however, further observed in this regard that conferral of bhumiswami rights on these persons was a naive contrivance on the part of the defendants to play all sorts of unethical tricks, to defeat the plaintiff's claim and equally, to defeat the object and purpose of the Provisions of M. P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act. It was, however, further observed in this regard that conferral of bhumiswami rights on these persons was a naive contrivance on the part of the defendants to play all sorts of unethical tricks, to defeat the plaintiff's claim and equally, to defeat the object and purpose of the Provisions of M. P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act. The plaintiff's claim, therefore, for specific performance of the contract for getting the sale-deed executed and registered by the defendants No. 1 and 2, was decreed. Hence, now, the present appeal. 6. The Learned Counsel for the appellants-defendants has urged, in the first place, that the trial Court was wrong in holding the sale dated 25-5-1956 as the genuine sale, conferring full exclusive ownership on the transferees viz. the defendants No. 1 and 2 Jainendra Kumar and Rajendra Kumar. It is urged in this connection that at the time of this sale by Bhaiyalal and Tekchand, other co-parceners viz. the present defendants No. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 had also their respective share and interest in the suit-land; and therefore, these alienating co-parceners were not competent to sell the undivided shares of Jainendra Kumar and Rajendra Kumar, to them only and were equally not competent to alienate the undivided shares of the defendants No. 4, 5 and 6, who though not born at the relevant time, had come to have interest therein by virtue of their birth later. Such sale is also assailed on the ground of want of legal necessity and benefit of estate. In the matter of agreement of sale Ex. P-1 dated 6-12-1973 also, it is vehemently argued that the defendants No. 1 and 2 viz. Jainendra Kumar and Rajendra Kumar, who had entered into the contract of sale, were not competent to enter into sale regarding the shares of other coparceners viz. the defendants No. 4, 5 and 6 (Vijay Kumar, Ashok Kumar and Rishabh Kumar). At worst, they could transfer only their own undivided shares and nothing beyond. 7. The Learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff has refuted the arguments advanced on the other side. It is urged that there is no proof regarding the suit-land, as being the ancestral property. In this connection, it is canvassed that Tekchand having not entered the witness-box, adverse inference against the defendants deserves to be drawn. 7. The Learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff has refuted the arguments advanced on the other side. It is urged that there is no proof regarding the suit-land, as being the ancestral property. In this connection, it is canvassed that Tekchand having not entered the witness-box, adverse inference against the defendants deserves to be drawn. It is also argued that Tekchand being the party to the earlier sale, he is estopped from challenging that sale in favour of his two sons. This sale being in his two sons' favour only viz. Jainendra Kumar and Rajendra Kumar, they are stated to be absolute owners; and as such, there is no question of any other co-parceners' right and interest in the suit-land. As regards the interest of the after-born sons viz. Vijay Kumar, Ashok Kumar and Rishabh Kumar, it is argued that the after born sons under the Hindu Law, do not acquire any interest in the co-parceners property or joint-family property, alienated or proposed to be alienated. Both sides have cited some case-law in support of their respective contentions. 8. I have considered the arguments, on both sides. The foremost question for consideration is the nature of right in which Bhaiyalal and his nephew Tekchand had held the suit-land, which they had admittedly sold to the defendants No. 1 and 2 (Jainendra Kumar and Rajendra Kumar) under the registered sale-deed dated 25-5-1956 Ex. P-3. The joint and undivided family is the normal condition of the Hindu Society. There is absolutely no material to substantiate the defendants' contention that the suit-land, held jointly by Bhaiyalal and his nephew Tekchand was ancestral property of their any ancestor, so as to make them co-perceners with respect to this property. The defendant No. 1 Jainendra Kumar, who is the son of Tekchand, has alone enterered the witness-box to make a sweeping statement that the suit-land was the ancestral property. He was obviously a very small child and a minor, at the time when this sale-deed Ex. P-3 had been executed in favour of his own self jointly with his younger brother Rajendra Kumar. Naturally, this witness does not have and could have any knowledge as to how this land had come to be jointly held by his father Tekchand and his paternal grand-uncle Bhaiyalal. 9. P-3 had been executed in favour of his own self jointly with his younger brother Rajendra Kumar. Naturally, this witness does not have and could have any knowledge as to how this land had come to be jointly held by his father Tekchand and his paternal grand-uncle Bhaiyalal. 9. The defendant No. 3 Tekchand, who would have been the best person to prove the source of acquisition of the suit-land, has stayed away from the witness-box; and as such, the trial Court as well as this Court have been deprived of the only real evidence, which could throw light on the source of acquisition of the suit land. On the defendants' failure to produce this material evidence, adverse inference has to be drawn against them, negativing their contention regarding the suit-land as being the ancestral property in the hands of Bhaiyalal and Tekchand. There being no proof of any ancestral nucleus in the hands of Bhaiyalal and Tekchand for acquisition of the suit-land in question, the defendants are found to have miserably failed to prove the suit-land as being the ancestral property in the hands of Bhaiyalal and his nephew Tekchand, (see Bal Kuntha v. Shashi Bhushan) AIR 1972 SC 2531 . Thus, the suit-property having not proved to be ancestral, there is no question of formation of 'co-parcenary' of the joint Hindu family of Bhaiyalal and Tekchand, as would be evident from State Bank of India v. Ghamand Ram AIR 1969 SC 1330 wherein the incidents of co parcenary are succinctly summarised. 10 Now, presumption being indubitable there, regarding the joint family status of Bhaiyalal and his nephew Tekchand, there could, however, be no further presumption that the property, jointly held by them, just because their family was joint, would also be joint family property (see Kamalakant Gopalji v. Madhavji Vaghji) 158 IC (1935) 145 (Bom.), Srinivas Krishnarao Kongo v. Narayan Devji Kongo and others AIR 1954 SC 379 & K.V. Narayanaswami Iyer v. K.V. Ramkrishna Iyer and others AIR 1965 SC 289 , The law is well settled that the property, jointly acquired by the members of the joint family with the aid of the ancestral property, is joint family property, but, if the property is acquired by the members of the joint family without the aid of the ancestral property, it may or may not be joint family property. Whether it is so or not, would be a question of fact in each case, (see Shyamlal v. Yesaram). AIR 1954 SC 334. 11. There being no ancestral nucleus nor there being any joint family nucleus for the acquisition of the suit-land by the joint family of Tekchand and his uncle Bhaiyalal, there is no escape from the presumption that the suit-land was joint property of the joint acquirers viz. Tekchand and his uncle Bhaiyalal. There is no material on record on the defendant's side to rebut this presumption which hence, stays to show the nature of the ownership of the suit land by Tekchand and his uncle Bhaiyalal. 12. The suit-land, as held above, being thus the joint property of joint acquirers viz. Tekchand and Bhaiyalal and being not ancestral property or coparcenary property or even joint family property both Bhaiyalal and Tekchand were competent to dispose of the suit-land in the manner as they liked, in as much as, sons of Tekchand, existing at that time, had no interest, whatsoever, of any sort, in the jointly acquired property viz. the suit land. Therefore, the sale-deed Ex. P-3 dated 25-5-56, executed by the joint original acquirers viz. Tekchand and Bhaiyalal, with respect to the suit-land, held in absolute ownership, had passed valid title in favour of the alienees viz. Jainendra Kumar and Rajendra Kumar (defendants No. 1 and 2), as has been held by the trial Court. Bhaiyalal is dead, but Tekchand is alive and is actually one of the defendants in the present case. After about two decades, he and the alienees viz. the defendants No. 1 and 2 are trying to challenge the nature of the document Ex. P-3 dated 25-5-56 by contending that it was nominal transaction, without any consideration. Tekchand, being one of the parties to the transaction and having also not entered the witness box, is estopped now to assail the said sale and also the nature of the property sold by him jointly with his uncle Bhaiyalal (see K.C. Kupoor v. Smt. Radhika Devi AIR 1981 SC 2128 . It may be stated that in the sale-deed Ex. P-3, there is no mention of suit-land being either ancestral property or joint family property; and that it has simply been mentioned therein that alieners Bhaiyalal and Tekchand are the full owners of the suit-land with no encumbrances thereon. It may be stated that in the sale-deed Ex. P-3, there is no mention of suit-land being either ancestral property or joint family property; and that it has simply been mentioned therein that alieners Bhaiyalal and Tekchand are the full owners of the suit-land with no encumbrances thereon. The alienees in the said sale-deed were Bhaiyalal's own two sons viz. defendant No. 1 and 2 who alone were in existence at that time. In the said sale-deed these alienees are shown to be minors through their maternal uncle Rajaram as their guardian. The sale-deed was obviously for the benefit of these minors. If this sale-deed was sham, bogus or nominal, these minor alienees viz. defendants No. 1 and 2 could well have taken steps to get the sale-deed cancelled but no such thing was done. On the contrary, these defendants No. 1 and 2 are found to have, later, sold a small portion of the very same Khasra of which the suit-land formed part in their own right, to some third persons who too were their close relatives, probably the sons of their own maternal uncles. Thus, circumstances on record and the conduct of Tekchand (defendant No. 3) and his two sons viz. defendants No. 1 and 2 leave no room for doubt that the joint acquirers viz. Bhaiyalal and Tekchand had sold the particular Khasra, of which the suit-land formed part, in their exclusive and absolute right in favour of the defendants No. 1 and 2, passing valid title to the latter. 13. Now, it is to be seen as to what was the nature of the property, coming in the hands of the defendants No. 1 and 2, consequent to their purchase vide sale-deed Ex. P-3 dated 25-5-56. It was not the coparcenary property nor joint family property which had come in their hands. Had it been so, the other brothers who had been born later, would have acquired their coparcenary interest in the said property; but, since the alienees viz. the defendants No. 1 and 2 had purchased the property in question, which was of the nature of joint property of the joint acquirers viz. Had it been so, the other brothers who had been born later, would have acquired their coparcenary interest in the said property; but, since the alienees viz. the defendants No. 1 and 2 had purchased the property in question, which was of the nature of joint property of the joint acquirers viz. Bhaiyalal and Tekchand, the said purchased property in the hands of defendants No. 1 and 2 had come to be their absolute property, as held by the trial Court (see C. N. Arunachala Mudaliar v. CIA Muruganatha Mudaliar and another AIR 1953 SC 495 , As such, other after born sons of Tekchand (i. e. defendants No. 4, 5 and 6) could not acquire any interest by birth in such property which had been acquired by defendants No. 1 and 2, since the same was neither the ancestral/coparcenary property nor even the joint family property, and was, on the other hand, their absolute property under the sale-deed Ex. P-3 dated 25-5-56 (see Katragadds China Anjanuyule and another v. Kattragadda China Ramayya and others AIR 1965 AP 177 . 14. As regards the nature of the document Ex. P-1 dated 6-12-73, the evidence on the defendants' side is obviously connected and there in no basis to support the contention that this document had been executed by way of security for any loan. Evidence on the plaintiff's side in this regard, is obvisously more trustworthy. The plaintiff himself as PW 5, the scribe PW 1 Kunjilal and the attesting witness PW 3 Sanad Kumar have duty proved that the Ex. P-1 was a contract of sale executed by the defendants No. 1 and 2. It is pertinent to observe that their father Tekchand has also signed this document, clearly stating therein that in his presence Rs 000/- were paid to the defendants No. 1 and 2 in the matter of this particular agreement. The trial Court's finding, therefore, is wholly correct that Ex. P-1 was the agreement of sale Incidentally it may be stated that in this document also, the defendants No. 1 and 2 have described the suit-land as being their own exclusively. 15. Coming to the last question whether Rajaram and Ratanchand were necessary parties to the suit, the trial Court is found to have rightly held that they were not. P-1 was the agreement of sale Incidentally it may be stated that in this document also, the defendants No. 1 and 2 have described the suit-land as being their own exclusively. 15. Coming to the last question whether Rajaram and Ratanchand were necessary parties to the suit, the trial Court is found to have rightly held that they were not. The observations of the trial Court in Para 12 of its Judgment, in the matter of revenue proceedings, in the resulting in the recording of Rajaram and Ratanchand as Bhumiswami in the revenue records in accordance with section 190 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, do not appear to be extraneous and irrelevant Copy of the revenue proceedings is on record as Ex. D-1 which shows that Rajaram and Ratanchand, had initiated the proceedings against Tekchand and his sons in the matter of the particular Khasra, of which the suit-land, formed part. Rajaram and Ratanchand are none else but Tekchand's own brother-in laws and maternal uncles of the defendant's No. 1 and 2 and 4 to 6. These proceedings before the Naib Tahsildar and the consequent appeal before the SDO that might have been preferred against N. T(sic)s order do not appear to be bona fide, and apparently are collusive which may well be appreciated in the light of the "statement of objects and reasons" in the matter of the particular Legislation viz., M. P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, as has been reproduced by the trial Court in its Judgment. To appreciate this collusion, there are found to be further circumstances on record. It was this Rajaram who had acted as the guardian of the defendants No. 1 and 2 in the matter of this sale-deed Ex. P-3 dated 25-5-56, Then again, Rajaram and Rajaram's another close relative who probably is also the maternal uncle, had later got executed the registered sale-deed Ex. P-4 dated 4-5-72 in favour of their own respective minor sons by Tekchand, acting as guardian of his two minor sons viz. the defendants No. 1 and 2. In such circumstances, the recording of Rajaram and Ratanchand in the revenue records as Bhumiswamis. does not affect the plaintiff's claim for specific performance of contract, which the trial Court has rightly decreed, holding these persons as not the necessary parties to the present suit. 16. the defendants No. 1 and 2. In such circumstances, the recording of Rajaram and Ratanchand in the revenue records as Bhumiswamis. does not affect the plaintiff's claim for specific performance of contract, which the trial Court has rightly decreed, holding these persons as not the necessary parties to the present suit. 16. In the result, thus, the defendant's appeal being without any merit, is dismissed; and the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court are affirmed. It may, however, be stated that the plaintiff has already got executed the registered sale-deed in execution of the Decree through the process of the Court and has equally obtained possession of the suit-land. Appellants-defendants to bear the respondent's costs of this Court and also of the Court below, besides bearing their own. Counsel' fee as per schedule, if certified. Appeal dismissed